



E 243









---

Photo by J. Brenner, N. Y.

**JAMES THOMSON SHOTWELL**

# THE NEW HISTORY AND THE SOCIAL STUDIES

BY

HARRY ELMER BARNES, PH.D.

William Bayard Cutting Fellow in the History of Thought and Culture,  
Columbia University (1916-17); Professor of Historical Sociology, Smith  
College; Professor of Social and Economic Institutions, Amherst College

NEW YORK  
THE CENTURY CO.

1925

**Copyright, 1925, by  
THE CENTURY CO**

**Printed in U S. A.**

TO  
THE "COLUMBIA SCHOOL" OF HISTORIANS  
OF A DECADE AGO  
WHO DID SO MUCH TO CREATE THE NEW  
HISTORY, AND TO INDICATE ITS FUNDAMENTAL  
DEPENDENCE UPON THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

situations in which man has been placed in the past. Likewise, the social scientists, other than the historians, cannot intelligently or profoundly cultivate their several subjects without that interest in the problems of genesis and development which is contributed by the historical outlook and methodology. Therefore, no competent historian of the new school, and no enlightened social scientist denies the essential nature of this collaboration between history and the social studies. It is not without significance that the official organ of the pedagogical division of the social studies is the *Historical Outlook*.

The author has been convinced that, along with other books now being published on the history and problems of history and the social sciences, there should be executed at least a preliminary attempt to set forth the interrelations of history and the social studies, and the mutual contributions which each has made or may make to the other. He would make no claim to any unique wisdom or competence in the premises, nor does he assume in any sense to be either an official or unofficial spokesman of any group now working in this field. His inspiration and sources of information have been drawn from a wide field of contacts, but for the particular formulation of the concepts in this book he must be held personally responsible. It has been the author's good fortune to study under the direction of those men who have been most interested and influential in the development of the more progressive phases of both history and the social sciences, and it has been both his ill and good fortune to have been forced by the exigencies of his academic career into collegiate instruction not only in most fields and periods of history, but in all of the social sciences as well. And the field of history which has most intrigued his attention has been that of the history of the social sciences, with the environmental situations which have always conditioned their content and development. Invitations to prepare papers for meetings of learned

societies and articles for professional periodicals have led to the gathering of materials covering most aspects of the development of the newer history and its points of contact with social science. His own convictions and the encouragement of indulgent and sympathetic friends have led the writer to revise these papers and articles in a thorough-going fashion and bring them together in book form in the present volume. Some repetition is inevitable, because the social sciences do not flourish in isolated compartments. Their data and problems are much the same, their methods show much resemblance, and many men have made notable contributions to more than one of the social sciences. Moreover, the newer school of historians have relied heavily upon all or most of the social sciences and have labored to make clear the nature of the interrelation between history and these sciences. Hence, it has been necessary to repeat in several chapters much the same list of historians when indicating the names of those who have done the most to forward the salutary process of bringing to bear upon problems of history the resources of each of the social sciences. Such repetition is, however, more likely to emerge as desirable emphasis than as monotonous irrelevance.

The specific purpose of the volume is first to sketch the general nature of the newer or dynamic and synthetic history, and then to indicate in logical succession the contributions of the various social sciences to the methods and subject-matter of history, as well as to make clear the ways in which the genetic approach to their data is of value to all the social sciences. Finally, there comes a concluding chapter designed to present in summary fashion the bearing of the new history and the social studies upon the problems of social reform and reconstruction. The author has been particularly impelled by the desire to give concrete and practical aid to the many earnest and ambitious teachers of the social studies who have been endeavoring to orient and inform themselves in this new and important

field of work with all too little training and bibliographic guidance.

The author well recognizes that to many historians this volume will have no more value or relevance than a theoretical treatise on contemporary astrophysics or astrochemistry would have for an esoteric modern astrologer, but he is not writing in any sense for this class. His interests are concentrated solely upon the hope of offering ever so slight aid to the growing group of historians and social scientists who are attempting to obtain a synthetic and comprehensive grasp upon the various aspects of human development in the past, with the aim of being able to use this knowledge in the cause of the betterment of man's mundane existence in the future. The author has no personal quarrel with the conventional historians. He has fully and frankly recognized their indispensable contributions to the development of history in its present status and conditions, in the same manner as he would freely grant the contributions of the alchemists to the establishment of the science of chemistry. He merely contends that history is a growing and developing subject, and that to continue to restrict it to the ascertainment and literary exposition of episodes and anecdotes drawn from the lives of figures in the politics of the past would be even more disastrous than it would have been if chemistry had never supplanted alchemy.

The range of materials covered in this book is so great that in spite of his unusual advantages in the way of teachers, and his wide experiences in giving instruction in history and the social sciences, the author would have hesitated to launch these preliminary studies in book form but for the aid and encouragement of many experts in all of the fields dealt with. General advice and encouragement relating to the enterprise as a whole have been offered by a number of scholars, first among whom would be placed Max Farrand, James T. Shotwell and Charles A. Ellwood.

The views expressed in the first chapter were drawn primarily from the writer's experiences and instruction while a graduate student at Columbia University. The chapter on geography has been read and criticized by Dr. W. L. G. Joerg of the American Geographical Society staff, and Dr. Donald E. Smith of the George Washington High School. The chapter on psychology has profited by the critical suggestions of G. Stanley Hall, Dr. L. Pierce Clark and Professor Kimball Young. The chapter on anthropology has been revised following the suggestions of Professors Alexander Goldenweiser and E. A. Hooton. The chapter on sociology was read critically by Professor Russell G. Smith, and the author was also able to profit by the discussion when this chapter was read at the St. Louis meeting of the American Historical Association in 1921. The chapter on the history of science and technology has been examined by Dr. George Sarton. The chapter on economics was submitted for critical reading to Professors Leon C. Marshall, N. S. B. Gras, Paul H. Douglas and Leland H. Jenks. The suggestions of Professors Walter J. Shepard and Raymond G. Gettell were embodied in the revision of the chapter on political science. The chapter on ethics was read by Professor R. C. Givler. The chapter on history and social intelligence was critically appraised by Dr. John Herman Randall, Jr. No one of these authorities is to be held responsible in any sense for any errors remaining in this volume, but they should receive credit for the elimination of many mistakes and for the inclusion of many important facts and theories which would otherwise have been omitted.

The author also desires to express his appreciation of the courtesy of the many editors who have been willing to publish the articles out of which this book has been constructed in full knowledge that they would be later reproduced elsewhere. This list would include the editors of the *Historical Outlook*, the *Journal of Geography*, the *American*



*Journal of Sociology*, the *American Journal of Psychology*, the *Philosophical Review*, the *Psycho-analytic Review*, *Humanity and Its Problems*, the *Journal of Social Forces*, the *Scientific Monthly*, the *Monist*, the *American Review*, and the *Sociological Review*.

Finally, the gratitude of the writer is particularly due to his wife, Grace S. Barnes, and to his friends and former students, who have cheerfully aided him in the dreary and thankless task of proof-reading.

HARRY ELMER BARNES.

Northampton, Mass.,  
April 4, 1925.

# ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I THE PAST AND THE FUTURE OF HISTORY . . . . .	3
I. The Current Historiography Its Nature, Contributions and Deficiencies . . . . .	3
1. The Static, Unprogressive Nature of Conventional Historiography . . . . .	3
2. The Conventional Conception of the Nature, Scope and Purpose of History . . . . .	4
3. The Political Fetish in Historical Writing . . . . .	5
4. The Episodical Element in Historical Writing . . . . .	5
5. The Contributions and Defects of the Conventional Historiography . . . . .	6
6. A Critical Examination of the Current Political Historiography . . . . .	8
II. The New Synthetic History Its Nature, Aims, Contributions and Prospects . . . . .	12
1. The Decline of Political and Episodical Historiography . . . . .	12
2. The Fundamental Explanation of the Changes in the Conception of History . . . . .	14
3. The Nature of the New Synthetic History . . . . .	15
a. The Purpose of History . . . . .	15
b. The Scope of History . . . . .	17
c. The Interpretation of History . . . . .	26
4. The Future of History . . . . .	36
II. THE RELATION OF GEOGRAPHY TO THE WRITING AND INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY . . . . .	40
I Brief Sketch of the Rise of Theories Regarding the Influence of Geography upon the Historical Development of Peoples . . . . .	40
II Some Notable Developments in Anthropogeography . . . . .	50
III Some Leading Contributions of Geographers to the Physiography and Human Geography of the Chief Cultural Areas and States in Human History . . . . .	55
IV. Geography and History . . . . .	60
1 Some of the More Important Work Done by Historians in the Way of Indicating the Significance of Geographic Factors in History . . . . .	60
2 The Disparity Between the Existing Body of Knowledge on Historical Geography and the	

CHAPTER		PAGE
	Degree of Its Utilization in the Conventional Writing and Teaching of History . . . . .	68
	3. The Newer Synthetic History and Regional Geography . . . . .	71
III.	SOME PHASES OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PSYCHOLOGY IN THE EQUIPMENT OF THE HISTORIAN . . . . .	78
I	Some of the More Important Aspects of the Development of Psychology in Its Relation to History and the Social Sciences . . . . .	78
1	The Origins of the Psychological Orientation . . . . .	76
2.	Psychologists Who Have Made Important Contributions to the Social Bearings and Implications of Their Subject . . . . .	82
a	William James (1842-1910) and the Appearance of Systematic Psychology in the United States . . . . .	82
b	Granville Stanley Hall (1846-1924) and Genetic Psychology . . . . .	91
c.	James Mark Baldwin (1861- ) and the Dialectic of Personal and Social Growth . . . . .	98
d	Edward Lee Thorndike (1874- ) and the Native Equipment of man . . . . .	109
e	William McDougall (1871- ) and the Emphasis upon the Sociological Significance of Instincts . . . . .	115
f	Wilfred Trotter and the Sociological Importance of the Recognition and Control of "Herd Instinct" . . . . .	122
g	The Attack on the Instinct Hypothesis . . . . .	136
(1)	John B. Watson (1878- ) and the Development of the Behavioristic Approach to Psychology . . . . .	136
(2)	L. L. Bernard (1881- ) and the Appraisal of the Recent Critique of the Instinct Hypothesis . . . . .	140
h	The Rise of the Conception of the Psychology of the Unconscious . . . . .	146
i	Differential Psychology and the Doctrine of Superior and Inferior Human Types . . . . .	150
j	Some Representative Early Attempts to Work Out the Principles of a Psychological Interpretation of History . . . . .	153
(1)	Walter Bagehot (1826-77) and the Psychological Interpretation of Social Evolution . . . . .	153
(2)	Gustave Le Bon (1841- ) and the Psychology of Peoples . . . . .	161
(3)	Gabriel Tarde (1843-1903) and the Psychology of Imitation . . . . .	170

## ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

xv

## CHAPTER

PAGE

	(4) Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) and Folk-Psychology . . . . .	176
	3. The Development of the Cultural Attack on Psychological Determinism in History . . . . .	178
II.	The Psychological Interpretation of History . . . . .	195
	1. The Nature and Historical Background of the Psychological Interpretation of History . . . . .	195
	2 Karl Lamprecht's Socio-Psychological Interpretation of History . . . . .	198
	3. The Defects of Lamprecht's System and Methodology . . . . .	202
	4. James Harvey Robinson and the Development of Intellectual History . . . . .	204
	5. Modern Dynamic Psychology and the Interpretation of History . . . . .	221
	a Dynamic Psychology and Historical Biography . . . . .	221
	b Dynamic Psychology and Institutional and Cultural History . . . . .	248
III	SUMMARY . . . . .	266
IV	SOME CONTRIBUTIONS OF ANTHROPOLOGY TO HISTORY . . . . .	269
	I The Development of Anthropology . . . . .	269
	II The Older Anthropology and Conventional History . . . . .	276
	III Critical Anthropology and the Newer History . . . . .	284
V.	SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY . . . . .	307
	I Some Aspects of the Origins of Historical Sociology . . . . .	307
	II The Conventional Attitude of Historians Towards Sociology . . . . .	318
III	The Nature of Sociology and Its Relation to History . . . . .	327
IV	Sociological Problems and Interpretations in the History of Western Civilization . . . . .	342
	1 Social Processes in European History . . . . .	342
	2 Sociological Problems in the History of the Near Orient . . . . .	347
	a Egypt . . . . .	347
	b Babylonia and Assyria . . . . .	350
	c Persia . . . . .	354
	d Crete and the Ægean . . . . .	354
	e Sociological Significance of the History of the Near Orient . . . . .	355
	3 Sociological Problems in the History of Classical Antiquity . . . . .	356
	4 Sociological Problems in Medieval History . . . . .	364
	5 Sociological Aspects of the Emergence of Modern Times . . . . .	370

CHAPTER	PAGE
6. The Sociological Background of the Development of Contemporary Civilization Since the Industrial Revolution . . . . .	375
V. Conclusion . . . . .	384
VI. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR HISTORY AND THE SOCIAL STUDIES . . . . .	387
I. The History of Science and the Interpretation of History . . . . .	387
II. General Neglect of the History of Science by Historians . . . . .	402
III. The Present Status of the History of Science . . . . .	407
IV. The Necessity of Cooperation Between Historians and Scientists in the Field of the History of Science . . . . .	412
VII. ECONOMIC SCIENCE AND DYNAMIC HISTORY . . . . .	421
I. The Nature of Economics . . . . .	421
II. Some Leading Stages in the Growth of Economic Science . . . . .	424
III. The Economic Development of Human Society . . . . .	438
1. Stages of Economic Evolution . . . . .	438
2. Laws of Economic Development . . . . .	446
3. A Sketch of the Economic Development of Western Society . . . . .	448
IV. The Development of Economic History . . . . .	458
V. Economics and History . . . . .	464
VIII. POLITICAL SCIENCE AND HISTORY . . . . .	470
I. The Nature of Political Science . . . . .	470
II. Some Leading Stages in the Development of Political Science . . . . .	472
III. Some Leading Problems in Contemporary Political Science of Particular Relevance to the Social Studies . . . . .	481
1. The Historical Evolution of the State . . . . .	481
2. The Racial Factor in Politics . . . . .	489
3. The Forms of the State and the Government . . . . .	495
4. The Functions of the State . . . . .	500
5. Proposals for the Reform and Reconstruction of Political Life . . . . .	503
IV. Past and Future Relations of History and Political Science . . . . .	508
V. History and Jurisprudence . . . . .	513
IX. ETHICS AND HISTORY. A GENETIC VIEW OF THE THEORY OF CONDUCT . . . . .	519
I. Some Prolegomena to the Conception of Conduct as a Science . . . . .	519

## ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

xvii

## CHAPTER

## PAGE

	1	Methods of Approach to Knowledge . . . . .	519
	2	The Genesis of Ethical Codes . . . . .	522
	3	The Modern Sex Complex . . . . .	526
	4	Science and Ethics . . . . .	534
	5	Pluralism, Relativity and Moral Conduct . . . . .	539
II		Ethics and History . . . . .	544
	1	Some Leading Historical Conceptions of the "Good Life" . . . . .	544
	2	Some Leading Types of Approach to Ethical Theory . . . . .	556
	3	Ethics and the Historian . . . . .	561
X		HISTORY AND SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE . . . . .	566
	I	The Old and the New in Historical Writing . . . . .	566
	II	Intellectual History and the Origins of Contemporary Problems . . . . .	567
III		The Social Studies and Some Major Contemporary Issues . . . . .	583



## ILLUSTRATIONS

JAMES THOMSON SHOTWELL . . . . .	<i>Frontispiece</i>
	<small>FACING PAGE</small>
FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER . . . . .	66
GRANVILLE STANLEY HALL . . . . .	90
FRANZ BOAS . . . . .	274
FRANKLIN HENRY GIDDINGS . . . . .	314
GUSTAV SCHMOLLER . . . . .	434
CHARLES AUSTIN BEARD . . . . .	476
JAMES HARVEY ROBINSON . . . . .	568





**NEW HISTORY AND THE SOCIAL  
STUDIES**



# NEW HISTORY AND THE SOCIAL STUDIES

## CHAPTER I

### THE PAST AND THE FUTURE OF HISTORY

#### I. THE CURRENT HISTORIOGRAPHY: ITS NATURE, CONTRIBUTIONS AND DEFICIENCIES.

##### 1. *The Static, Unprogressive Nature of Conventional Historiography.*

IT has been more than sixty years since Herbert Spencer in his memorable article in the *Westminster Review* on "What Knowledge Is of Most Worth," pointed out the narrowness and superficiality of the historiography of his day and argued for a new type of history which would reconstruct a complete and accurate picture of the past. More than forty years have passed since John Richard Green prefaced the most widely known product of English historiography with the remark that it was "a history, not of English Kings or English Conquests, but of the English People." Yet, only a few years ago Professor James Harvey Robinson could accurately characterize the current history writing and teaching as tending primarily to be concerned with the narration of meaningless names of potentates and battles, the recitation of political events, and the rehearsal of romantic or striking episodes which have had little or no significance in the historical development of humanity and culture.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> J. H. Robinson, *The New History*, Chap. 1

2. *The Conventional Conception of the Nature, Scope and Purpose of History.*

Before proceeding to an analysis of the pretensions and methods of the conventional historiography of the present day, an inquiry must be made as to its nature, origins and real contributions.

The modern political history has been variously defined. Freeman described it as "past politics," but Seeley's characterization of it as the "biography of states" is more accurate and clarifying. It assumes that political events have been the "backbone" of historical development and constitute the only logical foundation for the organization and presentation of historical events. In its extreme form, it maintains that political events have been the *causal influences* in determining the nature and course of history. While these are both wholly arbitrary assumptions, supported by nothing more than opinion, and give a very distorted notion of the historical process, there would be less cause for any quarrel with the political historian if he did not proceed to rule out as unworthy of consideration all the great events of history which are not directly and visibly connected with the life and growth of the state and the functioning of political organs.

The older view of the purpose of history was most tersely put by Bolingbroke when, following Polybius and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, he described it as "philosophy teaching by experience." History was conceived of more as a branch of ethics and homiletics than of social science. It was believed to be chiefly concerned with inculcating moral doctrine and with arousing bursts of patriotic enthusiasm through the glorification of the past of some particular nation.

While many of the better class of conventional political and episodal historians have escaped from this unfortunate misconception of the nature and purpose of history,

many of the most important historians of the nineteenth century still conceived and executed their works according to the belief that the chief purpose of history was to glorify the national past rather than to recount in a faithful manner the real facts and forces connected with national cultural development.

### 3. *The Political Fetish in Historical Writing.*

The cause for the present domination of historiography by the political fetish is obvious to anyone who has made a study of the development of historical writing in modern times. The source of the modern political history was the Germany which, following the defeat by Napoleon, at Jena, was reorganized by Stein, Hardenberg and Scharnhorst, and inspired by Fichte, Arndt and Hegel. It was in the midst of this fervid patriotism that Niebuhr, Ranke and the editors of the *Monumenta* began the work that transformed historical writing and research. The fact that many of the most influential followers of these men were Prussians, tended to sustain an unflagging interest in patriotic, political and nationalistic history throughout the nineteenth century—the period in which Prussia was securing a dominant position in the German Empire and longed for a European preeminence. National pride and competition stimulated a similar movement in France and England, and the American students brought back to this country the spirit and methods of the Continental historiography.<sup>2</sup>

### 4. *The Episodical Element in Historical Writing.*

The episodical aspect of conventional historiography has a more ancient origin. It goes back to the gossip of Herodotus, the scandal-mongering of Suetonius, the melodramatic tendencies of Orosius, the proneness of the medieval annalists and chroniclers to record the novel and

<sup>2</sup> See G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century*, Chaps. v, viii, ix-xi, xiv, xvii-xviii, xxii; and H. B. Adams, *The Study of History in American Colleges and Universities*.

striking events, and the rise of the modern historical narrative in the romance of Froissart's *Chronicles*. It also has a fundamental psychological basis in the notorious simian tendency of mankind to be attracted by the superficial, the sensational and the scandalous rather than the profound, dynamic and vital aspects of life. As Professor Robinson has well remarked, "Hundreds of thousands of readers can be found for Pastor Russell's exegesis of Ezekiel and the Apocalypse to hundreds who read Conklin's *Heredity and Environment* or Slosson's *Creative Chemistry*. No publisher would accept a historical textbook based on an explicit knowledge we now have of man's animal ancestry." The well-known fact that intellectual and educational habits and procedure are, with the exception of religious matters, the least subject and susceptible to rational analysis and progressive changes of any set of human interests has tended to perpetuate these exaggerated tendencies in the manner described in the opening paragraph.

### 5. *The Contributions and Defects of the Conventional Historiography.*

No informed person can well deny the immeasurable debt which history owes to this political and nationalistic school. It was under its inspiration and guidance that history writing was transformed from the interesting but unreliable gossipy memoirs of Saint-Simon and the polished rhetoric of Robertson and Hume into the highly accurate and organized historical works of Ranke and his pupils and associates; of Freeman and the English school; and of Mignet, Thiers, and the French political school. It was the same patriotic fervor which led to the compilation of the great collections of sources of national history—the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, of Pertz, Waitz and their successors; the French *Documents Inédits* of Guizot, Mignet, Thierry, and their associates and followers; the English *Rolls Series*; Carducci's revision of the great Italian col-

lection of sources by Muratori; and the American echo of this movement, to be discerned in Peter Force's *Archives*, Winsor's *Narrative and Critical History of America*, Bancroft's *History of the Pacific States*, and the more recent scholarly editions of the papers of statesmen and the proceedings of important public bodies and meetings. In short, it was political history which gave modern historiography its accurate methods of research and provided it with its vast compilations of primary sources.

But, as Professor Shotwell has very aptly said, the political historians were so intensely concerned with perfecting the methodology of research that they lost the sense of proportion and relative values and failed to discriminate as to the importance of the events which they narrated. Instead of attempting to grasp and describe the whole current of human progress, they merely seized upon the most conspicuous chip on the surface of the waters and thus obscured and distorted the whole picture of human development. Dean Albion W. Small has admirably summarized the defects of current historiography along this line: "The quarrel of the sociologists with the historians is that the latter have learned so much about how to do it that they have forgotten what to do. They have become so skilled in finding facts that they have no use for the truths that would make the facts worth finding. They have exhausted their magnificent technique in discovering things that are not worth knowing when they get through with them. . . . The historians are locating cinders on the face of the glacier, but they overlook the mountain ranges that carry the glacier." As it was the task of the last century in historiography to bring about method and accuracy, so this century has before it the problem of giving to history a comprehensive, well-balanced, natural and intelligent body of subject matter.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> See on this point J. H. Robinson, *The New History*, Chaps. 1-6, viii.



6. *A Critical Examination of the Current Political Historiography.*

We may now turn to an examination of the pretensions of current political history and analyze the validity of its contention that political phenomena are of such primary importance as to warrant receiving the almost exclusive attention of the historian.

In the first place, even the standards of accuracy of the political historian are open to serious criticism. The intensely nationalistic spirit that pervades much political history has been one of the most potent influences in obscuring the truth in historical writing. As Professor Gooch says of three of the most eminent political historians: "If the purpose of history is to stir a nation to action, Droysen, Sybel and Treitschke were among the greatest of historians. If its supreme aim is to discover truth and to interpret the movement of humanity, they have no claim to a place in the first class." Thus the assumptions of political history in the matter of contributing accuracy of method are not entirely valid. All that can be said is that scientific history began in a political atmosphere. The fact that it dealt with political events did not give it accuracy; in fact, the more intensely political it has been, the less accurate it has been.

The thesis of political history that political institutions and events are the causal influences in historic development is even less defensible. While no set of forces or type of institutions can be said to be entirely causal or resultant in any period of history, there are few intelligent students of history and social science, today, who would maintain that political institutions are of a determining character in human development. The general results of modern research and analysis, which have been admirably summarized by Ratzenhofer, Small, Oppenheimer, Bentley, Laski, Duguit, Gierke and others, have tended unquestionably to demonstrate that, at the best, the state is but a focussing

point for the interplay of a vast number of vital human interests which determine the nature and direction of political evolution. But even if it be granted that the state is the fundamental and directive force in human development, it would by no means follow that the current type of political history could secure any justification from this fact. There is astonishingly little in the present type of political history which throws any real light upon the origin, nature and development of the great political institutions of society. There is little to be learned regarding political evolution from lists of dynasties, records of court scandals, diplomatic intrigues and military exploits. The present type of history, instead of attempting to explain the origin, nature and developments of *the* state, simply recites the most striking episodes connected with the history of some *particular* state or group of states. It would not be inaccurate to say that the average student would gain more enlightenment regarding the evolution of political institutions from Edward Jenks' *The State and the Nation* or Franz Oppenheimer's *The State* than from the most pretentious historical work ever produced by the conventional type of political historian. It is not unfair, then, to designate the current political historiography as an incomplete and melodramatic exposition of a superficial and distorted view of human society and social evolution.

This criticism of the unfortunate and mischievous tendency of the conventional historians to concentrate their attention almost exclusively upon political phenomena is not to be taken to indicate the existence of an ultra-individualistic or anarchistic trend in the newer history. The enlightened advocates of a broader basis for history fully agree with Lester F. Ward that the state is, in all probability, destined to play a far more constructive and more intelligent part in human society in the future than it has in the past. There is no opposition to the state as a social institution. The progressive student of history

merely insists that, in view of the fact that a very important department of academic investigation—political science—has now been provided solely to study political phenomena in all their phases and manifestations, history should recognize the value of a division of labor and cease to cling to political institutions as its center of orientation. History certainly has no closer relation to political science than it has to sociology, social psychology, economics or anthropology. If an alleged historian fails to derive any personal satisfaction save from an investigation of political phenomena, he should either frankly recognize that he is dealing with only one small branch of history or seek solace in an avowed department of political science. The attempt to preserve the venerable practice of limiting history to a study of "past politics" is not only the most effective method of distorting history, but is also an unpardonable intrusion upon the domain of the science of government.

Again, the contentions of the usual political type of historians have received a new lease of life from the World War. The conflict, they tell us, was primarily caused by purely political and diplomatic influences, and, hence, only political history can furnish any adequate understanding of the origins, nature or probable effects of the war. The obvious answer to this assertion is that the only concession to the political historian which can be made is that the war was declared through the agency and mechanism of the political organizations. Its causes were but remotely political; they were primarily psychological and cultural, and this war was generated in the main by the elements of race, nationality, economic competition and a faulty educational and philosophical system. There is, however, an undoubted connection between the political historians themselves and the war. As Guiland, Scott, Altschul, Hayes and others have so amply demonstrated, the excessively nationalistic historiography was one of the chief agencies in fanning the flame of exaggerated patriotism which lay at the bottom of the whole militaristic movement.

There remains the final redoubt in the defenses of the conventional political history—the claim that if political events are not the most important, at least they furnish the only possible basis for organizing historical events and are the best specific for the development of mental discipline in the whole range of historical facts.

The newer synthetic history answers the first of these points by maintaining that the human mind is the only unifying thread in history and that, as the types of influences which determine the “furnishings” of the human mind vary greatly from century to century, no single valid set of events can be selected as a skeleton for historical organization. In the “ancient” Orient military, religious and commercial elements were ascendent; in Greece art, literature and general intellectual interests were the dominating influences; the chief significance of Roman history is to be found in its contributions to legal development and imperial administration; in the mediæval period the influence of ecclesiastical institutions was predominant; the early modern period was significant as witnessing the rise of nationality and capital, and the Commercial Revolution; the contributions of the seventeenth century were chiefly the spirit and movement of colonization and the origin of modern science and critical philosophy; the eighteenth century was one of general intellectual revolution, and it witnessed the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution, the greatest of all the transformations in human history; the nineteenth century was of preëminent importance on account of the marvelous development of natural science and mechanical industry, the perfection of the national state, and the rise of the newer or national imperialism; the twentieth century will undoubtedly find its task in solving the social, economic, political and diplomatic problems which have been bequeathed to it by the dominant creations and developments of the previous century.\*

\*See on these changes in historical interests and influences W. K. Wallace, *The Trend of History*, and *The Passing of Politics*, and Mr. F. S. Marvin's two books, *The Living Past*, and *The Century of Hope*.

## 12 THE NEW HISTORY AND THE SOCIAL STUDIES

This scanty review of the chief tendencies and developments in the history of the past will suffice to convince any unprejudiced reader that no single class of factors can be assumed to be adequate as a basis for historical organization; least of all the purely political factors, which at best could only serve as a basis for organizing certain phases of Assyrian, Persian, Roman and Prussian history. Certainly, since 1500 the economic and scientific factors and influences have quite overshadowed all others. The search for a single principle for historical organization is psychologically akin to the quest of the ancient Ionic philosophers for a unitary principle, such as water, fire, earth, air or flux, wherewith to interpret the universe.

The claim of the political historian for the supreme disciplinary value of political events is even more puerile. This argument is the final refuge of all educational anachronisms and has as ancient an origin as the Pythagorean belief in the magic qualities of numbers. It also is related to and supported by the basic notion of a certain prevalent type of punitive educational tradition which holds that anything dynamic, vital or interesting to the student must be dangerous to mental growth and conducive to a speedy decline in psychic vigor. It is poor taste and worse logic for the political historian to sneer at the cognate claim of the classicist for the supreme educational value of classical syntax, and then resort to an equally indefensible contention in regard to his own subject.

### II. THE NEW SYNTHETIC HISTORY: ITS NATURE, AIMS, CONTRIBUTIONS AND PROSPECTS.

#### 1. *The Decline of Political and Episodical Historiography.*

There are ominous signs that the current political and episodical type of history is very gravely threatened. Indeed, it is inevitable that a rather grotesque tendency which

has no justification save in tradition, convention and sentiment must sooner or later be wrecked by the modern critical and synthetic spirit which demands that every practice or institution shall show convincing cause for its existence. Books on the "New History" are appearing in constantly increasing numbers. No important textbook on history now appears in which the author does not at least profess in the preface to have given due consideration to the non-military and non-political aspects of history. Even the "dyed-in-the-wool" political historians do not hesitate to discourse on the "New History" in quarters where the more recent conceptions of the province of history have become popular.

The very fact that the adherents of the older conventional history feel compelled to cease scoffing at the contributions of the more advanced and modernized historians and to make concessions in form, if not in substance, to their contentions is most significant. It establishes beyond the possibility of successful contradiction the fact that the newer history can no longer be ignored and must seriously be reckoned with even by its enemies. It unmistakably indicates that the older school of historians feel that their cause is waning and that they must begin to prepare to submit to, and follow, the inevitable tendency towards a newer, sounder and more rational type of history.

But the most important of all the evidences of the approaching downfall of the episodical history and the political narrative is the fact that the number of serious historical works which breathe the spirit of Droysen, Treitschke, Seeley and Freeman, in regard to the province of history, is decreasing at a truly portentous rate. The older history is not only losing because of the increased power of the offensive of the "New History," but also because its own defenses are crumbling for want of reinforcements.

## 2. *The Fundamental Explanation of the Changes in the Conception of History.*

If one has made any serious attempt to acquaint himself with the development of historical writing since the unknown authors of the Jahvist sources of the Old Testament and the Greek "logographoi," it is not difficult to comprehend the causes for the recent changes in the conception of the scope and content of history. The historical writing of every age, as Professor Shotwell has so clearly explained, reflects the dominant interests of that period. The gossipy narrative of Herodotus, the rhetoric of Isocrates, the national epic of Livy, and the polemic of Tacitus all mirrored contemporary interests. Historiography from Augustine and Orosius to Baronius, Bolland and Bossuet was chiefly concerned with the religious and ecclesiastical interests which were uppermost in the minds of the educated classes in Europe for a thousand years. The rise of the national state, with the accompanying stirrings of patriotism, produced the political history which dominated the nineteenth century. But the Industrial Revolution and the unprecedented discoveries in natural science have revolutionized the whole basis of our civilization and have furnished the human mind with an entirely new set of ideas and interests.<sup>6</sup>

In the earlier régime when human thought was believed to be the result of a mysterious spiritual essence, when economic and social relations and positions were fixed by custom and confirmed by an inscrutable Providence, and when prowess in the natural sciences was thought to be allied to sorcery or savored of impiety, none of the most characteristic lines of modern thought could well exist. The political, economic, scientific and theological revolutions which humanity has passed through since 1750 have transformed the whole basis of our civilization and have also

<sup>6</sup> I have attempted to trace this more in detail in my article on "History Its Rise and Development," in the new edition of the *Encyclopedia Americana*, Vol. XIV.

been reflected in the development of a group of new sciences which were virtually impossible in any earlier era. These new sciences are the science of life or *biology*, the science of man or *anthropology*, the science of the mind or *psychology*, the science of industrial relations or *economics*, the science of the relation of man to his environment or *anthropogeography*, the science of group control or *political science*, and the science of social relations or *sociology*. Each of these sciences represents a new set of interests and there has grown up as the result a vital need for its type of information and analysis. Their spirit and tendencies have reacted upon history to give it a broader, sounder and more human content.<sup>6</sup>

### 3. *The Nature of the New Synthetic History.*

The contributions of this newer history can best be illustrated by examining how it answers the great problems of history, namely, what is the nature and purpose of history, what is the correct scope of history, and what is the soundest method of historical interpretation.

#### A. The Purpose of History.

The newer type of historian holds that the purpose of history is to give the present generation such a complete and reliable picture of the past that it will be able to arrive at an intelligent comprehension of how and why the present state of civilization came about. Only in this way can one reach a correct notion of what is really essential and progressive in our civilization and of what is but an encumbering survival from primitive times.

<sup>6</sup> See H E Barnes (Ed) *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*. A discussion of the relation of these new social sciences to history may be found in J H Robinson, *The New History*, Chap III, F J Teggart, *The Processes of History*; and, by the same, *Prolegomena to History*, F S Marvin, *The Century of Hope*, A J Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, Part III, the article on "Psychology and History" in the *American Journal of Psychology*, October, 1919, F H Giddings, *A Theory of Social Causation*, L M Bristol, *Social Adaptation*, W H R Rivers, "History and Ethnology" in *History*, July, 1920, and A B Hulbert, *The Increasing Debt of History to Science*.



The newer history contends that no further motive is necessary than the desire to know with as great accuracy as possible the whole story of the human past. The question of satisfaction or enthusiasm over the past achievements of any particular nation is held to be quite subordinate to the more vital necessity of knowing what actually has happened and, if possible, why it happened. The truth must in all cases be preferred to personal gratification and patriotic enthusiasm.

While the newer history freely admits the value of historical knowledge as an aid in improving the present and in planning for the future, it sounds a note of caution with respect to the view of Thucydides, Polybius, Dionysius and Bolingbroke, lest one attempt to draw lessons and formulate laws of historical causation which rest upon very frail analogies, if not upon totally false premises. It holds that few situations in a very remote past will allow of being used as data to test the validity or desirability of measures proposed for present or future application. It regards civilization as a great organic complex and contends that, as the general cultural setting of events in the past was so vastly different from the present situation, past events can furnish only a very doubtful and unreliable criterion for judging of the wisdom of present policies.

The chief way in which history can be an aid to the future is by revealing those elements in our civilization which are unquestionably primitive, anachronistic and obstructive and by making clear those forces and factors in our culture which have been most potent in performing this necessary function of removing these primitive barriers to more rapid progress.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Probably the most signally successful attempt at this type of historical writing is to be found in James Harvey Robinson's *Mind in the Making*, F. S. Marvin's books, *The Living Past*, and *The Century of Hope*, and J. K. Hart's *The Discovery of Intelligence*. See also Professor Robinson's *Syllabus of the History of the Western European Mind*.

**B. The Scope of History.**

The newer history would solve the problem of the scope of history by maintaining that history must take into account the sum total of human achievement. The historian of the new type does not try to substitute any magic basis of unity, organization or exclusion for the older political fetish, but confines his efforts to constructing as intelligible and complete a picture of the entire past as his sources of information will allow and to emphasizing the dominant features of every epoch.

It is not contended that a mediocre representative of the new school of history can duplicate Macaulay's famous description of England in the seventeenth century; but it is maintained that any careful and conscientious writer who brings together all that is known of the manners, customs, institutions and ideals of any age will give the reader a more accurate, comprehensive and intelligible picture of the past than is furnished by the works of the most consummate genius of political and episodical historiography. Owing to the broader scope proposed, it may be expected that the synthetic history of the future will become increasingly of the cooperative type.

The newer synthetic history has enlarged the scope of historical narrative in three distinct ways. (1) It has expanded it with respect to the variety of human interests and activities which are recounted (2) It has pushed back the period in which our knowledge of the career of man begins. (3) It has expanded the scope of history in space by showing that more and more modern history is becoming world history.

In regard to the extension of the range of human interests which are deemed worthy of narrating, the newer history refuses to look upon any phase of human conduct as unworthy of consideration, but it seeks to put due

emphasis upon those classes of activities and interests which the slightest reflection upon human life must demonstrate always to have been the most vital and influential in human existence and development, namely, prevailing intellectual attitudes, technology and natural science, economic activities, social relations, and political, legal and religious institutions.

The chief novel element in this phase of the newer historiography is the greater emphasis which is put upon economic, social and scientific factors in human development. Without for a moment committing itself to the Feuerbach-Marxian determinism, the newer synthetic history recognizes that civilization has a fundamental economic basis, that the state of scientific knowledge and technological processes at any period determines the manner in which the economic struggle will be carried on, and that the nature of the economic process will to a very large extent decide the nature of the prevailing social relations and political institutions.

The newer history desires to emphasize and clarify those forces which have made a people great as a nation, and to decry the previous tendency of history to be exclusively concerned with those military and political episodes in history which give rise to a narrow chauvinism or a general ignorance of the vital phases of national development. It attempts to make it plain that a people can be loyal and patriotic without being more warlike and bigoted than the dangers and necessities of the times compel them to be. It seeks to make clear the fact that in our national development the great scientists and inventors, such as Franklin, Whitney, Fulton, McCormick, Morse, Field, Edison and Gibbs have been more important than our leading generals and politicians. It insists that it is nobler to have developed a great industrial democracy than to have perfected a despotic military machine.

Of course, this tendency to emphasize non-political

factors in the treatment of history is not new. It is as old as Herodotus, and, in its modern phase, it dates from Vico, Voltaire and Heeren. It already has been represented by some of the most eminent of historians from all nations. England can boast of the names of Hallam, Flint, Symonds, Lecky, Green, Maitland, Bury, Pollard, Dill, Marvin, Morley, and Ashley, Cunningham, Rogers, the Webbs, the Hammonds and the less-noted economic historians; France has been represented by DeTocqueville, Guizot, Fustel de Coulanges, Luchaire, Rambaud, Tannery, Faguet, Reinach, and Jaurès, Levasseur and the other economic historians; in Germany the most conspicuous names are those of Heeren, Riehl, Gotheim, Burckhardt, Erman, Harnack, Breysig, Lamprecht, and Schmoller, Bucher and the lesser economic historians; Russia has contributed two noted members in Vinogradoff and Kluchevsky; finally, one finds in the United States such writers as Lea, Tyler, McMaster, Turner, Sumner, Jastrow, Breasted, Cheyney, Shepherd, Abbott, Burr, Becker, Taylor, Robinson, Shotwell, Beard, Schevill, Preserved Smith, Dodd, Thompson, Farrand, Hayes, Schlesinger, and the economic historians, such as Veblen, Coman, Bogart, Bolles, Gay, Gras, Commons, Wright, Day, Callender, Lippincott, Van Metre, Usher, Clark and Meyer.\*

Its attainment to an organized movement of such proportions that it seems destined to dominate historical writing and teaching in the not very distant future is what distinguishes the recent phase from the earlier sporadic and isolated examples of this synthetic tendency.

The newer history, and its allies archeology and anthropology, have greatly extended the range of our knowledge with respect to the period of man's existence and the stages of advance through which he has reached his present development. The ancient history textbooks which

\* See my chapter on recent developments in history in E. C. Hayes, *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences*

were common a decade ago, and some of which are still in use, were invariably prefaced with the legend of the dispersal of the sons of Noah from the plateau of Iran something less than 4000 B. C. Today, Eduard Meyer introduces the greatest of all histories of antiquity by a whole volume on anthropology. The word "prehistoric" has been abandoned in accurate historical terminology for the phrase "pre-literary history." We have the most indisputable evidence that man, in all anatomical respects entirely modern, lived in Europe at least 30,000 years ago. We are equally certain that definitely human precursors of this type of man lived there not less than 250,000 years ago.\*

Owing to the partially fortunate fact that primitive man left no decipherable writings, the students of this period of human development have been compelled to concentrate upon examining the actual conditions of primitive life as revealed by archeological remains and not upon domestic scandals, romantic episodes, or military and political affairs. As a consequence, any intelligent student who has taken a course in prehistoric archeology in our larger universities knows more about the life of the inhabitants of Europe in the period between 50,000 and 5000 years ago than he could discover regarding the life of the European peoples since 3000 B. C. from all the standard courses in European history in the average university or from the standard classroom manuals on European history. To make a convenient example, Boyd Dawkins, in his *Early Man in Britain*, or the stimulating books by the Quennells tell us more about the life of prehistoric man in England than one could glean from the standard manual on English history by Gardiner regarding the life of the inhabitants of England during the historic period. A student of European history in our universities might be excused for believing that Charlemagne used a "Pierce Arrow" touring car

\* See H. F. Osborn, *Men of the Old Stone Age*; G. F. S. Elphinstone, *Prehistoric Man and His Story*; H. H. Wilder, *Man's Prehistoric Past*; J. DeMorgan, *Prehistoric Man*, and G. G. MacCurdy, *Human Origins*.

in his travels over his empire and that he supplied his *Missi* with "Fords," but no intelligent student of prehistoric archeology would err to such an extent regarding the life of prehistoric man.

These newer ideas must of necessity bring with them a revolution in our historical chronology and our periodizing of history. Oriental history can no longer be regarded as "ancient." Ancient history really begins with the lower Paleolithic age, around three hundred thousand years ago, and ends with the beginning of the Neolithic, about fifteen thousand years ago. Medieval history might be said to extend from the Neolithic to the dawn of written history. The period from 3500 B. C. to 1750 A. D. might well be regarded as modern history. The contemporary age may be held to begin with the Industrial Revolution following 1750. The major part of the so-called "historic period" from 3500 B. C. to 1750 A. D. has in reality been the least important era in the development of material culture. Most of the really significant achievements in progress were made before 3500 B. C. or after 1750 A. D.<sup>10</sup>

It is highly obvious that this conception of the nature and course of human development over a period of time which is almost incomprehensible from our conventional chronological concepts and our modern standards of measurement, and from a condition not vitally different from that of the higher animals gives an entirely new interpretation to the probable future development and the real goal of the human race. Man is no longer to be thought of as striving "his lost estate to gain." Indeed, his "lost estate" is the one thing which the informed historical student of the present would least desire to recover, as the difference between that and our present condition is what really constitutes progress and civilization. The old retrospective theological conception of human retrogression has thus

<sup>10</sup> Cf. J. H. Robinson, *The New History*, pp. 236-41, and B. Croce, *History: Its Theory and Practice*, Part I, chap. vii.

been entirely relegated to the sphere of the wornout mythologies and superstitions which have all too long prevented an intelligent grasp of the nature and significance of human progress. According to the generally accepted position of the most enlightened modern students, man must be regarded as having attained at the present moment the supreme height of civilization which has as yet been reached, and as having potentially before him a future of progress and improvement such as we of the present can have but the slightest comprehension.

Such a grasp of the true nature of social evolution gives a dynamic and optimistic attitude towards reality that is as far removed from the old theological conceptions as the real buoyancy and optimism of youth is from the vain attempt of the man of threescore and ten to renew the sensations and ambitions of his boyhood. When one is able to grasp this dynamic forward-looking tendency produced by the modern view of human development and progress, the retrospective and obstructive cosmology and psychology which have prevailed since the time of Hesiod and earlier can no longer have any basis for existence.<sup>11</sup>

In addition to the pushing back of the supposed period of human origins, lost civilizations have been recovered which existed within what is conventionally known as historic times. We may pass over, as already too well known to require special emphasis, the constant extension of our knowledge regarding the great civilizations of oriental antiquity, and the rediscovery of the pre-classical civilization of the Ægean and the eastern littoral of the Mediterranean through the labors of such men as Schliemann, Evans, Dörpfeld and Wace.

Another early civilization, the existence of which was never quite lost sight of, but the historical significance of which has only recently been discovered and emphasized,

<sup>11</sup> See J B Bury, *History of the Freedom of Thought*; and *The Idea of Progress*.

is the Celtic civilization of Gaul. The researches of Joseph Déchelette, Fustel de Coulanges, Camille Jullian and T. Rice Holmes have revealed a Celtic North European civilization, coeval with the classical period, which was almost as highly developed in many ways as the classical civilization and nearly as important in the later development of European institutions. In spite of the corrective influence of historians like Jean Dubos, as early as the first half of the eighteenth century, the preoccupation of classical historians with Greece and Rome, and of the English, American and German historians with the Germanic peoples, obscured the knowledge of the existence and importance of this North European civilization until it was largely rediscovered in an institutional sense by Fustel de Coulanges and Camille Jullian and archeologically by Mortillet and Déchelette. They demonstrated the relatively moderate importance of Germanic racial traits and institutions in the historical development of Western Europe, thus destroying the myth which had extended from the days of Tacitus to the time of Droysen, Sybel and Treitschke in Germany and Freeman, Kemble and Green in England, to the effect that all the important political, social and cultural institutions of medieval and modern Europe were of Germanic derivation. In spite of the fact that European history can no more be understood without a study of this Celtic civilization than calculus can be comprehended without a knowledge of algebra, the current manuals on European history begin the survey with the so-called "barbarian invasions of the Germanic people."<sup>12</sup>

Space forbids more than a casual reference to the surveys of comparative legal, political, social and religious institutions which have been carried on by such writers as Lippert, Ihering, Tylor, Frazer, Morgan, Westermarck,

<sup>12</sup> The most convenient source for this neglected subject is the introductory chapter and the supplementary notes in T. Rice Holmes's *Cæsar's Conquest of Gaul*, see also A. L. Guérard, *French Civilization to the Close of the Middle Ages*.



Hobhouse, Durkheim, Sumner, Lowie, Kroeber, Wissler, Goldenweiser, Rivers and others, and which have recovered for us a knowledge of both primitive and historic civilizations. Nothing could be more destructive of chauvinism or more important for acquiring a proper perspective for the interpretation of historical development, but there seem few historians who are even aware of the existence of these works.

No phase of progress in historical writing or interpretation has been more significant than the advances which have been made in the demonstration of the importance of extra-European influences on the history of western civilization, namely, the elaboration of the concept of "world history." Breasted and Cumont have shown the importance of the Orient for the civilization of Greece and Rome. The prosperity of the Middle Ages and the rise of the towns were based on the trade with the Orient. The Arabs passed on civilization from the East to Europe. Particularly significant has been the investigation of these contacts in their relation to the origins of modern times. It was long the fashion to trace modern times to the Turkish occupation of the trade routes and the capture of Constantinople, to the Italian revival of letters and development of art, or to the Lutheran revolt against the Medieval Church. Professor Lybyer has proved beyond possibility of contradiction that the Turkish occupation of the trade routes had no influence on the early origin of overseas explorations and the development of modern colonial enterprise in America and the Far East, and, along with Professors Shepherd and Abbott, has demonstrated that the great cause for overseas expansion around 1500 was the scientific curiosity of the West and the jealousy of the western states concerning the Italian monopoly of the eastern trade with the Levant districts. Further, these writers, together with Professors Gillespie and J. B. Botsford, have shown that the characteristic events and developments of early modern times:

colonization, the downfall of feudalism and the rise of the national state, the beginnings of representative government through the rise of the middle class, the awakening of modern science, and the establishment of modern commercial and economic life, are primarily the products of the reaction upon Europe of the expansion of European civilization overseas. Even the Protestant Reformation, as Professors Robinson and Preserved Smith have shown, would not have succeeded but for the rise of the middle class and the awakening of those nationalistic aspirations which the expansion did so much to produce. Compared with the overseas expansion and the Commercial Revolution, the Renaissance and Reformation appear backward-looking movements. Likewise, the two great political events of this period, the English revolutions of the seventeenth century and the French Revolution, are but aspects and results of the rise of the *bourgeoisie* to a position of political ascendancy, and the middle class was a direct product of the Commercial Revolution.

Again, though the Industrial Revolution must be looked upon as the most impressive and far-reaching transformation in the history of humanity, it could scarcely have appeared without the preceding Commercial Revolution which prepared the way for its development directly or indirectly in the realms of navigation, capital, commercial practices and institutions, raw materials, markets, legal development and even the mobility of labor.

Finally, the Industrial Revolution and its direct resultant, modern national imperialism, have promoted the final stage of expansion overseas since 1870. This has led to the exploration and commercial exploitation of all remaining habitable portions of the earth's surface and has bound the whole world together as an organic economic and cultural unit, however powerful the centrifugal forces may at times become. As Viscount Bryce has well insisted in his judicious Raleigh Lecture on *World History*, we can now

for the first time witness a real concrete unity of history instead of postulating a metaphysical or potential unity as was the case from the Greek Stoics and Augustine down to our day. Despite anything that "irreconcilable" senators may do or say, we have now become inextricable units in a world organism, and any attempt to study, write or teach national history without considering external influences must be regarded as a hopeless anachronism.<sup>18</sup>

### G. The Interpretation of History.

Though history, as a record of human achievement in the widest sense of that term, goes back to the earliest archeological evidences of man's handiwork which have persisted since the first stone ages, it is only within the last century that written history has been either relatively complete in its scope or decently accurate in its content. Its progress has been the result of the successive contributions of every age from the days when the first savage began to scrawl picture-writing on stones or trees to the appearance of Giry's treatise on Diplomatic or the publication of Merz's *History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*. The honor of having originated the first real historical narrative belongs to the Hebrew authors of the Jahvist sources of the Old Testament at the close of the tenth century B. C. Most significant improvements were made by the Greek and Roman writers of classical antiquity. Herodotus first conceived the notion of a history of civilization; Thucydides introduced the principles of accuracy and relevance into the handling of historical material; Cæsar revealed himself to be a keen observer of contemporary

<sup>18</sup> For a further discussion of this point of view in the rewriting and reinterpretation of history, see W. R. Shepherd, "The Expansion of Europe" in *The Political Science Quarterly*, 1919, W. C. Abbott, *The Expansion of Europe*, W. Cunningham, *Western Civilization in Its Economic Aspects*, Vol. II, Book V, articles "Nationalism," "Democracy" and "World Politics" in the new edition of the *Encyclopedia Americana*, Viscount Bryce's lecture referred to above; and E. Fueter, *World History, 1815-1920*. The best guide is P. T. Moon's *Syllabus on International Relations*. Practical results of an acceptance of this viewpoint are evident in the Clark University and Williams-town Conferences on International Relations.

history and an unequalled writer of apologetic historical memoirs; Livy's patriotic rhetoric has never been surpassed, while Tacitus stands out as the greatest portrait painter and moralist among the historians of antiquity. With the coming of the so-called "Middle Ages," history writing, along with other branches of culture, suffered a marked decline and retrogression, due to the paralyzing Christian eschatology and the primitive cultural level of the northern barbarians who permeated the declining Roman civilization in the period following the fourth century. Even the greatest historians of this age—Bede, Paul the Deacon, Otto of Freising, Matthew Paris and Commines, failed to reach the level of Thucydides and Tacitus.

The literary revival following the thirteenth century known as Humanism, secularized the historian's viewpoint, led to the recovery and editing of lost classical texts, created some embryonic canons of historical criticism, and produced in the works of Machiavelli and Guicciardini systematic histories worthy to rank with those of the best classical writers. This secularizing and critical movement was set back by the great religious reaction in the Protestant Revolt and the Catholic Counter Reformation, but some progress was made even here through the feverish attempt to recover the sources of ecclesiastic history. With the dawn of the modern order following the Commercial Revolution of the sixteenth century many most significant innovations were brought into the field of historical science. The discovery of new lands, peoples, customs, and institutions widened the outlook of the historian. The new scientific philosophy shattered the "Christian Epic" and produced a healthy interest in mankind and its development. The subsequent development of Romanticism produced an intellectual reaction, but this was to some degree offset by the great emotional interest which it aroused in history, and by the extension of the interest of the historian to many new fields, such as philology, mythology, anthropology and com-

parative religion. The growth of nationalism following the French Revolution stimulated the production of the great collections of the sources of national history like the German *Monumenta*, the *Documents Inédits* and the *Rolls Series*, and the patriotic national histories associated with the works of Droysen, Treitschke and Sybel; Froude, Macaulay and Green; Michelet and Martin; and Bancroft and Fiske. The critical sifting of historical evidence, which had begun in the days of Humanism in the work of Blondus, Beatus Rhenanus, Vadianus, Zurita, Camden and De Thou, was revived and carried on by Mabillion and the Benedictines of St. Maur, and by Tillemont, Leibnitz, Muratori, Thoyras, Bayle, Dubos and Beaufort. Most of the previous lines of development converged in the work of Barthold Niebuhr, who is conventionally regarded as the founder of modern scientific historiography. Since his day the critical methodology has been further refined and the events of the past scientifically determined and catalogued in the works of the students of oriental and classical history, the ultra-scholarly medievalists and the more objective national historians, such as Ranke, Aulard, Gardiner, Osgood and Channing.

In this way vast collections of well-ascertained facts were brought together and the mechanism of the historical scholar perfected, in so far as it related to the externals of historical information. But in almost all cases the labors of these historians or archivists had resulted only in the collection of the *data* of history. History was in a condition not unlike that in which the physicist, chemist, or biologist would find himself if supplied with a vast body of notebooks containing the carefully written records of countless experiments, but without any real attempt to interpret the significance of this mass of material or to derive from it great scientific laws of general applicability. This inclination of the majority of historians to resist being seduced from the determination of facts and the narration of suc-

cessive events was not without some basis at the time. The memory of grotesque attempts like that of Hegel, to adapt the facts of history to substantiate a fantastic view of historical development was fresh in their mind and, moreover, the facts upon which any sound interpretation could be based had not yet been fully gathered. It would, however, betray clouded thinking to hold that this gathering of facts marks the final completion of the task of the historian, no less than it would for the scientist to contend that his work was at an end when he had tabulated his observations. The careful and painstaking interpretation of historical material, far from being unscientific and wholly aside from the task of the historian, in reality constitutes the final rounding out to completion of the scientific method in history and gives some meaning and significance to the vast array of facts which have been brought together by previous historians. This matter has been effectively stated by Professor James Harvey Robinson in the following citation:<sup>14</sup>

History, in order to become scientific, had first to become historical. Singularly enough, what we now regard as the strictly historical interest was almost missed by historians before the nineteenth century. They narrated such past events as they believed would interest the reader, they commented on these with a view of instructing him. They took some pains to find out how things really were—*wie es eigentlich gewesen*. To this extent they were scientific, although their motives were mainly literary, moral or religious. They did not, however, in general try to determine how things had come about—*wie es eigentlich geworden*. History has remained for two or three thousand years mainly a record of past events, and this definition satisfies the thoughtless still. But it is one thing to describe what once was, it is still another to attempt to determine how it came about.

As Professor Shotwell has made clear,<sup>15</sup> the prevailing types of historical interpretation through the ages faithfully

<sup>14</sup> J. H. Robinson, *The New History*, p. 62. Cf. also J. T. Shotwell, "The Interpretation of History," in *The American Historical Review*, July, 1913, pp. 692 ff. This is reprinted in his *Introduction to the History of History*.

<sup>15</sup> Shotwell, loc. cit.

reflect the dominating intellectual interest of the successive eras. The Divine epics of the ancient Orient were superseded by the mythological and the philosophical interpretations of the thinkers of classical antiquity. With the general acceptance of Christianity, the classical mythology was replaced by that eschatological conception which dominated historical interpretation from Augustine to Bossuet. With the coming of the expansion of Europe and the Commercial Revolution and its violent shock to the old intellectual order, there arose the critical and rationalistic school of Bacon, Descartes, Voltaire and Hume, which, on account of its being too far in advance of the intellectual orientation of the masses, tended to lapse into the idealism of Kant and Fichte and the romanticism of Burke, Bonald, DeMaistre, and Hegel. The growth of nationalism following the French Revolution tended to give temporary precedence to the political mode of interpretation, but the great transformations which constituted the Scientific and Industrial Revolutions of necessity doomed so superficial a view to an ephemeral existence. The unprecedented breadth and depth of modern knowledge and intellectual interests have produced a number of interpretations of historical development, most of which represent the outgrowth of some one or another of the outstanding intellectual and social transformations of the last century.

With the growth of modern natural science and the critical attitude in the appropriation and assimilation of knowledge, the effort to form some magnificent and systematic philosophical scheme for the organization and presentation of historical development, such as was devised by writers from Augustine to Hegel, has greatly declined. Skepticism of any formal philosophy of history seems to be but a necessary accompaniment of our increasing knowledge of the infinite complexity of social and historical phenomena, as these attempts to reduce history to such simplicity savor too much of the *a priori* method, now so

thoroughly discredited. To take the place of the older dogmatic philosophy of history there have developed what may be called "interpretations" of historical data. These at present differ from the older philosophy of history in the absence of any teleological element and in the rejection of the deductive method. They aim solely to emphasize and bring into high relief those factors, which, according to the various schools of interpretation, seem to have been most influential in producing the civilization of today. The interpretation of history is, in short, the attempt to supplement Ranke's aimless search for what occurred in the past by at least a feeble and humble preliminary effort to explain how the present order came about. Far from being less scientific than the older program of Ranke, it really constitutes the perfect completion of scientific method in historiography, in the same way that the formulation of the great laws of natural science constitute the logical consummation of the task of gathering data by observation and experimentation in the laboratory.

There are at present some eight definite schools of historical interpretation among the representatives of the modernized students of historical phenomena, each of which has made an important contribution to our knowledge of historical development. They are in no sense mutually exclusive but are rather, to a large degree, supplementary. They may be designated as the personal or "great man" theory; the economic or materialistic; the allied geographical or environmental; the spiritual or idealistic; the scientific; the anthropological; the sociological; and the synthetic or "collective psychological." It may be pointed out in passing that, in the main, the older type of historian either clings to the outworn theory of political causation or holds with Professor Emerton that historical development is entirely arbitrary and obeys no ascertainable laws.

The best known of these schools of historical interpretation, and the only one that the current political historians



accord any consideration, is that which found its most noted representatives in Carlyle and Froude, who claimed that the great personalities of history were the main causative factors in historical development. This view is, of course, closely allied to the catastrophic interpretation of the eighteenth century rationalists. Perhaps the leading adherents in our day have been Professor Emile Faguet in France, Mr. W. H. Mallock in England and Mr. William Roscoe Thayer and Professor William A. Dunning in this country.

The contributions of the economic school of historical interpretation, which was founded by the Ricardian Socialists, Feuerbach and Marx, and has been carried on by a host of later and less dogmatic writers, such as Rogers, Ashley, Schmoller, Sombart, Loria, Veblen, Simons, Beard, Bogart, and Simkhovitch, are too familiar to call for any additional elaboration. In its best and most generally accepted form, it contends that the prevailing mode and status of the economic processes in society will to a very large degree decide the nature of existing social and political institutions. In spite of some exaggerations, no phase of historical interpretation has been more fruitful or epoch-making. Immediately related is the geographical interpretation of history, which began with Hippocrates and continued through the writings of Strabo, Vitruvius, Bodin, Montesquieu, and Buckle and has been revived and given a more scientific interpretation in the hands of such writers as Karl Ritter, Ratzel, Reclus, Semple, Metchnikoff, Demolins, and Huntington. Since the days of Ritter no respecting historian has dared to chronicle the history of a nation without first having acquired a knowledge of its geography.

Widely at variance with the economic and geographical interpretations is the somewhat belated offshoot of the idealism of Fichte and Hegel, to be found in the so-called spiritual interpretation of history, which finds its most ardent advocates in Professor Rudolph Eucken of Germany, Professor Croce of Rome, Professor Shailer Mathews of

Chicago, and Mr. H. O. Taylor of New York. Professor Mathews thus defines this view of history: "The spiritual interpretation of history must be found in the discovery of spiritual forces coöperating with geographic and economic to produce a general tendency toward conditions which are truly personal. And these conditions will not be found in generalizations concerning metaphysical entities, but in activities of worthful men finding self-expression in social relations for the ever more complete subjection of physical nature to human welfare."<sup>16</sup> Viewed in this sense, this type of interpretation can be said to have a considerable affinity with the "great man" theory, and apparently aims to reconcile this doctrine with the critical and synthetic interpretation, under cover of a common theological orientation. Closely conformable to this mode of interpretation is Professor E. D. Adams' effort to connect the historical development of the United States with a succession of great national ideals, the origins of which are not explained.

The attempt to view human progress as directly correlated with the advances in natural science received its first great exposition in the writings of Condorcet, was revived by Comte and Buckle and greatly attracted Henry Adams. Aside from the attention given to it by students of the history of science, such as Dannemann, Sarton, Duhem, Tannery, Pearson, Shipley, Whetham, Libby, and Sedgwick, this phase of historical interpretation has been sadly neglected by recent historians, though Mr. F. S. Marvin, Professor Lynn Thorndike, and Professor C. H. Haskins have recently shown its promising potentialities. It has been emphasized incidentally by Professors Lamprecht, Seignobos, Shotwell, and Robinson in their synthetic interpretation of history, but it remains the least exploited and yet, perhaps, the most promising of all the special phases of historical interpretation. Its adherents claim a more

<sup>16</sup> S. Mathews, *The Spiritual Interpretation of History*; see also B. Croce, *History: Its Theory and Practice*; and H. O. Taylor, *The Freedom of the Mind in History*.

fundamental causal importance than can be assigned to the economic interpretation, in that they contend that the prevailing state of scientific knowledge and application will determine the existing modes of economic life and activities.<sup>17</sup>

Especially fruitful has been the anthropological interpretation of history. While not ignoring the contributions of earlier students, modern anthropology owed its origin primarily to the researches and writings of Tylor in England, Bastian in Germany, and Boas in America.<sup>18</sup> Its purpose is, according to Professor Boas, "to reconstruct the early history of mankind, and, wherever possible, to express in the form of laws ever-recurring modes of historical happenings." The chief point of contact between anthropology and history is found in the attempt of the former to discover and formulate the laws of cultural evolution. With the controversies between the older school of unilateral evolutionists, represented by Spencer, Avebury, Morgan, and Frazer, the more recent advocates of the doctrine of "diffusion," such as F. Graebner, W. H. R. Rivers, and Elliot Smith, and the exponents of the so-called theory of the "convergent development" of cultural similarities and repetitions, among the most important of whom are Ehrenreich, Boas, Lowie, Goldenweiser, and Kroeber, it will be impossible to deal in this place.<sup>19</sup> It will be sufficient to insist upon the fact that no historian can regard himself as competent to attempt any large synthesis of historical material without having thoroughly acquainted

<sup>17</sup> See A. Hansen, "The Technological Interpretation of History," in *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, November, 1921.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. A. C. Haddon, *History of Anthropology*. See A. A. Goldenweiser in H. E. Barnes, *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, Chap. v.

<sup>19</sup> A good summary of the literature of these theoretical positions in modern anthropology is contained in A. A. Goldenweiser's "The Principle of Limited Possibilities in the Development of Culture," *Journal of American Folklore*, 1913, Vol. XXVI. See also his "Four Phases of Anthropological Thought," in *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1921, R. H. Lowie's *Culture and Ethnology*; and F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, Chap. vii.

himself with these fundamental attempts to bring definite laws of cultural development out of the chaos of historical facts. An attempt to link up cultural anthropology with a dynamic history has recently been made in thoughtful books by Professors Teggart and Kroeber of the University of California.<sup>20</sup> Dr. Goldenweiser in a highly theoretical article has endeavored to provide a set of categories and a systematic methodological point of departure for scientific history and critical anthropology.<sup>21</sup>

The closely related sociological interpretation of history goes as far back as the Muslim, Ibn Khaldun; was developed by Vico, Turgot, Ferguson, Condorcet, Comte, and Spencer; and has its ablest modern representatives in Professor Giddings of Columbia, Professor Thomas of Chicago, and Professor Hobhouse of London.<sup>22</sup> Professor Giddings admirably describes this theory as "an attempt to account for the origin, structure and activities of society by the operation of physical, vital and psychical causes, working together in a process of evolution."<sup>23</sup> As a genetic social science, it works hand in hand with cultural anthropology in the effort to explain the repetitions and uniformities in historical development and to formulate the laws of historical causation.

But the latest, most inclusive, and most important of all types of historical interpretation, and the one which, perhaps, most perfectly represents the newer history, is the synthetic or "collective psychological." According to this

<sup>20</sup> F. J. Teggart, *Prolegomena to History*, and *The Processes of History*; and A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology*.

<sup>21</sup> A. A. Goldenweiser, "History, Psychology and Culture: A Set of Categories for an Introduction to Social Science," in *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 1918.

<sup>22</sup> This statement is not to be taken as an indication of the position of these writers in the general sociological field, but refers merely to their preeminence in the field of historical sociology. See below Chap. v.

<sup>23</sup> F. H. Giddings, *The Principles of Sociology*, p. 8, but see particularly his "A Theory of Social Causation," *Publications of the American Economic Association*, 3rd series, Vol. V, No. 2, and his "A Theory of History," in the *Political Science Quarterly*, December, 1920. Both of these are reprinted in his *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*.

type of historical interpretation no single category of "causes" is sufficient to explain all phases and periods of historical development. Nothing less than the collective psychology of any period can be deemed adequate to determine the historical development of that age, and it is the task of the historian to discover, evaluate, and set forth the chief factors which create and shape the collective view of life and determine the nature of the group struggle for existence and improvement. The most eminent leaders of this school of historical interpretation, though with widely divergent antecedents and points of view, have been Professor Lamprecht of Leipzig; Professor Weber of Heidelberg; Professor Ferrero of Italy; Professors Tarde, Lévy-Bruhl, Fouillée, Seignobos, and Durkheim of Paris; Professors Marvin, Zimmern, and Tawney of London; Professors Robinson, Shotwell, and Shepherd of Columbia University; Professor Veblen of New York; and Professors Burr, Smith and Becker of Cornell University. Their general doctrine has gained particular acceptance in France, probably on account of the early and extensive development of social psychology in that country.<sup>24</sup>

#### 4. *The Future of History.*

Even this scanty sketch will reveal to the most casual reader the fact that the "New History" is not a dream of the future, but a present and powerful reality. The most impregnable position of the older political and epistodical history has been our universities, which have been mainly dominated by professors trained in Germany, and, as a consequence, thoroughly enamored of the typical German historiography of the nineteenth century with its adulation of the state. A fine sense of propriety, a strong professional *esprit de corps*, impressive dignity, and no little solemnity have further served to render the respectable historians effectively immune to the irritating

<sup>24</sup>For an illustration of this point of view see Robinson's *Mind in the Making*, see also below Chap. III.

seductions of the natural and social scientists, and the distressing novelties of the cultural historian.

The fact that the university is the chief source of historical training and inspiration has served to perpetuate this older variety of history until it has become so anachronistic as to threaten the very existence of history itself. The vital question is as to whether the academic historians will awaken to the fact that the majority of them have dropped behind the procession and will readjust their vision of history so as to absorb these new developments, or whether they will allow them to be taken up by psychology, economics, sociology, geography, jurisprudence and natural science, until history becomes like a recluse shut off from the world of real life and vital activities and perishes from atrophy.

The inflexible and archaic attitude of the current historiography lost for history the department of economic history, in which the most important historical work of the last quarter of a century has been accomplished. For instance, with such noble subjects for its attention as the toilet of Louis XIV, the duplicity of Kaunitz, the immorality of Louis XV, the Reign of Terror, or the Battle of Austerlitz, the current type of history could not stoop to examine such problems as the economic policy of Colbert, the financial reforms of Turgot or the economic aspects of the Continental System, and, as a result, the departments of economics in our universities had to receive and cultivate this outcast but most important phase of history.

It remains to be seen whether history will permit this process to go on until all the fruitful phases of historical investigation have been absorbed by other more alert departments of study. Classical studies were saved from their threatened demise by a shifting of emphasis from syntax to civilization. We have yet to discover whether history will exhibit a similar sagacity by shifting the emphasis from episodes, politics, battles and scandals to a

study of the vital processes of social and cultural development.

While there is an ever-increasing volume of works which embody the viewpoint of the newer history, there is no decided general movement on the part of American universities to modernize the historical curriculum. Columbia was once the leader in this movement, and there the classes of Professors Shepherd, Robinson and Shotwell in the "new history" had a heavier registration than the total enrolment of the historical department in all other courses combined. Professor Beard threw new light on our early national history; and the monographic studies on the Civil War and Reconstruction directed or executed by Professor Dunning first made possible a synthetic view of that vital period. Chicago, Pennsylvania, Cornell and Wisconsin have shown some tendency to follow Columbia's lead in this respect. The work of Professors Farrand and Andrews in Yale and of Professors Pound, Turner, Gay, Abbott and Haskins in Harvard is also conspicuous for its modernity and breadth of view. In the normal schools and secondary schools the older approach to history is in most cases even less disturbed in its complacent slumbers.<sup>25</sup>

If the "new history" prevails in the contest which is now going on, one may be assured that the ultimate result will be to revolutionize completely our present view of the subject-matter of history until it will seem as absurd, for example, to study English history exclusively in Gardiner, Seeley or Freeman as it would appear to the historian of the old type to conduct a class in English history on the basis of Prothero's *English Farming, Past and Present*, or to organize European history about Garrison's *History of Medicine*.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Cf. *Historical Outlook*, December, 1923, pp. 359-60.

<sup>26</sup> The most suggestive work along this line is J. H. Robinson's *The New History*. Remarkable achievements in producing samples of the "new history" are J. H. Breasted's *Ancient Times*, and Preserved Smith's *Age of the Reformation*.

No better conclusion could be found for this chapter than the words of Professor Robinson: "The 'New History' is escaping from the limitations formerly imposed upon a study of the past. It will come in time consciously to meet our daily needs; it will avail itself of all those discoveries that are being made about mankind by anthropologists and sociologists—discoveries which during the last fifty years have served to revolutionize our ideas of the origin, progress and prospects of our race. . . . History must not be regarded as a stationary subject which can only progress by refining its methods and accumulating, criticizing and assimilating new material, but it is bound to alter its ideals and aims with the general progress of society and the social sciences, and it will ultimately play an infinitely more important rôle in our intellectual life than it has hitherto done."<sup>27</sup>

## SELECTED REFERENCES

- H. E. Barnes, "History Its Rise and Development," in *Encyclopedia Americana*  
 J. S. Bassett, *The Middle Group of American Historians*  
 C. Becker, "Some Aspects of the Influence of Social Problems and Ideas upon the Study and Writing of History," in *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol VII, 1912  
 B. Croce, *History Its Theory and Practice*  
 E. Fueter, *L'Histoire de l'Historiographie moderne*  
 G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century*  
 J. F. Jameson, *History of Historical Writing in America*  
 K. Lamprecht, *What is History?*  
 M. Ritter, *Die Entwicklung der Geschichtswissenschaft*  
 J. H. Robinson, *The New History*  
 J. T. Shotwell, "History," in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, eleventh edition  
 J. T. Shotwell, *An Introduction to the History of History*  
 H. M. Stephens, *History*

<sup>27</sup> *The New History*, pp 24-5



## CHAPTER II

### THE RELATION OF GEOGRAPHY TO THE WRITING AND INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY \*

#### I. BRIEF SKETCH OF THE RISE OF THEORIES REGARDING THE INFLUENCE OF GEOGRAPHY UPON THE HISTORICAL DE- VELOPMENT OF PEOPLES.

MANY historians have been startled by what they regarded as the unique and original doctrines of Ellsworth Huntington calling attention to the relation between geography and certain aspects of history, but, as a matter of fact, this approach to the interpretation of the progress of society is as old as history itself<sup>1</sup> The subject was first systematically discussed by the contemporary of Herodotus and Thucydides, the physician Hippocrates of Cos (c. 460-370 B C.), in his work on *Airs, Waters, and Places*. While primarily concerned with the relation between the physical environment and the pathogenesis of disease, Hippocrates digressed into a discussion of the relation of geographical surroundings to the character of peoples, and presented an interesting account of the effect of climate and topography upon the physical characteristics and the political tendencies of the peoples of Asia and southeastern Europe.<sup>2</sup> Aristotle found a geographical explanation for the assumed superiority of the Greeks over the barbarians. He con-

\* Revision of a paper prepared for the spring meeting of the New England Teachers' Association, Clark University, March 19, 1921

<sup>1</sup> A brief and ill proportioned survey of the history of this subject is contained in A. H. Koller's, *The Theory of Environment*. The authoritative survey is that by Franklin Thomas, *The Environmental Basis of Society* (1925). Much of value on the earlier period is to be found in A. Meuten's *Boden's Theorie von der Beeinflussung des politischen Lebens der Staaten durch ihre geographische Lage*.

<sup>2</sup> *Works of Hippocrates*, trans. by Adams, London, 1841, Vol. I, pp. 190-222.

tended that by virtue of their intermediate geographical position the Greeks were able to combine the superior mental attainments of southern peoples and the greater bravery of northerners, while escaping the fickleness of the southerners and the stupidity of the inhabitants of cold climates.<sup>3</sup> Strabo (64 B.C.-19 A.D.) was not only the greatest geographer of antiquity; he also contributed much of value on the theory of the relation between topography, climate and civilization, as well as presenting much descriptive material on the environments of the leading contemporary peoples.<sup>4</sup>

The Roman writers made use of environmental doctrine to explain the alleged superiority of the Roman polity and culture. Cicero (106-43 B.C.) pointed to the excellent strategic position and the topographic advantages of the city of Rome, while Vitruvius (c. 30 B.C.) commented upon the favorable climate and astral influences of Italy.<sup>5</sup> Vegetius (c. 375 A.D.) attempted to explain the military prowess of various nations on the basis of the influences derived from their differing geographical environments.<sup>6</sup> Paul the Deacon (725-800) in his *History of the Lombards* discussed the relation of geographical environment to the characteristics of the Germanic barbarians.<sup>7</sup> Both stressed the military superiority of northern people.

In the medieval period St Thomas Aquinas (1227-1274) revived the doctrines of Aristotle on the question of environmental influences and gave them vogue among scholastic philosophers.<sup>8</sup> The Muslim historian, Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), combined the Arabian appropriation of Aristotle with the progress of geographical science among the Arabs

<sup>3</sup> *Politics*, Jowett's translation, II, 7

<sup>4</sup> H F Tozer, *History of Ancient Geography, Selections from Strabo*, and the English translation of Strabo's *Geography* in the Bohn Library

<sup>5</sup> Cicero, *De republica*, I, 3, Vitruvius, *The Ten Books on Architecture*, trans by Morgan, Book VI, Chap 1

<sup>6</sup> Vegetius, *De re militari*, I, 2

<sup>7</sup> Paul the Deacon, *History of the Langobards*, trans by W D Foulke

<sup>8</sup> Aquinas, *De regimine principum*, II, 1-14

in what was the most thorough analysis of geographical influences upon human society which had appeared down to his time.<sup>9</sup> The French political philosopher and historian, Jean Bodin (1530-1596), contended that their geographic situation had made the French the foremost nation of the world, and analyzed in some detail the effect of topography and climate upon the inhabitants of a geographical region. According to Bodin, this knowledge possessed pragmatic value to the statesman. He could know thereby how to adapt institutions to the environment, and avoid revolutions.<sup>10</sup>

The chief defect in these early doctrines was that they were based upon fallacious scientific postulates, namely the Greek physical philosophy and physiological chemistry and the belief in astrology. When they attempted an ultimate explanation of geographical influences these writers resorted to the doctrine of the four elements in man's bodily constitution, the four humors which determined his health, and the influence of astral bodies on the constitution and the destiny of man. Between the time of Bodin and that of Montesquieu (1689-1755), Boyle, Stahl and other seventeenth century scientists had destroyed the grotesque body of Greek physical philosophy and established the inductive or experimental method in science. Tycho Brahe, Galileo and Kepler had discredited astrology. Hence, though Montesquieu may have in part formulated his doctrines of geographic determinism from experimentation as to the effect of heat and cold upon a sheep's tongue, such procedure marked a great advance over Empedocles, Hippocrates and astrological hypotheses.

Richard Mead, an English physician of note, under the influence of Isaac Newton's scientific discoveries, composed

<sup>9</sup> Ibn Khaldun, *Prolégomènes historiques*, trans by M G De Slane Cf. R. Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History in France*, 1894, pp 158 ff

<sup>10</sup> Jean Bodin, *The Six Bookes of a Commonweale*, trans by Richard Knolles, Book V, Chap 1 Cf Meuten, op cit, Fournol, Bodin, *prédécesseur de Montesquieu*, Flint, op cit pp. 190-200.

the first modern treatise on the effect of the atmosphere upon human conduct and vitality, *The Power of the Sun and Moon over Human Bodies* (1704). An even more comprehensive and suggestive work was John Arbuthnot's *Essay on the Effects of Air on Human Bodies* (1733), which is said by Dedieu to have furnished Montesquieu with most of his views with respect to the effect of climate on man. The brilliant young German physician, Bernhardus Varenus (1622-50), in his *Geographia generalis* not only created the framework for the modern science of geography, but also foreshadowed the work of Ritter in comparative geography. The *Travels* of Sir John Chardin (1667-1735) did much to popularize the knowledge of extra-European lands, particularly the near Orient, and were widely used later by such writers as Montesquieu. Finally, Vico (1668-1744) in his *Scienza Nuova* anticipated Montesquieu in his appropriation of these advances for social science.

The beginning of scientific anthropogeography is conventionally associated with the appearance in 1817-18 of the first edition of Karl Ritter's *Die Erdkunde im Verhältniss zur Natur und zur Geschichte der Menschen*. A number of phases of progress in geographical and other sciences served to make possible Ritter's monumental work and to give its views wide currency. Montesquieu discussed the importance of a knowledge of geographical environment, particularly climate, in understanding the customs, laws and civilization of peoples, and the school of historians, led by Heeren, who adhered to his views, naturally emphasized the significance of geographical factors.<sup>11</sup> Montesquieu's work was subjected to constructive criticism by Turgot (1727-1781) and Charles Comte (1782-1837).<sup>12</sup> Romanticism was foreshadowed by Herder who inquired at length into the geographical factors which entered into the shap-

<sup>11</sup> Montesquieu, *The Spirit of Laws*, Books XIV, XVII, Heeren, *Ideen über die Politik, den Verkehr, und den Handel der vornehmsten Völker der Alten Welt* (trans. by Tolboys, 1833)

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Flint, op cit, pp 286-7, 577-9

ing of national character.<sup>13</sup> The progress and utilization of geographical discovery, best typified perhaps by the work of Alexander von Humboldt, vastly increased the body of geographical data and helped to shape the subject of physical geography.<sup>14</sup>

The period from Ritter to Ratzel marks the transition to a scientific and specialized treatment of geographic facts and their relation to history. Ritter's *Erdkunde* and various courses of lectures on human geography constitute the first synthetic study of geographic factors in their relation to mankind. United to an unprecedented command of the concrete facts of geography and their specific operation on man, he possessed a sort of religious or teleological outlook, which represented nature as the arena for a divine plan or scheme of historical unfolding—a kind of anthropogeographical Hegelianism not uncommon in writers of his time. He insisted upon the adoption of the strict observational method, and a cautious exploitation of the theory of geographical determinism. Nature, he held, works slowly and in an extremely complex manner. Again, geographic factors have different degrees of influence upon man in various stages of his cultural evolution. What may at one time be an obstacle may at a later period constitute a great aid and stimulus to cultural growth. In general, geographic influences are most important in their action upon man in the primitive stages of human development. As man develops in knowledge and technical equipment he becomes progressively better able to master nature, and the geographic forms of control decline in the degree of their determining influence. With these qualifications upon the naive use of the geographical interpretation which had characterized some of his predecessors, Ritter contributed

<sup>13</sup> Herder, *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*, trans by Churchill, 1800. Cf. Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History*, (1874 edition), pp. 375-86.

<sup>14</sup> Humboldt, *Ansichten der Natur* (English trans. 1850), also *Cosmos*, Vol. I.

much of importance as to the actual geographic influences on man. It is geography which gives individuality to nations and produces the variety of customs and occupations, which are a product of man's reaction to differing environments. The temperate climate is best adapted for cultural progress. The ideal configuration and topography is that of Europe, which is midway between the extreme diffusion and incoherence of Polynesia and the excessive compactness of Africa. This, together with its location in the temperate zone, has made Europe designed by nature to lead the world in civilization. Thus, as ancient writers, Bodin and others had accounted for Europe's superiority on the basis of her intermediate climatic position between the hot and cold zones, so Ritter explained it as being primarily due to its intermediate configuration between the dispersed islands of Polynesia and the compactness of the African continent.<sup>15</sup> Ritter's spirit can, perhaps, best be illustrated in brief form in the following citation.<sup>16</sup>

We have to keep constantly in mind that there is such a truth as the contemporaneous existence of things, as well as their chronological sequence. The science which embraces the affairs of place can just as little do without a measure of the order of events in point of time, as the science which embraces the affairs of time can dispense with the theatre of observation where those affairs can be brought before the eyes of man. History demands such a theatre for its own development, it must, whether it declares the need or not, have a geographical department—a field where it may display its events. On the other hand, geographical science can just as little dispense with the historical element, if it wishes to take rank as embracing all the relations of extents on the earth's surface—not as an imperfect and partial thing, the mere frame and rafters of a structure, but the whole perfected dwelling itself, comely, shapely, and in every part complete.

Since Ritter's day it has become more and more difficult for the competent and self-respecting historian to neglect

<sup>15</sup> Most of Ritter's important theoretical work has been translated by W. L. Gage in a book entitled *Ritter's Geographical Studies* (1863). On Ritter and the subsequent development of anthropogeography see E. A. Wütsche, *Die geschichtliche Bewegung und ihre geographische Bedingtheit* (1899).

<sup>16</sup> Ritter, in Gage, op. cit., pp. 242-3.

the geographic factors in the historical development of the area which he has taken for his special field of study.

Next in order to Ritter in arousing an interest in the relations between geography and history was Arnold Henry Guyot (1807-84), a Swiss pupil of Ritter, who was induced by Agassiz to come to America, and who became professor of geology at Princeton in 1854. As a geologist and geographer he did important technical work in the study of glaciation and the early study of meteorology. As a promoter of human geography his contributions fall under three chief heads. In the first place, he presented one of the most eloquent and convincing statements which we have of the superior nature and advantages of the temperate climate in its promotion of civilization.<sup>17</sup> In the second place, he anticipated Vallaux and Cowan in contending that the chief dynamic factor in history is the contact and co-operation of the diverse human cultures that are produced by the varied geographic environments of the world.<sup>18</sup> Finally, he foreshadowed Metchukoff, Huntington and others by his concept of "the geographic march of history," namely, the progression of cultures from their origins in the semi-tropical fluvial areas of the ancient Orient, to the more temperate regions of the thalassic area of the Mediterranean basin, and, finally, to the expansion of European culture over the world with the conquest of the Atlantic.<sup>19</sup> In this process Guyot saw the hand of God operating through a dominating moral purpose. One of the most conspicuous things about Guyot was his unusual literary powers which served to gain popularity for his writings, though they did little to advance the science of anthropogeography in America.

Perhaps the leading figure in German anthropogeogra-

<sup>17</sup> Guyot's views are summarized in his *Earth and Man: Comparative Physical Geography*, originally delivered as Lowell Lectures in 1848. Reference here is made to the second revised edition of 1876. On the superiority of the temperate climate see pp. 252 ff.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 272.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 300 ff.

phy between Ritter and Peschel was Johann Georg Kohl (1808-1878). He was equally noted as an extremely wide traveler, as an acute observer of geographical facts, and as an authority upon the history of cartography and of explorations. He was one of the greatest and most widely read writers on experiences of travel in the whole nineteenth century. His works on descriptive geography covered most of the earth's surface, but were especially full on eastern Europe and North America. He was probably the most voluminous European writer on the history of the discovery of the United States. His two chief works on anthropogeography were *Der Verkehr und die Ansiedelungen der Menschen in ihrer Abhängigkeit von der Gestalt der Erdoberfläche* (1841) and *Die geographische Lage der Hauptstädte Europas* (1874).

As a student in the University of Göttingen, in 1828, he came under the influence of Heeren and from him derived his notion of the significance of commerce and material factors in the evolution of civilization. He was also profoundly affected by Ritter's view of the relation between the physical factors of the earth's surface and the course of human history. In his very latest works, especially the above mentioned one of 1874, he brought in the idea of the organic nature of nations and of human society—a conception which so conspicuously affected the later work of Ratzel. Even his two chief theoretical works on anthropogeography were mainly descriptive rather than analytical. As a fundamental proposition he held that "the task of geography is this, namely, to trace out and to demonstrate the evident relationship between the situation and configuration of countries and the course of the history of their inhabitants."<sup>20</sup> He set forth the general nature of the relationship between the state and social organization, on the one hand, and geographical forms and processes on the

<sup>20</sup> *Die geographische Lage der Hauptstädte Europas*, "Vorwort," p. vii. The greater portion of this work is descriptive, but the "Vorwort" contains an excellent brief summary of his theoretical position.



other. Social progress depends upon the concentration of population and its effective control and direction through the knowledge and will of man. But both of these rest in turn upon the physical surroundings—fertility and topography—on the one hand, and on the development of the state and social institutions on the other. Social evolution is a resultant of these two forces, and in this process of development human society, both generally and in local units, reacts toward its geographical surroundings as an animal organism towards its physical environment.<sup>21</sup>

Oscar Peschel (1826-1875) ranks with Kohl among the important transitional figures between Ritter and Ratzel. He was rather more competent as an academic geologist and physical geographer than Ritter, and less active in promoting the cause of elucidating the relation between geography and history. His three chief theoretical contributions to human geography are his views on the geographic basis of the origins of civilization, the relation between natural resources and the location of populations, and the climatic and topographic theory of religious origins. In regard to the origins of civilization, he took the position later elaborated by Metchnikoff, namely, that civilizations arise where the environment can support a dense population. "If we ask the question as to in what regions of the earth's fastness human society could earliest arrive at a comparatively advanced state of maturity, we must answer that it was where the greatest density of population was most mitigated by the favorable nature of the region."<sup>22</sup> In explaining the location of the great civilizations and the greatest density of population, Peschel contended that it was

<sup>21</sup> Kohl, *op cit*, "Vorwort" In his *Theory of Environment* A. H. Koller gives on pages 32 to 34 certain significant summary passages from Kohl's earlier work published in 1841. Also see Koller, pp 34-6, 39, 46-7 (especially the notes), for other leading German writers on the subject in this period.

<sup>22</sup> Peschel's best summary of his theoretical position in human geography is contained in his "Über die Bedeutung der Erdkunde für die Culturgeschichte," in Vol I of his *Abhandlungen zur Erd- und Völkerkunde*, Leipzig, 1877, pp 457-72.

due either to the presence of unusually good natural resources or special commercial advantages in gathering and distributing such products.<sup>23</sup> In his theory of the origin of high forms of religions, particularly monotheism, Peschel contended that they arose chiefly in semi-tropical, and particularly in desert areas, where the leisure and opportunity for philosophical and religious reflection are greater than in the temperate or colder zones, where more of man's time is consumed in productive effort to sustain himself and perpetuate his kind.<sup>24</sup>

Probably no writer's works have been more misunderstood or misinterpreted than those of Henry Thomas Buckle (1821-1862). Actually, one of the first important exponents of the psychological and cultural interpretation of history, he has been frequently accused of being one of the more extreme of the geographical determinists. Buckle's fundamental aim was to make history an exact science of cultural development, and one phase of this effort lay in the attempt to estimate the importance of external or geographic factors on the development of civilization. His conclusion in this regard was unmistakably that psychic processes are the most important factors in history, and that while the geographical conditions are unquestionably very important in the earlier periods of human culture, they become less and less so as civilization develops. To this position and interpretation even the most critical cultural historian and anthropologist could heartily subscribe. With some of Buckle's specific views on geographical influences there might be less thorough agreement. His efforts here were chiefly in the way of explaining the effect of climate, soil and food, and the "aspects of nature" on human cultures. The first three factors are examined with respect to their operation on the accumulation and distribution of wealth and the creation of eco-

<sup>23</sup> *The Races of Man*, pp 209 ff

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid*, pp 308 ff

nomie and social classes. Perhaps his most original view is that low wages and standards of living are usually correlated with a bountiful environment, because plentiful food makes possible a dense population and, hence, an oversupply of laborers. His notions as to the alleged direct effects of the scenery or "aspects of nature" upon man have been less uniformly approved. He contended that too majestic and impressive scenery, like that of northern India, overawed man and begot a form of paralyzing inferiority-complex which produced arrested civilizations. A variegated and stimulating array of scenery, such as that in the Greek peninsula, was the type best adapted to produce a progressive civilization.<sup>25</sup> Few critical writers now believe in any such direct effect of nature upon man, which in part rests upon an unconscious ascription of a sort of tourist psychology to the natives of any region. Probably the most enduring contribution of Buckle in this field was his exemplification of the consciousness on the part of an historian of the importance of the geographic factor in history, though it may be doubted whether his type of theoretical analysis in this field was as significant as the contemporary work of Curtius and others in investigating the details of the historical geography of certain specific human cultural areas.

## II. SOME NOTABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTHROPOGEOGRAPHY.

A brief catalogue of the more significant works on various phases of anthropogeography will suffice to indicate the large amount of relevant material which this group of writers has put at the disposal of historians. Peschel, Ratzel, Richthofen and Kirchhoff in Germany; Reclus, Vidal de la Blache, Vallaux and Brunhes in France; and Huntington and Miss Semple in the United States have contributed

\* H. T. Buckle, *History of Civilisation in England*, Vol I, Chap. ii. J. M. Robertson's *Buckle and His Critics*, is an excellent corrective of the usual misinterpretations of Buckle's views

systematic works on anthropogeography which deal with nearly every phase of geographic influences on man.<sup>26</sup>

Fully as important as the systematic works upon the subject are the writings of those who have considered special aspects of environmental influences. The influence of topography in its general implications has been discussed by Demolins, Cowan and Vallaux. Demolins has pointed out the relation of natural routes of travel and communication to the movements, habitats and culture of peoples.<sup>27</sup> Cowan has combined the environmental doctrine with the Gumpłowicz theory of group-conflict as the chief progressive force in society. Holding that progress can come only where there is enough social mixture and conflict to prevent cultural stagnation, and yet not so great a degree of invasion as to produce continuous warfare and destruction, he has attempted to prove that the great historic nations have evolved in those districts where the topography secured protection without at the same time causing isolation.<sup>28</sup> Vallaux contends that progress is possible only where there is an adequate degree of social differentiation and division of labor, and he holds that this condition can exist only in a region of variegated topography and climate.<sup>29</sup>

The importance of rivers, of the sea and of the ocean for the movements of peoples and the expansion of civilization has been touched upon by Metchnikoff and Mackinder, and

<sup>26</sup> F. Ratzel, *Anthropogeographie*; and *Politische Geographie*. The best summary of Ratzel's views is contained in Chap. III of Vol. I of Helmolt's *Weltgeschichte*, of which an English translation is available. An excellent brief sketch of Ratzel's contributions is contained in Brunhes' *Human Geography*, pp. 31-35. A. Kirchhoff, *Mensch und Erde* (English translation, (1914), E. Reclus, *L'Homme et la terre*, P. Vidal de la Blache, *Principes de géographie humaine*, C. Vallaux, *Géographie sociale, le sol et l'état*; J. Brunhes, *La Géographie humaine* (English translation, 1920), E. Huntington (and S. W. Cushing), *Principles of Human Geography*, E. C. Semple, *The Influences of Geographic Environment*.

<sup>27</sup> E. Demolins, *Comment la route crée le type social* (English translation in publication).

<sup>28</sup> A. R. Cowan, *Master Clues in World History*.

<sup>29</sup> Vallaux, *op. cit.*, pp. 174 ff., 244 ff.

systematically studied by Vallaux.<sup>30</sup> The historical significance of the great oriental river basins has been indicated by Léon Metchnikoff, who has tried to demonstrate that they supplied the indispensable conditions of fertility of soil and concentration of population under which man could make his first steps towards civilization. He further contends that the chief stages of civilization have been those founded upon a river, then a sea or thalassic, and finally an oceanic environment.<sup>31</sup> Le Play and Geddes have analyzed the river basin as a natural geographic region which has been the unit of cultural evolution and should constitute the basis for social reconstruction.<sup>32</sup> The relation of strategic geographical position to political and economic power has been pointed out by Ratzel, Demolins and Cowan, but has been most strikingly worked out by H. J. Mackinder. In particular he has contended that the pivotal area in the old world is the great Eurasiatic steppe region, and he maintains that the state possessing this district has the key to the domination of the eastern hemisphere.<sup>33</sup>

Climate, in both its static and dynamic aspects has claimed the attention of Ellsworth Huntington in several daring and original volumes. He has not only attempted to correlate culture and civilization with the presence of certain specific climatic conditions, but, following out the suggestions of Holdich and Kropotkin, has also made an effort to connect great historic changes with what he assumes to be marked climatic oscillations.<sup>34</sup> Less spectacular but more reliable work has been done in this field by J. Hann and R. De C. Ward.<sup>35</sup> The relation of climatic

<sup>30</sup> C. Vallaux, *Géographie sociale la mer*, cf. also F. Ratzel, *Das Meer*

<sup>31</sup> L. Metchnikoff, *La Civilisation et les grands fleuves historiques*

<sup>32</sup> F. Le Play, *La Réforme sociale*, P. Geddes, *Cities in Evolution*, Geddes and Branford, *The Coming Polity*

<sup>33</sup> H. J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History" in *Geographical Journal*, April, 1904, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, Cf. Teggart, *Processes of History*, Chap. 11

<sup>34</sup> E. Huntington, *The Pulse of Asia; Civilization and Climate; World Power and Evolution, Climatic Changes*, and *Earth and Sun*

<sup>35</sup> R. D. C. Ward, *Climate*. The standard reference work on climate is J. Hann's *Handbuch der Klimatologie*, cf. also the work of W. Köppen

influences to international relations has been discussed by Kidd, Ripley and Woodruff, particularly with reference to the possibility of the white race inhabiting the tropics as permanent occupants. Ripley contends that this is still an open question, but Woodruff is confident that climatic and solar influences will operate to prevent permanent large-scale white settlement in the tropics.<sup>36</sup> Ripley has further produced a monumental work on the relation between physical environment and racial characteristics. Huntington has recently contended that the alleged racial traits are but specific human reactions to particular environmental conditions.<sup>37</sup> Leffingwell has sought to correlate seasonal changes with certain aberrations of conduct.<sup>38</sup> Dexter has contributed the most thorough study of the effect of temporary oscillations of the weather upon human conduct, energy and vitality.<sup>39</sup> An even more ambitious study has been undertaken by W. Hellpach in his *Die Geopsychischen Erscheinungen*.

Brunhes has insisted that any comprehensive account of environmental influences must include a consideration of the artificial environment which man has contributed. For a majority of the population of the modern western world the artificial environment of the industrial city is of more significance than the geographical features of adjacent regions, even though the very existence of the city in a particular region depended upon the original facts of geographic location and opportunities. Special attention must be given to man's exploitation and alteration of the natural geographical environment, a matter emphasized by Brunhes and R. L. Sherlock.<sup>40</sup> In this connection also should be

<sup>36</sup> W. Z. Ripley, *The Races of Europe*, Chap. xxi, C. E. Woodruff, *The Effect of Tropical Light on White Man, The Expansion of Races; and Medical Ethnology*.

<sup>37</sup> Ripley, *op. cit.*, Huntington, *The Character of Races*.

<sup>38</sup> A. Leffingwell, *The Influence of Seasons upon Conduct*.

<sup>39</sup> E. G. Dexter, *Conduct and the Weather, and Weather Influences*.

<sup>40</sup> J. Brunhes, *La Géographie humaine*. An English translation of this extremely important work has appeared. It is entitled *Human Geography* and is published by Rand, McNally & Co. Cf. R. L. Sherlock, *Man as a Geological Agent*.

mentioned Poete and Bonnier's important periodical *La Vie urbaine*. City geography has been cultivated by Geddes and Fleure in England, by Blanchard and Gallois in France, by Hasert and Geisler in Germany, and by Mark Jefferson in the United States.

In this section one would also need to include the many important studies of the natural resources of our planet, their location, exploitation and mode of distribution throughout the world, which are embodied in the numerous works on economic and commercial geography. In this class of books certainly should be mentioned the general works on economic geography by Karl Dove, J. F. Niermeyer, F. Heiderich, M. Dubois and J. C. Kergomard, P. Clerget, J. MacFarlane, J. Russell Smith, W. D. Jones and O. D. VonEngeln; and the special studies of the economic geography of the British Empire by A. Demangeon, Emil Deckert, E. Geddes and S. Barrow, of the United States by Deckert and K. Hassert, of Austria-Hungary by Heiderich and P. Teleki, and of the Balkans and the Near East by K. Hassert and R. Marek.<sup>41</sup> In the field of commercial geography mention should be made of the works of Dove, K. Andree, R. Sieger, Heiderich, A. Allix, P. Clerget, G. G. Chisholm and J. R. Smith.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>41</sup> K. Dove, *Allgemeine Wirtschaftsgeographie*; F. Heiderich, *Wirtschaftsgeographie*; Dubois and Kergomard, *Précis de géographie économique*, P. Clerget, *Géographie économique*, J. MacFarlane, *Economic Geography*, J. R. Smith, *The World's Food Resources*, W. D. Jones, *An Introduction to Economic Geography*, O. D. Von Engeln, *Inheriting the Earth*, A. Demangeon, *L'Empire britannique*, E. Deckert, *Das britische Weltreich*, Geddes and Barrow (Eds.), *The Resources of the Empire* (12 Volumes), E. Deckert, *Die Länder Nordamerikas in ihrer wirtschaftsgeographischen Ausrüstung*, K. Hassert, *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika als politische und wirtschaftliche Weltmacht geographisch betrachtet*, F. Heiderich, *Die weltpolitische und weltwirtschaftliche Zukunft Österreich-Ungarns*, P. Teleki, many works in German and Hungarian, and *The Evolution of Hungary and Its Place in European Politics*, K. Hassert, *Das türkische Reich*, R. Marek, *Südost-Europa und Vorder Asien*.

<sup>42</sup> K. Dove, *Allgemeine Verkehrsgeographie*, K. Andree, *Geographie des Welthandels*, new edition by R. Sieger and F. Heiderich, A. Allix, various works on the geography of trade and fairs, P. Clerget, *Manuel de géographie commerciale*, G. G. Chisholm, *Handbook of Commercial Geography*, J. R. Smith, *The Organization of Ocean Commerce*, *Industrial and Commercial Geography*.

### III. SOME LEADING CONTRIBUTIONS OF GEOGRAPHERS TO THE PHYSIOGRAPHY AND HUMAN GEOGRAPHY OF THE CHIEF CULTURAL AREAS AND STATES IN HUMAN HISTORY.

At the outset in this section should be listed such representative comprehensive works on the general physical geography of the world as those by H. Wagner, W. Ule, A. Supan, A. Philippson, G. Marinelli, G. Schott, E. de Martonne, and W. M. Davis.<sup>48</sup> To these might be added such regional surveys of the world as H. R. Mills' *International Geography*, and H. J. Mackinder's series, *The Regions of the World*. On the borderland between physical and human geography is Elisée Reclus's *Nouvelle géographie universelle*, translated into English as *The Earth and Its Inhabitants*. Next we should put the general works on anthropogeography, such as those by Ratzel, Kirchhoff, Reclus, Vidal de la Blache, Brunhes, Semple and Huntington. Then would come the general surveys of the specific relation of geography to the history of man in such books as A. J. Herbertson's *Man and His Work*, James Fairgrieve's *Geography and World-Power*, E. Protheroe's *The Dominion of Man*, Brunhes and Vallaux's *La Géographie de l'histoire*, and Lucien Febvre's *La Terre et l'évolution humaine*. An admirable theoretical discussion of the subject is contained in a recent article by Professor John C. Merriam, "The Earth Sciences as the Background of History," in the *Scientific Monthly*, January, 1921.

When we come to the Mediterranean theater of oriental and classical history we have the great work of A.

<sup>48</sup> H. Wagner, *Lehrbuch der Geographie*, W. Ule, *Grundriss der allgemeinen Erdkunde*, A. Supan, *Grundzüge der physischen Erdkunde*, A. Philippson, *Grundzüge der allgemeinen Geographie*, G. Marinelli, *La Terra*, W. M. Davis, *Physical Geography*. For a descriptive bibliography and guide to such works on geography as are listed in this section one should combine D. E. Smith's *Syllabus of Historical Geography* (1908) and W. L. G. Joerg, "Recent Geographical Work in Europe," in the *Geographical Review*, July, 1922.



Philippson, *Das Mittelmeergebiet*, and the more recent and popular work of Miss M. I. Newbigin, *The Mediterranean Lands*, of which less than half is specifically devoted to the geography of the area. A more complete study is in preparation by Miss Semple. L. Metchnikoff, in his *Les grands fleuves historiques*, has presented a socio-geographic study of the great river basins of antiquity in their relation to the development of civilization in these areas.

The geography of the Ægean, Greece and the Balkan peninsula has been dealt with adequately in H. F. Tozer's *Islands of the Ægean*, D. G. Hogarth's *The Nearer East*, M. I. Newbigin's *Geographical Aspects of the Balkans*, and Jovan Cvijić's *La Péninsule balkanique*, the last of which is an excellent study in human geography as well. For Italy there is J. Conder's old work, *Italy*, H. Nissen's *Italische Landeskunde*, as well as the comprehensive works of the Italian scholars, Giuseppe dalla Vedova, A. R. Toniolo and O. Marmelli.<sup>44</sup> For Spain we have T. Fischer's work on the Balkans, Italy and the Iberic peninsula,<sup>45</sup> A. Blázquez's *España y Portugal*, and J. D. Cereceda's *Resumen fisiográfico de la Península Iberica*. On northern Africa the great authorities are A. Bernard and E. F. Gautier. On the geography of medieval history there are B. Knull's *Historische Geographie Deutschlands im Mittelalter*, and the latter part of Miss Newbigin's *Mediterranean Lands*.

When we turn to the geography of the separate states of western Europe, the literature becomes enormous. H. Fleure has covered the whole field in his excellent little work, *Human Geography in Western Europe*. In his standard work on *The Races of Europe* Professor W. Z. Ripley has discussed the interrelation of the geography and the racial distribution in Europe. For France there is the

<sup>44</sup> On the history of geography in Italy see R. Almagià, *La geografia*

<sup>45</sup> T. Fischer, *Länderkunde der drei Sued-Europäischen Halbinseln*. For a survey of the development of geography in Spain see J. Becker, *Los estudios geográficos en España*.

classic survey by P. Vidal de la Blache in the first volume of Lavissee's *Histoire de France*, and the more recent and thorough survey in two volumes by J. Brunhes, *La Géographie humaine de la France*, which introduces G. Hano-taux's *Histoire de la nation française*. Along with these general surveys must be noted the innumerable special studies of particular French regions, a department of geo-graphical work in which the French excel. Of these studies Demangeon's work on Picardy, Vallaux's on Brittany, and Blanchard's on Flanders are characteristic. Then there are the admirable studies of the geographical factors in the location and growth of the main French cities, of which L. Gallois's work on Paris is perhaps the most notable.<sup>46</sup>

On the historical geography of central Europe there is, as might be expected, a large amount of material. We have already mentioned Knull's work on the historical geogra-phy of central Europe in the Middle Ages. There is a work of importance on the early modern period by K. Biedermann, *Deutschland im achtzehnten Jahrhundert*. J. Wimmer's *Historische Landschaftskunde* is, perhaps, the best historical geography of Germany. To these works should be added such excellent books as J. Partsch's *Central Europa*, K. Kretschmer's *Historische Geographie von Mitteleuropa*, W. Goetz's *Historische Geographie*, A. Himly's *Histoire de la formation territoriale des États de l'Europe centrale*, W. Ule, *Das deutsche Reich*, G. Braun, *Deutschland*, A. Penck's *Die Donau*, and Teleki's work on Hungary.<sup>47</sup> Then, there is the large amount of work done on the regional geography of Germany, where the Germans vie with the French in productivity. On Bohemia there are the many studies of geography and ethnography by

<sup>46</sup> For an excellent account of the development and present state of French geography see E. de Martonne, "Geography in France," in *American Geo-graphical Society Research Series*, No. 49.

<sup>47</sup> The greatest of modern German geographers was probably Ferdinand von Richthofen, cf. his *Vorlesungen über allgemeine Siedlungs- und Verkehrs-geographie*.

L. Niederle. In regard to the historical geography of Poland there are, among other sources, S. Pawlowski's general survey of Polish geography, *Geographia Polski*, E. Romer's monumental works on the political and economic geography of Poland, particularly since the war, Wunderlich's excellent German survey, and the earlier volumes of the *Polish Encyclopedia* which deal specifically with the geography and ethnography of Poland.

The historical and physical geography of Russia is adequately covered in the work of the brilliant Heidelberg geographer, A. Hettner, *Russland. eine geographische Betrachtung*, and the many monographs of A. Woeikof. On Roumania the best work has been done in the book, *La Valachie*, by the French geographer, E. de Martonne, who has specialized on the regional geography of Roumania. One of his students, G. Vâlsan, has provided us with a remarkable study of the great plain of Roumania, in his *Câmpia Română*. A. Dimitrescu, in his *Die untere Donau*, has executed an excellent study of the physiography of the lower reaches of this historic stream. We have already mentioned the general work of Cvijić on the Balkan peninsula, to which we might well add mention of the works of G. Gravier and J. Dedijer on Serbia, and of I. Ishirkov on Bulgaria.

On the Scandinavian lands there are the geographical handbook of Denmark, *Danmark: Land og Folk*, edited by D. Bruun, H. W. Ahlmann's survey of the physiography of Norway in his *Geomorphological Studies in Norway*, and Helge Nelson's studies of the human and physical geography of Sweden. Otto Nordenskjöld, in his *Polar naturen*, has worked out a general geography of the polar lands. The standard work on the geography of Holland is R. Schuiling's *Nederland: Handboek der Aardrijkskunde*. R. Blanchard's *La Flandre* is probably the most adequate study of the Belgian topography. The classic treatment of the geography of the British Isles remains H. J. Mac-

kinder's *British Isles and British Seas*, though the second volume of Chisholm's *Europe* is highly valuable. For the geography of the Atlantic, which constitutes the connecting link between the Old and the New Worlds, one may consult G. Schott's *Geographie des Atlantischen Ozeans*, Vallaux's *La Mer*, the various works of F. Nansen, one of the world's chief authorities on oceanography, D. Bruun's studies of the early Norse voyages to Greenland, and the earlier but still reliable work of J. G. Kohl on the discovery and exploration of North America.

On the physiography, natural resources and human geography of the United States there is a growing body of material. The point of departure may be taken from N. S. Shaler's *Nature and Man in America*, and the composite work which he edited, *The United States of America*. Ratzel himself contributed a survey, *Politische Geographie der Vereinigten Staaten*, and his disciple, Miss Semple, has applied his ideas, with a large amount of additional concrete information, to the historical geography of the country in her *American History and Its Geographic Conditions*. Another useful book is A. P. Brigham's *Geographic Influences in American History*. Then there is the inadequate volume on North America in Mackinder's *Regions of the World* by I. C. Russell, who has also written a good treatise on *The Rivers of North America*; and there must not be forgotten the excellent work of N. M. Fenneman, *The Physiographic Divisions of the United States*. The most modern and comprehensive work on the subject yet produced is the recent book by J. Russell Smith on the regional geography of North America. R. T. Hill has dealt with the West Indies. South America still awaits adequate study, though beginnings have been made in such excellent work as that by Isaiah Bowman, W. Sievers and A. V. Lavelli.<sup>48</sup>

The economic and geographical basis of the new imperialism is beginning to be surveyed in such books as A.

<sup>48</sup> See I. Bowman, *South America*; and W. Sievers, *Süd- und Mittelamerika*.

Supan's, *Die territoriale Entwicklung der Europäischen Kolomen*, C. P. Lucas's *Historical Geography of the British Colonies*, Kermack's *Expansion of Britain*, Geddes's and Barrow's series on the resources of the Empire, A. Megglé's *Le Domaine colonial de la France*, G. Assereto's *L'Italia e le sue Colonie*, G. Bevione's *L'Asie Minore e l'Italia*, and E. J. Vasconcelos's *As Colónias Portuguesas*. And cognizance is being taken of the material basis of world struggles in such books as E. C. Eckel's *Coal, Iron and War*, M. Olivier's *La Politique de charbon*, and P. E. de la Tramerye's *The World Struggle for Oil*. The importance of the geographic factors in the World War was fully recognized by D. W. Johnson in his *Topography and Strategy in the War*, and *The Battlefields of the World War*. The significance of geography and economic resources is also being considered by various authors contributing to Professor J. T. Shotwell's great series on *The Economic and Social History of the World War*. T. H. Holdich, in his *Political Frontiers and Boundary Making*, and C. B. Fawcett, *Frontiers*, have dealt with these problems in their geographical and historical setting. The geographical basis of the reconstruction of the world after the war has been admirably set forth in a comprehensive and most useful work by Dr. Isaiah Bowman, *The New World*, and more briefly by H. J. Fleure, *The Treaty Settlement*. Even the salutary propaganda for the League of Nations has been put on a geographical basis by J. F. Unstead in his *Citizens of the World* series of geographical handbooks.

#### IV. GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY.

1. *Some of the More Important Work Done by Historians in the Way of Indicating the Significance of Geographic Factors in History.*

Historians have long insisted that a knowledge of geography is essential to any intelligent grasp of the history

of a state. It is significant that the first works on method and interpretation in historical study, Polybius' *History of Rome*, the *Prologomènes historiques* of Ibn Khaldun, the *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem* of Jean Bodin, and the *Méthode pour étudier l'histoire* of Nicolas Lenglet-Dufresnoy (1674-1755)—all stressed the assertion that an acquaintance with the geographical background constitutes the indispensable prolegomena to historical writing. While some of the early modern historians gave evidence of adherence to this doctrine, most of the notable writing on historical geography or geographical history has been subsequent to the work of Karl Ritter and Guyot.

Since the days of Montesquieu and Heeren there have not been lacking historians who showed some awareness of the significance of the geographic setting for both the development of a culture and the contact of cultures. The case of Buckle in the "fifties" has already been pointed out. In his *Kulturgeschichte in ihrer natürlichen Entwicklung bis zur Gegenwart* (1874) A. Hellwald worked out a universal history in which he assigned a very prominent part to natural or geographical factors in the development of culture. The book was a sort of combination of social Darwinism with geographical determinism. P. Maugeouille, in his *Les Problèmes de l'histoire* (1886) also defended the view of geographic determinism. The same general point of view was taken by Otto Henne-am-Rhyn in his voluminous *Allgemeine Kulturgeschichte*,<sup>49</sup> but with far more discrimination and insight. A universal history of great merit has been edited by Hans F. Helmolt, his *Weltgeschichte*,<sup>50</sup> which was planned largely in accordance with the historical philosophy of Ratzel, and to which Ratzel contributed the section on geography, this being the best brief statement of his doctrines. Helmolt's work was widely exploited by H. G. Wells in his *Outline of History*.

<sup>49</sup> Nine volumes, Leipzig, 1877-1908

<sup>50</sup> Nine volumes, Leipzig, 1899-1907. There is an English translation which contains an admirable foreword by Lord Bryce

H. B. George in his *The Relation of Geography and History* has attempted to assess the importance of geographic factors in history, particularly in their relation to political and military history. The general theoretical aspects of the problem have been discussed with erudition and acumen by F. J. Teggart in his stimulating writings, particularly *The Processes of History*.

In beginning the survey of the recognition of geographic influences in particular periods of history we may note that even the "prehistoric" archeologists are coming to recognize the importance of definite physical factors in the location of culture sites in this antique period, as may be seen from the works of P. Deffontaines and O. S. G. Crawford.<sup>51</sup> In tracing the importance of geographic factors in the period of the so-called "dawn of history" first place must unquestionably be assigned to Professor J. L. Myres, who has set forth his views in the stimulating little work, *The Dawn of History*, and in the two magisterial chapters opening the first volume of the new *Cambridge Ancient History*. A similar, if less discriminating, attitude has been shown by the industrious archeologist J. de Morgan in his *Les Premières civilisations*. Professor Breasted has not only given generous attention to the geographic element in Egyptian history, but has even thoroughly acquainted himself with the historical geology of the Nile Valley, in the effort to discover the geographical setting of the prehistoric cultures of Egypt which were unearthed by De Morgan.<sup>52</sup> The monumental works on the history of the ancient Orient by Petrie, Breasted, Rogers, Jastrow, Olmstead and others make ample allowance for the operation of environmental forces in the history of these cultural areas. George Adam

<sup>51</sup> P. Deffontaines, "Sur la Géographie préhistorique," in *Annales de Géographie*, 1924, O. S. G. Crawford, *Man and His Past*, and "Prehistoric Geography," in *Geographical Review*, 1922.

<sup>52</sup> See his articles on "The Origins of Civilization," in the *Scientific Monthly*, 1919-20.

Smith's *Historical Geography of the Holy Land* remains a classic.

Much important work has been done by historians on the geographic aspects of Greek history since Ernst Curtius, under the influence of Ritter, initiated this work more than a half century ago. R. Dussaud, in his *Les Civilisations préhelléniques*, has brought together an admirable summary of the results of recent archeological work in providing us with information concerning the early history of the Greek and Aegean area. In this he shows clearly the importance of the geographic factors involved in the location of the important cultural sites. Walter Leaf, in his two most suggestive works, *Homer and History*, and *Troy: a Study in Homeric Geography* has attempted a rather convincing geographical interpretation of the Mycenaean civilization and the Trojan War. A. E. Zimmern in his *Greek Commonwealth*, an important study of Greek civilization in the Periclean age, has set forth an excellent appraisal and description of the environmental elements which affected and conditioned this historic culture. Benjamin Ide Wheeler, in his *Alexander the Great*, has given proper attention to the geographic basis of Alexander's conquests and the beginnings of the Hellenistic period. Finally, Karl Julius Beloch, in what is far the greatest of the histories of Greece, has not overlooked the physical stage on which the Greek drama was enacted.

Various distinguished authorities have awarded proper attention to the environmental basis of Roman history. The geographical introduction in Victor Duruy's *History of Rome* has never been approached since in any general history of Rome. T. E. Peet, O. Montelius and V. I. Modestov have presented in detail the geographical basis of the earliest cultures of the Italian peninsula. G. Ferrero was throughout his much discussed work on *The Greatness and Decline of Rome* thoroughly alive to the influence exerted



by the geography of Italy and the Mediterranean basin. The geographic foundations of the Roman Empire have been inadequately appraised, though some good work has been done on particular provinces. E. Gothein has considered with care the geographical factors involved in the Italian culture of the Renaissance period, and of southern Italy in general. And one must not overlook E. A. Freeman's detailed study of the geography of Sicily. Professor Hutton Webster, in his elementary manual on ancient history, has provided both students and teachers with a brief but discriminating appraisal of the environmental background of classical history. Little work has been done by historians on the geographical forces in Spanish history, though there has been some recognition of their potency by R. Altamira and R. B. Merriman. Perhaps the best work which has been done in this field is that contained in C. Oman's discussion of the importance of topography for strategy in his *History of the Peninsular War*.

In treating of the work of historians on the relations of geography and history during the Middle Ages, one must begin by mentioning the thoroughgoing exposition of the geographical basis and conditioning of the spread of Christianity which has been the contribution of Adolph Harnack in his great work *Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums*. For medieval Europe the incomparable work by an historian is E. A. Freeman's *Historical Geography of Europe*. Much important work has been done by specialists on the history of particular areas which cannot be mentioned here.

The classic sketch of French geography in its historic relations is that contained in the first chapter of the second volume of Jules Michelet's *History of France*. Camille Jullian has examined with great thoroughness the physical factors involved in the origins of French civilization in pre-Roman and Roman Gaul. Many historians have analyzed, with ample attention, the geographic factor in the history

of Germany and Austria. Among these should be named Wilhelm Riehl, Gustav Freytag, Heinrich von Treitschke, Otto Henne-am-Rhyn, Karl Lamprecht and Kurt Breysig.<sup>53</sup> Likewise, some little attention is given to the physical setting in the general histories of Russia by A. Leroy-Beaulieu, A. Rambaud, D. M. Wallace and V. O. Kluchevsky, as well as in the economic history of Russia by J. Mavor, but any adequate consideration of the geographic factors in Russian history by a competent historian is still lacking. An interesting step in this direction was made by C. Sarolea some twenty years ago.<sup>54</sup> The best work done by an historian on the geography of England in relation to its historical development remains John Richard Green's *Geography of the British Isles*, and *The Making of England*. Much valuable work by various historians on the geography of the British Empire is contained in Lucas's above mentioned composite work on *The Historical Geography of the British Colonies*.

The geographical basis of the expansion of Europe overseas after 1450 has never been adequately handled, though there has been some consideration of it in the stimulating works of Lannoy and Linden, W. R. Shepherd, W. C. Abbott, R. B. Merriman, H. E. Bolton and E. J. Payne. Much fruitful work has been done with respect to the geographic factors affecting American history. A serviceable atlas containing analytical material on the study of the historical geography of America has been prepared by Dixon Ryan Fox. Excellent summary discussions of the geographic factor in American History are to be found in A. M. Schlesinger's *New Viewpoints in American History*, and A. B. Hulbert's *The Increasing Debt of History to Science*. Far and away the best description of the geographical background of the colonization of America is

<sup>53</sup> W. Riehl, *Die Naturgeschichte des Volkes als Grundlage einer deutschen Sozialpolitik*, G. Freytag, *Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit*, H. von Treitschke, *Politik*, O. Henne am Rhyn, *Kulturgeschichte des deutschen Volkes*, K. Lamprecht, *Deutsche Geschichte*, K. Breysig, *Kulturgeschichte der Neuzeit*.

<sup>54</sup> C. Sarolea, "The Geographical Foundations of Russian Politics," in *Scottish Geographical Magazine*, 1906.

contained in the remarkable book by E. J. Payne, *A History of the New World Called America*. Livingston Farrand has dealt with the influence of physical features in his incisive work on the anthropological basis of American history. A corrective to the usual approach to colonization through the settlements of the French and English has been supplied in H. E. Bolton's insistence on both the priority and the primary importance of the Spanish explorations and conquests in the making of the Americas. The routes of travel in the penetration of America have been studied in great descriptive detail by A. B. Hulbert in his *Historic Highways of America*, and his *Routes of Inland Travel*. The geographic factors of the Mississippi valley, and their relation to the history of this section, have been brought together by Justin Winsor in his *Mississippi Basin*. H. H. Bancroft and his associates have described in detail the physiography of the Pacific Coast in its bearing upon the settlement of that area.

The relation of the chief routes of travel and access to the settlement of the continent has been set forth in such works as those by Benton, Baker, Goodwin, Coman, Speed, Johnston and Inman. J. W. Draper, in his *History of the Civil War*, has offered a suggestive, if exaggerated, interpretation of the effect of climate on American sectionalism. It is, however, with the work of Frederick Jackson Turner and his more capable disciples that the development of a really dynamic historical geography of the United States is properly associated. By his thorough knowledge of the physical geography of the country, and his envisaging of American history as a process of conquering the continent through an ever expanding frontier society, and as the achievement of welding together in a workable unity a group of diverse sectional societies and cultures produced by the variegated geography of the country, he has introduced more vitality and realism into the study of American history than any other American historian of this or any



FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER



earlier generation. And by relating the economic interests to geographic resources, and political movements to economic factors he has done more than any of his modern colleagues in his profession to give a plausible interpretation to the nature of, and changes in American political life. Yet he cannot be accused of being a crude geographical or economic determinist, as he recognizes the importance, if not the primacy, of dominating ideas. He does, however, hold that these ideas have a definite relation to the realities of American life rather than originating *in vacuo*, as seems to be the position of E. D. Adams and others of the more conventional group of historical writers.<sup>55</sup> A similar realism, if less interest in specific geographical problems, has characterized the approach to American history in the writings of C. A. Beard, W. E. Dodd and Carl Becker. The historians of Latin America have been primarily interested in political and diplomatic history, but there have been not a few who have shown a concern with the physical basis of its history, particularly H. H. Bancroft in his *History of Central America*, and W. H. Koebel in his diverse works on the history and social life of Latin America.

The expansion of Europe overseas has had an extremely important relation to the growth of historical geography. It was the curiosity over the newly discovered lands and peoples that gave rise to both modern geography and the modern interest of historians in geographical data.<sup>56</sup> Owing in part to the fact that the usual data for conventional historical writing in biographies of statesmen and politicians, anecdotes of court scandals, and military episodes have been scarcely as rich in the history of colonization and the conquest of less developed peoples as in accounts of the

<sup>55</sup> See his *Frontier in American History, The Rise of the New West*; "Sectionalism," in Hart and McLaughlin's *Cyclopedia of American Government*, "Sections and Nations," in *Yale Review*, October, 1922, *Select References on the History of the West*. His best work is embodied, however, in unpublished lectures on the history of the West. Cf. E. D. Adams, *The Power of Ideals in American History*.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. E. Fueter, *L'Histoire de la historiographie moderne*, pp. 361 ff.



earlier generation. And by relating the economic interests to geographic resources, and political movements to economic factors he has done more than any of his modern colleagues in his profession to give a plausible interpretation to the nature of, and changes in American political life. Yet he cannot be accused of being a crude geographical or economic determinist, as he recognizes the importance, if not the primacy, of dominating ideas. He does, however, hold that these ideas have a definite relation to the realities of American life rather than originating *in vacuo*, as seems to be the position of E. D. Adams and others of the more conventional group of historical writers.<sup>55</sup> A similar realism, if less interest in specific geographical problems, has characterized the approach to American history in the writings of C. A. Beard, W. E. Dodd and Carl Becker. The historians of Latin America have been primarily interested in political and diplomatic history, but there have been not a few who have shown a concern with the physical basis of its history, particularly H. H. Bancroft in his *History of Central America*, and W. H. Koebel in his diverse works on the history and social life of Latin America.

The expansion of Europe overseas has had an extremely important relation to the growth of historical geography. It was the curiosity over the newly discovered lands and peoples that gave rise to both modern geography and the modern interest of historians in geographical data.<sup>56</sup> Owing in part to the fact that the usual data for conventional historical writing in biographies of statesmen and politicians, anecdotes of court scandals, and military episodes have been scarcely as rich in the history of colonization and the conquest of less developed peoples as in accounts of the

<sup>55</sup> See his *Frontier in American History, The Rise of the New West*; "Sectionalism," in Hart and McLaughlin's *Cyclopedia of American Government*, "Sections and Nations," in *Yale Review*, October, 1922, *Select References on the History of the West*. His best work is embodied, however, in unpublished lectures on the history of the West. Cf. E. D. Adams, *The Power of Ideals in American History*.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. E. Fueter, *L'Histoire de la historiographie moderne*, pp. 361 ff.



home country, the historians of European expansion have been compelled to give more attention to geographic, economic and social factors. In the standard manuals on colonization by H. C. Morris, A. G. Keller, A. Zimmermann, A. Girault and P. Leroy-Beaulieu one will find some attention given to the geographical setting, while in special treatments of particular areas by such writers as H. H. Johnston, and Hans Meyer and his associates the physical environment is analyzed with some detail.<sup>57</sup>

2. *The Disparity Between the Existing Body of Knowledge on Historical Geography and the Degree of Its Utilization in the Conventional Writing and Teaching of History.*

The fact which probably most impresses the student of historiography is the degree to which the conventioned treatment of the subject has lagged behind the more progressive tendencies.<sup>58</sup> This has been as true in the matter of the general lack of appropriation of the existing and readily available information with respect to the indispensable geographical background of history as it has been with regard to the other phases of the anachronisms of conventional historiography. Even among the better type of monographs and textbooks it is rare to find one which gives anything like as much space to the geographical factors underlying the historical development as it does to well-nigh irrelevant biographical episodes and anecdotes. An excellent illustration of the conventional attitude of even the most scholarly historians in the country that has been most progressive in historiography may be found in

<sup>57</sup> See references in Brunhes' *Human Geography*, p. 589, Note 1; for detailed references see bibliography in article "World Politics" in *Encyclopedia Americana*, and bibliography following chapters II, XVII, XVIII and XXIX of Hayes' *Political and Social History of Europe*.

<sup>58</sup> I have tried to touch upon various phases of this subject in the article on "History Its Rise and Development," in the *Encyclopedia Americana*, and in articles in the *American Journal of Psychology*, October, 1919, *The Scientific Monthly*, August, 1920, *The Psychoanalytic Review*, January, 1921, and *The Historical Outlook*, February, 1921.

the decidedly hostile attitude of the majority of the historians who discussed Professor Giddings' paper on social causation in New Orleans in 1903<sup>59</sup> Even where a textbook devotes respectable space to geographical material the average teacher of history regards this as the least significant portion of the manual and either skips it altogether or passes over it hurriedly. Further, even where considerable attention is given to the so-called "map-studies" in history courses, the work is rarely a consideration of geography at all in its modern signification, but rather a detailed investigation of what has been well designated "chromatic politics." Little attention is given to anything except changing political boundaries, which are rarely correlated with geographical factors of any great significance. There is little probability that either teachers or students will learn too much about political boundaries and their changes, but a mastery of this subject should not be confused with competence in dynamic historical geography.<sup>60</sup> One might safely hold that truly scientific geography, namely, dynamic and regional geography, has made almost no impression upon historiography when one takes into consideration the number of books written on the subject and the number of teachers engaged. The chief reason for this strange anachronism is doubtless the fact that a knowledge of physical and human geography is not essential to a study of political intrigues and diplomatic duplicity, which has constituted the chief source of historical interest in the past. As soon as historians become interested in the history of civilization they will be forced to take into account geographic factors operating to condition human cultural development. This has distinctly been the case with every past and present practitioner of *Kulturgeschichte*.

<sup>59</sup> Publications of the American Economic Association, Third Series, Vol. V, No. 2, 1904, pp. 190 ff.

<sup>60</sup> For an illuminating example of this interpretation of boundary changes in historical geography see the scholarly and interesting article by Ruth L. Higgins in *The Iowa Journal of History and Politics*, July, 1923, Cf. W. L. G. Joerg, "Recent American Wall Maps," in *Geographical Review*, July, 1924

It would seem that one of the chief obstacles to the adequate appreciation of geographical data by professional historians would be removed if we ceased to talk of geographic influences as of a *determining* character and recognized that rather they are extremely important *conditioning factors*. The anthropologists and cultural historians have made out a fairly good case against absolute environmental determinism,<sup>61</sup> and the historians are still generally afflicted with metaphysical doctrines as to free-will, and not by any means freed of theological dogmas which oppose every kind of materialistic determinism. It is not a matter of earth versus man, but, as Ratzel has well insisted, a problem of man and the earth evolving together as the result of reciprocal influences.<sup>62</sup> Particularly is this true if one accepts Brunhes' view that the human alterations of the natural geographic factors, and the artificial environment, for instance, the modern city, are to be considered as well as natural environment.<sup>63</sup> Further, one must keep in mind the fact that with the development of science and technology man is able to win a progressively greater mastery over nature. The effect of a geographical factor thus differs during the historic period. The ocean, which a thousand years ago was an insuperable obstacle, has, with the advent of the compass, sextant, cartography and the steamboat, become one of the foremost aids to progress in the modern world. However, historians must not forget that though man has mastered nature he has not dissociated himself from nature and geographic influences thereby. He simply exploits nature more successfully and in more diverse ways. In one important sense, geographical factors are more important today than ever before, in that our whole industrial

<sup>61</sup> Boas, and Lowie, loc. cit.; R R Marett, *Anthropology*, Chap iv; A. A. Goldenweiser, "Culture and Environment," in *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1916

<sup>62</sup> Ratzel, in Helmolt, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 61.

<sup>63</sup> J Brunhes, *Human Geography*. Cf. N S Shaler, *Man and the Earth*; A J. and F D Herbertson, *Man and His Work*, an *Introduction to Human Geography*, and R L Sherlock, *Man as a Geological Agent*.

system rests fundamentally upon this superior and more thorough utilization of, and control over, geographical elements in civilization.

### 3. *The Newer Synthetic History and Regional Geography.*

In discussing the desirability of closer relations between history and geography one must take into account the progress evident in both. In geography we have not only that interest in human geography which comes down through Ratter, Ratzel and Brunhes, but also a far better technique for its cultivation in the new regional geography, which originated in France due to the combined influence of the socio-economic impulse of Frédéric LePlay and the geographic acumen and enthusiasm of P. Vidal de la Blache.<sup>64</sup> This has gained rapid popularity through the learned world, and has already been adopted by the most progressive geographers. Paralleling this development in geography has been the growth of a more dynamic and synthetic history concerning itself with the whole field of the development of human culture and social institutions, which has taken its initial impulse from the works of such writers as Burkhardt, Henne-am-Rhyn, Lamprecht, Schmoller, Sombart, Rambaud, Seignobos, Ferrero, Green, Pollard, Marvin, Zimmern, Vinogradoff, Maitland, Robinson, Shotwell, Turner, Breasted, Dodd, Becker and many others. It is in the coöperation of these two lines of progressive development in the two sciences that we may expect the most fruitful developments in the next generation.<sup>65</sup>

There is no doubt that geography has important relations to every type of history, even the most archaic political and military history. Probably no factor has had a greater influence upon English political and diplomatic history than its insular position and more recently its im-

\* F LePlay, *La Reforme social en France*, P Vidal de la Blache, *La France tableau géographique* Herbertson stimulated the movement in England

\* On the development of synthetic and social history see C Becker in *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1912, pp 73-107

perial responsibilities. The diversity of American colonial political institutions has been shown to depend to a large degree upon geographic differences. Professors Turner, Buck and Haynes have indicated the geographical foundations of agrarian politics in the United States since the Civil War. Yet political history is not the most fertile field in which to study geographical factors. The primary occupation with political boundaries is quite as destructive of good geography as of good history. One point should be noted, however, namely, that even the most perfect political boundaries of the present time—those coinciding with national lines of demarcation—are less fundamental and natural than those which relate to basic geographic regions. Without going into a discussion of "regionalism" as a mode of social and political reconstruction,<sup>66</sup> it may safely be maintained that the only sane history must be that which meets the new geography in the study of fundamentally unified geographic regions, and minimizes, while not ignoring, the artificial political units.

The two branches of the modern historical investigation which seem most likely to have fruitful interrelationship with regional geography are international relations and intellectual, industrial and social history.<sup>67</sup> The expansion of Europe and the resulting international relations have been most intimately bound up with geography. The colonization and imperialistic occupation of the extra-European areas have followed and been dependent upon the progress of geographical exploration and discovery and the revelation of resources inviting exploitation. On the other hand, without the subsequent occupation of the regions explored by Europeans, the discoveries would have been devoid of

<sup>66</sup> On this point see, C. Brun, *Le Régionalisme*, P. Geddes, *Cities in Evolution*; Geddes and Branford, *The Coming Polity*, Branford and Farquharson, *An Introduction to Regional Surveys*.

<sup>67</sup> I have indicated that these are the most promising fields now being cultivated by historians in a syllabus on "Recent Tendencies and Problems in the Study and Interpretation of History" in *The Historical Outlook*, March, 1922. Cf. also the section on "History" in E. C. Hayes (Ed.) *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences*.

value, except for the incidental additions to scientific knowledge.<sup>68</sup> Likewise, the progress of geographical knowledge and discovery has been intimately related to intellectual history. Not only have the progress in the science of geography and the results of geographic discovery been productive of great additions to the history of science and thought, but it is also coming to be recognized that the expansion of Europe overseas and its various results did more than anything else to break down the paralyzing medieval order and bring into existence modern times with its industrialism and critical thought.<sup>69</sup> Again, regional geography is inseparably bound up with economic and social history. Modern industrial civilization is a product of two chief factors, geographic resources and the advanced machine-factory technology which enables us to exploit these resources to an unparalleled degree. It will require no further argument to establish the dependence of industrial history upon regional geography or the necessity of industrial history to give *rationale* to regional geography.<sup>70</sup> It can be demonstrated with equal ease that social history must be associated with geography. Agrarian life is intimately bound up with the natural resources, prosperity and culture being correlated with areas of fertility, and poverty and backwardness with regions of inferior productiveness.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>68</sup> Cf. J. Jacobs, *The Story of Geographic Discovery*, W. R. Shepherd, "The Expansion of Europe, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1919, R. Muir, *The Expansion of Europe*, W. C. Abbott, *The Expansion of Europe*.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. Shepherd, loc. cit., J. E. Gillespie, *The Influence of Oversea Expansion on England to 1700*, J. B. Botsford, *English Society in the Eighteenth Century*, W. C. Abbott, op. cit.

<sup>70</sup> This field is surveyed in the standard monographs and manuals of Gibbins, Cunningham, Usher, Levasseur, Schmoller, Kovalevsky, Bogart, Coman, Van Metre, and in the classic works on economic geography by Goetz, Dove, Niermeyer, Heiderich, Chisholm, MacFarlane, W. D. Jones, and J. Russell Smith.

<sup>71</sup> For an admirable statement of the value of a knowledge of the botany, agriculture, zoology, geology, and hydrography of a region in reconstructing its history see J. H. Breasted, "The Place of the Near Orient in the Career of Man," in *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. XXIX, pp. 159-184. Cf. also on this point A. B. Hulbert, "The Increasing Debt of History to Science," in *Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society*, April, 1919; and Laura H. Wild, *Geographic Influences in Old Testament Masterpieces*.

Urban life, which is becoming more and more characteristic of modern civilization, not only depends for its existence on the exploitation of geographic resources by modern industrial technique, but also is normally located at points where this exploitation can proceed with the greatest facility and economy. The chief social processes, migration, conflict, and assimilation have ever been intimately associated with geographic factors.<sup>72</sup> It so happens that these fields of historical endeavor with which geography is most intimately bound up, namely, international relations, intellectual, social and economic history, are those in which progress is most evident at the present time and in which new and progressive ideas are most readily accepted. This fact cannot but be regarded as auspicious by those who hope for the growth of a *rapprochement* between history and geography.

While we have been in this chapter chiefly concerned with the relation of geography to history it may be well to insist that it is not less pertinent to the other social sciences. Professor Giddings has frankly admitted that sociological doctrine has consisted of a combination of psychological and geographical interpretations of the social process, and he has sought to correlate and synthesize these factors in his own interpretation.<sup>73</sup> Economics is most frequently defined as the science of wealth-getting, or, in other words, the science of exploiting the environment.<sup>74</sup> Political scientists from the time of Aristotle have recognized the influence of geographic conditions upon the policies and destinies of states. Wars spring in large part from a desire to secure natural resources, and the degree of natural geographic protection determines the amount of artificial military or

<sup>72</sup> Cf. F. H. Giddings, "A Theory of History," *Political Science Quarterly*, December, 1920, A. C. Haddon, *The Wanderings of Peoples*, F. Oppenheimer, *The State*, J. L. Myres, *The Dawn of History*, W. Z. Ripley, "Geography as a Sociological Study," *Political Science Quarterly*, 1895.

<sup>73</sup> F. H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 10, "A Theory of Social Causation," *loc. cit.*

<sup>74</sup> E. R. A. Seligman, *Economic Interpretation of History*, pp. 11-15, 65-6; H. J. Davenport, *Economics of Enterprise*, Chap. 1.

naval protection which will be necessary. Again, geographic conditions to a large degree determine the density and nature of the social population which reacts to shape the state and political policies.<sup>75</sup> As laws reflect social conditions and pressures, and are the product of political institutions, jurisprudence is also not without its dependence upon geographic factors, something which has long been recognized by the comparative school of jurisprudence.<sup>76</sup> Finally, the modern students of ethics have given up the doctrine of transcendental ethical values and have accepted the pragmatic and comparative doctrine of relativity. Ethical conduct is determined by the mores of the particular group, and these mores have been built up through the reaction of the population to the facts of their physical environment.<sup>77</sup>

## SELECTED REFERENCES.

- J. Brunhes, "Human Geography," Chap 11 in H. E. Barnes (Ed ),  
*The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*  
 J. Brunhes and C. Vallaux, *La Géographie de l'Histoire*  
 H. B. George, *The Relation of Geography to History*  
 A. A. Goldenweiser, "Culture and Environment," in *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1916  
 W. L. G. Joerg, "Recent Geographical Work in Europe," in *Geographical Review*, July, 1922  
 A. H. Koller, *The Theory of Environment*  
 R. H. Lowie, *Culture and Ethnology*, Chap iii.  
 R. R. Marett, *Anthropology*, Chap iv  
 J. C. Merriam, "The Earth Sciences as the Background of History," in *Scientific Monthly*, January, 1921  
 A. Meuten, *Bodin's Theorie von der Beeinflussung des politischen Lebens der Staaten durch ihre geographische Lage*  
 F. J. Teggart, *The Processes of History*, Chap 11  
 F. Thomas, in C. E. Merriam and H. E. Barnes (Eds ), *History of Political Theories: Recent Times*, Chap xii  
 F. Thomas, *The Environmental Basis of Society*.  
 E. A. Wunsche, *Die geschichtliche Bewegung und ihre geographische Bedingtheit*  
 "J. W. Garner, *Introduction to Political Science*, pp 68-79  
 "Recognized by juristic writers from Montesquieu to Ihering, Kohler and Pound. See *Formative Influences of Legal Development*, pp 198-233, in the *Evolution of Law* series, edited by A. Kocourek and J. H. Wigmore, Vol II.  
 "W. G. Sumner, *Folkways*, Dewey and Tufts *Ethics*, R. C. Givler, *The Ethics of Hercules*, P. Kropotkin, *Ethics Origin and Development*.



## CHAPTER III

### SOME PHASES OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PSYCHOLOGY IN THE EQUIPMENT OF THE HISTORIAN \*

#### I. SOME OF THE MORE IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY IN ITS RELATION TO HISTORY AND THE SOCIAL STUDIES.

##### 1. *The Origins of the Psychological Orientation.*

WHILE one may accept Dr. Davis' statement that "psychological sociology as we now know it is extremely recent,"<sup>1</sup> it by no means follows that the psychological interpretation of social and political processes is of recent origin. Aristotle, in his *Ethics*,<sup>2</sup> introduces his readers to a discussion by ancient Greek philosophers of the problem whether men prefer the society of those who resemble them or that of those who differ from them. The similarity of this to the discussions twenty-five years ago respecting the validity of Professor Giddings' theory of the "consciousness of kind" will be evident to all familiar with the development of sociological theory. Aristotle's own doctrine of the instinctive sociability of men, which was adopted by the Stoics, Cicero, the Church Fathers and the Scholastic philosophers, was a distinctly psychological interpretation of society and an anticipation of Trotter.<sup>3</sup> One

\* This chapter is the outgrowth of a series of papers read in the graduate seminar of G. Stanley Hall at Clark University in 1918-19. Both in their original and their amplified form they profited by the careful reading and critical suggestions of Dr. Hall.

<sup>1</sup> M. M. Davis, *Psychological Interpretations of Society*, p. 33.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, Book VIII, Chap. i.

<sup>3</sup> *Politics*, I, 2.

might further call attention to his acute psychological analysis of the bureaucratic spirit, of the effect of the possession of property, of political revolutions, and of the instability of the masses. Polybius contributed a striking anticipation of the theory of reflective sympathy developed later by Spinoza, Hume and Adam Smith, and of the notions of Bagehot and Sumner with respect to the evolution of customs and folkways.<sup>4</sup> A dim foreshadowing of Stanley Hall is evident in the basic concepts of Epicurus and Lucretius.<sup>5</sup> The contract theory of political and social origins, which had a distinguished history from Epicurus to Blackstone and Kant, was distinctly a psychological conception.<sup>6</sup> Thomas Hobbes set forth a trenchant psychological interpretation of the basis of social and political institutions and processes, particularly stressing the element of fear as the foundation of political obedience.<sup>7</sup> Spinoza touched upon the sociological significance of reflective sympathy and prepared the way for Hutcheson, Hume and Adam Smith.<sup>8</sup>

John Locke, in his discussion of "the law of fashion or private censure," anticipated Sumner and Trotter by holding that the force of group custom and fashion was more powerful in its psychological pressure than the laws of God or the state.<sup>9</sup> Berkeley attempted to adapt the Newtonian terminology to a psychological interpretation of social processes.<sup>10</sup> Hume made important contributions to the socio-psychological significance of sympathy and imitation.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>4</sup> *History of Rome*, trans by Schuckburgh, VI, 56

<sup>5</sup> *De rerum natura*, Cf. Masson, *Lucretius, Epicurean and Poet*, and H. F. Osborn, *From the Greeks to Darwin*, pp. 60-62

<sup>6</sup> F. Atger, *L'Histoire des doctrines du contrat social*

<sup>7</sup> *Philosophical Rudiments concerning Society and Government, Leviathan*; Cf. Graham Wallas, *The Great Society*, p. 191

<sup>8</sup> *Ethics*, Part III, prop. xxvii

<sup>9</sup> *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Fraser edition, Vol. I, p. 479

<sup>10</sup> "The Principles of Moral Attraction," *Works*, Fraser edition, Vol. IV, pp. 111-18

<sup>11</sup> *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Green and Grose edition, Vol. II, pp. 112, 142, 155, 179-80, 259-60, *Essays, Moral, Political and Literary*, Green and Grose edition, Vol. I, pp. 244 ff

Adam Smith's analysis of sympathy was of sufficient thoroughness and insight to lead Professor Giddings to characterize Smith as the founder of psychological sociology.<sup>12</sup> The first systematizers of sociology, Comte and Spencer, make a liberal use of suggestive psychological concepts. Comte's bio-psychic interpretation of social unity, his psychological interpretation of history and progress, and his emphasis upon feeling as the dynamic power in society are commonplaces in the history of sociology.<sup>13</sup> Spencer's powerful statement in his *Study of Sociology* of the relation of psychology to sociology, and his contributions to the psychology of primitive man are equally well-known.<sup>14</sup>

In spite of these notable anticipations of the modern psychological sociology, the more significant phases of the subject have been developed since the time of Comte. Sir Henry Maine and the legalists stressed the sociological influence of habit in building up social institutions and insuring respect for constituted authority.<sup>15</sup> An attempt was made by certain German writers, of whom Röhmer, Stein and Gierke are representative, to apply concepts similar to those of Comte and Spencer to a classification of the psychological stages of political development and to the elaboration of the notion of the state as a psychic personality.<sup>16</sup> George Henry Lewes, an admirer of Comte and a contemporary of Spencer, gave the first clear and definite statement to the notion of the unity of the social mind,<sup>17</sup> while Adolf Bastian carried the conception still further to establish the unity of the human mind.<sup>18</sup> The newly-awakened interest in folk-psychology, which proceeded from

<sup>12</sup> *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Cf F. H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, Preface to the third edition

<sup>13</sup> *The Principles of a Positive Polity*, especially Vol. III, pp. 55 ff, 151 ff, 421-2 Cf Lévy-Bruhl, *The Philosophy of Comte*, pp 332 ff

<sup>14</sup> *Study of Sociology*, Chap XV; *Principles of Sociology*, Vol I, Part I

<sup>15</sup> Cf E Barker, *Political Thought in England from Spencer to the Present Day*, Chap vi.

<sup>16</sup> F W Coker, *Organismic Theories of the State*, Chap ii

<sup>17</sup> *Problems of Life and Mind*, Cf F. H Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, pp 132-3; M M Davis, op cit, pp 25-7.

<sup>18</sup> *Der Mensch in der Geschichte*

philosophical, philological and anthropological antecedents, was given a great impetus through the foundation of the *Zeitung für Volker-Psychologie und Sprach-Wissenschaft* by Lazarus and Steinhal in 1860, and was carried further from widely different standpoints by such men as Theodor Waitz, Charles Letourneau, E. B. Tylor, D. G. Brinton and Wilhelm Wundt.<sup>19</sup> Then came the attempt of Lester F. Ward and Simon N. Patten to readapt hedonism to serve as the psychological basis of sociology.<sup>20</sup> The significance of evolutionary biology for psychology, individual and social, was established by genetic psychology in the hands of Granville Stanley Hall and James Mark Baldwin.<sup>21</sup> At the same time a group of important writers, such as Bagehot, Tarde, Sidis, Durkheim, Sighele, Le Bon, Sumner and Giddings, were developing the sociological bearings of such psychic factors as imitation, suggestion, fear, social constraint, custom and the consciousness of kind.<sup>22</sup> While emphasizing different psychological forces they were at one in assaulting the intellectualism of the venerable Benthamite felicific calculus.<sup>23</sup>

The most important developments in social psychology during the first two decades of the present century have been the tendency towards a synthesis of the various specific doctrines which had emphasized some psychological force or process which is active in society, and the provision of new techniques and modes of approach to psychological and sociological problems. The need for a more synthetic con-

<sup>19</sup> DAVIS, *op cit*, pp 27-32, 42-44, T Waitz, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, E B Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, W Wundt, *Elements of Folk Psychology*, Ch Letourneau, *La Psychologie ethnique*, D G Brinton, *The Basis of Social Relations*

<sup>20</sup> L F Ward, *Psychic Factors of Civilization*, S N Patten, *A Theory of Social Forces*

<sup>21</sup> G S Hall, *Adolescence*, Vol II, Chaps x, xvi, J M Baldwin, *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*

<sup>22</sup> DAVIS, *op cit*, L M Bristol, *Social Adaptation*, Part III, Graham Wallas, *The Great Society*, Part I

<sup>23</sup> Cf. W C Mitchell, in *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1914, pp 142; and in *Political Science Quarterly*, June 1918, pp 161-82, Graham Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics*

sideration of socio-psychological problems was set forth by Professor W. I. Thomas in his notable paper on *The Prov-  
mence of Social Psychology*, delivered before the Congress of Arts and Sciences at St. Louis in 1904. He emphasized the necessity of a pluralistic approach to the subject and of a consideration of the interaction of man and his social environment.<sup>24</sup> Soon works began to appear which proved the soundness of his thesis. McDougall, Thorndike, Trotter and others carried further William James' preliminary generalizations concerning the socio-psychological significance of human instincts and the "original nature of man."

The results of their work were appropriated for sociology and social psychology by writers such as Graham Wallas, Edman and Lippmann. American psychological sociologists also made many important contributions to this synthetic tendency. Professor Giddings has broadened his psychology of society by weaving the doctrine of the "consciousness of kind" into a theory of social causation founded upon the doctrine of the differential response of organisms to stimulation which issues in "pluralistic behavior." Professor Small has contributed a psycho-economic explanation of the social process resting upon the notion of the basic significance of a number of vital human interests. Baldwin, Cooley, Gault, and Balz have presented original syntheses which aim at a merging of individual and social psychology in the attempt to analyze the chief psychic factors in social organization and democratic society. Professor Ross has united an original adaptation of the theories of Tarde and other European social psychologists with his own penetrating observations on modern social processes in one of the most lucid and striking of the systems of psychological sociology. Professor Ellwood has prepared what is unquestionably the most reliable and comprehensive synthesis of the best and most up-to-date

<sup>24</sup> *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, pp. 445-55.

writings in the fields of psychology and psychological sociology. Further, a number of writers, most notably Ward, Hobhouse, Wallas and Trotter, have shown that while one must admit the potency of instinctive and emotional factors in social behavior, yet progress and constructive effort can come only from a social appreciation and appropriation of volitional and intellectual factors. New concepts and methods have been developed which contribute powerfully to an improvement of social psychology and psychological sociology. The experimental and statistical method, developed especially by Cattell and Thorndike, has provided a more perfect technique for gathering reliable data and testing results. Behavioristic psychology is far more related to social psychology than the older introspective approach. Psychoanalysis has both provided a new set of mechanisms for exploring the mind of the individual and has shown the social significance of the repression of normal human instincts. The introduction of fairly reliable methods of mental testing has revealed the existence of wide variations of mental capacity in even the so-called "normal" population which have sociological significance of the greatest import. These advances have been synthesized by F. H. Allport in the most adequate treatise yet produced in the field of social psychology, and by E. S. Bogardus in the most recent general text book on the subject.<sup>25</sup>

\* Among the more significant surveys of the development of social psychology and psychological sociology may be mentioned M. M. Davis, *Psychological Interpretations of Society*, Chaps 1-v, John Dewey, "The Need for Social Psychology," in *The Psychological Review*, 1917, pp 266 ff, Graham Wallas, *The Great Society*, Part I, L. M. Bristol, *Social Adaptation*, Part III, A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, Part I, L. L. Bernard, *Instinct: A Study in Social Psychology*, W. C. Mitchell, "Human Nature and Economics," in *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Nov 1914, pp 1-47, J. P. Lichtenberger, "The Social Significance of Mental Levels," in *The Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol XV, K. Young, "The History of Mental Testing," in *Pedagogical Seminary*, March, 1924, and the sections on "Social Psychology," in *The Psychological Bulletin*. An admirable syllabus of social psychology and psychological sociology, together with a classified bibliography, may be found in G. E. Howard's *Social Psychology, an Analytical Reference Syllabus*. For a discussion of the use of the terms

2. *Psychologists Who Have Made Important Contributions to the Social Bearings and Implications of Their Subject.*

A. William James (1842-1910) and the Appearance of Systematic Psychology in the United States.

From the standpoint of chronological priority it is not an easy task to select the name which should head the list of psychologists who helped to shape social psychology in America. G. Stanley Hall, in his work on genetic psychology, or Lester F. Ward, in his attempt to adapt hedonism to psychological sociology, might contest with James the claim to precedence, but it has become customary to regard James as the founder in America of scientific psychology and the first to indicate its social implications. Of his position in the history of psychology Professor Woodworth has well said: <sup>26</sup>

Perhaps no one has better expressed in his writings the full scope and tendency of modern psychology than the late William James. He took as his background the older mental philosophy, especially of the English associationist school, being, however, keenly aware of its shortcomings and of certain necessary complements to be found in the mental philosophy of the Germans. Coming into psychology from the physiological laboratory, he retained the physiological point of view, was entirely hospitable to the new experimental psychology, and very early conducted experiments of his own . . . His interest in the problems of genetics is seen in his specially excellent chapters on instinct and habit, and in the whole tenor of his work. With the French school of abnormal psychology he was keenly sympathetic, and he was able to find much of value in their works. All in all, he was evidently a good internationalist in his science, as indeed every good psychologist must be. Better than any other book, his great work on the *Principles of Psychology* can be taken as at once a summing up of the older psychology and an introduction to the modern point of view.

social psychology and psychological sociology, see O. A. Ellwood, *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, pp. 58-64. The most competent analytical survey of the recent history of social psychology is contained in Chap. IV of H. E. Barnes, (Ed.) *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*. It is written by Kimball Young.

<sup>26</sup> R. S. Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology*, pp. 18-19.

While James occupies no such pontifical position in the history of social psychology as in the field of the psychology of the individual, he made most important anticipations here, especially in his treatment of the "social self," habit and instincts. As Professor Dewey has said of this aspect of his contributions, "big books have been written since which are hardly more than an amplification of suggestions found in these few pages."<sup>27</sup> The works of McDougall and Thorndike on instincts and the original nature of man, of Trotter, Ross and Durkheim on the influence of the group over the individual, and of Sumner and others on the effect of socially acquired habits of thinking and action bear out Professor Dewey's statement.

In discussing the subject of habit, James summarizes his conclusion as to the psychology of the matter by quoting with approval Carpenter's generalization that "our nervous system grows to the modes in which it has been exercised."<sup>28</sup> Among the most important practical applications of the psychology of habit are the facts that "habit simplifies the movements required to achieve a given result, makes them more accurate and diminishes fatigue," and that "habit diminishes the conscious attention with which our acts are performed."<sup>29</sup> The most important aspect of habit from the standpoint of sociology is its relation to the preservation of the social order:<sup>30</sup>

Habit is the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent. It alone is what keeps us all within the bounds of ordinance, and saves the children of fortune from the envious uprisings of the poor. It alone prevents the hardest and most repulsive walks of life from being deserted by those brought up to tread therein. It keeps the fisherman and deck-hand at sea through the winter, it holds the miner in his darkness, and nails the countryman to his log-cabin and his lonely farm through all the months of snow, it protects us from invasion by the natives of the desert

<sup>27</sup> J. Dewey, "The Need for Social Psychology," *Psychological Review*, 1917, p. 266

<sup>28</sup> Wm. James, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 112

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 112-14

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 120-21



and the frozen zone. It dooms us all to fight out the battle of life upon the lines of our nurture or early choice, and to make the best of a pursuit that disagrees, because there is no other for which we are fitted, and it is too late to begin again.

The implications of the psychology of habit for political theory are obvious. It is both indispensable and detrimental. Political obedience, as insisted by Maine and the legalists, certainly rests to a large degree upon habit. Habit helps to make possible the existence of systematic and permanent political institutions, but it also facilitates the perpetuation of grossly ineffective, wasteful and anachronistic methods and practices. It makes it difficult for the vested interests to recognize the defects in their domination and for the poor to sense properly their oppression or to grasp its causes. It seriously challenges the Marxian theory of class-consciousness, for history and psychology have proved that the reactions of the masses are determined far more by their life experiences than by a rational comprehension of their interests, and that oppression is likely, within certain limits, to bring acquiescence rather than revolt. Further, it shows that though political parties may be in the most fundamental sense "interest-groups" their success and permanence rest chiefly upon the habitual and traditional allegiance of the masses to shibboleths and party names which are charged with the compelling psychological power of habitual response. In short, habit is the chief joy and bulwark of the conservative and despair of the radical and reformer.

In order properly to comprehend the psychology of habit one must examine the psychological nature and operation of instincts. An instinct, according to James, "is usually defined as the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends, without foresight of the ends, and without previous education in the performance"<sup>81</sup> Among the more important special human instincts are imitation, emu-

<sup>81</sup> James, *op cit*, Vol II, p 383

lation or rivalry, pugnacity, anger, resentment, sympathy, fear, approbation, acquisitiveness, construction, hunting, play, curiosity, sociability and shyness, modesty, shame, parental love and sexual love.<sup>82</sup> The chief social significance of instincts is that they produce socially necessary habits, in fact, most habits are originated by instinctively impelled action.<sup>83</sup> As a gregarious animal man is excited by both the presence and absence of his kind. Therefore, the instincts are modified in their operation by their social setting, as well as being designed to fulfil some sort of social purpose.<sup>84</sup> To point out the sociological and political significance of instinctive action is quite unnecessary in the light of the subsequent development of social psychology. Thorndike and McDougall have attempted to cover the whole field, and other writers have seen fit to devote systematic works to the consideration of the social operation of one or more leading instincts. Perhaps the most important phase of the subject is that which has been cultivated by Wallas and Eldridge in their analyses of the relation between human nature and politics and of the necessity of providing a social and political environment which will secure a proper stimulation of, and an adequate outlet for, the chief instinctive cravings of man.<sup>85</sup>

One of the most significant aspects of James' social psychology was his analysis of the "social self." Dividing the self into four phases or constituents—the material, social, spiritual and ego—he defines the social self as "the recognition which a man gets from his mates."<sup>86</sup> The normal individual has a compelling desire to be noticed by his associates and to be regarded by them in a favorable manner. Therefore, each individual has as many social selves as there are distinct groups about whose opinion of him he has

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 403 ff

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 402

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 402, 430

<sup>85</sup> Graham Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics, The Great Society; Our Social Heritage*, and S. Eldridge, *Political Action*

<sup>86</sup> James, *op cit*, Vol I, pp 292-3.

any concern.<sup>37</sup> It is this influence of widely different groups of associates which accounts for the radical diversity of conduct and ethical standards of the individual when in the face of one or another of these groups. It is this which explains the remarkable propriety of the boy before his parents or the family clergyman, and his propensity to "swear like a pirate" when with his gang. It explains the existence of "honor among thieves." Fame and honor are products of the social self. Professional morality and honor depend almost wholly upon the type of conduct which is expected of an individual by his group. The influence of the forces flowing from the social self can alone explain why the individual who obeys nothing else will respect the code of honor of his club or profession.<sup>38</sup>

The significance of the basic notions of the "social self" for social theory can scarcely be exaggerated. They lay the foundation for a pluralistic view of society and the state as well as for a doctrine of personal conduct. They show that the individual will have as many loyalties as he has groups of associates and that his loyalty will be most intense towards that group with which he is most intimately and permanently associated. Further, they furnish the basis for the disconcerting query as to whether an individual can be loyal to a large national state or develop any high degree of "political" morality. The individual carries no image of the state in his mind and he has no strong sense of association with the mass of citizens who make up the state. His attitude towards the state is likely to be determined wholly by the stand taken by his associates with respect to political obedience and morality. The path is straight and direct from James' notion of the "social self" to the political theory of Léon Duguit, J. N. Figgis, G. D. H. Cole and H. J. Laski.<sup>39</sup>

The problem of the relation of the individual to society,

<sup>37</sup> James, *op cit*, Vol I, p 294.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 294-6

<sup>39</sup> Cf H. J. Laski, *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty*, Chap 1.

namely, social determinism, is considered by James in several of his essays. In that on "Great Men and Their Environment" he makes a forceful plea for a comprehensive view of the problem, and sharply criticizes Herbert Spencer and Grant Allen for their defense of social and geographical determinism. He contends that both the notion that individual genius overrides the social environment and is independent of it, and the view that civilization is wholly shaped by general social or geographical conditions, are hopelessly incomplete and unscientific ways of looking at the question. The individual and society must each be assigned a proper weight. A few brief citations from this essay will summarize his well-balanced analysis of this basic problem in sociology and history: <sup>40</sup>

Our problem is, What are the causes that make communities change from generation to generation—that make the England of Queen Anne so different from the England of Elizabeth, the Harvard College of to-day so different from that of thirty years ago?

I shall reply to this problem, The difference is due to the accumulated influences of individuals, of their examples, their initiatives, and their decisions. The Spencerian school replies, The changes are irrespective of persons, and independent of individual control. They are due to the environment, to the circumstances, the physical geography, the ancestral conditions, the increasing experience of outer relations, to everything, in fact, except the Grants and Bismarcks, the Joneses and the Smiths . . .

The causes of production of great men lie in a sphere wholly inaccessible to the social philosopher. He must simply accept geniuses as data, just as Darwin accepts his spontaneous variations. I affirm that the relation of the visible environment to the great man is in the main exactly what it is to the "variation" in the Darwinian philosophy. It chiefly adopts or rejects, preserves or destroys, in short *selects* him. And whenever it adopts and preserves the great man, it becomes modified by his influence in an original and peculiar way. He acts as a ferment, and changes its constitution, just as the advent of a new zoological species changes the faunal and floral equilibrium of the region in which it appears . . .

The mutations of society, then, from generation to generation,

<sup>40</sup> *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy*, pp. 218, 225, 227, 229-30, 232, 245, 253

are in the main due directly or indirectly to the acts or the example of individuals whose genius was so adapted to the receptivities of the moment, or whose accidental position of authority was so critical that they became ferments, initiators of movement, setters of precedent or fashion, centres of corruption, or destroyers of other persons, whose gifts, had they had free play, would have led society in another direction.

But the indeterminism is not absolute. Not every "man" fits every "hour." Some incompatibilities there are. A given genius may come either too early or too late. Peter the Hermit would now be sent to a lunatic asylum. John Mill in the tenth century would have lived and died unknown. Cromwell and Napoleon need their revolutions, Grant his civil war. An Ajax gets no fame in the day of telescopic-sighted rifles, and, to express differently an instance which Spencer uses, what could a Watt have effected in a tribe which no precursive genius had taught to smelt iron or to turn a lathe? . . .

Thus social evolution is a resultant of the interaction of two wholly distinct factors,—the individual, deriving his peculiar gifts from the play of psychological and infra-social forces, but bearing all the power of initiative and origination in his hands, and, second, the social environment, with its power of adopting or rejecting both him and his gifts. Both factors are essential to change. The community stagnates without the impulse of the individual. The impulse dies away without the sympathy of the community . . .

The evolutionary view of history, when it denies the vital importance of individual initiative, is, then, an utterly vague and unscientific conception, a lapse from modern scientific determinism into the most ancient oriental fatalism. The lesson of the analysis that we have made (even on the completely deterministic hypothesis with which we started) forms an appeal of the most stimulating sort to the energy of the individual . . .

The plain truth is that the "philosophy" of evolution (as distinguished from our special information about particular cases of change) is a metaphysical creed, and nothing else. It is a mood of contemplation, an emotional attitude, rather than a system of thought,—a mood which is as old as the world, and which no refutation of any one incarnation of it (such as the Spencerian philosophy) will dispel, the mood of fatalistic pantheism, with its intuition of the One and All, which was, and is, and ever shall be, and from whose womb each single thing proceeds.

While James wrote this before the sociological school of historians had even partially reconstructed the synthesis of the past and attached rather more importance to the individual in history than is at present customary, his essay

is a valuable corrective to either "hero-worship" or "social absolutism."

In his presidential address before the American Philosophical Society on "The Energies of Men," James made another important contribution to the subject of individual initiative, which, it would seem, rather tended in its implications towards emphasizing social limitations upon individual action and energy. The essence of his thesis is that "the human individual lives usually far within his limits; he possesses powers of various sorts which he habitually fails to use. He energises below his *maximum*, and he behaves below his *optimum*." Individuals utilize their real powers only when "some unusual stimulus fills them with emotional excitement, or some unusual idea of necessity induces them to make an extra effort of will" <sup>41</sup> While James did not offer many suggestions looking towards removing the cause of this serious defect in society he called attention to the problem. Some of the more evident explanations of this state of affairs have been contributed by the Freudian psychology with its theory of "repressions," and by Graham Wallas in his derived notion of "balked dispositions" caused by a maladjustment between social institutions and customs and the native impulses of mankind <sup>42</sup> It need not be emphasized that this waste of potential thought and energy in the social population is as serious a problem for the sociologist and statesman as the biological deterioration with which the eugenicist concerns himself.

James' important discussion of the problem of eliminating or reducing the frequency of wars in his "The Moral Equivalent of War" can be only briefly touched upon here. The set of facts to which he refers may, however, have quite as much bearing upon the whole problem of internationalism as the great volume of discussion and suggestions which have centered about the League of Nations. After a con-

<sup>41</sup> *Memories and Studies*, pp 229-64, cf G S Hall, *Morale*

<sup>42</sup> Cf S Freud, *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, Graham Wallas, *The Great Society*, Part I.

vincing demonstration of both the savagery and the deep-seated nature of the warlike impulses and sentiments in human nature, he concludes with the assertion that he does not "believe that peace either ought to be or will be permanent on this globe, unless the states pacifically organized preserve some of the old elements of army-discipline. . . . We must make new energies and hardihoods, continue the manliness to which the military mind so faithfully clings. Martial virtues must be the enduring cement; intrepidity, contempt of softness, surrender of private interest, obedience to command, must still remain the rock upon which states are built" <sup>43</sup> This essential condition could be met, James believed, by a social conscription of all young men to war against nature for a few years. They should be sent to "coal and iron mines, to freight trains, to fishing fleets in December, to dish-washing, clothes-washing, and window-washing, to road-building and tunnel-making, to foundries and stoke-holes, and to the frames of skyscrapers" <sup>44</sup> This would not only be socially and economically productive, but would also "preserve in the midst of a pacific civilization the manly virtues which the military party is so afraid of seeing disappear in peace." <sup>45</sup> In his "Remarks at the Peace Banquet" James advanced internationalist doctrine from another psychological standpoint by urging those interested in pacifism to

Organize in every conceivable way the practical machinery for making each successive chance of war abortive. Put peace men in power, educate editors and statesmen to responsibility. Seize every pretext, however small, for arbitration methods, and multiply precedents, foster rival excitements, and invent new outlets for heroic energy, and from one generation to another the chances are that irritation will grow less acute and states of strain less dangerous among the nations <sup>46</sup>

<sup>43</sup> *Memories and Studies*, pp. 287-88.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 290-91.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 291.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 305-6.



GRANVILLE STANLEY HALL





In his theories respecting state-activity James was by training and preference an advocate of individualism and *laissez-faire*, but was acute enough to realize that social and economic conditions had sharply modified the applicability of the views of the classical economists. While about the only whole-hearted praise he ever bestowed upon Herbert Spencer was his eulogy of Spencer's individualism, he became, like John Stuart Mill, at least partially reconciled to the probable development of a progressively greater amount of state-activity.<sup>47</sup>

#### B. Granville Stanley Hall (1846-1924) and Genetic Psychology.

It has become well-nigh a platitude that Darwinism was the most important discovery of the nineteenth century, and adequate recognition of this fact has been made by social scientists in various fields. To the task of linking up psychology with Darwinism and indicating the bearing of the evolutionary hypothesis upon the mental development and traits of mankind no other writer has made a contribution in any way approaching the work of G. Stanley Hall in formulating his body of "genetic psychology."<sup>48</sup>

Hall's training was almost unique. He was the first American really to get in touch with the remarkable advances in German psychology and the other branches of science and philosophy auxiliary to it. The names of some of his teachers, Pfeleiderer, Paulsen, Virchow, Bastian, Dubois-Reymond, Helmholtz, Ludwig, Fleischig, Czermak,

<sup>47</sup> *Memories and Studies*, pp 140-41. James says of Spencer on this point: "Spencer's politico-ethical activity in general breathes the purest English spirit of liberty, and his attacks on over administration and criticisms on the inferiority of great centralized systems are worthy to be the text-books of individualists the world over. I confess that it is with this part of his work, in spite of its harshness and inflexibility of tone that I sympathize most."

<sup>48</sup> Much biographical material of scientific as well as personal interest may be obtained in L. N. Wilson's *G. Stanley Hall, a Sketch*, (1914). The period of his education is covered in pages 25-71. In his *Makers of Modern Psychology*, he describes many of his teachers. Hall's autobiography, *The Life and Confessions of a Psychologist*, is a book of great interest and importance. It also gives a list of Hall's writings.

Fechner and Wundt, are sufficient to indicate the breadth and excellence of his training. Further than being the founder of genetic psychology, Hall was the first to introduce modern experimental psychology into this country and the first academic psychologist to sanction Freudian psychology.<sup>49</sup>

The fundamental doctrines of genetic psychology may be summarized in the following manner: The developmental point of view must be assumed at the outset. It is essential to recognize that the mind, as well as, and along with, the body, has evolved through the selective process in the course of an almost boundless era of time. Hence, attention should be centered chiefly on the problem of mental evolution. Much data can be obtained through a study of the mental life of primitive peoples, but this may be supplemented by an examination of the mental development of the individual, for, by the "law of recapitulation," the individual reproduces in his psychic growth the chief stages and characteristics in the mental evolution of the race. Psychologically, as well as biologically, "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny." The practical application of these doctrines by Hall and his disciples has been chiefly in the field of child study, the scientific beginning of which may be traced back to three articles contributed in 1882-3 on "The Moral and Religious Training of Children," "The Contents of Children's Minds on Entering School," and "The Study of Children."<sup>50</sup>

The following selected and arranged citations from Par-

<sup>49</sup> It is significant that it was under Hall's guidance that nearly every phase of modern psychological progress made its entry into this country.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. especially *Adolescence*, 2 Vols, 1904, preface, and Vol II, Chaps x, xv, xvi. This book in its field and in its influence may be compared to James' *Principles of Psychology*. A complete bibliography of his published works to 1914 is contained in Wilson, *op cit*, pp 118 ff. The most convenient place in which to find a comprehensive statement of Hall's psychological and pedagogical principles is in G. E. Partridge's *The Genetic Philosophy of Education*, (1912), a faithful synthesis and compilation of all of Hall's major doctrines. It was authorized and approved by Hall. For an excellent brief summary of Hall's leading principles see the *American Anthropologist*, 1904, pp 589-91. Hall's own epitome of his *Adolescence* appeared in 1906 under the title *Youth, Its Education, Regimen and Hygiene*.

tridge's epitome of Hall's psychological method and approach will suffice to indicate the most significant of his theoretical positions:<sup>51</sup>

The ideal of the new psychology, based upon the dictum, *No psychosis without neurosis*, has been to discover for each mental state and process an equivalent or correlate in the body or in nature. This is the main problem of physiological psychology, of psycho-physics, and of the experimental methods generally. The point of view is good, so far as it goes, but it is still a narrow conception of the province of a science of mind. A far more fruitful method is opened to it by the principle introduced into biology by Charles Darwin. Not only does it reveal a program of more important and far-reaching work than the study in the laboratory, but it suggests the means of a truer interpretation of all the facts. Such a science is entitled to the name of *Biological Philosophy*; for it extends its problems from the study of the merely individual mental processes of the adult, to the study of all mind, past, present, and future, in whatever form it appears, and its interpretation passes from the physiological explanation of mental states to the biological.

The fundamental fact and principle of this biological philosophy is that mind and body have evolved together in the race, and have developed together in the individual, in one continuous process. Not only, therefore, must all mental facts be understood in terms of, or with reference to, physical facts, but the individual, both in his mental and physical aspects, must be studied in relation to the whole history of the race. This evolutionary principle must be applied to all problems of psychology, until we have a complete natural history of the mind.

This new method and problem in psychology, taken in its widest sense, may be called the genetic. It aims to explain whatever process or state it observes by tracing it, in all its connections, to its origin. To understand any trait of the human mind, for example, it is necessary to discover not only the relation of the mental process to the changes in the nervous system upon which it depends, and to analyse the process into its elements, but we must know the genesis of the trait in the individual, both in its physical and its mental manifestations and connections, and also the whole history of it as it appears in the race. This is an ideal not to be attained in any problem at the present time, but it must constantly be striven toward in every investigation of the facts of human life. The genetic method has, therefore, two main branches: the study of mind in its development in the child, and

<sup>51</sup> Partridge, *op cit*, pp 14-28. Cf. J. M. Baldwin, *History of Psychology*, Vol. II, pp 94-98.

the study of mind in its evolution in the race No problem can be regarded as deeply understood that does not take into account both these aspects. . . .

Genetic psychology assumes as an ultimate fact, and as a background for all its principles, an endless process of time, stretching out into an infinitely remote past and pointing towards an infinitely remote future Every thing, and every event, must be regarded as the completion of an infinitely long process of development, in terms of which it can be explained, and also as germinal of a future, of which it is in turn to be the cause or genetic origin. Development and change are continuous and unbroken Nothing is stationary, and man himself is in a stage of active evolution toward a higher form . . .

The mind stretches far beyond the limited experiences of the individual It contains within itself all the past and all the future. It has grown up in the race, step by step, and has passed through stages as different from its present form as we can possibly conceive It is so vastly complex that it is never twice alike in the same individual, nor are ever two minds the same It is a product of millions of years of struggle. Its long experiences with light and darkness, and with heat and cold, have established many of its rhythms A long apprenticeship in aquatic and arboreal life has left deep and indelible marks Sky, wind, storm, flowers, animals, ancient industries and occupations, have directed its fears and affections, and have made the emotions what they now are. It has been shocked and molded into its present form by labor and suffering, and it shows in every function the marks of the process through which it has passed Although it is by far the most wonderful work of nature it is still very imperfect, full of scars and wounds, incompletely co-ordinated, and but poorly controlled; in many ways ill-adapted to the practical situations of life. In it barbaric and animal impulses are still felt Its old forms appear at every turn, and every trait of mind, as well as of body, is full of indications of its origin So close, indeed, is the past to the present in all we think and feel, that without referring to what has gone before in the race, the human mind, as we know it, is utterly unintelligible and mysterious, while many, if not most, of its mysteries become clear, when the mind is studied with reference to its past.

This point of view is essential for any introduction into the science of psychology. Only thus may one grasp the significance of mind in the world, and be prepared to interpret the common facts of everyday life One must see that only by studying mind objectively, in its racial manifestations, and in many individuals, can any conception of its range, depth, and meaning be attained An individual mind is but an infinitesimal fragment and expression of all the soul life in the world . . .

Such is the conception of man that results from the work of Darwin. His mind is to be regarded as quite as much an offspring of animal life as is his body. The same principles may be applied to both, and both must be investigated by similar inductive methods.

Thus far we have considered the mind and body with respect to their nature and contents. It is quite as important to understand them in what may be called their dynamic aspects, with reference to their development, both in the individual and the race, and to the relation of the two series, the ontogenetic and the phylogenetic, to one another. The discovery of the laws of development is one of the chief aims of genetic science, and in our practical science of man, we are most of all concerned with such principles. The most general formulation of all the facts of development that we yet possess is contained in the *law of recapitulation*. This law declares that the individual, in his development, passes through stages similar to those through which the race has passed, and in the same order, that the human individual of the higher races, for example, in the brief period from the earliest moment of life to maturity, passes through or represents all the stages of life, through which the race has passed from that of the single-celled animal to that of present adult civilized man. The recapitulatory process is sometimes obscured, stages overlap, or become dissociated, the individual must sometimes recount thousands of years of his racial history in a day or year, environment complicates and modifies the process in ways still quite unknown, but in a general way the individual may be said to recapitulate the race.

The bearing of the general thesis of genetic psychology upon politics is readily discernible. It furnishes a scientific basis for the generalizations of writers on political theory from Polybius to Hume and the present day, who have held that the state, government and the habits of obedience which accompany them were not "made," but developed gradually along with the progress of the culture of the race. The habits of political obedience and associated practices and institutions go back for their origins to the limitations imposed upon early appearing organisms by the physical environment, to the disciplining of the young of animals, to the control of animal behavior by the herd, to the domination of primitive man by the strong, wise and wily, and to the gradual evolution of obedience to formal political insti-

tutions which have themselves evolved along with the generations which have shaped them and adapted them to their needs and services. A psychical foundation is thus provided for a truly "natural history of the state." Further, ethnographic and historical evidence as to the origins of political institutions may be supplemented by observing the genesis of obedience in the individual from childhood to adult life.

In a paper on "The Social Phases of Psychology," read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society in 1912, Hall indicated the major points of common interest between genetic psychology and sociology. Both are interested in the analysis of animal and insect societies as an introduction to a study of human society. Both are concerned with child-study, for the social phases of the development of children recapitulate the progress of social life in primitive society. Both must consider anthropology and folk-psychology as throwing light upon the evolution of mentality and social life. Both must deal with the psychology of imitation, for it is a basic factor in both education and socialization. Both regard crime as anti-social action and as the product of an abnormal personality. Finally, both look upon justice as "the cardinal virtue of the social man," and recognize the validity of a broadly conceived identification of pleasure and duty and of sin and suffering.<sup>52</sup>

In one of his most recent works, *Morale, the Supreme Standard of Life and Conduct*, he has applied his psychology, which by this time had come to embrace a modified Freudianism, to a study of the leading problems of war and peace. As the work is itself primarily an encyclopædic survey of doctrines, space does not allow a detailed examination of its contents, but it is essential to make clear his view of the nature of morale and its function in individual

<sup>52</sup> *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1912, pp. 38 ff.

and social life. The following paragraph epitomizes his thesis: <sup>53</sup>

Is there any chief end of man, any goal or destiny supreme over all others? If so, and if found, we shall have in the degree of approximation to it the best of all scales on which to measure real progress in terms of which all human values are best stated and defined. I answer that there is such a goal and that it took the awful psychic earthquake of war to reveal it in its true perspective and to show us its real scope. It is simply this—to keep ourselves, body and soul, and our environment, physical, social, industrial, etc., always at the very tip-top of condition. This super-hygiene is best designated as *Morale*. It implies the maximum of vitality, life abounding, getting and keeping in the very centre of the current of creative evolution, and minimizing, destroying, or avoiding all checks, arrests and inhibitions to it. This mysterious developmental urge, entelechy, will-to-live, *élan vital*, *horme*, *libido*, *nisus*, or by whatever name it is called, which made all the ascending orders of life and in Man-soul itself evolved mind, society, language, myths, industry, gods, religion—in short, all human institutions, and, lastly, science, is in some strong, in others weak, and in the same individual it is now high, now low, but its presence makes and absence destroys, *morale*. The story of the retardations and advancements of this great energy in the cosmos constitutes every kind of real history. It is the only truly divine power that ever was or will be. Hence it follows that *morale* thus conceived is the one and only true religion of the present and the future, and its doctrines are the only true theology. Every individual situation and institution, every race, nation, class, or group is best graded as ascendant or decadent by its *morale*.

On the basis of this view of the nature and significance of *morale* Hall analyzes the problems of war *morale* on the field of battle and among the civilian population. This section of the work is an important resumé of a field which has been little cultivated in the literature of war psychology and statesmanship.<sup>54</sup> He then examines the bearing of this conception of *morale* upon contemporary economic and social problems, such as labor, prohibition, profiteering, feminism, education, statesmanship, radicalism and religion.

<sup>53</sup> G. S. Hall, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-2.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 22-200.



Especially significant is the chapter on morale and statesmanship, in which he points out the general domination of mediocrity in modern political society, the hopelessness of the rule of mediocrity in the time of a great crisis, and the difficulty which even great leaders have in rising to the demands produced by such an event as the World War and its after-problems.<sup>55</sup> As far as his work adequately deals with the subjects he has set himself to examine it constitutes an important approach to the problem which James has outlined in his "Energies of Men" and to which Wallas calls attention in his theory of "balked dispositions" and his analysis of the organization of concerted social effort. Notable is Hall's acknowledgment of the necessity of recognizing the subconscious factors which affect morale, individual and social.

**C. James Mark Baldwin (1861- ) and the Dialectic of Personal and Social Growth.**

Baldwin's extensive work in psychology and psychological sociology has gained for him distinction in various fields. Many think of him chiefly as the leading contender of G. Stanley Hall in the field of genetic psychology. Others look upon him as, next to Gabriel Tarde, the chief exponent of the psychological and sociological importance of imitation. Finally, he may be correctly viewed as the formulator of a comprehensive and coherent system of psychological sociology.<sup>56</sup>

While Baldwin and his disciples have been the only important group in this country to question Hall's primacy in the field of genetic psychology, there was in reality little

<sup>55</sup> Hall, *op. cit.*, pp. 293-315.

<sup>56</sup> Baldwin's systematic works which are of interest to us are *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*, and *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*. His psychology of society is best summarized in *The Individual and Society*. This serves a purpose comparable to Partidge's *Genetic Philosophy of Education*. An exposition of certain of Baldwin's principles is contained in L. M. Bristol's *Social Adaptation*, pp. 192-99; and Baldwin's theory of the social process is criticized by Giddings, *Democracy and Empire*, pp. 30-41.

true competition between these two "schools," so great was the divergence between their modes of approach to the subject. Baldwin deals with the problem from the more purely logical and psychological standpoint, and is inclined to doubt the value of too much reliance upon the law of recapitulation or upon biological and anthropological analogies in interpreting the psychic evolution of the individual. Hence, he was naturally far stronger than Hall in the narrower and more conventionally psychological aspects of his work, but vastly inferior in connecting individual development with the cosmic process and in clarifying the general cultural and sociological lessons and implications of genetic psychology. Perhaps the sharpest contrast between the attitudes of Hall and Baldwin is to be seen in their treatment of the subject of consciousness. Genetic psychology and Freudian psychology both emphasize the significance of the unconscious or sub-conscious, and Hall has been the leading academic exponent of both of these points of view. Baldwin's writings, however, represent almost the apotheosis of consciousness. As he says in one characteristic passage, "the matter of social organization consists of thoughts—by which is meant intellectual states—which are socially available" <sup>57</sup> Professor M. V. O'Shea, in his review of Hall's *Adolescence*, has presented what is, as far as is known to the writer, the best comparison of the methodology and achievements of Hall and Baldwin in this field: <sup>58</sup>

One naturally compares *Adolescence* as a whole and in particular parts with Baldwin's work, and he finds that there are fundamental points of likeness, but there are many points of difference. Hall's range is far greater, but Baldwin goes much deeper into his specific problem,—the development of mind in the individual, including his intellectual, social and ethical activities and relations. The latter is systematic, logical and psychological throughout, while the former covers in great detail many phases of development, but makes no attempt to be systematic or logical

<sup>57</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, third edition, p. 504

<sup>58</sup> M. V. O'Shea, *The Psychological Bulletin*, April 15, 1905, pp. 122-3.

in the strict sense. Both are alike in certain basal characteristics, however. For one thing their work is permeated throughout with modern evolutionary and biological doctrine. Both reject the methods and most of the conclusions of metaphysical and epistemological speculation. Both have the same large aim in view,—to give an account, in the spirit of contemporary biological science, of the natural history of the individual human mind. Both base their story upon the fundamental conception that ontogenesis epitomizes phylogenesis, but Baldwin uses the conception only occasionally, while Hall uses it constantly. Baldwin's discussion of mind is concerned very largely with a description of the developmental phenomena of the individual's conscious utilization of experience to secure adjustment, while Hall regards consciousness as of relatively slight importance in the life of the individual. Nine-tenths of mind is submerged, it is neither intellect nor emotion, it is impulsion, instinct, the generalization of ancestral experience running away back into the dim geologic past. Consciousness may be only "a wart raised by the sting of sin, a product of alienation or a remedial process." The moving phantasmagoria of images and conscious objects are not the chief facts of mind, as are the many-voiced comments, the sense of assent and dissent, pleasure and pain, the elation of strength or the æsthetic responses, the play of intuitions, the impulses to do or not to do, automatic tensions or contractions. These are not epiphenomenal, but noumenal in soul-life, its palmary facts and experiences."

Baldwin's attitude towards his theme is essentially an intellectual and scientific one, he observes, organizes, systematizes, traces causal relations. Hall's attitude is more largely emotional, poetic, ethical, and perhaps hortative. These differences in attitude explain in part differences in temper and tone and style of writing. Baldwin's aim is best realized by means of a comparatively direct, unemotional style, with only a mild use of rhetorical aids, but in all philosophical, biological, psychological, and educational writing, so far as the reviewer's knowledge goes, there is no verbal architect and artist equal to Hall, none who can approach him in the fervor, the stateliness, the impassionateness, the at times well-nigh overwhelming effect of his rhetoric. This style is, though, well suited to his point of view and his purposes. His vision sweeps from one mountain peak to another, and he must tell what he sees in words and phrases that befit the great scenes which he beholds, and that will stir his listeners to action. To influence the conduct of men, not to convince their intellects, is after all, as I see it, the fundamental motive and *raison d'être* of Hall's work. He has more faith anyway in the impulsions of feeling than in the formulæ of mechanical reason. He does not believe that the highest type of truth about human nature can come from the psychological laboratory. Modern culture represses feeling and "intellect saps its

roots." The psychologist of the study does not concern himself with the deepest and most characteristic things in soul life—with "hate that makes man mad or bestial", with "love . . . that is stronger than life", with "fear that shakes the pulses", with "courage that faces death in its cruelest forms unflinchingly"; and with "torture, and joy that threatens sanity."

Baldwin's major contributions to social and political psychology can probably best be summarized by a brief consideration of his views upon the dialectic of personal growth, the analogous dialectic of social growth, the nature of the social process, and the psychological aspects of social sanctions and social control.

The separate discussion of personal and social growth does not imply any belief on the part of Baldwin that there is a radical distinction between the individual and society. Rather they are parts of an organic unity, cannot exist alone, and have evolved together:<sup>59</sup>

The traditional contrast between individual and collective interests is largely artificial and mistaken. The individual is a product of his social life, and society is an organization of such individuals. There is, on the whole, no general antagonism of interests. On the contrary, there is a concurrence and practical identity, at least in those great aspects of life which constitute the utilities of society, and motive the essential actions of men.

Society and the individual are not two entities, two forces acting separately, two enemies making forced and grudging concessions each to the other. On the contrary, they are the two sides of a growing organic whole, in which the welfare and advance of the one minister to the welfare and progress of the other.

The conception of the dialectic of personal growth is based upon an analysis of the four stages in the development of the individual's consciousness of himself and others. In the first or *objective* stage the infant distinguishes only objects and does not distinguish between personal and impersonal objects. Gradually he is able to discriminate between these and distinguishes persons in their external relations, though he does not become conscious

\* *The Individual and Society*, pp. 118, 170

of himself. This second stage is called the *projective*. The child next begins to imitate other persons, and thereby to amplify and extend his own experiences until he becomes conscious of himself and his more vivid experiences. In this third or *subjective* stage the individual also makes the first elementary beginnings of volition. Finally, there comes the fourth or *ejective* stage in which the individual reads his own experience into those of others and becomes conscious of others as similar to himself. In this way the social-self is born, the individual thinking of himself in terms of others and of others in terms of himself.<sup>60</sup>

Here are, therefore, four very distinct phases of the child's experience of persons not himself, all subsequent to his purely *affective* or pleasure-pain epoch, first, persons are simply *objects*, parts of the material going on to be presented, mainly sensations which stand out strong, etc.; second, persons are very peculiar objects, very interesting, very active, very arbitrary, very portentous of pleasure or pain. If we consider these objects as fully presented, *i. e.*, as in due relationship to one another in space, projected out, and thought of as external, and call such objects again *projects*, then persons at this stage may be called *personal projects*. They have certain peculiarities afterwards found by the child to be the attributes of personality. Third, his own actions issuing from himself, largely by imitation, as we shall see, in response to the requirements of this "projective" environment, having his own organism as their centre and his own consciousness as their theatre, give him light on himself as *subject*; and, fourth, this light upon himself is reflected upon other persons to illuminate them as also subjects, and they to him then become *jects* or social fellows.<sup>61</sup>

The dialectic of social growth constitutes a remarkably analogous process to the dialectic of personal growth. Thoughts are the raw material of the social process, and social growth consists in the appropriation and organization of thoughts. The projective stage of social growth occurs when the thoughts exist only in the minds of the individuals. The subjective period is reached when society

<sup>60</sup> *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*, third edition, pp. 17 ff., 318 ff., *The Individual and Society*, pp. 18-26.

<sup>61</sup> *Mental Development*, p. 18.

appropriates these thoughts and works them over into institutions. The ejective level is attained when society compels its component individuals to respect and obey the institutions which embody the thoughts which have been absorbed.<sup>62</sup>

If we take any lesson which society learns,—any one thought which it adopts and makes a part of its organized content,—we can trace the passage of this thought or element through the two poles of the “dialectic of social growth,” just as we can also trace the elements of personal suggestion, in the case of the analogous dialectic of the individual’s growth. The new thought is “projective” to society as long as it exists in the individual’s mind only; it becomes “subjective” to society when society has generalized it and embodied it in some one of the institutions which are a part of her intimate organization, and then finally society makes it “ejective” by requiring, by all her pedagogical, civil, and other sanctions, that each individual, class, or subordinate group which claims a share in her corporate life, shall recognize it and live up to it.

Society, in other words, makes her particularizations, inventions, interpretations, through the individual man, just as the individual makes his through the *alter* individual who gives him his suggestions, and then society makes her generalizations by setting the results thus reached to work again for herself in the form of institutions, etc., just as the individual sets out for social confirmation and for conduct the interpretations which he has reached. The growth of society is therefore a growth in a sort of self-consciousness—an awareness of itself—expressed in the general ways of thought, action, etc., embodied in its institutions; and the individual gets his growth in self-consciousness in a way which shows by a sort of recapitulation this twofold movement of society. So the method of growth in the two cases—what has been called the “dialectic”—is the same.<sup>63</sup>

The essence of Baldwin’s doctrine of the social process may be briefly summarized in the following manner. The raw material of society and socialization is thoughts:

It is only thoughts or knowledge which are imitable in the fruitful way required by a theory of progressive social organization. . . . It is only in the form of thoughts, conceptions, or in-

<sup>62</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*, third edition, pp. 539 ff.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 540-42.

ventions that new material, new "copies for imitation," new schemes of modified organization, can come into a society at any stage of its development."<sup>64</sup>

Thoughts arise through invention, but these thoughts are not wholly new. They are rather variations of the old, appear in old channels and form a recombination or reinterpretation of familiar materials:

The individual becomes the source of the new ideas, the inventions, the formulas of legislation and reform. The individual is the only source of novelties of thought or practice, and it is from the individual that society learns them. They are "generalized" discussed, pared down, made available in form and content, by social processes, and then finally passed over to the domain of the accepted and socially selected.<sup>65</sup>

An effective invention is always rooted in the knowledge already possessed by society. No effective invention ever makes an absolute break with the culture, tradition, fund of knowledge treasured up from the past.<sup>66</sup>

The most striking and significant inventions are those of the genius, but even these are socially determined and are not successful unless they are socially accepted. "If perchance the creations of the genius seem in a measure to violate tradition and to be judged more truly by the thinker than by society, nevertheless even such real additions to possible human achievement do not become the social success which makes them additions to human culture, until society do come up to the standard of judgment which they require."<sup>67</sup> In order to be socially appropriated and, hence, significant, inventions in the field of thought must be spread through imitation. Imitation is of three types representing stages of development. First comes biological, organic or subcortical imitation which embraces all repetitions which are not on a conscious level. Next is found psychological, conscious, or cortical imitation, which im-

<sup>64</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 504 ff.

<sup>65</sup> *The Individual and Society*, pp. 152-3.

<sup>66</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 180, Cf. pp. 99-193.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 181.

plies images or a copy consciously imitated. Finally, there appears plastic or secondarily subcortical imitation, namely, that which was once conscious but has, with the passing of time and increased experience, become automatic and subconscious.<sup>68</sup> But mere imitation does not complete this social process. The thought imitated must be assimilated by the individual and ejected out into society. "Ideas, inventions of all sorts, are actually propagated by the imitation of one man by another; but this is only one step in their conversion into social matter. Merely this fact of social imitation does not necessarily make these things socially available. If so, my parrot would, by imitating me, come into a social status with reference to me. Another factor is necessary, i.e., imitative assimilation and growth, whereby what is imitated is also organized in the individual's own thought, and imitatively ejected into others, becoming part of a situation—a status scheme—whose organization includes 'publicity' and 'duties and rights.'"<sup>69</sup> This social process taken as a whole constitutes the mechanism of social progress.<sup>70</sup>

There is, therefore, a process of give and take between the individual and society by which what we call the consciousness of the social body as a whole is built up. Society absorbs the thoughts and examples of individuals, and makes them socially available, then the individuals of successive generations receive them by social inheritance and reinforce them in turn. But in this process the individuals again produce variations, exceptional proposals of thought, action, and sentiment, and the social body again reacts to their suggestions. Society takes the "copy" from the individual, as the individual takes it from his fellows, makes it its own, as the individual makes his own the lessons of self-consciousness, and then ejects it back into the individual as the person also has ejected it into his fellows about him. Thus the concurrent growth goes on, the individual feeds upon the current custom, science, morals of his time and group, and society feeds upon the thoughts, inventions, plans of social welfare excogitated by individuals.

<sup>68</sup> *Mental Development*, pp. 332 ff. Ellwood criticizes Baldwin's views of imitation in his *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, Chap. XIII.

<sup>69</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 535-6.

<sup>70</sup> *The Individual and Society*, pp. 155-6.



This process, taken as a whole, is what we mean by social progress. It is the normal and continuous growth of social organization concurrently with the person's progress in individuality. Its direction is that of the growth of personal self-consciousness, its states are those of ascending self-realization, its ideal is that of the self of the socialized individual. It is progress in the concurrent development of the collectivistic and individualistic factors to which society owes its very existence.

Social progress, which would be inevitably and automatically realized through the reciprocal action of the individual and society, may be hastened through the conscious planning of the human intelligence. "Collectivism, reflective solidarity, the pursuit of moral and social ends—this is the direction that nature itself pursues in social evolution. We may, therefore, lend a helping hand to the car of progress by utilizing the resources of thought, invention, and morality, and bring in a period of better things."<sup>71</sup> Baldwin thus gives at least moderate approval to Lester F. Ward's notion of social telesis.

Baldwin considers in some detail the problems of social control:<sup>72</sup>

The individual's thought or judgment is "controlled" by the facts he is dealing with, on the one hand, and by the customs, habits, social and disciplinary conventions, and so forth, under which he does his thinking. He cannot use his judgment fruitfully without recognizing these elements of control.

Social control is exerted chiefly through social institutions which furnish the sanctions for conduct.<sup>73</sup>

The institution is only the permanent form in which the organization of members of a group embodies itself for carrying on its social function. The school, the state, the church, are typical institutions thus understood. The essential thing is not the external form, the means by which it accomplishes its end, but the type of collective interest and action it devotes itself to and fulfils.

<sup>71</sup> *Individual and Society*, pp. 163-4.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 69.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 119.

There are four general types of institutions which furnish social sanctions—natural institutions, pedagogical and conventional institutions, civil institutions, and ethical and religious institutions.<sup>74</sup> Natural institutions are those which “arise directly out of the nature of man” and are best exemplified by the family.<sup>75</sup> The pedagogical and conventional institutions “prepare the individual for his social place and rôle” and are represented by the school in a broad sense.<sup>76</sup> Civil institutions are designed to curb the “undue operation of the individualistic factor” and are represented by the state and its agent the government.<sup>77</sup> Ethical and religious institutions are less utilitarian than the first three types and exist to develop sentimental agencies for social control. They are represented chiefly by public opinion and the church.<sup>78</sup>

Baldwin sets forth his specific psychological interpretation of the state and government in the following manner: The natural and pedagogical institutions of society reduce to a large degree the extreme egoistic and individualistic tendencies, advance socialization and prepare mankind for cooperative endeavor. Yet some form of external constraint is necessary for the most effective group co-operation and to curb the disintegrating tendencies of imperfectly socialized individuals. Government constitutes the only agency adequate to insure the most complete degree of collective activity through coöperative endeavor. Yet, political constraint is but the means to an end, and administration of collective interests rather than constraint is the chief function of government. Government is not created by a contract; it is an agreement which implies social self-consciousness and the recognition of the neces-

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 120 ff., *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 414 ff.

<sup>75</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 415-22

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 422-30, *Individual and Society*, pp. 123-26

<sup>77</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 430-43, *Individual and Society*, pp. 127-35

<sup>78</sup> *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 443-55; *Individual and Society*, pp. 137-44

sity of an adequate institution for furthering and perfecting group coöperation. Owing to the dependence of government upon this social self-consciousness the forms of government change with alterations in the type of social self-consciousness:<sup>79</sup>

In the main we may say, therefore, that the pedagogical institutions of society are socializing and collectivistic. They aim to preserve the type of "socrus," or citizen, that the system of things requires. This necessitates the development of the individual along lines that reduce his eccentricity and train his powers into conformity to the standards of social usage and common life. . . .

This is true to even a greater extent of the institutions of government. They are of necessity conserving and conservative. The need of self-control in the individual is felt first of all in the social body, its utility is social more than individual. The unrestrained exercise of personal powers, of the more instinctive and impulsive sort, might often seem to serve the immediate advantage of the individual. But society points out the wider unit, the larger utility, afforded by co-operation and union. It is for society, then, to secure this by constraining the individuals who do not recognize it. So the exercise of some sort of constraint upon the individuals who need it is the condition of effective social organization. Social control and self-control go hand in hand.

This does not commit us to a theory of government which makes constraint the essence of society, the fundamental motive of social organization is not in my opinion "constraint." On the contrary, all fruitful constraint assumes a sort of social bond. The need and the advantage of social union and co-operation must be felt in order that its lack or its impairment may come home to individuals. Granted, on the other hand, the growing bonds of social interest and life, then the need of restraining the more unsocial and individualistic tendencies of individuals becomes apparent. Thus arises the recognition of the function of the many to use what means it may to secure the widest and most effective co-operation. . . .

It appears evident, also, from this consideration, that government is not a matter of formal consent or contract, it is a means of conserving a state or fact and a state of mind already recognized as existing.

If government were only with "the consent of the governed," there would be no need of government. Such a consent is a result, not a cause. The fact of government is the external side of the state of mind by which the individuals of a group come into their status with reference to one another, the status in which the soci-

<sup>79</sup> *The Individual and Society*, pp 127-135

reciprocate in varying degrees the feeling of concession and co-operation which growing self-consciousness implicates. This growth is unequal, varying, less or more developed, while the demands of social utility are urgent and compelling. The result is the civil and pedagogical rule, in which the element of authority, with its correlative obedience, plays a conspicuous part.

This element—the enforcing of social rule or law with penalties of various sorts—embodies itself in institutions of separate form and sanction. This is government. It is the authority of the social group as such recognized as enforced by and upon individuals. It is effective or it could not be established, it is compulsory, or it would not be effective.

Government, then, is the explicit form in which the actual bonds existing in a group are made authoritative and are enforced upon individuals. The greater part of the function of government, however, we should not overlook, is administrative, not coercive. It is mainly an instrument of social procedure, not one of social constraint. There is the consent of the governed in all that in which they do not come into conflict with the established authority; and this covers, for most civilized men, the whole of their lives and all the details of their lives. No one but the law-breaker fears the law.

The form of government changes with development in the form of the social self-consciousness. The ruder societies show most constraint, and have the most brutal procedure of administration, these are the reflex of the cruder forms of solidarity and community which are not yet tolerant, imitative, or reflective. Legislation is undeveloped, and executive action is autocratic and peremptory.

As society advances, the more psychological factors tend to release the group from its bondage to animal brutality, and from the biological sanctions of appetite, force, individual passion, and ambition, and the more administrative and popular forms of government appear. The stages seem to be in type from absolute despotism, through various modes of constitutionalism, to representative government and democracy. How far democracy succeeds seems to depend upon the relative social and political virtue of the people. If government is ever to dispense with an authority that may, on occasion, assert itself without the ratification of its decrees by the popular voice, it must be when and because that voice is not necessary.

#### D. Edward Lee Thorndike (1874— ) and the Native Equipment of Man.

Among American psychologists the pioneer in the application of experimental psychology to a study of animal

behavior and an analysis of the "original nature of man" has been Professor E. L. Thorndike of Columbia University. In a way he has combined the type of contribution to psychology which has been made in England by C. Lloyd Morgan and William McDougall. Yet he represents a somewhat more advanced stage in the evolution of the science—a more rigorous application of and a greater dependence upon the purely experimental method, and less utilization of the philosophical and dialectic mode of approach. His most important contributions to animal psychology were incorporated in the volume on *Animal Intelligence*. In this work he disposed of two persistent assumptions of psychological sociologists, namely, the belief that animals have a general tendency towards imitation and possess a social consciousness. He contends that his experiments tended to prove that there is no general tendency on the part of animals to imitate each other, and that they have no true social consciousness, namely, a consciousness of the feelings of their fellows.<sup>80</sup> Much more important for political and social psychology, however, is his attempt to discover, describe and catalog those "unlearned tendencies," those "reflexes, instincts, and inborn capacities" which go to make up the "original nature of man."

The "original nature of man" or his native equipment consists of those unlearned tendencies with which he starts his career and which are in no way dependent upon the facts of his immediate social or natural environment. His subsequent life and activities are a product of the reciprocal action of this original equipment and the social and geographical environment. Hence the necessity of ascertaining the exact nature of man's unlearned tendencies, so that the question of their adequacy as a guide for educational and social policy may be considered, as well as the problem of the desirability and degree of their possible modification through pedagogical and social effort:

<sup>80</sup> *Animal Intelligence, Experimental Studies*, pp. 76-98, 146-7.

Any man possesses at the very start of his life—that is, at the moment when the ovum and spermatozoon which are to produce him have united—numerous well-defined tendencies to future behavior. Between the situations which he will meet and the responses which he will make to them, pre-formed bonds exist. It is already determined by the constitution of these two germs, that under certain circumstances he will see and hear and feel and act in certain ways. His intellect and morals, as well as his bodily organs and movements, are in part the consequence of the nature of the embryo in the first moment of its life. What a man is and does throughout life is a result of whatever constitution he has at the start and of all the forces that act upon it before and after birth. I shall use the term “original nature” for the former and “environment” for the latter. His original nature is thus a name for the nature of the combined germ-cells from which he springs, and his environment is a name for the rest of the universe, so far as it may, directly or indirectly, influence him.<sup>61</sup>

It certainly is impossible to summarize the original nature of man without great risk of misleading. The inventory which has been made is, indeed, itself, too condensed to do full justice to the elaborate mental organization with which man meets his environment. But, accepting the risk, one may say that the original nature of man is roughly what is common to all men *minus* all adaptations to tools, houses, clothes, furniture, words, beliefs, religions, laws, science, the arts, and to whatever in other man's behavior is due to adaptations to them. From human nature as we find it, take away, first, all that is in the European but not in the Chinaman, all that is in the Fiji Islander but not in the Esquimaux, all that is local or temporary. Then take away the effects of all products of human art. What is left of human intellect and character is largely original—not wholly, for all those elements of knowledge which we call ideas and judgments must be subtracted from his responses. Man originally possesses only capacities which after a given amount of education will produce ideas and judgments. And from the situations to which he originally responds, must also be subtracted all ideas and judgments, for, again, his original tendencies are bound only to direct sense-presentations and feelings. To ideas, when he gets them, he responds originally only as he would to some direct presentations which they sufficiently resemble. Much, perhaps nine-tenths, of what commonly passes for distinctively human nature is thus not in man originally, but is put there by institutions or grows there by the interaction of the world of natural forces and the capacity to learn. To reduce the chance of misleading, the original nature of man may be summarized also by listing its essential differences

<sup>61</sup> *The Original Nature of Man*, pp. 1-2.

from that of the primates in general. Consider the intellectual and moral equipment of the monkeys. Add to it certain important social instincts, notably those connected with the more refined facial expressions and the approval-disapproval series. Increase in intensity and breadth the satisfyingness of mental life for its own sake, widen the repertory of movements to include human facial expressions, finger and thumb play and articulated babble, enrich the fund of indifferent possibilities of secondary connections and give them the tendency to piece-meal action in very fine detail. The result will be substantially the original nature of man.<sup>52</sup>

It is a first principle of education to utilize any individual's original nature as a means to changing him for the better—to produce in him the information, habits, powers, interests and ideals which are desirable.

The behavior of man in the family, in business, in the state, in religion and in every other affair of life is rooted in his unlearned, original equipment of instincts and capacities. All schemes of improving human life must take account of man's original nature, most of all when their aim is to reverse or counteract it.

A study of the original nature of man as a species and of the original natures of individual men is therefore the primary task of human psychology. This volume is concerned with only the former task. The main topics of such a study are

1. The description and classification of original tendencies.
2. Their anatomy and physiology.
3. Their source or origin.
4. The order and dates of their appearance and disappearance, and
5. Their control in the service of human ideals.<sup>53</sup>

Thorndike discusses in some detail the nature, origins and operation of these unlearned tendencies of man, but we cannot follow him here on account of the concrete nature of the material and the wide citation of leading students of the various phases of the subject.<sup>54</sup> There are, however, certain phases of this material to which at least brief attention must be devoted. It is in his discussion of the social instincts that Thorndike reflects most fully the influence of William James and approaches more closely to

<sup>52</sup> Thorndike, *op. cit.*, pp. 198-9.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, *passim*, especially Chaps. v-xi, xiv-xvi.

the ground covered by McDougall. He considers the instinct of motherly behavior, the gregarious instinct with its results in the pleasure of association, the thrills of group approval and the misery of group scorn, the instinct of mastery or submission, depending upon the respective size, sex and age of the individuals concerned, sex behavior, secretiveness, rivalry, cooperation, suggestibility and opposition, greed, ownership, kindness, teasing, tormenting and bullying, constructiveness, cleanliness, curiosity, multiform mental and physical activity, workmanship and play.<sup>85</sup> This is one of the most comprehensive catalogs of alleged instinctive tendencies which has been set forth by any psychologist of repute and has been sharply criticized by some on this very account.

Perhaps the most significant of Thorndike's contentions for psychological sociology is that there is no such thing as an original tendency in man to imitate. He criticizes Tarde sharply for his undoubted looseness and ambiguity in the use of the term, and concludes that—

I can find no evidence that any such tendency (to imitate) is original in man. As will be stated later, certain particular sorts of behavior do originally provoke in the spectator behavior that resembles them, but, so far as I can see, behavior in general does not. . .

On the whole, the imitative tendencies which pervade human life and which are among the most powerful forces with and against which education and social reform work, are, for the most part, not original tendencies to respond to behavior seen by duplicating it in the same mechanical way that one responds to light by contracting the pupil, but must be explained as the results of the arousal, by the behavior of other men, of either special instinctive responses or ideas and impulses which have formed in the course of experience, connections with that sort of behavior. Man has a few specialized original tendencies whose responses are for him to do what the man forming the situation does. His other tendencies to imitate are habits learned nowise differently from other habits.

The most probable cases for the production, by behavior witnessed, of similar behavior in the witness, are *smiling when smiled*

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 81-107, 138-46



*at, laughing when others laugh, yelling when others yell, looking at what others observe, listening when others listen, running with or after people who are running in the same direction, running from the focus whence others scatter, jabbering when others jabber and becoming silent as they become silent, crouching when others crouch, chasing, attacking and rending what others hunt, and seizing whatever object another seizes*<sup>80</sup>

Finally, Thorndike takes up the question, answered in the affirmative by Rousseau, as to whether the impulses from man's original nature are a reliable guide for conduct and a suitable criterion for judging ethical codes. While not fully agreeing with either, Thorndike inclines to believe that Stanley Hall and his followers, who regard nature as the safest guide for conduct and education, err less than the absolutist philosophers with their categorical imperatives and their adulation of pure thought spelled with a capital T, who condemn natural impulses on all occasions. The natural impulses are far from perfect and also far from being entirely evil. Progress comes through modifying and improving them by conscious effort and readjusting them to meet the varying needs of an advancing civilization, yet they contain within themselves the raw material out of which all progress must be constructed.

The original tendencies of man have not been right, are not right, and probably never will be right. By them alone few of the best wants in human life would have been felt, and fewer still satisfied. Nor would the crude, conflicting, perilous wants which original nature so largely represents and serves, have had much more fulfilment. Original nature has achieved what goodness the world knows as a state achieves order, by killing, confining, or reforming some of its elements. It progresses, not by *laissez faire* but by changing the environment in which it operates and by renewedly changing itself in each generation. Man is now as civilized, rational and humane as he is because man in the past has changed things into shapes more satisfying, and changed parts of his own nature into traits more satisfying, to man as a whole. Man is thus eternally altering himself to suit himself. His nature is not right in his own eyes. Only one thing in it, indeed, is unreservedly good, the power to make it better. This power, the

<sup>80</sup> Thorndike, *op cit*, pp 108-22

power of learning or modification in favor of the satisfying, the capacity represented by the law of effect, is the essential principle of reason and right in the world <sup>87</sup>

I have been at some pains to make it clear that the instinctive tendencies of man must often be supplemented, redirected and even reversed, and that, in the ordinary sense of the words, original nature is imperfect and untrustworthy. But in a certain important sense nature is right . . .

The original nature of man, as we have seen, has its source far back of reason and morality in the interplay of brute forces, it grows up as an agency to keep men, and especially certain neurones within men's bodies alive, it is physiologically determined by the character of the synaptic bonds and degrees of readiness to act of these neurones, parts of it are again and again in rebellion against the higher life that the acquired wisdom of man prescribes. But it has evolved reason and morality from brute force, amongst the neurones whose life it serves are neurones whose life means, if a certain social environment is provided, loving children, being just to all men, seeking the truth, and every other activity that man honors, the wisdom that criticises it is its own product, the higher life is the choice of its better elements: for whatever aberrations and degradations it imposes on man, its own virtues are the preventive and cure and to it will be due whatever happiness, power and dignity man attains <sup>88</sup>

**E. William McDougall (1871- ) and the Emphasis upon the Sociological Significance of Instincts.**

Probably the best known of English contributions to the psychological foundations of sociology is the work of the Oxford Professor, William McDougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*.<sup>89</sup> McDougall is one of the leaders of modern psychology and was in his earlier days an adherent, though a moderate one, of the so-called "Behavioristic" school of psychology. As a work on social psychology the book both gains and suffers by the previous specialization of the author in psychology and his limited acquaintance with systematic sociology. The psychological

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid*, pp 281-282

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid*, pp 310-12 For another excellent summary discussion of the field covered by Professor Thorndike in this book see R. S. Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology*, Chap. III

<sup>89</sup> Tenth ed., Boston, 1916. Reviewed by James H. Leuba, *American Journal of Psychology* (1909), pp. 285-89. Professor McDougall was called to Harvard University in 1920.

aspects of the work are particularly full and complete, but the sociological applications of psychology are rather scanty. Mr. Barker's criticism is very concise and pertinent. "The difficulty is, when it comes to the point, that Mr. McDougall, while giving a full account of the genesis of instincts that act *in* society, hardly shows how they issue *into* society. He seems to do a great deal of packing in preparation for a journey on which he never starts."<sup>90</sup> It is for this reason that McDougall's treatise is admirably supplemented by Professor E. A. Ross's *Social Psychology* in which there is scarcely any "packing" for the journey but a considerable amount of traveling.

McDougall's *Social Psychology* is noteworthy in the history of sociological theory as the first systematic treatment of the sociological importance of instinct. In the words of Professor Ellwood:<sup>91</sup>

In general, however, in sociological literature, there was little adequate explicit recognition of the large part which instincts play in our social life down to the publication of McDougall's *Social Psychology* in 1908. While many scattered articles and passages had emphasized the importance of instinct in particular phases of the social life, McDougall's work first systematically attempted to show the bearing of instinct upon the social life as a whole and upon the social sciences.

Instinct, of which McDougall makes so much, he defines as follows: "We may, then, define an instinct as an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action."<sup>92</sup>

<sup>90</sup> Barker, *Political Thought in England from Spenser to the Present Day*, p. 157.

<sup>91</sup> Ellwood, *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, pp. 202-3.

<sup>92</sup> *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, p. 29. McDougall's later writings should be consulted for some revisions of his view of instincts. See especially his "Can Sociology and Social Psychology Dispense with Instincts?" in *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, Vol. XIX, No. 1, pp. 13-41.

McDougall finds that there are some eleven complex instincts, to the operation of which may be referred most human and social actions. The first seven have corresponding primary emotions. The following is the list of his postulated instincts with their corresponding emotion: flight and the emotion of fear; repulsion and the emotion of disgust; curiosity and the emotion of wonder; pugnacity and the emotion of anger; self-abasement and the emotion of subjection; self-assertion and the emotion of elation; the parental instinct and the tender emotion; the reproductive or sex instinct; the gregarious instinct; the instinct of acquisition; and finally the constructive instinct.<sup>93</sup> This procedure of basing a psychological theory of society too exclusively upon the element of instinctive behavior has been rather vigorously criticized by Professor Tenney,<sup>94</sup> but it seems that whatever the shortcomings of McDougall's scheme, it is of the utmost importance to recognize the importance of instinctive behavior in society,<sup>95</sup> and McDougall errs chiefly in ascribing excessive influence and definiteness to a phase of the motivation of behavior which was largely ignored before his analysis appeared.

McDougall's theories throw much light upon the problem of the psychological foundations of political authority and obedience. The gregarious instinct must be regarded as an important conditioning influence rather than the direct causal factor in the development of political and social institutions. It merely brings individuals together in contiguity and makes possible their subsequent molding into a society through the operation of socializing influences.<sup>96</sup>

We may briefly sum up the social operation of the gregarious instinct by saying that, in early times when population was scanty,

<sup>93</sup> *Introduction to Social Psychology*, Chap. III.

<sup>94</sup> "Some Recent Advances in Sociology," *Political Science Quarterly*, September, 1910, pp. 514-15. See also the criticism by Bernard below.

<sup>95</sup> Cf. Ellwood, *op. cit.*, Chap. IX.

<sup>96</sup> McDougall, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

it must have played an important part in social evolution by keeping men together and thereby occasioning the need for social laws and institutions, as well as by providing the conditions of aggregation in which alone the higher evolution of the social attributes was possible, but that in highly civilized societies its functions are less important, because the density of population ensures a sufficient aggregation of the people, and that, facilities for aggregation being so greatly increased among modern nations, its direct operation is apt to produce anomalous and even injurious social results

McDougall distinguishes four levels of conduct which are passed through by all advanced peoples in the course of their social and political evolution and by every individual between birth and the attainment of adult status:<sup>97</sup>

We may roughly distinguish four levels of conduct, successive stages, each of which must be traversed by every individual before he can attain the next higher stage. These are (1) the stage of instinctive behavior modified only by the influence of the pains and pleasures that are incidentally experienced in the course of instinctive activities, (2) the stage in which the operation of the instinctive impulses is modified by the influence of rewards and punishments administered more or less systematically by the social environment, (3) the stage in which conduct is controlled in the main by the anticipation of social praise and blame, (4) the highest stage, in which conduct is regulated by an ideal of conduct that enables a man to act in the way that seems to him right regardless of the praise or blame of his immediate social environment.

Instinctive behavior characterizes the animal kingdom. Social control through the presence of direct and imminent rewards and punishments is typical of primitive societies. The domination by public opinion prevails among the majority in modern society. Critically thought out and rationally determined conduct is found only among the small class of courageous, independent, and scientifically minded individuals. Therefore, the chief problem connected with social control and political obedience in modern society is to explain the ascendancy of public opinion:<sup>98</sup>

<sup>97</sup> McDougall, *op. cit.*, p. 181

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 188-89

Why is our conduct so profoundly influenced by public opinion? How do we come to care so much for the praise and blame, the approval and disapproval, of our fellow-men? This is the principal problem that we have to solve if we would understand how men are led to control their impulses in a way that renders possible the life of complexly organised societies. For the praise and blame of our fellows, especially as expressed by the voice of public opinion, are the principal and most effective sanctions of moral conduct for the great mass of men, without them few of us would rise above the level of mere law-abidingness, the mere avoidance of acts on which legal punishment surely follows, and the strong regard for social approval and disapproval constitutes an essential stage of the progress to the higher plane of morality, the plane of obligation to an ideal of conduct.

This domination of public opinion can only be satisfactorily interpreted in the light of the development and operation of the "self-regarding sentiment."<sup>99</sup> The self-regarding sentiment must be looked upon as expressing itself through both positive and negative self-feeling. While the former is the basis of the desire for ascendancy, the latter is much more important in explaining the foundations of obedience. The negative self-regarding sentiment is aroused whenever we are in the presence of any one whom we believe to be possessed of superior power or prestige. This naturally produces an impulse to submission and obedience.<sup>100</sup> This is reinforced by the fear of punishment which is inculcated in the childhood of both the race and the individual. "This colors our emotional attitude towards authority in whatever form we meet it."<sup>101</sup> Finally, there must be noted the potency of "active sympathy" which leads men to desire to put their feelings and emotions in harmony with those of their fellow-citizens.<sup>102</sup> These factors serve to explain the development of the self-regarding sentiment and the power of public opinion.<sup>103</sup>

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 188-89, 191.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 193, 197-98.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, p 200

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 200-201

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 201-2.

The two principles we have now considered—on the one hand the influence of authority or power, exercised primarily in bringing rewards and punishments, on the other hand the impulse of active sympathy towards harmony of feeling and emotion with our fellows—these two principles may sufficiently account, I think, for the moralization of the self-regarding sentiment, for that regard for the praise and blame of our fellow-men and for moral approval and disapproval in general, which is so strong in most of us and which plays so large a part in shaping our sentiments, our character, and our conduct.

It cannot be denied that there is in McDougall's treatment of the genesis of obedience and submission to public opinion something of the views of Durkheim and Trotter as to the all-importance of social ascendancy and the essentially passive nature of the individual. This point of view Professor Woodworth has recently criticized as disregarding the more agreeable, pleasurable, voluntary, and dynamic phases of associated life:<sup>104</sup>

One thing that strikes you in reading McDougall's book is the little reference made to comradeship and other relationships between equals, as compared with his constant use of the instincts of domination and submission . . .

Society appears in his pages as an authority, impressing the individual with its vastness, and awakening in him a submissive attitude. It does not appear as anything interesting and attractive to the individual, except indeed, in so far as the mere multitude attracts by virtue of the gregarious instinct . . . Society, we should not forget, is essentially activity or behavior, it is an activity rather than a condition. And the social motive is the tendency to engage in group activity, which is interesting and satisfying to beings of a social nature .

The main criticism to be passed upon McDougall is that he fails to recognize a definitely *social motive*. He recognizes several motives that contribute to social life by making one individual interested in other individuals, but he recognizes none that would make group activity interesting. Society appears in his pages as an authority controlling the individual, but not as an activity attractive to the individual.

<sup>104</sup> R S Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology*, pp 193-200. Cf. also pp 62 ff. and *Political Science Quarterly*, June, 1920, pp 236 ff. McDougall unquestionably over-compensated for this defect in his later book, *The Group Mind*, written under the influence of the war psychology.

While the majority of men never pass beyond that type of conduct which is determined and regulated by the praise and blame of the public, the intellectually élite are able to escape from this type of domination when, through education and experience, they learn of the variety of the codes of customary conduct and reflect upon these aspects of variation and relativity in what the public regards as ideal conduct. This weakens their respect for public opinion and makes possible a rationally determined type of individual behavior.<sup>105</sup>

While the whole of McDougall's work is of very great importance as throwing light upon the psychological foundation of the various forms of human behavior which are involved in the organization of political activity, it will be possible to consider in this place but two other points of particular relevance—the shortcomings of public opinion as a guide for conduct, when viewed in the light of social psychology, and the influence of the instinct of pugnacity in social evolution.

McDougall finds public opinion to be defective as a guide of conduct for several reasons. In the first place, it regulates conduct through our regard for the approval or disapproval of our acts by our fellow-men.<sup>106</sup> As a result, the motives of conduct are egoistic; public opinion cannot be an effective regulator of conduct outside of the circle of those who shape the particular public opinion in question; and it provides a very narrow and one-sided basis for opinion and the conduct which is determined by it, since it is limited by the mores of the particular group.<sup>107</sup> "The sanction of public opinion, then, provides no guaranty against gross defects and absurdities of conduct; and—what is of more importance—it contains within itself no principle of progress, but tends rather to produce rigid

<sup>105</sup> McDougall, *op. cit.*, pp. 209 ff.

<sup>106</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 209

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 209-11



customs whose only changes are apt to be degenerative distortions of elements once valuable." <sup>108</sup>

McDougall's analysis of the social influence of the instinct of pugnacity is primarily a restatement of Bagehot's doctrine of the importance of the conflict of groups with different codes of customs, together with a more complete analysis of how the conflict between groups may favor the extension of coöperation and sociability within the separate groups. He sums up his observations upon this point in the following paragraph: <sup>109</sup>

When in any region social organization had progressed so far that mortal combat of individuals was replaced by the mortal combat of tribes, villages, or groups of any kind, success in combat and survival and propagation must have been favored by, and have depended upon, not only the vigor and ferocity of individual fighters, but also, and, to an even greater degree, upon the capacity of individuals for united action, upon good comradeship, upon personal trustworthiness, and upon the capacity of individuals to subordinate their impulsive tendencies and egoistic promptings to the ends of the group and to the commands of the accepted leader. Hence, wherever such mortal conflict of groups prevailed for many generations, it must have developed in the surviving groups just those social and moral qualities of individuals which are the essential conditions of all effective co-operation and of the higher forms of social organization.

Aside from its psychological importance this view of McDougall's is valuable as pointing out how the struggle for existence in human society is primarily a group rather than an individual struggle—a difference of the utmost importance in sociological theory.

#### F. Wilfred Trotter and the Sociological Importance of the Recognition and Control of "Herd Instinct."

The dominant note in recent English psychological sociology has been an attack upon the earlier intellectualistic

<sup>108</sup> McDougall, *op. cit.*, p. 211. In his later work on *The Group Mind* McDougall was compelled to rationalize his own capitulation to war propaganda by eulogizing the nobility and reliability of public opinion, *cf. New Republic*, December 15, 1920, pp. 82-6.

<sup>109</sup> *Social Psychology*, p. 287.

theories which were characteristic of the period of the contract theory and were later revived in a different application by the Utilitarians. This tendency has been characteristic of most of the psychological interpretations of society offered in recent times not only in England but also on the Continent and in America. Bagehot had been the harbinger of this trend in his emphasis upon the importance of the non-intellectual factor of imitation in social processes. One of the most suggestive and profound expositions of this modern tendency to emphasize the instinctive and emotional aspects of the psychic factors in society is to be found in two essays by Dr. Wilfred Trotter, a noted English surgeon whose sociological interests have been revealed to readers of the *Sociological Papers* and the *Sociological Review* through his discussions at meetings of the English Sociological Society. The first essay is entitled, "Herd Instinct and Its Bearing upon the Psychology of Civilized Man,"<sup>110</sup> and the second, "Sociological Applications of the Psychology of Herd Instinct."<sup>111</sup> Aside from their emphasis upon the non-rational basis of human conduct, these essays are extremely noteworthy, since they question seriously the unqualified assertion of many sociologists that the social instinct has been the basic factor in human progress. Ever since Aristotle uttered his famous aphorism, the majority of social philosophers and social scientists, with a few exceptions like Machiavelli and Hobbes, have viewed the social instinct as the basis of all of human achievement, and any question as to its beneficent action has been looked upon as almost irreverent. But now Dr. Trotter appears as a sort of psychological Malthus and questions the accuracy of this assertion, as Malthus questioned the eighteenth-century ideas of the perfectibility of man. While Dr. Trotter admits the value of the gregarious instinct as an indispensable factor

<sup>110</sup> *Sociological Review*, 1908, pp. 227-48

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, 1909, pp. 36-54

in human progress, he also detects certain detrimental influences radiating from it which seem capable of eliminating man from the planet as another of Nature's failures unless this instinct is consciously guided and directed by intellect. Important as are Dr. Trotter's conclusions, they had escaped the notice of most sociologists up to the time of their republication in book form.<sup>112</sup>

Of course, Trotter's basic premise of the constraining influence which is exerted over the individual by the group is not new, having been long ago elaborated by Bagehot and Durkheim, and much more extensively developed in Professor Sumner's work on *Folkways* which appeared just before Dr. Trotter's essays. The novel element in Dr. Trotter's treatment is rather his penetrating psychological analysis of the nature and influence of the herd instinct and the highly original and all-important deductions which he draws from this analysis. To put the situation briefly Trotter gives a profound psychological interpretation and explanation of the phenomenon of social constraint, the practical operation of which Sumner has so thoroughly described. Important for political science is his view of the psychological derivation of public opinion, political parties, political opinions, and the spirit of conservatism. The following are the main points presented in these highly suggestive essays.

In the first place, Trotter lays down the law that modern psychology must always start from the assumption that man is social, since isolated man is unknown.<sup>113</sup> He next

<sup>112</sup> Mr Graham Wallas in the preface to his *Human Nature in Politics*, expressed a hope that he might carry his psychological analysis on the same high level of accuracy and insight which had been displayed by Dr Trotter, and Professor Ellwood, in his *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, pauses to call attention to Trotter's first essay as one of the best recent sociological treatments of gregariousness (op cit, p 220) Aside from these writers Dr. Trotter's important conclusions seem for a decade to have passed unnoticed by the sociologists, and have been utilized only by the abnormal psychologists. See the breezy but penetrating review of Trotter's doctrine by J H Robinson, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1917, pp 315 19

<sup>113</sup> "Herd Instinct and Its Bearing upon the Psychology of Civilized Man," in *The Sociological Review*, 1908, p. 227.

turns to an investigation of the psychology of instinctive behavior. An instinctive impulse he finds to be one which "reveals itself to human consciousness as an axiomatically obvious proposition, as something which is so clearly 'sense' that any idea of discussing its basis is foolish or wicked."<sup>114</sup> The primary instincts of self-preservation, nutrition, and sex have been found insufficient to account for all the observed varieties and characteristics of human conduct. This gap is only supplied when one accepts the existence and operation of a gregarious instinct, into whatever components it may be analyzed, as the necessary fourth instinct to explain the difficulties and omissions which would otherwise arise. That gregariousness has had a very high survival value in the evolution of the animal kingdom is to be inferred from the fact that it is the most universal characteristic of the animal world. The whole history of man's physical and mental evolution indicates the fact that he has evolved as a gregarious animal.<sup>115</sup>

After this preliminary demonstration of the existence of a gregarious instinct in man, Trotter takes up a consideration of some of the current notions regarding the nature and consequences of this gregarious instinct, as viewed by biologists, sociologists, and psychologists. He finds that Karl Pearson was the first to point out the deeper significance of the gregarious instinct in human evolution by indicating that by its operation the selective process was greatly modified within the group. The neglect of this consideration by Haeckel, Spencer, and Huxley had led them into many errors and perplexities. Lester F. Ward had seen fit to designate this gregarious instinct as religion. Boris Sidis, at that time (1908), according to Trotter, had been about the only psychologist to investigate the importance of the gregarious instinct for that

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid*, p. 230

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 230-35

science. He disagrees with Sidis, in that he believes that the subconscious mind is a normal characteristic of man and that man is suggestible at all times, though in different degrees.<sup>116</sup>

Dr. Trotter devotes the remainder of his first essay to a discussion of the more important deductions which may be drawn from the psychological characteristics of a gregarious animal, particularly man. The fundamental characteristic of the "herd" is homogeneity, to secure which the members must be very sensitive to the conduct of their fellow-members and restrain their behavior within the normal bounds of the herd customs. Those members whose originality is so great as to lead them to deviate widely from the norm of herd-conduct will be eliminated by natural selection, owing to the inability to exist without the aid of the herd, or by artificial selection resulting from the destruction of the innovator by the alarmed herd. The whole sum of life-experiences attaches the animal to the herd and its ways, and makes its separation both physically dangerous and mentally intolerable. While the secondary impulses that arise from the operation of the herd instinct are not really instinctive, they act upon the mind with all the emotional value of an instinctive impulse, and make any criticism of such an impulse appear highly ridiculous and objectionable. The herd can thus confer the emotional sanction of instinctive behavior upon many fields of action and thus enormously increase the coercive influence upon the individual.<sup>117</sup>

The mental consequences of gregariousness are of the utmost significance in determining the psychic activities of the individual. The member of the herd feels comfortable, warm, and secure in the presence of the herd and equally uncomfortable and insecure in its absence. Each individual wants his opinions on all matters to receive the appro-

<sup>116</sup> Trotter, loc. cit., pp. 235-39, 243.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 239-41.

bation of the herd, and if he cannot secure for them the sanction of the whole herd, he will seek that of a part of the herd. This is the root of the universal human tendency to segregate into classes each distinguished by the cherishing of a certain type of opinion, for example, political, religious, and other parties. Minor manifestations of the action of the herd instinct are to be seen in the dislike of being too conspicuous, in shyness, and in stage-fright. Man is instinctively suggestible only to the impulses arising from the herd instinct. The history of the popular resistance to inventions shows that he is "notoriously insensitive to the suggestions of experience." There is an instinctive dislike of anything new or novel, as it runs counter to those herd opinions which are based upon older traditions. Hence the suggestions that conform most closely to herd habits will be most readily accepted, and Trotter justifies Machiavelli's psychology by pointing out that the successful innovator is the one who is wise enough to present his innovations under the disguise of old herd opinions. The invention of speech in the human race greatly increased the scope and intensity of the application of herd instinct. The result may be seen in the perfectly amazing tyranny of custom in primitive society.<sup>118</sup>

This comfortable satisfaction of the herd in regard to its habitual behavior and its aversion to anything that runs counter to its customary views is well illustrated by the history of science. It is hard for man to bear the suspense that science, with its tentative hypotheses, imposes; the herd opinions have the merit of a confident assurance of certain and assumed, if unreal, accuracy and finality. Therefore, the sciences have developed in the order in which their subject-matter least affected man's most important and sensitive activities and hence received the least resistance from the herd, namely, in the order of mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, psychology,

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 241-44.

and sociology. The present opposition to the admission of sociology to the rank of a science arises because it upsets or threatens to discredit so many of the antiquated herd opinions.<sup>119</sup> Diplomacy, politics, and theology deal with such intimate fields of human conduct that they have not even yet reached the level of sciences, and we go on preferring the pleasant but deluded certitude of herd opinion on those subjects.<sup>120</sup>

That the majority of human opinions are merely the reflection of herd ideas and impulses and are not the result of scientific knowledge may easily be perceived by examining the "mental furniture of the average man."

He will have fairly settled ideas upon the origin and nature of the universe and upon what he will probably call its meaning, he will have conclusions as to what will happen to him at death and after, as to what is and what should be the basis of conduct, he will know how the country should be governed and why it is going to the dogs, and why this piece of legislation is good and that bad. He will have strong views upon military and naval strategy, the principles of taxation, the use of alcohol and vaccination, the treatment of influenza, the prevention of hydrophobia, upon municipal trading, the teaching of Greek, upon what is permissible in art, satisfactory in literature, and hopeful in science.<sup>121</sup>

Nothing could be more obvious than that no one person could arrive at all these opinions in a scientific manner, and most of them relate to problems which are admitted by experts to be far from settled or which are not amenable to scientific treatment. One may thus safely hold that the "wholesale acceptance of non-rational belief must be looked upon as normal."<sup>122</sup>

The holder of these varied opinions believes, however,

<sup>119</sup> It would be interesting to inquire as to how far this is at the root of the academic opposition to sociology.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 244. Dr Trotter's revision of Comte's famous explanation of the order of the origin of the sciences is probably, like Comte's, only partially true, but a combination of the two explanations would appear to be a very plausible theory.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 244-45

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 245

that they are conspicuous for their rationality, and he is equally convinced that opposing opinions are especially ridiculous, unreasonable and foolish. The atheist and the Christian are each held by the other to be superficial and stupid, and neither the Conservative nor the Liberal can for a moment comprehend how his opponent can be so totally averse to using even a modicum of reason.<sup>123</sup> The obvious explanation of such misunderstanding is that these opinions are the result of different varieties of herd suggestion, and are, as a result, to the minds of their supporters rational almost beyond description. Since the mind likes to justify rationally these opinions which are unconsciously derived from herd suggestion, one can understand the common tendency to produce elaborately rationalized justifications for the most irrationally derived practices. This is the root of that ingenious process of secondary rationalization of subconsciously derived opinions which is perhaps the most characteristic element in the mental life of man:<sup>124</sup>

This mechanism enables the English lady, who, to escape the stigma of having normal feet, subjects them to a formidable degree of lateral compression, to be aware of no logical inconsistency when she subscribes to missions to teach the Chinese lady how absurd it is to compress her feet longitudinally. The process of rationalization which has just been illustrated by some of its simpler varieties is best seen on the largest scale, and in the most elaborate form in the pseudo-sciences of political economy and ethics. Both of these are occupied in deriving from eternal principles justification for masses of non-rational belief which are assumed to be permanent merely because they exist. Hence the notorious acrobatic feats of both in the face of any considerable variation in herd belief.

There is, fortunately, a compensating feature in the action of the herd instinct upon the individual mind. When herd suggestion happens to act in the behalf of a scientific truth which the herd has finally accepted after a genera-

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 245

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 246-47



tion or two of resistance, it becomes an overwhelming power in the spreading of this idea and in securing its acceptance. The popularization of science is accomplished in the following manner. A new discovery gains vogue among the group of specialists concerned, and the herd suggestion and coercion which begin in this relatively small group of experts spread in successively larger circles until its adherents have come to embrace all of civilized humanity. The acceptance of the Copernican system and the gradual spread of Darwinism may be cited as illustrative examples of this method of the diffusion of science.<sup>125</sup>

The effects of herd suggestion are as important in matters of emotion as they are in the intellectual field. That the sense of conscience, guilt, and duty has its origin in the suggestion of the herd may be realized from the fact that none of these feelings are found in non-gregarious animals, that judgments of conscience on most subjects differ in various communities, and finally that these judgments of conscience are not usually advantageous to the species as a whole outside of the community in which they originated.<sup>126</sup>

In his second essay Dr. Trotter deduces the main sociological consequences which arise from the operation of the herd instinct.<sup>127</sup> It would be most valuable if man could be made to recognize the instinctive and non-rational basis of most of his convictions. He would then know that any belief or opinion, which is so charged with emotion as to make its criticism highly objectionable, is of purely instinctive sanction and that it is not only likely to be erroneous but also harmful, since it stands in the way of progress toward the truth. Man has no such aversion to the criti-

<sup>125</sup> Trotter, *loc. cit.*, pp 246-47.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 246-48

<sup>127</sup> He states at the outset that it is imperative that some sort of accurate statistical measurement be made of the nature and extent of human suggestibility, so that the discussion of the subject can be put on a quantitative basis, "Sociological Application of the Psychology of Herd Instinct," in *The Sociological Review*, 1909, pp 36-37

cism of those opinions which are based upon scientific investigation, but rather welcomes it as the means to improving his knowledge.<sup>128</sup> It is highly erroneous, however, to attempt to eradicate the evil effects of herd suggestion by seeking to destroy gregariousness, even if that were possible. Man's inclination toward a social life is the main bulwark of social cohesion and progress.

The solution would seem rather to lie in making it certain that suggestion always acts on the side of reason, if rationality were once to become really respectable, if we feared the entertaining of an unverifiable opinion with the warmth with which we fear using the wrong implement at the dinner table, if the thought of holding a prejudice disgusted us as does a foul disease, then the dangers of man's suggestibility would be turned into advantages.<sup>129</sup>

Not only does herd suggestion have a perverting effect upon the accuracy of the opinions entertained by mankind, but it also materially modifies the nature and extent of that altruism of which Spencer wrote so eloquently and to which Drummond ascribed the main credit for the evolution of the race. While altruism is a normal and natural product of herd suggestion, at the same time the herd limits the possible extent of altruism, since one who becomes too altruistic is exterminated as an innovator.<sup>130</sup>

When we remember the fearful repressing force which society has always exerted on altruism, and how constantly the dungeon, the scaffold, and the cross have been the reward of the altruist, we are able to get some conception of the force of the instinctive impulse which has triumphantly defied these terrors, and to appreciate in some slight degree how irresistible an enthusiasm it might become if it were encouraged by the unanimous voice of the herd.

But the most important of all the sociological applications of the psychology of herd instinct arises from the conflict which develops between the herd instinct and the primary instincts of self-preservation, food, and sex.<sup>131</sup>

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 37

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 38

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 39 ff

The three primary instincts do not normally conflict directly with each other; they are of temporary duration and periodic action, and are highly charged with emotional satisfaction. If man were guided by the impulses arising from these three instincts alone he "would lead a life emotionally quite simple, for at any given moment he would necessarily be doing what he most wanted to. We may therefore imagine him to be endowed with the feeling of free-will and reality to a superb degree, wholly unperplexed by doubt, and wholly secure in his unity of purpose."<sup>132</sup> The herd instinct, however, which guides and orders the life of the individual, controls his conduct from without and he does not act wholly in response to the dictates of his own instincts. The herd instinct is able, as we have seen, to give instinctive force to many human actions not at all necessarily pleasant or really instinctive. Hence there arises that most momentous of all mental conflicts—that between man's instinctive desires and the quasi-instinctive coercion of herd suggestion.<sup>133</sup> Thus "duty has first appeared in the world, and with it the age-long conflict which is described in the memorable words of St. Paul, 'I delight in the law of God after the inward man, but I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members.'"<sup>134</sup>

The consequences of this conflict between the primary instincts and the instinct of the herd are many and far-reaching. The child with certain important instincts partially undeveloped, and being generally forgetful of experience, can see his lying chum have a better time and yet be consoled by the admonition of his parents that veracity

<sup>132</sup> Trotter, *loc. cit.*, p. 40. According to Trotter's deductions, therefore, Rousseau's imaginary picture of the care-free life of the non-gregarious primitive man who fulfilled only the demands of his three primary instincts may have been, on the whole, quite accurate.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 40

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.

is the chief virtue of life. When in adolescence, however, the primary instincts are fully awakened and the youth finds their outlet blocked by the domination of herd opinion and suggestion, there then arises that tremendous mental conflict which renders that period of life the most precarious in the whole psychic history of the individual. It is over religion and sex that this conflict centers, though it extends to every other field of conduct. The so-called religious instinct is a derivative of the herd instinct. The latter produces the basic psychic element in religion, namely, that desire to be in mystic harmony and unity with the infinite. It is the same psychic mechanism which makes the company of the master to the dog what "walking with God in the cool of the evening" is to man.<sup>135</sup> Sex is even more a source of mental conflict than religion, for it has a tremendous driving power, is connected closely with its derivative impulse, that of altruism, and is most rigidly restrained and tabooed by herd opinion.<sup>136</sup>

This mental conflict between the primary instincts and the herd instinct is usually carried over into adult life, and the final issue of this prolonged conflict may be of four possible types. In the first type, the desires at the bottom of the conflict may be automatically eradicated by later experiences. In the second, the person may by exceptional skepticism become aware of the irrationality of the herd impulses and ignore them. In the third, the person may indulge his desires and then rationalize the matter and justify his opposition to the herd by a subsequent contribution to religious and charitable agencies—a sort of psychic compensation; or the individual may agree that the herd opinion is right, assent to its mandates, and relinquish his desires. The fourth type consists of those individuals who

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42. Modern dynamic psychology has, however, shown that religion is in part a derivative of the filial emotions. See E. D. Martin, *The Mystery of Religion*.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43.

are not able to get rid of their conflict in any of these ways and in whose mind the conflicting impulses persist.<sup>137</sup>

The great majority of those who rid their minds of conflict are of the first and third types, and these make up the great mass of normal individuals in society who are the defenders of the rationality of the herd impulses and suggestions, resistive to the lessons which experience should teach and to the changes which experience suggests. The only value of this class in society is the cohesion and stability which it imparts to the group. This class was never known to contribute a whit to progress or original thought, and if it had always dominated society in every circumstance man would have remained forever in the Stone Age.<sup>138</sup>

This triumph of herd suggestion over experience and over altruism has clearly the advantage of establishing existing society with great firmness, but it has also the consequence of entrusting the conduct of the state and the attitude of it towards life to a class which their very stability shows to possess a certain relative incapacity to take experience seriously, a certain relative insensibility of the value of feeling and to suffering, and a decided preference for herd tradition over all other sources of conduct.<sup>139</sup>

This stable mediocre class, which makes up the mass of society, constituted almost the entire body of society in primitive times and is still in control of modern governments. While the control of political organization by such a class might have been fairly satisfactory for a static society which existed before the modern period, its persistence as the controlling agency in a dynamic civilization is probably our most serious social problem. "It is this survival so to say, of the waggoner upon the footplate of the express-engine which has made the modern history of nations a series of hair-breadth escapes."<sup>140</sup>

<sup>137</sup> Trotter, *loc. cit.*, pp. 43-44.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 44.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 45.

The class in whose minds the conflict created by the clash between native instincts and herd instinct persists<sup>141</sup> makes up most of the other great group of citizens and is distinguished by relatively keen sensitiveness to experience, and by mental instability, in contrast to the imperviousness to experience and the mental inertia manifested by the class just described. This mentally unstable class holds within it every type from that of the transcendent but eccentric genius to that portion of the insane whose abnormality rests upon no organic defect. It contains most of the so-called abnormal classes, the criminal and the vicious; and there is every reason to suppose that vice is but an avenue of escape from the tortures of mental conflicts, and that crime is normally the behavior of the person whose mental stability has been overthrown by the same disturbing clash of desires and impulses<sup>142</sup>

While both the stable and the unstable classes are dangerous to society, the latter is the most menacing group, for it is very rapidly increasing with the growing volume of new stimulation which has resulted from the vast transformation in civilization in the last generation or two. Since it is the conflict between experience and the suggestions of the herd which creates this class, it is but natural that the greatly increased stream of experience in recent times should have borne its unfortunate fruit in this amazing increase of mental instability<sup>143</sup> The main "rift in the clouds" is to be discovered in the fact that the growth of this class may be prevented in such a way that society may retain its invaluable mental powers and high sensibility to the lessons of experience and yet have these capabilities unimpaired by the disintegrating effect of conflict.<sup>144</sup> The method by which this indispensable re-

<sup>141</sup> Dr Trotter does not discuss the nature and contributions of the class which ends the conflict by skepticism, it is perhaps to be inferred that they constitute the mentally élite—the true social and intellectual aristocracy

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 46-48

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 49 ff.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*, p 49.

sult may be accomplished is so to arrange it that herd suggestion may be enlisted on the side of reason and experience and hence end the conflict and its detrimental results.<sup>145</sup> But the difficulties inherent in the remedy and the lack of evidence that we are making any progress toward its utilization leads Dr. Trotter to the following incisive paragraph which challenges the attention of every thinking person:<sup>146</sup>

We see man today, instead of the frank and courageous recognition of his status, the docile attention to his biological history, the determination to let nothing stand in the way of the security and permanence of his future, which alone can establish the safety and happiness of the race, substituting blind confidence in his destiny, unclouded faith in the essentially respectful attitude of the universe toward his moral code, and a belief no less firm that his traditions and laws and institutions necessarily contain certain permanent qualities of reality. Living as he does in a world where outside his race no allowances are made for infirmity, and where figments, however beautiful, never become facts, it needs but little imagination to see that the probabilities are very great that after all man will prove but one more of Nature's failures, ignominiously to be swept from her work-table to make way for another venture of her tireless curiosity and patience.

#### G. The Attack on the Instinct Hypothesis.

- (1) *John B. Watson (1878- ) and the Development of the Behavioristic Approach to Psychology.*

One of the most vigorous controversies in the history of modern psychology has been associated with the rise of a new method of approaching the study of psychic phenomena, namely, the behavioristic attitude. Eschewing any concern with conscious states, introspection, and the subjective aspects of psychic reactions, the behaviorists aim to make psychology an objective natural science and seek to introduce a method which would reduce to the common denominator of a single method the investigation of the

<sup>145</sup> Trotter, *loc. cit.*, pp. 51-53.

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.

behavior of all types of organisms from the amœba to man. The most valiant exponent of this new method in psychology in America has been Professor John B. Watson of Johns Hopkins University. Watson has summarized in the following manner his chief dogmas as to the essence of behaviorism:<sup>147</sup>

Human psychology has failed to make good its claim as a natural science. Due to a mistaken notion that its fields of facts are conscious phenomena and that introspection is the only direct method of ascertaining these facts, it has enmeshed itself in a series of speculative questions which, while fundamental to its present tenets, are not open to experimental treatment. In the pursuit of answers to these questions, it has become further and further divorced from contact with problems which vitally concern human interest.

Psychology, as the behaviorist views it, is a purely objective, experimental branch of natural science, which needs introspection as little as do the sciences of chemistry and physics. It is granted that the behavior of animals can be investigated without appeal to consciousness. Heretofore the viewpoint has been that such data have value only in so far as they can be interpreted by analogy in terms of consciousness. The position is taken here that the behavior of man and the behavior of animals must be considered on the same plane, as being equally essential to a general understanding of behavior. It can dispense with consciousness in a psychological sense. The separate observation of "states of consciousness" is, on this assumption, no more a part of the task of the psychologist than of the physicist. We might call this the return to a non-reflective and naive use of consciousness. In this sense consciousness may be said to be the instrument or tool with which all scientists work. Whether or not the tool is properly used at present by scientists is a problem for philosophy and not for psychology.

From the viewpoint here suggested the facts on the behavior of amœbæ have value in and for themselves without reference to the behavior of man. In biology studies on race differentiation and inheritance in amœbæ form a separate division of study which must be evaluated in terms of the laws found there. The con-

<sup>147</sup> *Behavior: An Introduction to Comparative Psychology*, pp. 26-28. Cf. "Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It," in *Psychological Review*, 1913, pp. 158 ff., and *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, Chap. 1. Max Meyer has been the other vigorous American exponent of behaviorism. See his *Fundamental Laws of Human Behavior*. Such psychologists as Thorndike, Dewey and Woodworth accept the behavioristic program, but in a more modified and eclectic form than Watson and Meyer.



clusions so reached may not hold in any other form. Regardless of the possible lack of generality, such studies must be made if evolution as a whole is ever to be regulated and controlled. Similarly the laws of behavior in amoebæ, the range of responses, and the determination of effective stimuli, of habit formation, persistency of habits, interference and reinforcement of habits, must be determined and evaluated in and for themselves, regardless of their generality, or of their bearing upon such laws in other forms, if the phenomena of behavior are ever to be brought within the sphere of scientific control.

This suggested elimination of states of consciousness as proper objects of investigation in themselves will remove the barrier which exists between psychology and the other sciences. The findings of psychology become the functional correlates of structure and lend themselves to explanation in physico-chemical terms.

Psychology as behavior will, after all, have to neglect but few of the really essential problems with which psychology as an introspective science now concerns itself. In all probability even this residue of problems may be phrased in such a way that refined methods in behavior (which certainly must come) will lead to their solution.

Some psychologists have contended that the behaviorist's approach is as significant for social psychology as for individual psychology. They maintain that it gives a better background from which to estimate the original endowment of man and to interpret the nature of artificial social institutions. Further, it makes the subject one in which observation and measurement is far more feasible. Perhaps no better brief statement of this view has been made than that contained in the following citation from John Dewey:<sup>148</sup>

The behavioristic movement transfers attention from vague generalities regarding social consciousness and social mind to the specific processes of interaction which take place among human beings, and to the details of group-behavior. It emphasizes the importance of knowledge of the primary activities of human nature, and of the modifications and reorganizations they undergo

<sup>148</sup> "The Need for Social Psychology," in *Psychological Review*, 1917, pp. 270-71. For an illustration of a restatement of psychological sociology in behavioristic terminology see Professor Giddings' articles in the *American Journal of Sociology*, January and March, 1920. In fact, Professor Giddings had taken this position as early as 1903, even before the formulation of the behavioristic position in psychology.

in association with the activities of others. It radically simplifies the whole problem by making it clear that social institutions and arrangements, including the whole apparatus of tradition and transmission, represent simply the acquired transformations of original human endowments.

This provides the possibility of a positive method for analysing social phenomena. I shall avoid engaging in passing in the disputed question of the value of an introspective psychology. But it seems almost self-evident that even if introspection were a valid method in individual psychology, so called, it could not be of use in the investigation of social facts, even though those facts be labeled social mind or consciousness. Yet one has only to look at the writings of the Austrian and German school of "folk-psychologists" (say of Wundt, obviously the most important) to see how this treatment has been affected by an assumed need of making the methods and results of social psychology conform to the received categories of introspective psychology. From such deforming of facts the behavioristic outlook immediately redeems us, it represents not an improvement in detail but a different mode of attack. It is not as yet possible to estimate the significance of this alteration. In my opinion, however, the chief cause of the backwardness of social psychology has resided in the artificiality of the endeavor to adapt the rubrics of introspective psychology to the facts of objective associated life. The opening of another road of approach may therefore be expected to emancipate inquiry.

We need not go into the controversy between introspectionists and behaviorists, but the analytical anthropologists, Boas and his disciples, have presented one valid argument against the complete efficacy of the behavioristic approach. They have demonstrated that mere objective behavior is not an adequate guide for the interpretation of cultural situations. It is extremely frequent that identity of external behavior fails utterly to be correlated with similar subjective attitudes in the groups concerned, and it is also often the case that the subjective fact is the most important element in the situation. This is also true in interpreting political psychology. The objective behavior, for example, of a crowd assembled for political purposes would be much the same whether gathered to hear or praise Harding or Debs, and the behavior of a crowd

gathered for political purposes would not differ materially in its larger characteristics or general pattern of reaction from that of a crowd which had met for economic or religious purposes. It is evident, however, that political activity offers an almost unique field for the behavioristic method in the objective aspects of the problem, on account of the definite and public method of expressing a considerable portion of political behavior.

While Watson actually included a rather elaborate classification of instincts in his book, he may be regarded as the starting point of the recent criticism of the thoroughgoing instinct hypothesis, as he is much more guarded and qualified in his conception of the origin, nature and operation of these alleged instinctive tendencies.<sup>149</sup> There is evidence in his recent writings that he has gone much further in the way of skepticism regarding the validity of those who interpret human behavior on the basis of the assumption of inborn and specifically motivating instinctive tendencies.<sup>150</sup>

(2) *L. L. Bernard (1881- ) and the Appraisal of the Recent Critique of the Instinct Hypothesis.*

More recently there has appeared a much more concentrated and devastating attack upon the instinct doctrine. Ellsworth Faris, C. E. Ayres, J. R. Kantor, C. C. Josey and the cultural anthropologists have assaulted the concept on the ground of cultural determinism and the institutional point of view.<sup>151</sup> A primarily neurological critique has been formulated by Knight Dunlap, L. L. Bernard and Z. Y. Kuo,<sup>152</sup> while C. H. Cooley, John Dewey and Bernard

<sup>149</sup> See the discussion in L. L. Bernard, *Instinct: a Study in Social Psychology*, pp. 166 ff.

<sup>150</sup> See his chapter, "Are There Any Instincts?" in his new book, *Behaviorism* (1925).

<sup>151</sup> For a bibliography of this literature see S. Eldridge, *Political Action*, p. 330, footnotes 1-4.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 331, footnotes 5-7, and Bernard, *op. cit.*

tend to look upon non-inherited habit-complexes as the key to individual and social behavior.<sup>153</sup>

The subject is still too much in the controversial stage to warrant any final and definitive judgment, and to no little extent the conflict has been really one over nomenclature and terminology. Good authorities are able to go over the same literature and emerge with widely different opinions. For example, Eldridge, after analyzing with reasonable insight the literature of criticism mentioned above, comes to the following conclusion:<sup>154</sup>

Why, then, all this hue and cry after McDougall, Thorndike and all other psychologists of their party? I for one am unable to find any just grounds for it. Much of the criticism directed against them is certainly based on reading them out of context, as the preceding considerations will have shown. Such criticism needs only to be exposed for what it is in order effectually to dispose of it. Again, it may be that the love of controversy is partially responsible. Controversy is likely to center around writers who have made a "killing," as have McDougall and Thorndike, especially when their analysis is both clear and cogent, as theirs is, and at the same time in conflict with current views on the topics considered, as theirs has been.

In what is by far the most competent and thorough analysis and appraisal of the instinct hypothesis and the literature which it has produced, Professor L. L. Bernard arrives at a much different and rather severely critical attitude. This difference may in part be accounted for on the ground that Eldridge had constructed his own scheme of social psychology chiefly on a combination of the views of McDougall and Trotter, thus having an interest at stake in defending the theory of instinct, while Bernard started his inquiry in a rather frankly skeptical vein. Bernard would limit the conception of instinctive action to "those definite stimulus-response processes or action patterns which are inherited." He says further, "We rightly re-

<sup>153</sup> Eldridge, *op. cit.*, p. 332, footnotes 10-11, and Bernard, *op. cit.*

<sup>154</sup> Eldridge, *op. cit.*, p. 349

gard these fundamental structural and functional organizations, which remain much or wholly the same throughout the life period and which are so basic to the life of the individual and the species, as mainly instinctive. They retain their inherited forms with a minimum of change until the death of the individual."<sup>155</sup> On the other hand, most of those action-patterns which the older writers regarded as inherited or instinctive are, on the contrary, distinctly of the acquired type. Aside from the action of the glandular and visceral tissues controlled by the sympathetic or autonomic nervous system, most action-patterns are certainly acquired after birth by adaptation to the experiences of life. Neuro-muscular structure and brain-tissue are fitted to a great number of varied adaptations, and most action-patterns are assuredly acquired or habitual and not determined as to specific content. Least of all is there any ground for the view that ideas and concepts may be inherited. The sooner social science recognizes these facts the quicker it will be of effective and intelligent service in the direction and control of individual and social behavior. "The fundamental problem of the social sciences, which have grown out of the attempt to adjust man to his social environments, is therefore to work out the mechanism by which new and non-instinctive action and thought-patterns are built up to mediate those adjustments of man to the social environment which the social sciences undertake to control. Such a problem is urgent in order that those who are working in these subjects may not go further afield in search of false but seductive leads." Many of Professor Bernard's conclusions are of such vital importance for history and the social sciences as to warrant extensive citation:<sup>156</sup>

There are various forms of the misuse of instinct in the social sciences. The most serious confusion, however, is the one men-

<sup>155</sup> Bernard, *op. cit.*, 509-10

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 509-10, 522, 531, 533-4

tioned in the preceding paragraphs, where the functioning automatism is not distinguished as to origin, any relatively fixed or definite action-pattern being pronounced an instinct whether it is acquired or inherited. If all that the writer or reader means to convey by such an employment of the term instinct (as seems to be the case with some continental and a few American writers) is that the act is performed without reflection or consciousness of purpose or previous plan, little harm will in most cases be done. For example, if by saying that people are "instinctively protectionists" or by speaking of "instinctive truth-telling" the writers mean that certain people are protectionists or truth-tellers by habit, and if the reader understands such to be the sense of the expressions, it cannot be said that harm is done, although little may be gained in the way of closer definition of subject-matter or technique from such indefinite employment of the term. However, the writer often confuses both himself and the reader by such vagueness of speaking, for he may at one time mean only to emphasize the automatic character of the act and at another he may fall back upon the recognized or approved meaning of the term, implying that the automatism is an inherited action-pattern. Especially is there such danger of confusion to both reader and writer in the latter of the two expressions above and in such expressions as "instinctive regard for law," or "the instinctive conservatism of the propertied," or this striking instance "Jefferson's instinct to keep the government close to the people." These are functional qualities, based upon highly complex organizations of acquired neural connections or structures and cannot be inherited, but must be acquired from experience. Yet it would be easy to cite several thousand similar instances of confusion in the employment of this term from a collection made by the author.

This vague employment of the term instinct finds its logical *reductio ad absurdum* in the application of the term to well-developed habit complexes, such as the "instincts" listed in the classification in McDougall's *Introduction to Social Psychology* and the various books on educational psychology of recent years. The most cursory analysis of the origin of the action-patterns involved in such so-called instincts as the parental instinct, reproductive instinct, fighting instinct, instinct of self-preservation, the gregarious instinct, and the like, will show that by far the greater part of the action content is acquired. Most of what a parent does for a child is the product of racial or individual experience and therefore belongs to the category of acquired habit rather than to that of inheritance or instinct. The same is true of the content of the other so-called instincts mentioned in this paragraph. To characterize such habit complexes as instincts implies either the

abandonment of the accepted and desirable definition of instinct as stated above or a failure to analyze the structure of the acts involved. An instinct, since it is as much a unit character as any other product of Mendelian inheritance, is inconceivable apart from the fact of its structure.

However, there are many, psychologists as well as social scientists and others, who do think of the term instinct in such a vague and indefinite manner. They look upon it as a mystical something, variously denominating it as a "tendency" or "urge" or "motor impulse" or "quality of the act," etc. Their thinking is metaphysical and animistic rather than scientific. They have either come to the social and mental sciences by the way of the vague and resonant categories of metaphysics and a priori logic and have remained untouched by the biological foundations of these sciences which they profess, or they have failed to grasp the true significance of the Mendelian theory for the social and mental sciences as well as for biology. Those who would admit that the total set of acts included under the terms "fighting" or "self-preservation," as applied to modern activities in the world, are predominantly acquired rather than inherited may still erroneously believe that such a set of acts is instinctive because it is the result of some undefined "tendency" to act in that way. Or they may claim that the habit complexes, such as "fighting" or "self-preservation," have original instinctive "cores." Or they may believe, with McDougall, that the habit complex is developed around an emotion and its derivative sentiments and that the emotion is the central and unchanging element of the original instinct from which the act takes its name. Or, finally, the writer may have no clearly defined notion of how he may justify calling a habit complex an instinct but he "feels" that the habit complex is "dominated by" instincts or "grows out of instincts" . . .

Viewed in this light, activity complexes, such as were described above, can no longer be called instincts. Their acquired content becomes too obvious. The actual instincts are at once much simpler and more elemental and much more numerous than those set forth in the classifications of such writers as McDougall, Thorndike, Woodworth, and other psychologists. There are probably hundreds or even thousands (if we include the reflexes under the general heading of instinct) of these inherited mechanisms, mainly overlooked by the casual observer because they do not ordinarily function as independent units in adjustment processes but rather as constituent elements in larger habit complexes developed in response to environmental pressures . . .

Are we not, then, in the light of these facts, forced to the conclusion that the complex social "instincts" are in reality aggre-

gates of habits and instincts and reflexes, organized and reorganized from more elementary habits and simple constituent instincts and random movements, with reference to some specific function, the content constantly changing as the function and organization of the adjustment to be made vary? Although the content of the habit complex, mis-called instinct, varies constantly with the character of the adjustment, the aggregate of acts itself retains the same class name as long as it serves the same general function in society or for the individual. Thus, the habit complex tends to be named with reference to its function or according to its value—as maternal, gregarious, ethical, fighting—while the content varies infinitely, never consecutively possessing that unity of character which is essential to the concreteness of biological instinct. . . .

The real task before the social and educational psychologists with respect to instincts is to discover the mechanisms by means of which the child and the citizen build up their habits upon the basis of the instincts, directly or indirectly, and by means of which one habit or set of habits is transformed into another. Hitherto they have approached this problem from essentially the wrong angle, that of the analysis of instinct, on the assumption that instinct dominates the development of habit. Both the approach and the assumption are erroneous. The sociologist is demonstrating that the environment increasingly dominates both the content and the direction or functioning of habit formation. It is, therefore, from the standpoint of the content and the organization of the psycho-social environment that the control of the growth of human character should be approached, the instincts being regarded primarily as the original—not necessarily the immediate or the only—starting points in the process. But before this change in emphasis can be brought about the inadequacy of the theory of instinctive control must be made manifest through an exposure of the current radical misconceptions regarding the nature and content of the instincts. Many sociologists have been feeling their way toward this objective for some time. It is a task which of necessity falls to the sociologist, because only he has the data regarding social organization and social pressures in sufficient mass and detail to make the error of the biological group—generally quite uninformed regarding the complexity and dynamic character of the social environment—sufficiently evident. It is not too much to say that the future control of the human race and its civilization lies not through selective breeding of the higher social qualities—although selective breeding of those traits which can be so bred is of the greatest importance—but through their transmission by social contact and control. The overwhelming—and generally the immediate—pressures upon the character-form-



ing process, especially in its more advanced stages, come from the accumulated psycho-social environment

#### H. The Rise of the Conception of the Psychology of the Unconscious.

Within the last few years there have been discoveries and advances in psychology which are of such far-reaching importance and of so revolutionary a nature that they threaten the well-nigh total discrediting of the conventional historical literature, in so far as it touches individuals and their motives, and would seem to indicate the necessity of reconsidering much of even the most advanced socio-psychological interpretation of history. These phases of psychological progress to which reference is made are those connected with the discoveries of, or the new emphasis which is placed upon, the importance of the instinctive, subconscious and unconscious impulses or motives in human conduct. It was once confidently supposed that man is fully conscious of the impulses which move him to action, that if a person honestly avowed that he acted from certain motives there could be little doubt that he did so. If these premises were accepted, the task of the historian in establishing the facts in the case was the relatively simple one of determining the degree of honesty and candor in the statement. It has now come to be almost universally agreed, however, that even that part of this newer dynamic psychology which is beyond the least probability of error in fundamental principles, has demonstrated beyond any possibility of doubt that the great majority of human psychic reactions are produced by impulses or motives that are below the level of consciousness—that emerge unknown from the unconscious sources of psychic life and power.<sup>157</sup>

<sup>157</sup> With the exception of a few antediluvian organic neurologists and a still smaller number of academic psychologists, afflicted with an acute "defense-reaction," this fact is undenied by any informed student of present day psychology. It stands whether or not one accepts the Freudian mechanisms with which it is maintained that the skilled psychoanalyst can explore the unconscious. A denial of Freudianism in no way involves an elimination of the reality of the unconscious. Competent popular or readable expositions are contained in A. G. Tansley, *The New Psychology*; W. Lay, *Man's Un-*

A much worn, but illuminating figure compares the psychic life and activity of man to the iceberg, with the great submerged mass of unconscious impulses and motives, and its relatively slight visible portion of conscious activity.

This interesting and veritably revolutionary development in psychology has passed through a number of phases or stages of development, and may still be regarded as but in the early period of its ultimate development at the present time. While vaguely hinted at from time to time since the Greek period, the first clear conception of the nature and significance of the unconscious in mental life was embodied in the famous work on *The Psychology of the Unconscious* by Eduard von Hartmann, published in 1869. This was, however, primarily philosophical in its approach, and the actual knowledge of the potency and specific nature of the unconscious mind was subsequently secured through the work of clinical psychologists dealing chiefly with mental and nervous diseases. This did not need to be the case, as the unconscious is as important in the psychic life of the so-called "normal" individual as in that of the sufferer from a psychosis, but the academic and educational psychologists, who had custody of the psychology of the normal mind, were rarely interested in the psychology of conduct, and hence could not well get on the track of unconscious motives and impulses.<sup>168</sup> The first important work along this line was done by Jean Martin Charcot (1825-1893) and Hippolyte Bernheim, who conducted the rival schools of Salpêtrière and Nancy in the period following the "seventies." They relied chiefly on hypnotism as a therapeutic agent, but they had definitely come to conceive of mental and nervous diseases as being due primarily to disturbances in the unconscious. The second stage came in the refinement of the concepts and methods of Charcot

*conscious Conflicts*, F. Pierce, *Our Unconscious Mind*; and F. L. Wells, *Mental Adjustments*

<sup>168</sup> For a stimulating study of the "normal mind" in a more dynamic manner see W. H. Burnham, *The Normal Mind*.

and Bernheim by Pierre Janet, Morton Prince, Boris Sidis and others, who developed the notions of dissociation of personality and the split personality, but who still relied largely on hypnotism, suggestion and direct reeducation in their therapeutic work. But in such a work as Dr. Prince's study of the unconscious one has as thorough an acceptance of this concept as in any of Freud's works, though the specific notions of the unconscious held by these two writers vary notably.<sup>159</sup>

The most modern and thoroughgoing of the modes of approach to a study of the unconscious has been the work of the distinguished and ingenious Viennese psychiatrist, Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis. Freud was one of the more brilliant of Charcot's students in the later days of the master's teaching. In conjunction with Josef Breuer upon his return to Vienna, Freud, after experimentation in the treatment of hysteria, worked out a technique which proved much more successful in therapy than hypnotism, but was even more significant in exploring the nature of the unconscious mind. Particularly important was the emphasis which he placed upon the sex motivation in the unconscious, and upon dream analysis as a revolutionary technique for investigating the unconscious and discovering the hidden sources of the disorders. Whatever its defects as the initial stage of a discovery, the Freudian system constitutes both one of the great advances in modern medicine and one of the outstanding contributions to modern psychology.<sup>160</sup> There have been diverse developments of the subject since Freud's original work. Some, such as Brill, Jones and others, have followed the master faithfully, and Freud has shown unfortunate intolerance

<sup>159</sup> See P. Janet, *Les Névroses, Major Symptoms of Hysteria*, M. Prince, *Dissociation of a Personality, The Unconscious*, cf. F. Pierce, *Our Unconscious Mind*.

<sup>160</sup> See Stanley Hall's introduction to Freud's *General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, and H. M. Kallen, "Freudianism," in *Encyclopedia Americana*.

of dissent and of improvements on his concepts and technique. Adler has developed in particular the conception of compensation. Jung has elaborated the system in the direction of mysticism, and has postulated a general unconscious common to the race whose stages of development he has attempted to trace. Stekel has shown particular acumen as a dream analyst.

The best work has been done by the eclectics who have been bound by no rigid preconceptions, but have made use of their clinical experience to criticize and revise old and partially erroneous notions, and to push forward to new discoveries. Despite criticism from the more static neurologists and psychiatrists, and from purists, the movement is developing rapidly, and is yearly throwing more light upon the foundations of our motives and impulses, and suggesting various types of practical guidance to more sane and healthy modes of living.<sup>161</sup> In such a discriminating reformulation as that by J. T. MacCurdy it can stand unabashed alongside of the most severely refined academic and laboratory psychology.<sup>162</sup> While developed chiefly as a system of individual psychology, Walter Lippmann, E. D. Martin, W. H. R. Rivers and others have clearly shown its possibilities in explaining and clarifying many phases and aspects of group and crowd psychology.<sup>163</sup> The writer would express no opinion beyond the conviction that a most promising and dynamic field has thus been opened up which no psychologist and no historian interested in the psychological approach to his subject can afford to ignore.

<sup>161</sup> The best history of Freudian psychology is contained in Fritz Wittels's *Sigmund Freud*, which contains an admirable bibliography of these writings. A popular exposition may be found in A. Tridon's *Psychoanalysis and Behavior*, pp. 289-349. The history of the whole subject of the psychology of the unconscious is well discussed in W. N. Northridge, *Modern Theories of the Unconscious*.

<sup>162</sup> See J. T. MacCurdy, *Problems in Dynamic Psychology*. The best case that can be made against psychoanalysis is contained in A. Wohlgenuth, *A Critical Examination of Psychoanalysis*.

<sup>163</sup> See in particular W. Lippmann, *A Preface to Politics*, E. D. Martin, *The Behavior of Crowds*, and W. H. R. Rivers, *Psychology and Politics*.

**I. Differential Psychology and the Doctrine of Superior and Inferior Human Types.**

In spite of the general acceptance of the Jacksonian democratic dogma of the equality of all men, the fallacies of this conception had been intuitively perceived long before the rise of mental testing and modern differential psychology. Aristotle concluded that some men were born to rule and others to serve, and that the best society was one which took practical cognizance of this fact. The Stoics held to a belief in an aristocracy of the intellect, which constituted the basis of their view of the brotherhood of men. Machiavelli, Hobbes, Harrington, Saint-Simon, Comte, Quetelet, Calhoun and others adhered to much the same views as to the hierarchy of ability in human society. But their opinions were merely *a priori* assumptions and rough observations. It was necessary to ground the doctrine in substantial and demonstrable fact.

While differential psychology rests upon the foundations laid by many aspects of the development of psychology in the last century, these psychological contributions were first exploited systematically in mental testing by Francis Galton in England, Alfred Binet in France and J. McK. Cattell in the United States. In the first decade of the present century, Binet, working with his colleague, T. Simon, devised the first comprehensive set of tests applicable alike to rich and poor, wise and foolish. His results were brought to this country by several psychologists and educators, but H. H. Goddard was the first American to exploit these tests to any considerable degree. He substituted new questions for those which related rather specifically to material and experiences drawn from the French environment. Then R. M. Yerkes of Harvard University introduced the "point-scale" device to make allowance for the greater difficulties met by foreign children in answering the questions in the tests. Next Professor Lewis M. Ter-

man of Leland Stanford University in 1915 perfected the famous Stanford Revision of the Binet tests, which provided more refined methods of testing, adapted the tests for utilization by any trained psychologist, and made provision for detecting superior children, particularly by the introduction of the notion of the "intelligence quotient," obtained by dividing the mental age by the chronological age up to 16, after which 16 is used as the chronological age for all. In 1917, Otis, one of Terman's students, worked out a method of applying these tests to large groups, and devised two sets of tests, the Alpha test designed for those who could read and write English, and the Beta or performance test for those who could not. The Otis adaptation of the Stanford tests, with some later modifications, were those used by the psychologists in the famous tests administered to the recruits in the United States army during the World War. The results obtained from a testing of this unusually adequate sample of 1,700,000 Americans, rather better than the average because of the rejection of the definitely feeble-minded at the local draft boards, were to some astonishing.<sup>164</sup> The distribution was the following.<sup>165</sup>

Grade	Mental Age	Percentage of the total
A	18-19	4½
B	16-17	9
C +	15	16½
C	13-14	25
C -	12	20
D	11	15
D -	10	10

<sup>164</sup> There is an admirable history of the whole mental testing movement by Kimball Young in the *Pedagogical Seminary*, March, 1924.

<sup>165</sup> See R. M. Yerkes and C. S. Yoakum, *Army Mental Tests*, and C. Brigham, *American Intelligence*.

This proved that less than one-seventh of the recruits examined could be regarded as of a superior type as far as intelligence is concerned, and proved for all time the accuracy of the assumption of highly varied ability among mankind at large. While assailed by some writers,<sup>166</sup> the attack was not successful except against non-essential details or misapplications of the results.<sup>167</sup> Subsequently many writers, such as Stoddard, McDougall, Goddard, Mrs. Cannon, Brigham and Wiggam have attempted to indicate its bearing upon current political and social problems, most notably the validity of democratic theory and practice.<sup>168</sup> Whatever else this literature may or may not have established, it certainly has proved that we must eliminate from our conceptions of workable and realistic democracy any of the older egalitarian dogmas, and that the only claim which can be made for equality is unrestricted opportunity to develop to the highest possible degree the inherent capacity of all types in society.<sup>169</sup>

The chief bearing of all this upon historical writing and interpretation is, of course, to expose thoroughly the fallacies of the older democratic assumptions which underlay many of the liberal historical products of the last few generations. Another Bancroft will find it more difficult to declare with complacency that "the voice of the people is the voice of God," unless he is willing to confess a rather disrespectful theism. There will also need to be more qualms when defending the thesis that the movement towards democracy in the last century was a sure mani-

<sup>166</sup> Most notably by Walter Lippmann in the *New Republic*, October 25, 1922 ff.

<sup>167</sup> See the effective answer to Lippmann by E. G. Boring, *Ibid.*, June 6, 1923.

<sup>168</sup> W. McDougall, *Is America Safe for Democracy?*; L. Stoddard, *The Revolt Against Civilization*, H. H. Goddard, *Human Efficiency and Levels of Intelligence*, C. J. Cannon, "American Misgivings," in *Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1922, pp. 145-57, C. Brigham, *American Intelligence*, A. E. Wiggam, *The New Decalogue of Science*, and *The Fruit of the Family Tree*.

<sup>169</sup> See the excellent review of current views of democracy by M. M. Willey, in C. E. Merriam and H. E. Barnes, *A History of Political Theories: Recent Times*, Chap. II.

festation of the divine purpose in history. It is no vindication of egalitarian democracy to inquire what we have on hand to take its place. But to give a well-balanced explanation of the nature and bearing of differential psychology, it will be necessary to call upon the psychiatrists to offer their views of the psychic instability and abnormalities of genius, and upon the biologists for their elucidation of the doctrines of hereditary genius and positive eugenics.

**J. Some Representative Early Attempts to Work Out the Principles of a Psychological Interpretation of History.**

The effort to sketch a psychological theory of history goes well back into the early eighteenth century, if indeed not back to Lucretius and other classical philosophers. From the period of Vico onward there were offered schemes of psychological stages in the development of man and culture, among them the views of Turgot, Condorcet, Saint-Simon, Comte and others on the subject. But the first really significant theory was that of Walter Bagehot. We shall limit ourselves here to Bagehot, Tarde, Le Bon and Wundt as representative of this type of work, not overlooking the importance of Comte's triadic interpretation, which was not, however, the work of a psychologist, strictly speaking.

(1) *Walter Bagehot (1826-77) and the Psychological Interpretation of Social Evolution.*

Walter Bagehot was not the least among that great group of nineteenth-century Englishmen who formed an almost unrivaled circle of brilliant minds, including among others Acton, Buckle, Darwin, Gladstone, T. H. Green, Huxley, Maine, Maitland, Mill, Ruskin, Spencer, Tylor, and Wallace. Perhaps he possessed a higher degree of genius than any of the others of that company. Certainly his power of brilliant analysis and ability to interpret the spirit rather than the mere form of institutions and doc-



trines was unequaled by any other man of his time. His *English Constitution* remains the best interpretation of the spirit of the English government after fifty years have elapsed and bulky volumes have been devoted to the exposition of the subject. His *Economic Studies* and *Lombard Street* were among the first attempts to rescue political economy from the abstract deductions of the classical school, and to interpret the real dynamic nature of economic processes in an objective manner. Finally, his *Physics and Politics* was not only one of the first extensive and successful attempts at a psychological interpretation of society, but it also embodied implicitly or explicitly most of the leading psychological postulates which have since been offered in the interpretation of social processes. His early death was a blow to brilliant scholarship in England only equaled by the premature cutting off of the lives of Buckle, J. R. Green, Arnold Toynbee, and Maitland.

While Bagehot's *Physics and Politics* (1873) was the first great modern psychological interpretation of social processes and institutions, the sub-title of the work well indicates his relation to contemporary developments in approaching social analysis. This reads: "Thoughts on the Application of the Principles of 'Natural Selection' and 'Inheritance' to Political Society." While Bagehot was thus influenced by the biological school to the extent of adopting some of its terminology, he correctly understood that fundamentally social processes were psychologically motivated in a manner analogous to individual actions. Bagehot thus attempted to reconstruct the history of political organization and institutions through applying psychology rather than biology as the key to the process.

The first step in the evolution of any political community must be that by which the group attains a considerable degree of cohesion. To give it this essential quality there must be a body of authoritative principles which dominate the group. "To sum up—law—rigid, definite,

concise law—is the primary want of early mankind; that which they need above anything else, that which is requisite before they can gain anything else.”<sup>170</sup> To supply this primary need was the contribution of the first great age in the psychological evolution of humanity—the *custom-making age*. It was not a written body of law which first dominated mankind and gave to group life coherence and stability, but an equally authoritative code of rules for conduct which were embodied in what Bagehot suggestively designates as the “cake of custom”<sup>171</sup> In building up this cake of custom *imitation* was the vital factor. From the setting of a standard of style in dress or literature to the forming of national characteristics, this tendency of mankind to imitate a model, which for one reason or another appeals to the general taste of the community, is the dominant force.<sup>172</sup> Once there was perfected this cake of custom to guide conduct in uniform lines of activity the first great step in human progress was accomplished. Thereafter there could be no trouble in securing concerted action; any deviation from the type of conduct prescribed by custom was not only a crime but a sin, and those individuals who dared to be original were soon eliminated. Toleration of originality became wicked, for it amounted to “allowing one individual for a moment’s pleasure or a stupid whim to bring a terrible calamity upon all.”

The next great period in the psychological history of man is *age of the conflict of customs* or the *nation-making age*. Technically this should be called the “state-making” rather than the “nation-making” age. This is the period of the struggle for existence among groups with different

<sup>170</sup> *Physics and Politics* (New York edition of 1876), p. 21.

<sup>171</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 36 ff., 88 ff. However, though Bagehot directly anticipated Tarde in his emphasis upon imitation, he was by no means the originator of this doctrine. Hume in his essay on “National Characters” had advanced exactly this doctrine, namely, that it was imitation rather than geographic influences which reduced the customs of a people to uniformity. Hume, *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary* (Green and Grose edition), I, 244 ff. Cf. *The Philosophical Review*, May, 1919, pp. 248 ff.

"cakes of custom," and results either in the elimination of the groups with the less effective types of customary procedure or in their incorporation within those groups with the superior codes. In this period of the conflict of customs, war is the dominating process, as imitation was in the first stage. Each nation or group is continually straining to improve its military equipment. Hence, this stage is essentially identical with Spencer's military type of civilization.<sup>173</sup> "The progress of the military art is the most conspicuous, I was about to say the most *showy*, fact in human history."<sup>174</sup> "The cause of this military growth is very plain. The strongest nation has always been conquering the weaker; sometimes even subduing it, but always prevailing over it. Every intellectual gain, so to speak, that a nation possessed was in the earliest times made use of—was *invested* and taken out—in war; all else perished."<sup>175</sup> As to why one nation or group could conquer another and impose its customary code upon it there is one general reason and several specific explanations. In general, a group which has developed the power of unified action through a political organization based upon the code of customary law has an overwhelming advantage over that group which cannot be organized with alacrity or function in unison, owing to the lack of any definite political organization. In the conflicts of the nation-making age the groups which were backward in political organization would be eliminated.<sup>176</sup> Again, granted that such loosely organized groups no longer exist, there are certain specific advantages which may be possessed by groups which would enable them to overcome those which were not thus favored. In the first place, a patriarchal type of organization is stronger for military purposes than a ma-

<sup>173</sup> *Physics and Politics*, pp. 44 ff.

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 44

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 49

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 50 ff.

ternal family or promiscuous family relations.<sup>177</sup> Then, a competent central organization is indispensable for successful military activity.<sup>178</sup> Further, a group made up of mixed races would be likely to be superior to one which was homogeneous in racial composition, though there may be some qualifications necessary to universal application of this rule.<sup>179</sup> Also such "provisional institutions" as slavery may be of considerable value at certain times in human history. Slavery conferred an advantage by making possible that leisure class which first developed culture, learning, and refinement.<sup>180</sup> Finally, a religious system which is free from those crude superstitions and that belief in omens which often lead to delays or changes of plans in military activity, will ordinarily prevail over a group which is thus handicapped.<sup>181</sup> As a net result of the ceaseless struggles of this age, of the conflict of customs and the consequent making of nations, there emerged the great political organizations of antiquity—the first great territorial states, each possessed of that type of customary procedure and governmental system which was best designed for conquest. The selective process had now acted upon the innumerable petty customary groups of the "preliminary age" and had allowed those with the best organization to prevail and absorb the others.

But with the close of this great military age the condition of the successful groups which had grown into powerful nations was far from being well adapted to further progress. They were dominated by a rigid code of custom, perhaps more tyrannical than that with which they had started upon their career of conquest. A more important and equally difficult problem lay before them, namely, to

<sup>177</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 123 ff., 215 ff.

<sup>178</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 50 ff.

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 67 ff.

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 71 ff.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 126 ff., 216 ff.

rid themselves of this depressing bond of custom which had been useful in its day but was now bound to produce only stagnation and decay. "The great difficulty which history records is not the difficulty of getting a fixed law, but of getting out of a fixed law; not of cementing a cake of custom, but of breaking the cake of custom; not of making the first preservative habit, but of breaking through it and reaching something better."<sup>182</sup> The nations which were successful in this process of breaking down the domination of custom became the progressive nations of history; those which were unsuccessful have been known in history as the "arrested civilizations."<sup>183</sup> It was the contribution of the third great psychological age postulated by Bagehot—the *age of discussion*—to break the stagnating power of custom and make further progressive development possible.<sup>184</sup> The process through which discussion effects the demolition of custom is both general and particular. In general, discussion tends to destroy the sacredness of any subject that is submitted to its action. Once a rationalistic view is turned upon an institution it can no longer exist solely because of the veneration previously attached to it, but must survive or perish according to its merits as a workable part of the social mechanism:

But a government by discussion, if it can be borne, at once breaks down the yoke of fixed custom. The idea of the two is inconsistent. As far as it goes, the mere putting up of a subject to discussion, with the object of being guided by that discussion, is a clear admission that the subject is in no degree settled by established rule, and that men are free to choose in it. It is an admission too that there is no sacred authority—no one transcendent and divinely appointed man whom in that matter the community is bound to obey. Once effectually submit a subject to that ordeal, and you can never withdraw it again, you can never again clothe it with mystery, or fence it by consecration, it remains forever open to free choice, and exposed to profane deliberation.<sup>185</sup>

<sup>182</sup> Bagehot, *op cit.*, p 53, *cf* pp 156 ff.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 53 ff., 156 ff.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 161 ff., 219 ff.

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*, p 161, *cf* also p 219.

Specifically, discussion aids in this process of dissolving traditional practices by putting a premium on intelligence;<sup>186</sup> by promoting the growth of toleration;<sup>187</sup> by contributing to the increase of intellectual life, and hence diminishing the birth rate; and, finally, by producing that most beneficial of all qualities, "animated moderation."<sup>188</sup> By animated moderation Bagehot means that rare combination of a mental constitution or a cultural condition which is receptive to suggestions of change with one which is sufficiently reflective to avoid impulsive and reckless approval of innovations. It is that type of mind which does not scorn the old merely because it is of remote origin or welcome the new simply on account of its novelty, but is able to discriminate, pick out and cherish the element of truth in both. In fact, the quality of animated moderation is closely akin to Spencer's closing exhortation to unite philanthropic energy with philosophic calm. Bagehot did not claim, however, that there were no other forces in addition to discussion that were operating to usher in the period of progress. Anything which would bring different customs into contact and awaken that interest which contrast always provokes could not but have its influence in disintegrating customary restraints. Among such agents he names trade, colonization, and a cosmopolitan ecclesiastical organization.<sup>189</sup> But even in these cases discussion is the vital basic principle which is at work. The extent to which discussion can operate and the rapidity with which progress can take place naturally depends upon the scope of the subjects submitted to discussion. At first, discussion is usually allowed only regarding relatively unimportant questions or in cases of great stress and emergency. Gradually, however, the scope of its application is extended, till at length among a few progressive nations no subject is too

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 162 f.

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 163 ff

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 200 ff

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 176 ff

sacred to escape its leavening influence.<sup>190</sup> After thus analyzing the means whereby progress is obtained, Bagehot inquires as to just what constitutes progress and finds a satisfactory answer in Spencer's formula that progress consists in "an increase of adaptation of man to his environment, that is, of his internal powers and wishes to his external lot and life."<sup>191</sup>

Historically considered, the "preliminary age" was concerned with building up the tribal customs. The nation-making age produced the great empires of antiquity with their custom-bound caste societies. The age of discussion was begun in Greece and continued for a while at Rome. The Middle Ages returned to the type of domination by custom characteristic of antiquity, but was rescued from this condition by the institution of the popular assembly among the Germanic peoples which kept alive and developed that vital element of discussion.<sup>192</sup>

In this highly lucid and incisive manner Bagehot traced out the first great psychological history of the human race, if one excepts the Comtian doctrine of the three stages of mental evolution. In spite of the fact that most sociological treatises written at the time have become antiquated, Bagehot's *Physics and Politics* remains as valuable as ever, for he dealt with those fundamental psychological foundations of group action which time is not likely to change in any material manner, and his psychology was built upon a broad enough foundation so that the advances in this subject are not likely to undermine his major premises or conclusions.

<sup>190</sup> Bagehot, *op. cit.*, pp. 164 ff.

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 209.

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 167-76. Of course, the researches which were first inaugurated by Fustel de Coulanges have dissipated the venerable myth perpetuated by Maurer, Freeman, and Stubbs regarding the German folk-moot as the cradle of Anglo-Saxon liberty, but Bagehot erred in a matter of detail rather than of principle.

(2) *Gustave Le Bon (1841- ) and the Psychology of Peoples.*

Of the three chief psychological sociologists that France has produced—Tarde, Durkheim, and Le Bon—the last is the most versatile, and yet by far the most superficial. In fact, Le Bon may be regarded as a popularizer of the more striking ideas of the first two, especially of Tarde's views on imitation and Durkheim's notion of crowd-psychology. The range of his interests, however, is certainly remarkable. Trained originally as a physician, he gave up the practice of medicine, but has contributed several works on physiology and hygiene. Next he was employed by the French government as an archeologist and paleographer in the Orient. In recent years he has been editor of the *Bibliothèque de philosophie scientifique*. In addition to these activities he has occupied himself by producing a general work on social evolution in two volumes; studies of the chief historic civilizations; several contributions to mathematical chemistry and physics, among them a paper on intra-atomic energy which was published in a number of the leading scientific journals; a statistical study in physical anthropology; a work or two on education; and the some half-dozen books on social psychology.<sup>193</sup>

Of course it is obvious that a man who ranges at will over a dozen fields of research, any one of which could only be partially traversed with thoroughness in a lifetime, is not likely to have excelled in any of them. This is certainly true of Le Bon, whatever his mental powers may be. Professor G. E. Vincent has thus characterized him

<sup>193</sup> For a list of Le Bon's contributions see the article on Le Bon in *La Grande Encyclopédie* for his earlier works, and the biographical note in the *New International Encyclopedia* for a list of his main works. Another list of his works is given in the French biographical annual *Qui Êtes-Vous?* His productivity is perhaps only exceeded by that of his fellow-countryman, Solomon Reinach, who can hardly boast an equal breadth of interests. Among his important works on social psychology are: *The Crowd; The Psychology of Socialism; La Psychologie politique; The Psychology of Revolution; The Psychology of the War; The World in Revolt; The World Unbalanced.*



in a fairly accurate manner: "M. Le Bon may be described as an intellectual kodak fiend. His books are filled with snapshots at truth, interesting in themselves, but sadly unconnected and out of focus."<sup>194</sup> At the same time, Le Bon's works are all highly interesting, and many of his generalizations sound plausible. His arguments are bolstered up by copious citations of a pertinent nature. Le Bon is one of those writers who exploits his theories in his own works. In discussing crowd psychology, for example, he tells the reader that the sure and certain method to be successful in convincing an audience of the truth of an assertion is to affirm the matter repeatedly, and, at the same time, to be careful to avoid any attempt at thorough analysis or any reference to a possible exception to its applicability. Nothing is more characteristic of Le Bon's own procedure than this very method. Taking a few rather striking psychological postulates which have the virtue of modernity, novelty, and suggestiveness, he applies these conceptions to nearly every phase of contemporary life in general and to French social conditions in particular. These theses are repeated and reiterated without detailed analysis or candid statement of exceptions to their application, until even a wary reader is likely to be beguiled by the facile phraseology of the author. Aside from his brilliant but uncritical dogmatism and "cock-sureness," another characteristic of Le Bon's socio-psychological writings should be noted. That is what Herbert Spencer would call his "anti-patriotic bias" and his "class bias." At least up to the outbreak of the World War, Le Bon could see little good in what he alleged to be the characteristics of the modern Romance peoples. Their assumed tendency towards a crowd-psychological condition and their desire to suppress individuality and put into power the incompetent masses contain little of promise from his viewpoint.

<sup>194</sup> G. E. Vincent, in review of Le Bon's *The Psychology of Peoples*, *American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1899, p. 555

The oft-asserted Anglo-Saxon initiative, energy, will-power, and individualism, attract him as strongly as the alleged French traits repel him.<sup>195</sup>

Again, Le Bon finds little to arouse his enthusiasm in the traits of the masses; from his viewpoint progress and civilization are almost exclusively the contribution of the intellectually *élite*. There can be no doubt that Le Bon's exaggerations are in part due to his generalizations from French conditions, though even these he views in an extreme and prejudiced light. The relation of Le Bon's doctrines to his social environment is not of that subtle type which is likely to escape the attention of the reader, but is so prominent in all his works as to make them full of generalizations which are highly inaccurate and distorted when viewed as sociological propositions of general import. His fundamental doctrines—the idea of national character, the psychology of crowds and revolutions, his "anti-patriotic" and "class" bias, his continual scenting of impending calamities, and his bitter attacks upon socialism and syndicalism, are all directly and in large part traceable to his reactions to his French "milieu." At the same time, no one can deny that Le Bon has pointed out tendencies, conditions, and psychological laws which had previously been overlooked or undeveloped, and, when his works are read with the understanding which allows the discounting of his exaggerations and prejudices, they constitute an important contribution to sociological literature.

Le Bon's first considerable work in the field of social psychology was the volume entitled, *Lois psychologiques de l'évolution des peuples*.<sup>196</sup> This work purports to be a summary of the main psychological generalizations reached in his earlier works upon social evolution and the history of

<sup>195</sup> Probably Matthew Arnold would have found Le Bon rather comforting reading.

<sup>196</sup> Paris, 1895, English translation, N. Y., 1898, reviewed by Professor Vincent, *Amer. Jour. Soc.*, January, 1899, pp. 554-6. Cf. also Bristol, *Social Adaptation*, pp. 133-138.

the civilizations of Asia, Africa, and Europe.<sup>197</sup> It consists mainly of what might be called psychological prolegomena to the study of history, though few historians or psychologists would agree to all of his generalizations. His main theme is the nature and importance of national character, or "the soul of a race," in the explanation of history and modern social problems.<sup>198</sup>

This all-important "racial soul" is the sum total of the moral and intellectual characteristics that he at the foundation of the civilization of a race and determine the course of its evolution. The soul of the race finds objective expression in the totality of the type of civilization which distinguishes the particular race. "The moral and intellectual characteristics, whose association forms the soul of a people, represent the synthesis of its entire past, the inheritance of all its ancestors, the motives of its conduct."<sup>199</sup> In the formation of the racial soul the influence of the dead is preponderant. The racial soul is primarily unconscious; it underlies the rational phases of national thought and is, on that account, much more dominating in its influence. It is over this field of unconscious motives of conduct that the influence of the dead is particularly potent. "A people is guided far more by its dead than by its living members. It is by its dead, and by its dead alone, that a race is founded. Century after century our departed ancestors have fashioned our ideas and sentiments, and in consequence all the motives of our conduct."<sup>200</sup> These

<sup>197</sup> *The Psychology of Peoples*, p. 230

<sup>198</sup> Le Bon's notions of social evolution and of the contrasting characteristics of the French and Anglo-Saxon peoples are but a holdover of the doctrines of the "Romanticists," given a modern dress through a dash of psychology

<sup>199</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 5-6, 63-64.

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 11, 15-16, 51 ff. Le Bon admits that it is practically impossible to find a pure race at the present time in the sense of anatomical purity, and states that what he refers to are "historical races"—a product of psychological rather than physical evolution. An historic race is produced when two or more not too dissimilar peoples are brought together in fairly equal numbers and subjected to the same environmental conditions for a very long period of time. The apparent confusion which might arise from identify-

psychological characteristics which go to make up the soul of a race are composed of a relatively few fundamental ideas which are highly permanent in character and are changed only very slowly, except through the effect of racial inter-mixture. Only the more superficial and secondary characteristics of a race are modifiable with any degree of rapidity.<sup>201</sup>

Le Bon contends that these races may be classified psychologically as well as anatomically. There are primitive races, or "those in which no trace of culture is met with," made up of peoples like the Fuegians; inferior races composed mainly of negroes; average races represented by the Mongolians; and superior races mainly exemplified by the Indo-European peoples.<sup>202</sup> The higher the race the more highly differentiated it is psychologically and the more superior minds it contains.<sup>203</sup> Though there may be a vast difference in the intelligence of the numerous individuals that go to make up a superior race, nevertheless the race is practically uniform in those fundamental psychological factors which determine its character.<sup>204</sup> This explains why it is that national character and not intelligence is the dominant factor in social evolution—why the English can hold in subjection the millions of India who equal or surpass the English in pure intelligence.<sup>205</sup> Even the most superior races cannot change the constituent elements of their civilization with any facility. Cross-breeding of racial stocks is the only agency which will effect a rapid and fundamental change in national character. Social and physical environment have little strength as compared to

ing the soul of a race with national character he explains by taking the ground that nations are normally subdivisions of some well-defined historical race and thus partake of the general characteristics of the race of which they form a part

<sup>201</sup> *Ibid*, pp 17 ff, 154 ff, 167 ff

<sup>202</sup> *Ibid*, pp 25 ff. Cf Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, Chap. i.

<sup>203</sup> *Psychology of Peoples*, pp 39 ff, 232

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid*, p 46

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid*, pp 33-34, 46-47

heredity and inheritance.<sup>206</sup> "The history of civilizations is thus composed of slow adaptations, of slight successive transformations. If these latter appear to us to be sudden and considerable, it is because, as in geology, we suppress the intermediate phases and only consider the extreme phases."<sup>207</sup> According to Le Bon's view, therefore, history is nothing more than a product of racial character.<sup>208</sup>

History in its main lines may be regarded as the mere statement of the results engendered by the psychological constitution of races. It is determined by this constitution, just as the respiratory organs of fish are determined by their aquatic life. In the absence of a preliminary knowledge of the mental constitution of a people, its history appears a chaos of events governed by hazard. On the contrary, when we are acquainted with the soul of a people, its life is seen to be the regular and inevitable consequence of its psychological characteristics. In all the manifestations of the life of a people, we always find the unchangeable soul of the race weaving itself its own destiny.

The idea that institutions can remedy the defects of societies, that national progress is the consequence of the improvement of institutions and governments, and that social changes can be effected by decrees—this idea, I say, is still generally accepted . . . The most continuous experience has been unsuccessful in shaking this grave delusion . . . A nation does not choose its institutions at will any more than it chooses the color of its hair or its eyes . . . Centuries are required to form a political system and centuries needed to change it. Institutions have no intrinsic virtue in themselves they are neither good nor bad. Those which are good at any given moment for a given people may be harmful in the extreme for another nation . . . To lose time in the manufacture of cut-and-dried constitutions is, in consequence, a puerile task, the useless labor of an ignorant rhetorician. . . The conclusion to be drawn from what precedes is, that it is not in institutions that the means is to be sought of profoundly influencing the genius of the masses . . . Peoples are governed by their character, and all the institutions which are not intimately modelled on that character merely represent a borrowed garment, a transitory disguise.

<sup>206</sup> Le Bon, *op cit*, pp. 53 ff., 56 ff., 81 ff.

<sup>207</sup> *Ibid*, p. 96

<sup>208</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 129-130, *The Crowd*, pp. 97-101. Cf. Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 184-193, 544-575, *Applied Sociology*, pp. 13-17.

The soul of a race is very visibly and strikingly manifested in its political institutions. Applying this idea to French conditions he finds that all the French parties, whatever their name, pursue the identical end of attempting to absorb the individual in the state and destroy individual initiative. In England and the United States, however, a different type of racial soul leads all parties to favor individual initiative at the expense of state-activity. All this goes to prove that, in reality, forms of government and political institutions in general count for very little in comparison to the psychological characteristics of a race. The great historical importance of the psychological characteristics of a race is well illustrated by the conspicuous success and expansion of Anglo-Saxon colonization and political forms in America, and the equally apparent failure of the Spanish in this respect.<sup>209</sup>

Because of the very fact that cross-breeding is the only method by which it is possible rapidly to change the character of a nation, immigration on a large scale, with the consequent interbreeding, has a very important effect upon the destiny of a nation. Roman civilization perished more as a result of the peaceful amalgamation with barbarians than as a consequence of the subsequent military invasions. The same threatening conditions are now to be detected in the wholesale immigration into America, but thanks to Anglo-Saxon superiority the Americans may, if they act in time, exterminate these present barbarians as Marius did the Cimbri. If action is long delayed America must sooner or later meet the fate of the Roman Empire and disintegrate into many small and warring nations.<sup>210</sup>

<sup>209</sup> *The Psychology of Peoples*, pp 130 ff. "This terrible decadence of the Latin race, left to itself, compared with the prosperity of the English race in a neighboring country, is one of the most sombre, the saddest, and, at the same time, the most instructive experiences that can be cited in support of the psychological laws that I have enunciated," *Ibid*, p 152. Le Bon's views are seriously compromised by the fact that he overlooks the historical elements in the situation.

<sup>210</sup> *Ibid*, p 154 ff.

Aside from the rapid changes in national character which may result from wholesale racial intermixture, there may come about a more gradual modification, as a result of the infiltration of new ideas.<sup>211</sup> A new idea always arises in the mind of an individual who attracts a few enthusiastic disciples who aid him in zealously affirming its truth without analysis or discussion. But this soon leads to a wider and wider discussion of the merits of the idea by the public. If it gains ground it is spread by contagion and imitation throughout the society, and in time the group becomes as obsessed with the new idea as its originator was in the beginning. But, even with successful ideas, this is a very slow process. An idea never becomes a national obsession until, after years of discussion, it has filtered down into the unconscious strata of national character. When the idea has thus become a matter of dogma or sentiment it has reached its full degree of effectiveness.<sup>212</sup> On account of the sentimental and dogmatic nature of religious beliefs, which renders them especially amenable to fanatical support, ideas of this type have been the most powerful of all factors in the past history of mankind. To a large degree they have tended to shape the other types of beliefs and institutions.<sup>213</sup> In spite of the absurdities of past religious beliefs they have played an immense part in social control and in giving solidarity to society. There can be no doubt that the present tendency towards social dissolution is partially a result of the decay of the religious beliefs that society has outgrown, but which have not been supplanted by a new body of religious thought.<sup>214</sup>

Only by an application of social psychology can one comprehend the relation of leadership to social progress. While practically every real and substantial advance in

<sup>211</sup> Le Bon, *op cit*, p 167 ff.

<sup>212</sup> *Ibid*, p 169 ff

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid*, p 190 ff

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid*, pp 197-198

culture is the result of the services of the *élite* in any society, they usually do little more than to synthesize the latent possibilities and tendencies of the age. Again, the truly *élite* never bring about any sudden or startling changes; they affect civilization only gradually. The great dramatic changes in history are the work of fanatics.<sup>215</sup> "At the bidding of a Peter the Hermit millions of men hurled themselves against the East, the words of an hallucinated enthusiast such as Mahomet created a force capable of triumphing over the Greco-Roman world; an obscure monk like Luther bathed Europe in blood. The voice of a Galileo or a Newton will never have the least echo among the masses. The inventors of genius hasten the march of civilization. The fanatics and the hallucinated create history."

As nations are built up by the formation of a national character, so they perish with its dissolution. As an organism decays when it no longer functions, so a nation disintegrates when it has lost its character. Le Bon finds at present many symptoms of decay among the Latin races of Europe, among which socialism, or the cult of state-worship, is the most menacing.<sup>216</sup>

Stated with their bold dogmatism and unobscured by being buried beneath a mass of erudition of another sort, these propositions of Le Bon sound rather novel and startling, but they are by no means new. His idea of national character as a vital reality, his belief in the superiority of certain races, and even his faith in the supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon or Germanic peoples is at the bottom identical with the doctrine preached in the works of Burke and the "Romanticists," of Freeman, Kemble, Green, and Stubbs in England and of Ranke, Waitz, Sybel, Droysen, and Treitschke in Germany. Further, his doctrine of the predominant importance of the

<sup>215</sup> *Ibid.*, p 199 ff.

<sup>216</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 204, 211 ff., 219 ff.



ideas and beliefs of a people in their historic development is but an exaggerated statement of the conception of history as a socio-psychic process, stated by Lamprecht in Germany and now championed in America by Professor Robinson, and which seems likely to be one of the most fruitful lines of historical investigation for years to come.

(3) *Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904) and the Psychology of Imitation.*

Of all French writers upon systematic sociology since the time of Comte probably no other author has been as influential in shaping the general body of sociological thought as Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904).<sup>217</sup> Tarde's contributions to sociology mainly center about the elaboration of the psychological and sociological importance of imitation, though this principle by no means embraces the whole of his system. There can be no doubt that his interest in imitation was fostered by his duties during the greater part of his life as a judge and a statistician, professions well designed to impress upon the mind the significance of the repetition of similar circumstances and phenomena.<sup>218</sup> To be sure the idea of imitation as a socializing force was not new; a century and a half before Tarde, Hume had emphasized its action in his brilliant essay upon "National Character," in which he had defended the idea of imitation

<sup>217</sup> The classic exposition of Tarde's sociological system is to be found in Davis' monograph, *Gabriel Tarde*, New York, 1906, which was incorporated in his later work, *Psychological Interpretations of Society*, 1909. This work is one of the best expositions of a sociological system extant. Other briefer discussions are to be found in G. Tosti's excellent article, "The Sociological Theories of Gabriel Tarde," *Pol. Sci. Quar.*, 1897, pp. 490-511, Professor Giddings' Introduction to Mrs. Parsons' translation of Tarde's *Laws of Imitation*, Bristol's *Social Adaptation*, pp. 185-192, Gault's *Introduction* and Lindsey's editorial preface to Howell's translation of Tarde's *Penal Philosophy*, and Professor Small's review of Tarde's "Social Laws," *Amer. Jour. Soc.*, Vol. IV, pp. 395-400. For an ingenious American adaptation of Tarde's sociological theories see Ross's *Social Psychology*, and for the most extended application of similar theories to psychology by an American writer see Baldwin's *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*.

<sup>218</sup> For a brief survey of the salient points connected with Tarde's career see Giddings' Introduction cited above.

as producing those uniformities of culture attributed by Montesquieu to geographic influences. The emphasis placed upon imitation by Bagehot and Huxley is also well known. Finally, at about the same time that Tarde was elaborating his doctrine, similar views were being put forward by a number of writers, among them, Bordier, Espinas, Baldwin, James, and Royce.<sup>210</sup> But whatever Tarde may have lacked in originality he compensated for in the completeness and thoroughness of his analysis of imitation. Tarde's exposition of the social aspects and influence of imitation has not been received without criticism, Graham Wallas criticizes it sharply for its ambiguity,<sup>220</sup> and Bristol lightly remarks that "indeed his discussion of suggestion and imitation is *passé*."<sup>221</sup> The truth seems to be that, on the one hand, Tarde rather exaggerated the influence of imitation and was not averse to straining a point to claim a certain process as the product of this socializing force, and that, on the other hand, certain of his assumptions regarding the psychology of imitation have not stood the test of refined experiments in the psychological laboratory. At the same time, there can be little doubt that his discussion of the sociological importance of imitation has been of the sort which will render further exploitation of that field extremely unprofitable.

Imitation, however, was only the central theme of Tarde's system of sociology, and it now remains to examine his system as a whole. Tarde's sociology was almost exclusively psychological, though he frankly admitted that there were other legitimate lines of approach. He finds that the social process consists fundamentally in the intermental activity of a group of associated individuals. This intermental activity takes place through the three funda-

<sup>210</sup>For the historic antecedents of Tarde's theories and the stages in the development of his system, see Davis, *Psychological Interpretations of Society*, Chaps. II, VII.

<sup>220</sup>*The Great Society*, pp. 119-20

<sup>221</sup>*Social Adaptation*, p. 191

mental processes of *repetition* (imitation), *opposition*, and *adaptation*; and these in turn operate upon the beliefs and desires of individuals and societies.

In other words, beliefs and desires are the psychological raw materials of socialization, intermental activity is the general process through which socialization is achieved,<sup>222</sup> and repetition, opposition, and adaptation are the special processes through which intermental activity accomplishes its work.<sup>223</sup>

Tarde finds that these three principles of repetition, opposition, and adaptation will serve as the basis of a cosmic philosophy as well as for the foundation of a system of sociology. They are the three great factors in the development of all sciences and all phenomena.<sup>224</sup> His general thesis is two-fold: (1) in the thoughts and observations of men regarding the operation and existence of these three fundamental processes, the historic progress has been from that of the observation of the large-scale and sometimes fantastic examples of repetition, opposition, and adaptation to that of the discovery of the minute and fundamental examples which go to make up the greater; (2) in the actual world of phenomena the repetitions, oppositions, and adaptations proceed in the reverse order from the minute and fundamental to the great and extensive.<sup>225</sup>

It will be impossible in this place to do more than to summarize the main points which he makes in regard to sociology and socialization. In the field of social phenomena one may discover the same inversion of order between theory and fact in regard to *repetition* as was

<sup>222</sup> *La logique sociale*, chap. i., and *Essais et mélanges sociologiques*, pp. 156, 268.

<sup>223</sup> Cf. *Social Laws*, *passim*. Each of these three great agencies receives its complete analysis in a separate volume. Repetition is analyzed in *Les lois de l'imitation* (1st ed 1890, 3rd ed 1900), opposition in *L'opposition universelle* (1897), and adaptation in *La logique sociale* (1895). These were epitomized in his *Les lois sociales* (1898), which presented an outline of his whole system of philosophy as well as of his sociology.

<sup>224</sup> *Social Laws*, translated by H. C. Warren, New York, 1899, pp. 1-10.

<sup>225</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 11-23.

noticed in regard to phenomena in general. Beginning with the earlier superficial observation of picturesque social repetitions like the classical theory of the cycles of government or the triads of Vico and Hegel, the scientific sociologist has now come to regard as fundamental the repetitions of two persons in a state of association. In the same way, the reversal of observed progress to actual progress in repetition is manifested in the fact that social repetitions proceed in a geometrical ratio from the fundamental one of two persons to that of international repetition or imitation.<sup>226</sup> As it is under the head of repetition that Tarde would include the fundamental process of imitation, it might be well at this place to interpolate a brief summary of his analysis of the mode of action of this principle in social life as developed in his *Laws of Imitation*.

Davis sums up his treatment of imitation in the following ingenious and illuminating manner: "I. The source of social action is in individual initiatives expressed in new ideas or procedures called *Inventions*. II. The essential social and socializing act is *Imitation*, by which *Inventions* become more or less socially accepted and socially influential. III. The *origin* of an *Invention* is influenced by: (a) The inherent difficulty of combining mentally the ideas whose combination is the invention; (b) The grades of innate mental ability in the society; (c) The social conditions favoring mental alertness and the expression of ability. IV. The *imitation* of an invention is affected by: (a) the *general law* that imitations spread from their initial center in geometrical progression, with regard to the number of persons affected; (b) *Physical and biological* influences, including race characteristics; the general law being that 'Imitations are refracted by their media'; (c) *Social* influences: (1) *Logical*: the agreement or disagreement of the new invention with the inventions already more or less socially accepted (imitated); ('Logical causes operate

<sup>226</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 24 ff.

whenever an individual prefers a given imitation to others because he thinks it is more useful or more true than others, that is, more in accord than they are with the aims or principles that have already found a place in his mind.');<sup>227</sup> (2) *Extralogical*. (x) Ideas are transmitted before means; imitation goes *ab interioribus ad exteriora*; (y) Imitation proceeds from the socially superior to the socially inferior; (z) Ages of custom, in which the past has peculiar prestige, alternate with ages of fashion, in which prestige is possessed by the novel and the foreign."<sup>228</sup>

In regard to the principle of *opposition* in sociology and society, the earlier oppositions which were observed by students of society were the mythological struggles between the forces of good and evil. Next there came the idea of the conflicts of races and nations which was later softened by the economists into the notion of competition. Finally, however, the sociologist has reduced the matter so that he correctly understands that "the really fundamental social opposition must be sought for in the bosom of the social individual himself, whenever he hesitates between adopting or rejecting a new pattern offered to him, whether in the way of phraseology, ritual, concept, canon of art or conduct."<sup>229</sup> The three main types of social opposition are war, competition, and discussion, mentioned in the order of their historic predominance. Each of these forms has tended to develop on a larger scale and again verifies the thesis that the order of the progress of phenomena in fact is the reverse of the order of the observation of these facts.<sup>230</sup>

With respect to the third great principle, *adaptation*, the sociological observation of this principle was first confined to the somewhat fantastic ideas of the philosophy of

<sup>227</sup> *Laws of Imitation*, translated by Elsie Clews Parsons, New York, 1903, p. 141

<sup>228</sup> Davis, *Psychological Interpretations of Society*, pp 97-98

<sup>229</sup> *Social Laws*, pp 81-84.

<sup>230</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 111 ff

history whereby the path of history was looked upon as the result of the adaptation or harmonizing of the work of one nation to that of the nation which had preceded or was to follow it, thus making the advance of historical action appear as a harmonious and teleological whole. These ideas were gradually made more scientific until now, according to Tarde, we know that "we must seek the fundamental social adaptation in the brain and individual mind of the inventor"—a harmony among the ideas in the mind of the individuals in society is essential to a harmony of the minds of the different members of a society.<sup>231</sup> Following the usual rule, the adaptation of social phenomena proceeds from the lesser to the greater—from those in the individual mind to those adaptations between nations upon which must be based the expectation of eliminating war in the future.<sup>232</sup>

In summing up the interrelation of the action of these three principles of repetition, opposition, and adaptation, Tarde says:

"These three terms constitute a circular series which is capable of proceeding on and on without ceasing. It is through imitative repetition that invention, the fundamental social adaptation, spreads and is strengthened, and tends, through the encounter of one of its own imitative rays with an imitative ray emanating from some other invention, old or new, either to arouse new struggles, or to yield new and more complex inventions, which soon radiate out imitatively in turn, and so on indefinitely. . . . Thus of the three terms compared, the first and third surpass the second in height, depth, importance, and possibly also in duration. The only value of the second—opposition—is to provoke a tension of antagonistic forces fitted to arouse inventive genius."<sup>233</sup>

"The mutual relations of our three terms—repetition,

<sup>231</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 166

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 169 ff

<sup>233</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 135-137.

opposition, and adaptation—are easily understood when we consider successive repetitions as operating, sometimes in favor of adaptation, which they spread and develop by their own interferences, sometimes in favor of opposition, which they arouse by interferences of another sort.”<sup>284</sup>

#### (4) *Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) and Folk-Psychology.*

Wilhelm Wundt was the dean of the world's psychologists of the last generation and the man who did more than any other single individual to bring into existence scientific psychology. In his famous laboratory at Leipzig were trained the great majority of the distinguished psychologists of the last generation. In his general psychological doctrine Wundt repudiated the older associationist psychology of the English school and built upon the theory of the apperceptive mass as the synthesizing function of the mind. His doctrine of creative synthesis was an advance over the mechanical theories of causation of the Spencerians. His conception of the heterogeneity of ends and of changing causes implied a constant shifting of psychic values. Finally, he departed from the mysticism which was prevailing in ethnic and social psychology by denying that there was any such thing as a folk-soul or a social mind apart from the minds of individuals in the group.

Wundt was a veritable walking-encyclopedia of the

<sup>284</sup> *Social Laws*, pp. 212-13. In closing this brief introduction to Tarde's system of thought it might be well to indicate his more important works not already mentioned. Tarde's reputation as a criminologist, which is fully as great as his fame as a sociologist, rests, aside from his actual work as a judge, upon his *La criminalité comparée* (1886, 2nd ed., 1890), *La philosophie pénale* (1st ed., 1890, 4th ed. translated by Howell, Boston, 1912—his greatest work in this field and one of the world's criminological classics), and *Études pénales et sociales* (1892). His system is applied to the interpretations of the problems of jurisprudence in *Les transformations du droit* (1893), to the problems of economics in *Psychologie économique* (2 vols., 1902), and, finally, his views on the field of political science are embodied in his *Les transformations du pouvoir* (1899). For the complete bibliography of Tarde's works, including his main contributions to periodical literature, see Davis, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-60. This list also gives, p. 260, the main commentaries and critiques dealing with Tarde's contributions to social science.

*Geisteswissenschaften*; his only and not very close rival here was Stanley Hall. He produced voluminous and substantial works on physiology, logic, ethics and general philosophy, as well as upon general, comparative and social psychology. His social psychology is embodied chiefly in his great ten volume work—the *Volkerpsychologie*, in which he contended that human culture could be studied most fruitfully in the four fields of language, myth, religion and custom. His psychological history of culture is contained in the smaller work, the *Elemente der Volkerpsychologie*.<sup>225</sup>

Wundt divides the history of human culture and *Zeitgeist* into four main stages: the period of primitive man; the period of totemism; the period of gods and heroes; and the period of humanity. By the period of primitive man Wundt meant truly primitive or early man with a more rudimentary culture than that possessed by any existing peoples, with a few dubious exceptions. Hence, his description of the psychology of primitive man is chiefly an exercise in psychological reconstruction, and it is probably the ablest effort along this line which has ever been executed. The totemic period is literally named, being based upon the assumption of universal gentile society and a totemic complex. In spite of the fact that Goldenweiser and others have proved certain of these basic assumptions to be unwarranted by the facts, the treatment of the kinship period is not lacking in remarkable psychological insight. The next period is characterized by the rise of the hero as the successor of the deified animal of the totemic period. The gods were produced largely as a result of conscious ratiocination. This age of heroes and gods is marked by great cultural progress and differentiation. The state, property, economic and social classes, and the conception of the individual emerge. Also religion begins to take on moral implications and interests. The period of humanity is intro-

<sup>225</sup> There is a good English translation by E. L. Schaub



duced by the rise and fall of great empires, and the subsequent development of a sense of mutual interdependence, humanity and brotherhood. In his conclusion there is something quite reminiscent of Comte, and his views were also shared to a considerable degree by Leuba. Whatever its defects in matters of detail, Wundt's scheme was clear and precise, and possessed no little pedagogical value and convenience, something which doubtless accounts for its wide popularity and acceptance.

### 3. *The Development of the Cultural Attack on Psychological Determinism in History.*

There has recently developed a line of analysis which, while making wide use of psychological data and not opposed to the psychological viewpoint, criticizes severely the stand of the psychological determinists. The exponents of this position may be called the cultural determinists. They contend that man and culture are the dynamic elements in history, and that no one phase of culture nor no one factor in human and social action can be regarded as adequate to explain cultural development as a whole. Only culture can explain and interpret cultural changes and advances. This view began to a slight degree with the older exponents of ethnic psychology, but has been advanced chiefly by the cultural anthropologists, most of whom have been professionally highly trained in psychology. While not ignoring the extremely important work of Wundt, Vierkandt, Lévy-Bruhl, Durkheim, Rivers and Marett, the movement has been primarily one of American scholars, and we shall limit our discussion to representative phases and stages of its development here.

The best statement of the American version of the older point of view in ethnic psychology is probably that contained in Daniel Garrison Brinton's *The Basis of Social Relations*. Brinton (1837-1899) was one of the ablest of the early American anthropologists who were comparable

in the development of the science to such European writers as Tylor, Lubbock, Spencer, Letourneau and Post. Calling attention to the previous work done in this field by Bastian, Waitz, Lazarus, Steinhil and others, Brinton remarked that "it is strange that not in any language has there been published a systematic treatise on Ethnic Psychology; strange because its students claim that it is the key to ethnology, the sure interpreter of history, and the only solid basis for constructive sociology."<sup>286</sup> In the work mentioned above Brinton aspired to supply this lacking treatise. Ethnic psychology he defined as that branch of the subject which treats of the mental phenomena which are found in the mass or group mind and not in the individual mind.

"Ethnic psychology deals with collections of facts, feelings, thoughts, and historic events, and seeks by comparison and analysis to discover their causal relations. It is wholly objective, and for that reason eminently a 'natural' science. The objective truths with which it deals are not primary but secondary mental products, as they are not attached to the individual but to the group . . . The ethnic *psyche* is made up of a number of experiences common to the mass, but not occurring in any one of its individual members. These experiences of the aggregate develop their own variations and modes of progress, and must be studied for themselves, without reference to the individual, holding the processes of the single mind as analogies only."<sup>287</sup> The general subject falls into two divisions, the "natural" and the "cultural" history of the ethnic mind. The former embraces "the consideration of those general doctrines of continuity and variation which hold true alike in matter and in mind, in the soul as in the body, and a review of the known forces which, acting through the physical structure and function upon the organs which are the vehicles of

<sup>286</sup> *The Basis of Social Relations*, Introduction, p vii, and pp. 15, 158.

<sup>287</sup> *Ibid*, pp xii-xiii

mental phenomena, weaken or strengthen the psychical activities." The latter is concerned with "a classification of all ethnologic data as the products of a few general concepts, universal to the human mind, but conditioned in their expressions by the natural history of each group."<sup>238</sup>

We cannot give space to a detailed consideration of Brinton's analysis of the genesis of the ethnic mind, but his chief theses may be briefly summarized. These are that there is a fundamental unity of the human mind both in time and geographical distribution, that the group mind is a reality, and that the individual mind is dominated by the group mind, which is the condition of all progress. The basic doctrine of Brinton with respect to the unity of the human mind is set forth in the following manner:

These two principles, or rather demonstrated truths,—the unity of the mind of man, and the substantial uniformity of its action under like conditions,—form the broad and secure foundation for Ethnic Psychology. They confirm the validity of its results and guarantee its methods

As there are conditions which are universal, such as the structure and functions of the body, its general relations to its surroundings, its needs and powers, these developed everywhere at first the like psychical activities, or mental expressions. They constitute what Bastian has happily called the "elementary ideas" of our species. In all races, over all continents, they present themselves with a wonderful sameness, which led the older students of man to the fallacious supposition that they must have been borrowed from some common centre.<sup>239</sup>

Nor are they easily obliterated under the stress of new experiences and changed conditions. With that tenacity of life which characterizes simple and primitive forms, they persist through periods of divergent and higher culture, hiding under venerable beliefs, emerging with fresh disguises, but easily detected as but repetitions of the dear primordial faiths of the race.<sup>240</sup>

That intellectual actions are governed by fixed laws was long ago said and demonstrated by Quetelet in his remarkable studies of vital statistics. That the development of thought proceeds "under the rule of an iron necessity" is the ripened conviction

<sup>238</sup> Brinton, *op cit*, pp. xiv-xv

<sup>239</sup> This older view has, of course, reappeared under the category of the diffusion of culture in the writings of Graebner, Elhot Smith and Rivers

<sup>240</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 20-21

of that profound student of man, Bastian. We must accept it as the verdict of science.<sup>241</sup>

The only significant variations in the culture and elementary ideas of mankind have been those which were the result of a different geographical and social environment. "Where such externals were alike, or nearly so, the progress was parallel; where unlike it was divergent; analogous in this to well-known doctrines of the biologist."<sup>242</sup>

While agreeing that it could not exist without the minds of the individuals in the group, Brinton was a firm believer in the reality of the group mind, and held that the phenomena of the group mind constituted the sole object of investigation for ethnic psychology:

This science of ours, ethnic psychology, has, in one sense, nothing to do with the individual. It does not start from his mind or thoughts but from the mind of the group, its laws are those of the group only, and in no wise true of the individual, it omits wide tracts of activities which belong to the individual and embraces others in which he has no share, to the extent that it does study him, it is solely in his relation to others, and not in the least for himself.

On the other hand, as the group is a generic concept only, it has no objective existence. It lives only in the individuals who compose it, and only by studying them singly can we reach any fact or principle which is true of them in the aggregate.

Yet it is almost as correct to maintain that the group is that which alone of the two is real. The closer we study the individual, the more do his alleged individualities cease, as such, and disappear in the general laws by virtue of which society exists, the less baggage does he prove to have which is really his own, the more do all his thoughts, traits, and features turn out to be those of others; so that, at last, he melts into the mass, and there is nothing left which he has a right to claim as his personal property. His pretended personal mind is the reflex of the group minds around him, as his body is in every fibre and cell the repetition of his species and race.<sup>243</sup>

The actual existence of the group mind can no more be denied than the constant inter-relation between it and the individual mind. It takes nothing from its reality that it exists only in in-

<sup>241</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15

<sup>242</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21

<sup>243</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 24-5

dividual wills. To deny it on that account, as Wundt admirably says, is as illogical as to deny the existence of a building because the single stones of which it is composed may be removed. Indeed, it might claim higher reality than the individual mind in that its will is more potent and can attain greater results by collective action.

Of course there is no metaphysical "substance" or mythological "being" behind the collective mind. That were a nonsensical notion. Nor is it in any sense a voluntary invention, created by contract for utilitarian ends. That were a gross misconception. It is the actual agreement and interaction of individuals resulting in mental modes, tendencies, and powers not belonging to any one member, and moving under laws developed by the requirements of this independent existence.<sup>244</sup>

While the individual is less important for ethnic psychology than the group he is not a negligible factor. It may be true that "he submits his will to the collective will, his consciousness to the collective consciousness. He accepts from the group the ideas, conclusions, and opinions common to it, and the motives of volition, such as customs and rules of conduct, which it collectively sanctions."<sup>245</sup> Nevertheless, individual initiative is the original source of all progress, and the most advanced peoples have been those who have allowed the freest play to individual initiative.<sup>246</sup> Rather the process of cultural development is one of mutual interaction between the individual and the group.<sup>247</sup>

The individual receives from the group the symbols for complex and general ideas—that is, the words of language, he is also taught many complex purposeful motions, such as are needed in social and cultured life, he is supplied with artificial objects for his use, as tools, clothing, shelter, etc., and he is constantly subjected to a certain amount of physical force from those around him—in other words, is "made to do" a variety of acts. The group may consciously strive to modify him, as in public education, religious instruction, and the like, or it may act merely negatively in opposing any developments antagonistic to its own character. The individual may work for or against the group, or for himself only,

<sup>244</sup> Brinton, *op cit*, p. 28, *cf.* W. McDougall, *The Group Mind*, pp. 27, 55 f., 66.

<sup>245</sup> Brinton, *op cit*, p. 27.

<sup>246</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 30-32.

<sup>247</sup> *Ibid*, p. 32.

but in either case has to reckon with the group for what he obtains from it.

Finally, Brinton at least feebly anticipated the present scientific viewpoint of Boas and his followers to the effect that there is no proved inherent biological or psychological superiority of any one race over another or of civilized over primitive man. He contends that "human groups have differed less in inherent psychical capacity than in stimuli and opportunities."<sup>248</sup> In conclusion, it may be said that Brinton's work is a strong and perhaps exaggerated statement of a basic element in modern anthropological science, namely, the unity of the human mind. Some of his associated doctrines as to the nature of geographical and psychological determinism, the relation of the individual to his group, and the content and development of culture have been greatly modified by the results of more recent anthropological research and formulation of doctrine.<sup>249</sup>

G. Stanley Hall, in his genetic psychology with its view of the analogy between the child and the savage mind, was naturally led into a consideration of folk-psychology. In chapter eighteen of his classic work on *Adolescence* he goes into a long discussion of the data and theories of ethnic psychology, and he always maintained a close contact with the progress of anthropological doctrine. Further, he founded the first department of anthropology in America, and maintained this department for years as an indispensable supplement to work in genetic psychology and pedagogy.

The most important contribution that the Clark group made to anthropology and folk-psychology was contained, however, in the work of Alexander Francis Chamberlain (1863-1914), who filled the chair of anthropology from the time of Professor Boas' resignation until his death in

<sup>248</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 158

<sup>249</sup> Professor Brinton was also widely known for his work *The Religion of Primitive Peoples*, which was based in large part upon his theory of ethnic psychology.

1914.<sup>250</sup> In two notable works on *The Child and Childhood in Folk-Thought* and *The Child: a Study in the Evolution of Man*, he presented the most thorough ethnographic study of childhood which has ever been attempted. Yet he did not agree with President Hall's biological orientation in psychology or admit the pedagogical soundness of the law of psychic recapitulation. Probably in part due to the influence of Professor Boas, of whom Chamberlain was the first American student, he regarded culture and primitive life as much more a matter for psychological analysis than for biological analogy. He was, however, even far more than Hall a believer in nature and the child as the ideal guides for conduct and education. Chamberlain also followed Boas in his belief that the differences between races and between primitive and civilized men were those which depended upon historical opportunity rather than upon inherent biological and psychological divergence.<sup>251</sup> As a specialist in anthropology Chamberlain was best known for his remarkable work in the bibliography of the subject and for his investigations in linguistics, which were both intensive, as in the case of his work on the Kootenay Indians, and extensive, as in his classification of the languages of the natives of South America.

Probably the greatest honor that Clark University can claim in the history of anthropology and folk-psychology is the fact that it offered the first academic position to the man who has by the volume, variety and scholarship of his work easily earned the first place among all modern anthropologists, Franz Boas. It can probably be said with entire accuracy that Boas has been the only anthropologist

<sup>250</sup> There is a good brief appreciation of the services of Professor Chamberlain to cultural anthropology and ethnic psychology in the *American Anthropologist*, Vol. XVI, 1914, pp. 337-48. It includes a complete bibliography of his writings. Testimonials from representative scholars are contained in the Clark University Memorial Publication, October, 1914.

<sup>251</sup> Cf. "The Contribution of the American Indian to Human Civilization," in *Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society*, 1903, pp. 91-126, and "The Contribution of the Negro to Human Civilization," in the *Journal of Race Development*, 1911, pp. 482-502.

who has completely mastered every field of anthropological study and has at the same time been the leader in introducing rigorous scientific methods into each division of the subject. Trained originally in Germany as a physicist, his first important scientific work was in anthropogeography as a student of the cultural influences of Arctic climate. Almost accidentally he was turned aside from a career as a professional psychologist and diverted into anthropology. Here he has distinguished himself as the director of the most fruitful concrete ethnographic investigation conducted in America, the *Jesup North Pacific Expedition*; as the founder of scientific primitive linguistics and as editor of the *Handbook of American Indian Languages*; as a physical anthropologist by his *Changes in the Form of Body of the Descendants of Immigrants*, and by his famous course on the races of Europe at Columbia University; and, above all, as the formulator of modern critical anthropological methodology through his work in statistical anthropometry, his insistence upon the true inductive method in arriving at anthropological generalizations, and his establishment of the historico-cultural method in approaching the problems of ethnology.<sup>252</sup>

Professor Boas has summarized most of his theoretical positions in his *Mind of Primitive Man*. He contends that there is no scientific proof for the current doctrine that cultural achievement measures mental ability, and maintains that cultural variations and differences are due to historic rather than biological causes, and that the white race is not scientifically proved to be the most gifted of the races psychologically and most highly developed biologically.<sup>253</sup> While admitting that the geographical environment may alter the bodily form of inhabitants, he contends that the manner or degree of modification is not certain and that there is no complete determination of culture by geographi-

<sup>252</sup> For a bibliography of Professor Boas' writings to 1906 see the *Boas Memorial Volume*, pp. 515 ff.

<sup>253</sup> *The Mind of Primitive Man*, pp. 1-29.



cal surroundings.<sup>254</sup> He supports the doctrine of the unity of the human mind and maintains that there is no marked difference between primitive and modern man as to the degree of endowment in the native mental faculties. The differences in culture are due to variations in opportunity for development.<sup>255</sup> He holds that there is no correlation between race, language and culture, thus completely disposing of the whole ground for the monstrosities of the Aryan myth and many other related or similar race prejudices.<sup>256</sup> Most important for cultural anthropology is his position that there is no universal or single key to the explanation of cultural parallelisms. Apparent similarities may have proceeded from quite different antecedents, and probably both independent development and diffusion must be recognized in the production of cultural parallelisms.<sup>257</sup> In studying the mental and cultural traits of primitive peoples care must be taken to enter as far as possible into the point of view of the savage and to interpret the particular cultural institution in its relation to the whole cultural complex of which it is an integral part.<sup>258</sup> In this way Professor Boas demolishes an imposing structure of errors erected by Spencer, Frazer, Letourneau and the classical anthropologists, and sets forth the sound principles upon which future ethnic psychology and cultural anthropology must build.

The two chief contributions of these doctrines of Chamberlain and Boas, which deny differences in mental potentiality and capacity between races and cultures, to political theory and practice are that political institutions are purely a product of cultural circumstances and not of biological or psychological advances, and that modern imperialism has been founded upon a false premise, in so far as it

<sup>254</sup> Boas, *op cit*, pp 30-75, 159-64

<sup>255</sup> *Ibid*, pp 95-123

<sup>256</sup> *Ibid*, pp 125-154

<sup>257</sup> *Ibid*, pp 155-196 Cf. "The Limitations of the Comparative Method of Anthropology," in *Science*, Vol IV, 1896, pp 901-8.

<sup>258</sup> *The Mind of Primitive Man*, pp 197-243.

assumes the superiority of the white races over others or of civilized man over primitive man in any other than a technological sense.

Many of Professor Boas' cardinal contributions to the newer critical anthropology and ethnic psychology have been further developed by his students and disciples, from whom we may select Wissler, Lowie, Goldenweiser and Kroeber. Dr. Clark Wissler has attacked the identification of anthropological method and data with the method and data of biology and has forcefully contended that culture is something which must be explained by history and psychology. While recognizing that the general intellectual impetus of Darwinism alone made anthropology possible, he holds that anthropology cannot accept the doctrine that "cultural phenomena are a part of, parallel to, or continuous with, biological phenomena."<sup>259</sup> Except for occasional mutations biological changes proceed in an orderly genetic manner and are sharply conditioned by preceding types. On the other hand, cultural development does not proceed in the logical sequence analogous to biological development, as Morgan once supposed. Because two contemporaneous peoples show apparent identity of culture in a certain aspect of the total cultural complex it cannot be safely assumed that the antecedents of these similarities were identical in both groups or that their subsequent development will be the same. Further, mere identity of certain phases of material culture in no way establishes the fact that the two groups have the same subjective interpretation of these similarities. In other words, the whole cultural problem in anthropology is primarily one for history and psychology to settle. The following is, perhaps, Dr. Wissler's most adequate summary of his position:<sup>260</sup>

<sup>259</sup> Clark Wissler, "The Doctrine of Evolution and Anthropology," in *Journal of Religious Psychology*, July 1913, pp 223-37

<sup>260</sup> *Ibid.*, pp 236-37 Cf "Psychological and Historical Interpretations for Culture," in *Science*, Vol 43, 1916, pp 193-201 Dr Wissler in his *American Indian* has contributed by far the best synthesis of the indigenous culture of

In general we may formulate our interpretation of the historical conception of anthropology by re-naming it the cultural point of view. Culture itself seems to be associated habit-complexes or constructs of the mind and not to be in any way innate or inborn, but to be an external affair, preserved and carried on entirely by learning or educating processes. Cultures develop and have an evolution of their own, but since they are not inherited they cannot be considered parts of a biological development. They are most assuredly facts of another order. Being products of the mind, the only limitations put upon them are to be sought in the mind itself, and since psychologists tell us that we have in the main only an associated cultural whole, resolvable into psychological elements, and since this in turn is only a matter of relation in time and attributes, we may reject the idea that cultures are predetermined or follow any design within the psychological limits imposed by life. If, then, there is an evolution of culture, it is to be conceived only in logical or psychological terms. There is, for example, a kind of genetic relationship between the flint chip and the razor, but it is a matter of invention and not of cell differentiation. Being a matter of invention, the genetic relationship becomes purely a matter of history, since we cannot foretell what the relationship is.

We have seen that there is a clear distinction between cultures on the one hand and the psycho-physical mechanisms that produce them on the other. The mechanisms are biological and are innate and constitute man's equipment for the production of cultures. Anthropology holds that the mechanism is general, in so far as it is not limited to any particular culture, and that it enables the individual to practice any culture he may meet, though not necessarily to equal degrees.

When we come to consider the biological theory of evolution, we find that it applies to the psycho-physical mechanism but not to culture. For cultures we must have another point of view or theory, and this in America at least is the historical or cultural conception. This conception is in general that cultural traits are the results of invention, a mental process, and their development or evolution is to be taken as a historical and psychological problem. In this cultural conception and all that it implies, anthropology has an insight into the phenomena of its chosen field, as vitalizing to it as Darwinism is to zoology.

The divergence from biological psychology and the evolutionary anthropology becomes still more marked in the work of Dr. Robert H. Lowie. Proclaiming that "culture is North America. His most thorough development of the cultural point of view is contained in his *Man and Culture*

the sole and exclusive subject-matter of ethnology," he will not admit that even psychology is adequate to solve the problems of ethnology. While granting that the psychologist can render much aid in helping to explain specific situations in which psychological factors are evidently present, he contends that only ethnology, the science of human culture, is capable of explaining and interpreting culture as a totality. The cultural complex is something *sui generis* and no science auxiliary to ethnology is equal to the task of its analysis: <sup>261</sup>

My conclusions as to the relation of psychology to culture are, accordingly, the following. The cultural facts, even in their subjective aspect, are not merged in psychological facts. They must not, indeed, contravene psychological principles, but the same applies to all other principles of the universe, culture cannot construct houses contrary to the laws of gravitation nor produce bread out of stones. But the principles of psychology are as incapable of accounting for the phenomena of culture as is gravitation to account for architectural styles. Over and above the interpretations given by psychology, there is an irreducible residuum of huge magnitude that calls for special treatment and by its very existence vindicates the *raison d'être* of ethnology. We need not eschew any help given by scientific psychology for the comprehension of specifically psychological components of cultural phenomena, but as no one dreams of saying that these phenomena are reduced to chemical principles when chemistry furnishes us with an analysis of Peruvian bronze implements, so no one can dare to assert that they are reduced to psychological principles when we call upon psychology to elucidate specific features of cultural complexes. The "capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society" constitute a distinct field of reality that must be the field of a distinct science autonomous with reference to psychology.

We cannot here go into any discussion of the leading problems of theoretical ethnology, but it should be mentioned in passing that Dr. Lowie's article on "The Principle of Convergence in Ethnology" <sup>262</sup> is one of the half-dozen

<sup>261</sup> *Culture and Ethnology*, pp. 25-6. Cf. "Psychology and Sociology," in *American Journal of Sociology*, 1915, pp. 217-29, and *Primitive Religion*, Chap. 1.

<sup>262</sup> *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, 1912, pp. 24-42.

cardinal contributions to modern ethnological method and synthesis. Its chief service is to provide a critical foundation for an analysis of cultural parallelisms by showing the necessity of establishing psychological as well as material identity before assuming parallelism as a fact. As a specialist in ethnology Dr. Lowie has been distinguished for his work on social organization. His *Primitive Society* is altogether the best synthesis of the newer evidence and completely displaces Morgan's antiquated treatise on *Ancient Society*. In his *Primitive Religion* he has more recently applied his critical principles to this field of early thought and action.

Dr. A. A. Goldenweiser has probably attacked a wider range of anthropological problems from the newer point of view than any other student of Professor Boas. His most significant work has been done in the study of religion. In his *Totemism, an Analytical Study*, he examined the current theories in the light of the concrete material available in Australian and Northwest Pacific Coast data, and found that none of the assumed criteria of the totemic complex were vindicated by the concrete evidence. He came to the conclusion that one could not accurately be more specific than to define totemism as "the tendency of definite social units to become associated with objects and symbols of emotional value."<sup>263</sup> He has further contributed much to the field of primitive religion by critical studies<sup>264</sup> and constructive formulations of doctrine.<sup>265</sup> In theory and methodology his article on "The Principle of Limited Possibilities in the Development of Culture" is one of the best statements of the newer critical historico-psychological position.<sup>266</sup> His best work on social organization, that dealing with the Iroquois, has not been published, but his article

<sup>263</sup> *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, April-June, 1910, p. 275

<sup>264</sup> *E.g.*, "Religion and Society," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, March 1, 1917

<sup>265</sup> *E.g.*, "Spirit, Mana, and the Religious Thrill," *Ibid.*, November 11, 1915.

<sup>266</sup> *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, July-September, 1913

on "The Social Organization of the Indians of North America" shows a wide knowledge of the literature and a firm grasp upon the results of recent investigation and conclusions.<sup>267</sup> In a critical article on "The Knowledge of Primitive Man" he contends that we have probably exaggerated the illogicality and irrationality of primitive thought and that "we may come to conceive of intellectual progress, from savagery to civilization, not as an evolution of mentality, but as a continuous accumulation of positive knowledge and a correlated advancement in the degree to which such knowledge determines thought" <sup>268</sup> Finally, he has attempted to work out a set of categories for social science from the psychological and ethnological point of view.<sup>269</sup>

Undoubtedly the most thoroughgoing and uncompromising attack upon conventional anthropology and ethnic psychology has been made by Professor Alfred L. Kroeber. In a brief and pointed manifesto entitled "Eighteen Professions" he offers in a series of propositions what almost amounts to a categorical denial of nearly every basic thesis of ethnic psychology, genetic psychology and classical or evolutionary anthropology.<sup>270</sup> His argument was still further elaborated in a lengthy article on "The Super-organic." <sup>271</sup> Agreeing with the point of view of Dr. Lowie that ethnology is a social science with culture as its chief object of investigation, he contends that neither biology nor psychology can solve the problems of cultural characteristics or transformations, that ethnology can in no way concern itself with differences in individual capacity, that the realm of the social and the cultural is *sui generis*—

<sup>267</sup> *Ibid.*, October-December, 1914

<sup>268</sup> *American Anthropologist*, April-June, 1915, pp. 240-44

<sup>269</sup> "History, Psychology and Culture: A Set of Categories for an Introduction to Social Science," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, October 10, 24, 1918. Much of his earlier work is brought together in synthetic fashion in his *Early Civilization*

<sup>270</sup> *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 17, 1915, pp. 283-88

<sup>271</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. 19, 1917, pp. 163-213

"not a link in any chain, nor a step in a path, but a leap into another plane,"—and that culture is "culturally determined."

Here, then, we have come to our conclusion; and here we rest. The mind and the body are but facets of the same organic material or activity, the social substance—or unsubstantial fabric, if one prefers the phrase,—the existence that we call civilization, transcends them utterly for all its being forever rooted in life. The processes of civilizational activity are almost unknown to us. The self-sufficient factors that govern their workings are unresolved. The forces and principles of mechanistic science can indeed analyse our civilization, but in so doing they destroy its essence, and leave us without understanding of the very thing which we seek. The historian as yet can do little but picture. He traces and he connects what seems far removed, he balances, he integrates, but he does not really explain, nor does he transmute phenomena into something else. His method is not science, but neither can the scientist deal with historical material and leave it civilization, nor anything resembling civilization, nor convert it wholly into concepts of life and leave nothing else to be done. What we all are able to do is to realize this gap, to be impressed by its abyss with reverence and humility, and to go our paths on its respective sides without self-deluding attempts to bridge the eternal chasm, or empty boasts that its span is achieved.<sup>272</sup>

The significance of the writings of the critical or analytical school of American cultural anthropologists or ethnologists for social and political theory lies chiefly in their demonstration of the inadequacy of either biology or psychology to serve as the sole instrument for interpreting culture and social institutions. While both may aid in this type of problems they are but auxiliary sciences, and only social science is competent to resolve social and cultural problems. Their work constitutes the most closely reasoned criticism of the older attempt to solve social and political problems by the use of biological formulæ and analogies and the more recent effort to find the key to social science in psychology. Yet, far from condemning the utilization of

<sup>272</sup> *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 19, 1917, pp. 212-13. His approach to cultural and historical problems is best illustrated in his *Anthropology*.

psychology, this school calls for a wider use of it, provided that its limitations are always realized.

The attack upon the comparative method in ethnic psychology has not been limited to Boas and the critical anthropologists. Professor John Dewey in a notable article on the "Interpretation of Savage Mind" sharply criticized the abuses of the comparative method as exemplified in the work of such a writer as Spencer. He complained that facts were torn from their context, that only unrelated facts of mind and no coherent scheme or pattern of mind could be discovered by this method, and that there was no possibility of a dynamic approach to the subject which would indicate the changes in mental patterns. He maintained that a genetic psychology of the mind must approach the subject with the aim of discovering the psychic patterns designed to meet the needs of different types of life and the elements which have led to the alteration of these patterns.<sup>273</sup>

The psychical attitudes and traits of the savage are more than stages through which mind has passed, leaving them behind. They are outgrowths which have entered decisively into further evolution, and as such form an integral part of the framework of present mental organization. Such positive significance is commonly attributed, in theory at least, to animal mind, but the mental structure of the savage, which presumably has even greater relevancy for genetic psychology, is strangely neglected . . .

Our standpoint must be more positive. We must recognize that mind has a pattern, a scheme of arrangement in its constituent elements, and that it is the business of a serious comparative psychology to exhibit these patterns, forms or types in detail. By such terms, I do not mean anything metaphysical, I mean to indicate the necessity of a conception such as is a commonplace with the zoologist. Terms like articulate or vertebrate, carnivore or herbivore, are "pattern" terms of the sort intended. They imply that an animal is something more than a random composite of isolated parts, made by taking an eye here, an ear there, a set of teeth somewhere else. They signify that the constituent elements are arranged in a certain way, that in being co-adapted to the dominant functions of the organism they are of necessity co-related

<sup>273</sup> *The Psychological Review*, May, 1902, pp. 217-220.



with one another. Genetic psychology of mind will advance only as it discovers and specifies generic forms or patterns of this sort in psychic morphology.

It is a method for the determination of such types that I wish to suggest in this paper. The biological point of view commits us to the conviction that mind, whatever else it may be, is at least an organ of service for the control of environment in relation to the ends of the life process.

If we search in any social group for the special functions to which mind is thus relative, occupations at once suggest themselves. Occupations determine the fundamental modes of activity, and hence control the formation and use of habits. These habits, in turn, are something more than practical and overt. "Apperceptive masses" and associational tracts of necessity conform to the dominant activities. The occupations determine the chief modes of satisfaction, the standards of success and failure. Hence they furnish the working classifications and definitions of value, they control the desire processes. Moreover, they decide the sets of objects and relations that are important, and thereby provide the content or material of attention, and the qualities that are interestingly significant. The directions given to mental life thereby extend to emotional and intellectual characteristics. So fundamental and pervasive is the group of occupational activities that it affords the scheme or pattern of the structural organization of mental traits. Occupations integrate special elements into a functioning whole.

Because the hunting life differs from, say, the agricultural, in the sort of satisfactions and ends it furnishes, in the objects to which it requires attention, in the problems it sets for reflection and deliberation, as well as in the psycho-physical coordination it stimulates and selects, we may well speak, and without metaphor, of the hunting psychosis or mental type. And so of the pastoral, the military, the trading, the manually productive (or manufacturing) occupations and so on.

Wilhelm Wundt might also well be included in this group of cultural determinists, as his psychological reconstruction of the history of man was built chiefly upon cultural assumptions and concepts. The general nature of his doctrines have been outlined above in connection with psychological theories of history. In this category would also certainly fall Durkheim's theoretical work; W. G. Sumner's *Folkways*; A. G. Keller's *Societal Evolution*; and Professor W. F. Ogburn's significant book, *Social Change*,

the first thoroughgoing development of the cultural point of view by a sociologist.

## II. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY.

### 1. *The Nature and Historical Background of the Psychological Interpretation of History.*

The essence of the psychological interpretation of history is the thesis that the determining factor in historical development is the collective psychology of an era and of a given cultural group. Its adherents rightfully claim that it is not only the most scientific but also the most all-inclusive of the various types of historical interpretation. It is the most scientific because it is now generally agreed that man functions as an active agent through his mental mechanism, and the most comprehensive because it takes into account every influence operating upon the group studied, which would in any way affect its psychic reactions. While broad in its scope, however, it is much more coherent and specific than a general history of events in that it has a definite orientation and organizing principle. While this interpretation is primarily socio-psychic, it gives due consideration to the part played by the dominating personalities in shaping the collective psychology and would even, in a complete form, attempt a psychological interpretation of these very personalities, in so far as such procedure is possible.

It is often held that the origin of the present day psychological interpretation of history is an offshoot or further development of the older subjective philosophies of history, which culminated in the grand, if fantastic, schemes like those of Hegel and the Romanticists, but it seems much more accurate to regard it as a product of the growth of modern science and civilization. The Deists brought forth the notion, in fundamental opposition to the depressing theological views of Augustine and Calvin, that man is

inherently decent and that his action is subject to natural laws, such as had been revealed by Newton and his fellow scientists. They held that man was both worth studying and possible to study. Another important prerequisite was the further development of experimental natural science, and particularly of psychology. Especially significant and stimulating was the new genetic psychology developed by G. Stanley Hall and J. Mark Baldwin, which emphasized the illuminating and useful analogy between the mental development of the individual and the race.

But individual psychology, important as it is, could not supply all that was needed to furnish the technique for the psychological interpretation of the historical processes; it was necessary to have a social psychology built upon the laws of individual psychology and sociology. For this the growth of modern industrialism was of the utmost significance. This brought with it an increase in the volume and rapidity of social and psychic contacts through the concentration of the population in the great industrial cities and through the development of the new means of communicating information. As a natural result of these antecedents there grew up in the latter half of the nineteenth century a science of collective or social psychology, which was foreshadowed by Lewes, Bagehot, Lazarus, and Steinhal, and was effectively cultivated by Wundt, Dilthey and Tonnies in Germany; by Fouillée, Guyau, Tarde, Durkheim, and Le Bon in France; by Sighele in Italy; by McDougall, Trotter, and Wallas in England; and by Giddings, Ross, Sumner, Cooley, Ellwood, Baldwin, Gault, Davis, Allport, Bernard, and Bogardus in America.<sup>274</sup>

While this new social psychology was primarily devoted to a general analysis of contemporary conditions or to forming a theoretical basis for systematic sociology, even these writers made some very significant contributions to

<sup>274</sup> See M. M. Davis, *Psychological Interpretations of Society*; and chapter by Kimball Young in H. E. Barnes (ed.), *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*.

the psychological interpretation of history. Dilthey's analysis of the relation of history to the sciences of the mind; Tarde's notion of the importance of imitation in the continuity of history; Durkheim's views on the significance of the crowd-psychological state in cultural and social development; Trotter's discussion of the operation of "herd-instinct"; Sumner's most suggestive analysis of the importance of the "folkways" and "mores"; and Ross' study of the psychic basis of social control, are among the best known of these valuable suggestions handed over from this field to aid the progressive historian. At about the same time that social psychology was being elaborated there was gradually developing a genetic view of history—the idea of the continuity of history, which is based upon the knowledge that our present cultural complex is primarily the product of a long inheritance from past conditions and that the present can be understood only when viewed in the light of its historical antecedents.<sup>275</sup> When this attitude towards history was accepted by a few of the more progressive students it was easy for them to comprehend that social psychology had put at their disposal exactly the methodology and point of attack which was necessary to interpret the significance of history and show how the modern age had come about. It seemed clear that if the collective psychology was an all-important factor in modern life, it should have had a great, if not equal, significance in all ages. The systematic following up of this clue has constituted essentially the psychological interpretation of history in so far as it has yet been developed.

There were, to be sure, some much earlier anticipations of this point of view. Voltaire had explained cultural differences as being due to the variation between the distinct genius of one people and that of another, but his view that this "genius" was essentially immutable was non-historical.

<sup>275</sup> This concept of the continuity of history was first systematically stated by Turgot in his Discourses at the Sorbonne in 1750. See Stephens, *Life and Writings of Turgot*, pp. 159 ff.

Turgot had set forth the notion of the continuity of history. The Romanticists, following Herder, had regarded civilization as the product of obscurely working creative 'psychic forces and had revelled in discussions of the *Weltgeist* and the *Zeitgeist*. Comte had set forth his very suggestive interpretation of the psychic evolution of mankind according to the three stages of intellectual development—the theological, the metaphysical and the positive or scientific. Burckhardt, Freytag, and Riehl in Germany, and Green in England emphasized the significance of the masses as opposed to the few conspicuous individuals. Taine had laid great stress upon the psychic *milieu* as a factor in cultural development, and Bagehot had presented his brilliant survey of political development from the custom-making age, through the period of the origin of states to the age of discussion. But none of these examples of a trend towards the psychological interpretation of history were based upon a sound comprehension of either genetic psychology or scientific history. The first systematic attempt to correlate history and psychology was the work of the distinguished Leipzig historian, Karl Lamprecht, who based his doctrines on the psychological achievements of the famous Leipzig psychologist, Wilhelm Wundt.

## 2. *Karl Lamprecht's Socio-Psychological Interpretation of History.*

Winning recognition as a historian by a voluminous monograph on the medieval economic history of the Rhine valley, Lamprecht, in 1891, began to publish his *Deutsche Geschichte* in which he illustrated his views on historical interpretation. From that time until his recent death he accompanied his systematic historical work by an unending controversy with the exponents of the older historical notions. In this debate he upheld his thesis that "history is a socio-psychological science" concerned primarily with the "social-psychic," as contrasted with the "individual-

psychic" factors which had been emphasized by the previous conventional narrative and biographical history. To him history was the collective psychology of the past rather than the collective biography, as had been the opinion of the typical historian who had generally followed Carlyle's views on historical causation, if, indeed, he believed in historical causation at all. Probably the best succinct statement of Lamprecht's principles is contained in the following summary by the eminent English historian John B. Bury: <sup>278</sup>

"Among the evolutionary attempts to subsume the course of history under general syntheses, perhaps the most important is that of Lamprecht, whose 'Kulturhistorische' attempt to discover and assign the determining causes German history exhibits the (indirect) influence of the Comtist school. It is based upon psychology, which, in his views, holds among the sciences of mind (*Geisteswissenschaften*) the same place (that of a *Grundwissenschaft*) which mechanics holds among the sciences of nature. History, by the same comparison, corresponds to biology, and, according to him, it can only become scientific if it is reduced to general concepts (*Begriffe*). Historical movements and events are of a psychological character, and Lamprecht conceives a given phase of civilization as 'a collective psychical condition (*seelischer Gesamtzustand*)' controlling the period, 'a diapason which penetrates all psychical phenomena and thereby all historical events of the time'. He has worked out a series of such phases, 'ages of changing psychical diapason,' in his *Deutsche Geschichte*, with the aim of showing that all the feelings and actions of each age can be explained by the diapason, and has attempted to prove that these diapasons are exhibited in other social developments, and are consequently not singular but typical. He maintains further that these ages succeed each other in a definite order, the principle being that the collective psychical development begins with the homogeneity of all the individual members of a society and, through heightened psychical activity, advances in the form of a continually increasing differentiation of the individuals (this is akin to the Spencerian formula). This process, evolving psychical freedom from psychical constraint,

<sup>278</sup> J. B. Bury, "Darwinism and History," in the volume entitled *Evolution in Modern Thought*, Boni and Liveright's *Modern Library*, pp. 260-62. Some critics, notably Bernheim, have held that Lamprecht derived his views directly from Comte, but Lamprecht denies any such dependence and maintains the complete originality of his scheme, while admitting its similarity to Comte's. See his *What is History?* (1904), p. 157, note.

exhibits a series of psychical phenomena which define successive periods of civilization. The process depends on two simple principles, that no idea can disappear without leaving behind it an effect or influence, and that all psychical life, whether in a person or in a society, means change, the acquisition of new mental contents. It follows that the new have to come to terms with the old, and this leads to a synthesis which determines the character of a new age. Hence the ages of civilization are defined as the 'highest concepts for subsuming without exception all psychical phenomena of the development of human societies, that is, of all historical events.' Lamprecht deduces the idea of a special historical science, which might be called 'historical ethnology,' dealing with the ages of civilization, and bearing the same relation to (descriptive or narrative) history as ethnology to ethnography. Such a science obviously corresponds to Comte's social dynamics, and the comparative method, on which Comte laid so much emphasis, is the principal instrument of Lamprecht."

Working from the above premises Lamprecht has outlined what he regards as the great stages in the socio-psychological development of western civilization. The earliest or the primitive stage he designates as the "symbolic." This was superseded in the early Middle Ages by the "typical," that period of differentiation which produced various distinct types of culture. The later medieval period was the age of the "conventional" in culture, social life, industry, art, and religion. This was followed by the period of "individualism" from the Renaissance through the *Aufklärung*, an epoch in which, in the Protestant portions of Europe, the individual might hold direct communion with God, and was everywhere distinguished by great individual works of genius in science, art, literature, commerce, and politics. Beginning with the Romantics and extending to the Industrial Revolution came the period of "subjectivism," characterized by the great emotional revolt against rationalism. The period since the Industrial Revolution is declared to be one of "nervous tension" in which mankind is still groping for a central ideal or a distinguishing socio-psychic principle.<sup>277</sup> Though these stages or epochs have

<sup>277</sup> Lamprecht, *What is History?* Lecture II.

been the organizing principle of his voluminous *German History*, Lamprecht maintains that they are typical of social evolution in general among all peoples that have developed to the level of modern civilization.<sup>278</sup>

While Lamprecht's original method of interpreting historical material involved him in a bitter controversy with the conventional political and episodal historians,<sup>279</sup> he has received remarkable support from the more progressive German historians and patrons of learning. He has been enabled to establish the remarkable *Institut für Universal Geschichte* at Leipzig and has trained and inspired a large number of promising followers. Georg Steinhäuser not only contributed many scholarly monographic studies on diverse phases of German cultural development, but, along with Walter Goetz, also founded in 1903 the *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, a periodical devoted to advancing the cause of Lamprecht's type of historical interpretation. Kurt Breysig, in his *Kulturgeschichte der Neuzeit*, has extended the new methods to a monumental attempt to trace in a unified and coherent form the cultural evolution of the western European world. Eberhard Gothein has ably defended the province, aims, and methods of the history of civilization and has himself made notable contributions to this field through monographs on the history of south Italian civilization and on the intellectual setting of the Renaissance. In addition to these writers, Lamprecht has exerted a deep influence upon many other European historians, as well as upon progressive historians in America, where, in 1904, he delivered in the form of a series of lectures his most extensive exposition and defense of his historical method and point of view.<sup>280</sup>

Besides these and many other unmentioned studies in

<sup>278</sup> *Ibid.*, Lectures IV-V

<sup>279</sup> See G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 589-93, and J. A. Goldfriedrich, *Die historische Ideenlehre in Deutschland*, pp. 431-65

<sup>280</sup> His *What is History?* delivered at the Congress of Arts and Sciences at St. Louis and at Columbia University



*Kulturgeschichte* which have been more or less intimately related to Lamprecht's influence, many writers in other countries have presented surveys of cultural development which have stressed the psychological element. Among the more notable of these are Guglielmo Ferrero's *Greatness and Decline of Rome*, Rafael Altamira's history of Spanish civilization, Alfred Rambaud's history of French civilization, Paul Milyoukov's survey of Russian cultural development, Charles Seignobos' general survey of the history of civilization, and the elaborate general history of civilization prepared by the venerable and scholarly Swiss bibliographer of St. Gall, Otto Henne-am-Rhyn.

### 3. *The Defects of Lamprecht's System and Methodology.*

All who welcome a new and more fundamental approach to historical problems must recognize the great value of the work of Lamprecht in boldly staking out a relatively new field, must agree that he was fundamentally right in maintaining that the chief task of historiography from this stage in its development onward should be to discover through a study of the past how the civilization of the present has come about, and will probably accede to his thesis that the most promising phase of historical research with this end in view is the study of the transformations in the collective psychology through the ages. Still, there is a very general trend among the more recent investigators in this field to doubt the complete validity of Lamprecht's specific interpretation of the course of history from the socio-psychological point of view. They feel that he was as much interested in trying to fit the facts of history into his original and suggestive scheme of historical development, which he had worked out in advance, as he was to discover how the present order of things has actually developed. The more critical converts to this new line of approach hold that the position of Lamprecht in the socio-psychological interpretation of history is highly comparable to that of

Lewis H. Morgan and the unilateral evolutionists in the development of cultural ethnology. This group set forth what must always be regarded as the basic principle of their science, namely, that it should be concerned with explaining the cultural repetitions and identities, which are evident to the student, and with formulating the laws of cultural development. But instead of waiting for necessary data to be gathered through a patient intensive study of various cultural areas, they formulated in advance, from very imperfect knowledge, schemes of orderly and sequential development of culture and institutions and adapted the facts of ethnography, wrenched from their context, to bolster up their particular near *a priori* systems of evolutionary development.

The more recent researches of Ehrenreich in Germany; Marett and Rivers in England; Durkheim and his school in France; and, above all, Boas and his disciples in America, have demolished these logical and pretentious, but wholly unscientific ethnological card-houses, have made it clear that only the most careful inductive study of ethnographic evidence will furnish the data upon which to base the laws of cultural development, and have rendered it equally certain that such investigation will demonstrate the futility of hoping to establish any simple unilateral evolutionary schemes of universal applicability.<sup>281</sup> The more critical workers in this field of historical interpretation believe that Lamprecht's work has suffered from this same fault. What Dr. Goldenweiser has said of Breysig's work will apply equally well to that of Lamprecht in its theoretical and methodological aspects: "In all such systems the discrepancies in the historical processes compared are never rated as theoretically on a par with the uniformities, nor as of equal significance. The discrepancies are either overlooked, thus involving a serious misrepresentation of the facts, or they are regarded as somehow less real or less

<sup>281</sup> See below Chap. iv

deep than the uniformities, or they are brushed aside as 'disturbing agencies.'"<sup>282</sup> As the work of Boas and his followers in the United States has marked the most effective attempt to reconstruct cultural ethnology on a scientific and inductive basis, so, with the psychological interpretation of history, the most significant development of the more objective and scientific approach to this subject has been associated with the work of Professor James Harvey Robinson of Columbia University, and with that of the followers whom he has attracted in this country to the study of "intellectual history."

#### 4. *James Harvey Robinson and the Development of Intellectual History.*

Professor Robinson accepts as the foundation of his approach to the study and interpretation of history Lamprecht's dictum that the historian should concern himself chiefly with discovering how the present has developed out of the past,<sup>283</sup> but he rejects absolutely the attempt to force the study and interpretation of the past into any such artificial and *a priori* scheme of cultural evolution as Lamprecht has devised. He would even reject as wholly unnatural and misleading, in view of the continuity of history, the conventional periodizing of the past as "ancient," "medieval," and so on, and will admit only a tentative division of intellectual development for pedagogical purposes into the: Primitive, Ancient, Hellenic, Patristic, Scholastic and its decline, the *Aufklärung*, and the Present age, since the industrial and scientific revolutions of the last century.<sup>284</sup> Believing with Lamprecht in the superior importance of the socio-psychic over the individual psychic, and being an extremely ardent exponent of the doctrine of

<sup>282</sup> A. A. Goldenweiser, "History, Psychology and Culture: A set of Categories for an Introduction to Social Science," in *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. XV, p. 589.

<sup>283</sup> James Harvey Robinson, *The New History*, pp. 62, 78, 102-3.

<sup>284</sup> J. H. Robinson, *Outline Syllabus of the History of the Western European Mind*, p. 35.

the continuity of history, he holds that the task of determining how the present world order has developed can best be solved by studying the changing attitudes of the intellectual classes from primitive times to the present day. By this he means not merely an investigation of the systematic philosophical systems of isolated thinkers, but of the prevailing intellectual orientation and outlook upon life, in the broadest sense of that term, which has existed in various successive epochs from the earliest times. Being wholly inductive and non-schematic, his method of approach makes possible an unlimited adaptation to any new developments in either psychology or history. It also recognizes much more freely and fully than Lamprecht the influence that great personalities may have had in shaping the socio-psychic trends.

As Professor Robinson makes clear, this notion is not a new one but was ably and distinctly stated by Francis Bacon, who, indeed, a century hence may be looked upon as quite as much the harbinger of the "New History" as of the new inductive scientific method. In the following citation Professor Robinson quotes this significant passage from Bacon and offers his own comments upon its value to the modern historical student:<sup>285</sup>

"Lord Bacon in his *Advancement of Learning*, says: 'No man hath propounded to himself the general *state of learning* to be described and represented from age to age, as many have done the works of nature and the State civil and ecclesiastical, without which the history of the world seemeth to me to be as a statue of Polyphemus with his eye out, that part being wanting which doth most show the spirit and life of the person. And yet I am not ignorant that in divers particular sciences, as of the juriconsuls, the mathematicians, the rhetoricians, the philosophers, there are set down some small memorials of the schools, authors, and books, and so likewise some barren relations touching the invention of arts or usages. But a just story of learning, containing the antiquities and originals of knowledges and their sects, their inventions, their traditions, their diverse administrations and managings, their flourishings, their oppositions, decays, depressions, oblivions, removes, with the causes and occasions of them, and all

<sup>285</sup> Robinson, *The New History*, pp 101-3

other events concerning learning, throughout the ages of the world, I may truly affirm to be wanting' Bacon's reproach is still merited, for no one has as yet, so far as I know, ever clearly conceived of a general history of the chief opinions of the intellectual class

"Yet what more vital has the past to teach us than the manner in which our convictions on large questions have arisen, developed and changed? We do not, assuredly, owe most of them to painful personal excogitation, but inherit them, along with the institutions and social habits of the land in which we live. The content of a well-stocked mind is the product of tens of thousands of years of accumulation. Many widespread notions could by no possibility have originated in modern times, but have arisen in conditions quite alien to those of the present. We have too often, in consequence, an outworn intellectual equipment for new and unheard-of tasks. Only a study of the vicissitudes of human opinion can make us fully aware of this and enable us to readjust our views so as to adapt them to our present environment. If it be true that opinion tends, in the dynamic age in which we live, to lag far behind our changing environment, how can we better discover the anachronisms in our views and in our attitude toward the world than by studying their origin? Is not Bacon right in accusing the historian of presenting us with an image of the past without its great cyclopean eye, which alone reveals its spirit and life?"

More than being merely the field of historical activity which seems far better adapted than any other to interpreting the significance of the past for an understanding of the present, intellectual history has a far richer and more extensive body of data than any other type. The volume of written records describing what man has been thinking of, or has avowed that he has been thinking of from the earliest times, exceeds beyond comparison the amount of historical information which has been preserved in any other field. Of the lives of the greatest figures in the history of culture and thought it frequently happens that little or nothing is known, while many volumes of their thoughts have been preserved. Further, intellectual history not only has at its disposal a vastly greater and more varied assortment of sources than any other branch of history but also, unlike that for any other phase of the subject, almost all of this information is of a sort which can be made use of with

confidence by the historian. In an attempt to reconstruct the political history of the past, for example, the general tendency of a generation or an age to exaggerate, lie, distort accounts, ignore vital events in contemporary political life, or attribute political or military success or failure to miraculous causes would render the writings of such an age of almost no value to the political historian, while to the historian of the intellectual reactions of humanity it would have a high degree of value, for, as Seignobos has expressed it, "the psychological fact" exists unimpaired. The very prevalence of allegory, miracle-mongering, forgery, or general distortion of fact would constitute a situation of the utmost interest and importance for the historian of the psychological development of the race.

Though this original and suggestive point of view, with its great emphasis upon the psychic factors in historical development, has gained no general acceptance among the conventional historians, its promise for the future can be gathered from the immense interest which Professor Robinson's lectures on the history of the intellectual class have aroused in recent years at Columbia University and the enthusiastic following he has developed among the younger and more progressive historians in this country.

In even the earlier editions of his syllabus for this famous Columbia course, Professor Robinson promised a comprehensive manual to cover the field of intellectual history. This has long been awaited by his students and disciples, and *The Mind in the Making*, delivered originally as the Kennedy Lectures before the New York School of Social Work, is to be regarded as the first preliminary effort at fulfilling this promise. As an intellectual history of Europe the volume is pathetically inadequate, but as an effort to present the leading generalizations which might be drawn from a long and assiduous cultivation of the field of intellectual history the book is nothing short of a magnificent achievement. Indeed, it is the calm and deliberate

judgment of the writer that no other book by an historian can be said to equal this one as a presentation of the more significant generalizations of history for the use of thoughtful citizens. From this standpoint Wells' *Outline of History* becomes insignificant and sophomoric by comparison. As a withering attack upon the conventional utilization of history to justify anachronisms in our own civilization the book is both unrivaled and invaluable.

The material in the book is arranged according to the consideration of the following topics: the futility of past efforts at reform because of an ignorance of the mechanisms of the human mind; the chief types of thinking, with special reference to the contrast between secondary rationalization and creative thought; the development of the human mind in its thought content from the animal stage to that manifested in contemporary civilization; the indictment of the capitalistic-nationalistic-pietistic "acquisitive society" of the present day, and an analysis of the bearing of a review of the genesis of the modes of human thought upon the problem of social reform in its widest implications. Throughout the book there is always evident an effort to show the relation of the facts of psychology and history to the present and future of human society. Yet there is no attempt to advocate any special type of reform measure. Indeed, so great is the detachment from propaganda that one eminent reviewer of the book has accused Professor Robinson of playing the rôle of Achilles in his tent.

The significant message of Professor Robinson's volume may be epitomized in the following manner. The basic need of today is to bring our thinking in the field of the social sciences up to the same level of scientific objectivity that now prevails in the realm of the natural sciences. Mankind has experimented unsuccessfully with three methods of reform, namely, tinkering up social machinery, moral uplift, and education through inculcation of "the collective wisdom of the past." We can understand why these have

failed only by an investigation of the prevailing modes of thought, their genesis and method of operation. We tend to respect and remain satisfied with the so-called "wisdom of the ages," though every forward step taken by the race has been in defiance of this moss-embellished sagacity. This we do because most of our thinking is derived from a subconscious level, where instinct, habit and tradition dominate. Most of our "basic principles" of conduct are but secondary rationalizations of habitual reactions. Our only escape is through the stimulation of creative thought, based upon the experimental and pragmatic method. Yet creative thought is obstructed on every hand by many forces, the variety and potency of which can only be understood after a review of the history of the chief stages in the formation of our present mental content and psychic operations. These stages are those of the genesis of our animal mind, the development of our savage mind, and the formation of our traditional civilized mind. Man's long period of existence as an animal developed in him the variety of instinctive reactions which he possesses, the method of learning by trial and error, and a certain docility and intellectual inertia. The period of human savagery was far longer than that of civilization, and has left its indelible impress upon our modes of thinking. It generated our animistic and mystical tendencies, our strange deference to authority, and our unbelievable conservatism. Most of the basic elements in our religious and ethical beliefs date from this stage of human psychogenesis. Taboos, ideas of "principle," symbolism, notions of the "sacred," and dream logic are some of the more conspicuously powerful vestiges of savage thought which still remain to plague our civilized age.

The background for the emergence of a civilized mind was provided by the Egyptians, who invented writing and many practical arts, by the Babylonians, who excelled in commercial life and in astrology; and by the Hebrews, who



developed to an unusually high degree the religious views they had drawn from a primitive era. Working on these and additional data the Greeks first evolved creative thought. "They discovered skepticism in the higher and proper significance of the word, and this was their supreme contribution to human thought." But the Greek intellectual life tended towards metaphysical abstractions and away from experimental and applied science. When the possibilities of metaphysics were exhausted, Greek thought inevitably entered into a period of stagnation and decay. The mediæval age brought with it intellectual reversion and deterioration. Christianity, aided by neo-Platonism and the Oriental mystery cults, substituted faith and emotion for reason and critical thought. A definite theory of creation, life and ultimate destiny was elaborated into a divinely authoritative epic, belief in which was enforced by the powerful Roman Catholic Church. Man was significant only as the possessor of an immortal soul to be saved from eternal torment. The monks and Augustine introduced and established in European intellectual and ethical tradition that impurity complex which, with additional impulses from Protestant Puritanism, has served to prevent any scientific consideration of the problem of sex, right down to our own day. An extensive system of secondary rationalization, supplying an elaborate and sophisticated explanation and justification of these primitive reactions on metaphysical grounds, was provided by the Scholastic philosophy, which culminated in Aquinas. The mediæval age added little or nothing of a progressive nature to the thought of the Greeks, but rather revived primitive supernaturalism and a vast mass of crude superstitions which have survived to obstruct the critical and scientific thought of the modern age.

Our modern civilization has been an outgrowth of a totally new type of thinking, which was partially foreseen by Roger Bacon and definitely heralded by Francis Bacon

—critical thought and experimental science. This was on all points opposed to the dialectical method of the Greeks and Scholastics, and has proceeded on the notion that "nature is more subtle than any argument." Though opposed by the Church and long by professional scholars, it has triumphed and made possible an entirely new material world through its applications to industry. Yet the great potential benefits of modern applied science have been but very partially and imperfectly realized, owing to the lack of adequate development of moral and social control over the new technique, which is in danger of developing into a Frankenstein monster. The two chief obstacles to a proper socialization of modern applied science are the profit-making objective of all modern economic life, and modern nationalistic patriotism, which diverts so much human energy and wealth into processes of mutual destruction. But those in control of modern civilization believe that they stand to gain by the modern theory of business enterprise and by unreasoning patriotism. Hence, they oppose all efforts at reform under a mass of secondary rationalizations known collectively as "the philosophy of safety and sanity." The challenge of the world war to the old social order increased the activity of its guardians, and we have had as a result the Palmer inquisition, the "Lusking" of New York State, and the "law and order myth" associated with Governor Coolidge of Massachusetts. Yet, if history proves anything, it is that excessive repression of progressive tendencies is as ill advised on the part of the vested interests as it is detrimental to society at large. Stupidly thorough repression merely postpones change, makes it violent and expensive, and costs the vested interests more dearly in the end. Conservatism is partially a savage and primitive trait and partially a sort of collective neurosis through which mechanism the guardians of the existing order seek to avoid facing the dynamic social realities of the present day.

Without bravely facing these realities which demonstrate the "sickness of the modern acquisitive society," however, we cannot hope to improve our social order. With the gradual elimination of the belief in the providential nature of social causation and supernatural interference with human institutions, we have come more and more to see that our civilization will be neither better nor worse than we will that it shall be, that man holds his destiny in his own hands. Until the leaders in modern society fully recognize this fact and intelligently accept the responsibility which this carries with it the "race between education and catastrophe" will continue, with the odds wholly favoring catastrophe.

Professor Robinson's book is an eloquent appeal to social initiative, but one feels that it will be read only by a small minority of the population and appreciated only by a small percentage of those who read it. In the meantime the custodians of the modern order and the masses who support them will continue to trust in "the tried wisdom of the ages," the "findings of mankind," "the sturdy virtues of manhood and womanhood," "the sagacity of the Fathers," the "hard sense and practical shrewdness of the modern business man," and "the adroitness and astuteness of the modern politician and diplomat." The outlook is not entirely encouraging or wholly conducive to optimism, and Professor Robinson's book is a convincing demonstration that one can derive little assurance or comfort amidst the novel and diverse problems of the modern age from the perennial conservative rejoinder that somehow things have always come out all right in the past, in spite of the calamity howlers of earlier ages.

Professor Robinson's second book is the logical sequel to *The Mind in the Making*. In the earlier work he traced the evolution of our contemporary modes of thinking, indicating the historical basis for the mental patterns of contemporaries, so far separated as Calvin Coolidge and

William J. Bryan, on the one hand, and John Dewey and Thorstein Veblen, on the other. Some critics felt, however, that he had left his task incomplete, as he had not offered any very definite suggestions as to how we might escape from the stupidities which encompass us in "Lusking, Sumnerizing and Ku Kluxing." The *Humanizing of Knowledge* is the answer to this challenge.

Professor Robinson's argument may be briefly summarized about as follows. There has been a general indifference to the scientific point of view through the ages, so that even today the more intelligent citizens are still dominated in their thinking by the attitudes and methods of the mystic, poet, rhetorician or shaman. The revolutionary scientific advances of the last three hundred years have, in their deeper implications, scarcely affected the thinking of mankind at large. This has been due in the main to the fact that science has tended to develop in an esoteric and detached fashion, in part necessitated by the need for self-protection. It has also tended towards excessive specialization and departmentalization, which has often resulted in amazing ignorance on the part of scientists of material outside of their own subjects, and in such abstruseness in scientific writing that even the average college graduate who is not a specialist could find little which is intelligible in such works. The great need of the future is not to render less effective and notable scientific specialization, research, and discovery, but to accompany this process by an intelligent and persistent effort to make available for the intellectual class the general implications of scientific discovery in every field, and to produce something like a general tendency towards critical and "reflective thinking." Eventually this may possibly be achieved by a rational integration and reconstruction of our educational institutions and curricula, but for the time being it may be most effectively advanced by the compilation of books of sufficient clarity and brevity to commend themselves to the intelligent gen-

eral reader. The alacrity with which this class took up Mr. Wells' *Outline of History* indicates that readers would not be lacking for competent books of this sort and offers some hope that if enough such books were available many of those now on the side of Mr. Bryan would come to line up behind men like Professor Robinson. Until something like the same degree of objectivity can be produced in the social sciences that exists today in natural science, we are likely to continue with our common-sense and rule-of-thumb methods in economics, politics, and modes of social conduct, a procedure which is becoming yearly more dangerous and menacing with the increasing complexity of modern life. If this is an impossible aspiration, then the "jig is up" with the human race. The following citations sum up fairly adequately his thesis and positive program:<sup>286</sup>

Modern scientific research, in spite of its professed aloofness and disregard of human feelings and motives, has succeeded in unfolding to our gaze so new a world in its origin, development, workings and possibilities of control in the interests of human welfare, that practically all of the older poetic and religious ideas have to be fundamentally revised or reinterpreted.

Scientific knowledge, ingeniously applied and utilized by inventors and engineers, has, with the assistance of business men and financiers, metamorphosed our environment and our relations with our fellow men.

Lastly, our notions of our own nature are being so altered that should we discreetly apply our increasing knowledge of the workings of the mind and the feelings, a far more successful technique might finally emerge for the regulation of the emotions than any that has hitherto been suggested. This is at least an exhilarating hope.

Now if all this be true we are forced to ask whether it is safe, since our life has come to be so profoundly affected by and dependent on scientific knowledge, to permit the great mass of mankind and their leaders and teachers to continue to operate on the basis of presuppositions and prejudices which owe their respectability and currency to their great age and uncritical character, and which fail to correspond with real things and actual operations as they are coming to be understood.

<sup>286</sup> *The Humanizing of Knowledge*, pp. 40-42, 69, 83, 90-92.

A great part of our beliefs about man's nature and the rightness or wrongness of his acts, date from a time when far less was known of the universe and far different were the conditions and problems of life from those of today.

Do we not urgently need a new type of wonderer and pointer-out, whose curiosity shall be excited by this strange and perturbing emergency in which we find ourselves, and who shall set himself to discover and indicate to his busy and timid fellow creatures a possible way out? Otherwise how is a race so indifferent and even hostile to scientific and historical knowledge of the preciser sort—so susceptible to beliefs that make other and more potent appeals than truth—to be reconciled to stronger drafts of medicinal information which their disease demands but their palates reject? . . .

We should have a dynamic education to fit a dynamic world. The world should not be presented to students as happily standardized but as urgently demanding readjustment. How are they to be more intelligent than their predecessors if they are trained to an utterly unscientific confidence in ancient notions, let us say of religion, race, heredity and sex, now being so fundamentally revised. . . .

The problem has apparently two phases. One, how is human knowledge to be so ordered and presented in school and college as to produce permanent effects and an attitude of mind appropriate to our time and its perplexities, the other, how is knowledge to be popularized and spread abroad among adults who have become dissatisfied with what they know and are eager to learn more. . . .

We need, therefore, a new class of writers and teachers, of which there are already some examples, who are fully aware of what has been said here and who see that the dissipation of knowledge should be offset by an integration, novel and ingenious, and necessarily tentative and provisional. They should undertake the conscious adventure of humanizing knowledge. There are minds of the requisite temper, training and literary tact. They must be hunted out, encouraged and brought together in an effective if informal conspiracy to promote the diffusion of the best knowledge we have of man and his world. They should have been researchers at some period of their lives, and should continue to be researchers in another sense. Their efforts would no longer be confined to increasing knowledge in detail but in seeking to discover new patterns of what is already known or in the way to get known.

They should be re-assorters, selectors, combiners and illuminators. They should have a passion for diffusing, by divesting knowledge as far as possible of its abstract and professional character. At present there is a woeful ignorance even among persons who pass for intelligent, earnest and well read, in regard to highly

important matters that are perfectly susceptible of clear general statement.

The re-assorters and humanizers should combine a knowledge of the exigencies of scientific research with a philosophic outlook, human sympathy, and a species of missionary ardor. Each of them should have professional familiarity with some special field of knowledge, but this should have come to seem to him but a subordinate feature of the magnificent scientific landscape

Opinions will naturally differ as to the feasibility and practicality of Professor Robinson's scheme, but it is the writer's firm conviction that there is no other promising or possible way out of our present intolerable and perplexing impasse, though of course the writing of clear books setting forth the new knowledge is but a phase of the program, which would need to be supplemented by such effective assaults upon the conventionally accepted standards as are being launched by Shaw and Mr. Mencken and his followers, and such fact-finding and disseminating organizations as are suggested by Mr. Lippmann in his *Public Opinion*.

Two prevailing misconceptions concerning Professor Robinson's plan need, perhaps, to be dissipated. One is the notion that he hopes to make all of this new scientific knowledge available to the masses, so that the day-laborer with an I. Q. of 70 will divide his time at lunch between a ham sandwich, a clay pipe, a clarified version of Bergson and an edition of Einstein made easy. Nothing could be further from his meaning or intention. What he does feel is that by such means as he indicates the leaders of present day society: bankers, physicians, merchants, lawyers, and, indeed, most college professors, may come to possess a fairly well integrated intelligence and body of information, which would bring their concepts and attitudes out of the pre-Victorian era into the twentieth century. It is the opinions of such that are of directive significance and most need reconstruction. The average elder in the First Baptist Church of Podunk may safely be trusted to continue to be-

lieve in the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch and the necessity and beneficence of the protective tariff. But even the laboring-classes need not remain in quite the same abysmal ignorance of the newer knowledge, as is evidenced by the literary tastes and consumption of the English laborers. The second mistake consists in the absurd notion that Professor Robinson would debase scientific effort by introducing into it the prejudices of the average man on the street. He would be the furthest of all men from any such proposal. To him the *humanizing* of science is not the injection of the frailties and prejudices of the average *homo sapiens* into the laboratory, but the attempt to put at the disposal of the largest possible number the revolutionary discoveries of the laboratory scientist who keeps himself as free as he may from every kind of human bias and disturbing interest.

Though Professor Robinson has not himself as yet produced his *magnum opus* he has guided and inspired many students who have ranged over the whole history of human thought. Among the studies which owe much to his initiative and suggestions are Preserved Smith's *History of Christian Theopagy*, J. W. Swain's *Hellenic Origins of Christian Asceticism*, J. T. Shotwell's *Studies in the History of the Eucharist*, Lynn Thorndike's brief preliminary history of European magic, and his monumental *History of Magic and Experimental Science in the First Thirteen Centuries of Our Era*, E. Brehaut's analysis of the thought of Isidore of Seville, Miss Loomis' survey of the development of medieval humanism, Preserved Smith's remarkable biography of Erasmus, and his diverse and profound studies in the culture of the Reformation period, Miss Stimson's sketch of the triumph of the Copernican system, A. J. Klein's account of Elizabethan intolerance, Miss E. P. Smith's as yet unpublished work on the development of free thought in England, Howard Robinson's interesting analysis of the reaction to the great comet of 1680, Miss



Ornstein's history of the rise of the Scientific Societies, Max Cushing's summary of the thought of Holbach and his disciples, and J. H. Randall, Jr.'s, general survey of the intellectual history of Western Europe.

Though few historians have consciously capitulated to Professor Robinson's forceful plea for intellectual history, and though there are but few courses offered in American universities which have been consciously based upon imitation of his famous Columbia course, yet there has been an enormous amount of excellent work done on various phases of the history of thought, and when historians finally awaken to the fertility and practical value of the cultivation of intellectual history, they will find at their disposal a great mass of illuminating material which is in itself the best possible vindication of the importance of this type of historical work.

Only a few of the more notable works in this field can be mentioned here. From Great Britain have come the researches in primitive thought by E. B. Tylor, J. G. Frazer, W. H. R. Rivers and F. C. Bartlett; the works of J. P. Mahaffy, Gilbert Murray, Jane Harrison, and Samuel Dill on classical thought; Rashdall's study of the medieval university; R. L. Poole's brilliant excursion into medieval thought; W. E. H. Lecky's precocious but brilliant analysis of the development of rationalism in modern times; John Morley's comprehensive appreciation of the writings of the 18th century rationalists in France; Leslie Stephen's monumental survey of English thought in the 18th and 19th centuries; A. W. Benn's history of modern English rationalism; J. T. Merz's massive and scholarly exposition of the progress of European science and thought during the last century; the brilliant and courageous attacks upon obscurantism which have been produced by Karl Pearson, J. B. Bury, J. M. Robertson, Joseph McCabe, T. H. Huxley, and Edward Clodd; the enduring contributions of Ernest Bar-

ker, F. W. Maitland, J. N. Figgis, G. P. Gooch, A. J. Carlyle, W. Graham, D. G. Ritchie, Frederick Pollock, H. J. Laski, G. D. H. Cole, and Thomas Kirkup to the history of political theory; the studies in the evolution of economic thought by W. J. Ashley, James Bonar, Edward Cannan, J. K. Ingram, and Henry Higgs; the surveys of historiography by J. B. Bury, James Gairdner, Lord Acton, and G. P. Gooch; the investigations of the history of science by Karl Pearson, A. E. Shipley, W. C. D. Whetham, C. Singer, Ray Lankester, and J. A. Thomson; the history of legal ideas by James Bryce, Frederick Pollock, Edward Jenks, and F. W. Maitland, the surveys of the development of religious thought by E. B. Tylor, J. G. Frazer, R. R. Marett, Robertson Smith, Jane Harrison, L. R. Farnell, Warde Fowler, T. R. Glover, F. C. Conybeare, H. B. Workman, J. E. Carpenter, and C. Beard; the histories of scholarship by Mark Pattison, J. E. Sandys and others; and the studies in the history of æsthetics by J. A. Symonds, John Ruskin, J. P. Mahaffy, and Gilbert Murray.

Germany has contributed the work of Wundt, Vierkandt and Preuss on primitive thought; the monumental studies of Eduard Zeller, Ulrich Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, and Theodor Gomperz on the history of Greek thought; the brilliant and original work of Wilhelm Dilthey and Wilhelm Windelband on the history of philosophy; W. Wundt's schematic survey of the development of culture from a socio-psychological point of view; the works of Rhode, E. Aust, G. Wissowa, Adolph Harnack, Karl Hase, and Ernst Troeltsch on the development of religious thought; the monumental treatments of the history of law and politico-legal theories by Otto Gierke, H. Brunner, R. Ihering, and J. Kohler; the studies of historiography by F. Wegele, E. Bernheim, and G. Wolf; the histories of sociological thought by Paul Barth and Ludwig Stein; the investigation of the history of science by E. Du Bois-Reymond, E. Mach,

W. Ostwald, and F. Dannemann; and the studies in the history of æsthetics by Burckhardt, Gervinus, Gregorovius, Woltmann, and Lübke.

France is represented in this field by the various monographic studies of the development of thought by L. Lévy-Bruhl; the brilliant contributions of Durkheim and his school to many phases of intellectual history; the encyclopedic publications of Solomon Reinach on every phase of the history of culture; J. Delvaillé's monumental work on the history of the concept of human progress; the works of A. Franck, E. Faguet, and Paul Janet on the history of political theory; Gide and Rist's notable survey, of recent economic and social theory; the contributions of Hubert and Mauss, A. Bouché-Leclercq, G. Boissier, E. Renan, L. Duchesne, A. Loisy and E. Chénon to the development of religious thought; the studies in the history of science by Émile Boutroux, Gaston Milhaud, P. Duhem, and P. Tannery; and the work in the field of the history of æsthetics by Renan, Sainte-Beuve, Taine, Faguet and Reinach. Italy has been honored by the contributions of Benedetto Croce to the history of thought. The Scandinavian nations have produced able students in this field such as Harald Høffding and Georg Brandes. Belgium is well represented by the contributions of George Sarton to the history of science, of Franz Cumont to the history of religion, of M. De Wulf and others to the history of philosophy, and of G. De Greef to the history of sociological and political thought.

In America the field of intellectual history was earliest cultivated by John W. Draper, whose works have long since become antiquated. Draper was followed by Andrew D. White, whose vigorous assault upon obscurantism was the most powerful influence in bringing the educated American public into proper orientation with the progress of modern science, thought, and criticism in nearly every field. Henry Osborn Taylor has produced a scholarly survey of European thought through the close of the Middle

Ages. Very important work has more recently been done in this field by Lynn Thorndike and C. H. Haskins. Professor G. L. Burr has devoted himself to a study of the history of superstition and the growth of toleration. Professors Dunning, Merriam, Gettell, Willoughby, and Scherger have done notable work in the field of the history of political theory. Professors W. C. Abbott and W. R. Shepherd have investigated the reaction of the expansion of Europe on European thought and culture. C. H. Toy, G. F. Moore, M. Jastrow, J. H. Breasted, R. W. Rogers, C. H. Moore, J. B. Carter, G. Fisher, G. S. Hall, N. Schmidt, H. C. Lea, A. C. McGiffert, E. C. Moore, and E. W. Hopkins have studied diverse phases of the development of religious thought. Lynn Thorndike, W. T. Sedgwick, F. Cajori, L. Karpinski, D. E. Smith, C. H. Haskins, W. C. Locy, H. Crew, and W. Libby have dealt with the history of science. Roscoe Pound has shown the relation of the history of law to the general development of ideas. Finally, the history of æsthetics has been investigated by Charles Elhot Norton, Emily James Putnam, and Ralph Adams Cram. This vast mass of highly scholarly analysis of all phases and periods of intellectual history, together with the great volume of original sources bearing upon this subject, present to the progressive historian a field for productive work which is indeed inviting.

#### 5. *Modern Dynamic Psychology and the Interpretation of History.*

##### **A. Dynamic Psychology and Historical Biography.**

We may conclude this long discussion of the interrelation of psychology and history by a preliminary and highly tentative appraisal and illustration of the significance of the new or dynamic psychology for the historian. We shall first consider its bearing upon historical biography, and then its possible utility in explaining broader group and cultural problems.

Historical biography may be of two types, the purely narrative and descriptive which confines itself to concrete acts and events and makes no attempt to assign or explain motives and causes, and the interpretative which endeavors to indicate the relation of an individual to his physical and social environment, to illustrate the interplay of cause and effect, and to discover the motives for acts and attitudes. The first type is relatively simple and calls only for adequate historical source-material and some constructive literary capacity on the part of the author. The second form is a far more perplexing and complicated task. It not only demands all the information and creative ability required for narrative biography, but also an understanding of the sociological basis of human conduct and the psychology of human motives, and a rare power of balanced synthesis. It so happens, of course, that the technical foundations of such knowledge have but recently been provided, and in only a tentative and incomplete manner. Further, even when an author possesses this rare equipment, he frequently finds that the information upon which such an analysis must be based is largely lacking and that only insupportable conjecture could emerge from the utilization of such as exists.

Consequently, it is quite apparent that, whatever its literary, rhetorical, and æsthetic virtues, the interpretative historical biography prior to the development of sociology and dynamic psychology could possess but little validity. If accuracy was attained it could have been solely a result of chance and accident and could not have been due to any scientific knowledge or acumen. In general, the literary biographers of the past possessed no technical knowledge of psychology at all. Indeed, down to the last generation there was no valid psychology for them to master and exploit. As a rule such writers had to content themselves with a projection of their own rationalized complexes into the personality of the subject of their biographical activity. As a matter of fact they knew little or nothing of their own

basic drives and motives, for as Professors Robinson and Ogburn, to say nothing of the clinical psychologists, have recently shown, the human mind has unlimited capacity for the obscuration and rationalization of facts concerning motives and desires not unqualifiedly approved by the individual or his group. But had a writer been able to penetrate clearly into the innermost recesses of his own psyche this would not have afforded him any reliable key to the personality of another. The tendency of conscious expression, which makes up the greater part of written or spoken records, is towards the displacement, rationalization, projection, symbolizing or otherwise disguising of the real dynamic motives and impulses in the unconscious. Thus, the motives or reasons assigned for his particular act or policy, by the most honest and reliable individual may be, and, indeed frequently would be, as far from the real truth as the statement of the most notorious liar of his generation. Hence, biography to date has been valuable either chiefly or solely as an enumeration of concrete facts and achievements, or for its literary and rhetorical merit. As an interpretation of personalities it has been next to worthless, and usually the only psyche revealed at all has been that of the writer instead of the person supposedly written about. It is probably not an exaggeration to say that so dubious and exaggerated a psychoanalytic biography as Freud's exercise on Leonardo da Vinci possesses far greater plausibility and validity than Carlyle's effort to interpret the characters of Cromwell and Frederick the Great. Therefore, tentative as the modern "psychographs" may be, they should be welcomed, as they represent in all cases at least a guess in the right direction and a definite advance over the rhetorical goose-eggs represented by the older literary biography.

It is a matter of common knowledge among educated persons that, as Stanley Hall indicated so clearly in his autobiography, the dynamic or Freudian psychology has

been the only branch of psychological research which has offered any significant contributions to an analysis of the human personality and the motives which dominate our conduct. That this type of psychology should sooner or later be exploited in biography was inevitable. But what not only men of literature, making an amateurish effort to employ the Freudian mechanisms in biography, but even clinical psychologists themselves, seem to have overlooked is the rarity with which one can discover sufficient available material concerning an historic personage to make a psycho-analytical biography plausible or convincing. When one reflects that it takes a skilful psychiatrist working with a sympathetic patient, blessed with a good transference, from forty to two hundred hours to carry through a successful analysis by means of dream-analysis, word-association, direct questioning, and all possible information from parents and relatives as to childhood experiences and tendencies, it is instantly apparent how futile it is to hope to discover a comparable volume of information concerning any person from the past. This possibility is rendered all the more remote when it is understood that the significant information concerning personality and character formation is chiefly that bearing on the years prior to puberty. As few great men are identified in their early years we are rarely able to secure any significant amount of trustworthy information concerning the facts of their youth, which are swallowed up in and buried beneath a vast body of apocryphal tales. Of course, a psychological biography of a suggestive sort and some degree of accuracy may be constructed with less information than is required for successful therapy in the case of a psycho-neurosis, but even the modicum of information essential is rarely available. It is only concerning personalities of recent times that we possess that volume of intimate information which would make it possible to gain even the most general knowledge of the unconscious motives of their psychic activity.

Among figures from ancient times Cicero alone would furnish anything like enough evidence to make it possible to determine his complexes. Of all the Patristics, Augustine was the only one sufficiently introspective and voluminous in his self-revelations to invite a fruitful psychoanalysis. Petrarch would probably be regarded as the first remarkable case for study by psychoanalysis as his *Confessions* have been designated by Professors Robinson and Rolfe as "the earliest unmistakable example of cool, fair, honest, and comprehensive self-analysis that we possess." Since the invention of the art of printing in the fifteenth century the mass of evidence dealing with historic personalities has become much more voluminous, but it is doubtful whether the most extensive and scholarly biography of the present day will furnish enough evidence to get very deeply into the subconscious motives of the individual being investigated.

Even more impossible is it to obtain the supplementary information from differential psychology and endocrinology. Writers have attempted to psychoanalyze figures from ancient history, but as far as the reviewer knows, no one has yet been rash enough to estimate the I. Q., mental age, or endocrine balance of Julius Cæsar or Theodosius, and it is scarcely a demonstrable fact that Goliath was a victim of hyperpituitarism. Hence, it would seem that if we desire reliable interpretative biographies we must require all eminent men to submit to mental testing, psychoanalysis, and physiological and neurological examination and have the results preserved until such a time as it would be proper and legal to exploit this information. But even here the results would not be wholly satisfactory, as an involuntary analysis would rarely be successful. The upshot of the whole matter, then, seems to be that historical biography must continue to be either irrelevant, unreliable, or both, to a distressing and disconcerting degree. The psyche of the departed is likely to remain a closely guarded secret for the most part; not even Freud and possibly not



even God can furnish the key which will fully unlock the mystery.

While these severe limitations upon the application of the new dynamic psychology of unconscious motives to the extension of our knowledge of the great personalities of history may seem rather disconcerting to the over-enthusiastic adherent to the more advanced psychological concepts and methods, it is only by keeping them well in mind that work in this field can be restrained from straying from the realm of possible facts of great value into the region of the fantastic and grotesque; in short, from history into poetry. But within these limitations this recent development of psychology, which has revealed the potency of the unconscious in mental life and has furnished us with at least a preliminary and tentative set of mechanisms for exploring unconscious mental activity, may possibly render the greatest service to history. It will certainly enable the historical student who is well grounded in the new psychology to bring out clearly the general character types, and in many cases to disclose at least the major determining complexes of the leading individuals in history concerning whose personal life, thoughts, and activities any considerable body of evidence exists. It should be noted that modern dynamic psychology proves that different methods and standards must be adopted in interpretative historical biography if it is to be more than a contribution to descriptive literature. Vital biography must deal with those intimate features of private life which reveal the deeper complexes of the personality, and cannot content itself with a superficial presentation of certain objective achievements nor accept as valid, explanations of motives which may be only elaborate forms of disguise or extended secondary rationalization. In particular, special attention must be given to childhood experiences, for it is a cardinal fact of analytical psychology that the complexes which determine the major outlines of personal conduct are formed

and largely fixed during the period of childhood and adolescence. It has now come to be a guiding principle of dynamic psychology that the individual is a "creature of his complexes,"<sup>287</sup> and it is quite evident that without a knowledge of the complexes of an individual we can know little of the real motives and forces which influence his action. Psychology today completely rejects the notion that a certain stimulus of a given sort will affect all persons alike, but rather proves that the effect of the stimulus upon the individual will be in accordance with his complexes. It may be objected that this type of psychology applies chiefly to the abnormal types of men and that the great mass of normal individuals are affected by few or no subconscious complexes. While this position could scarcely be wholly accepted, it would at any rate have little bearing upon the question under discussion. As far as progress has been dependent upon the work of individuals, it has come from the contributions of the abnormal types, and the great mass of "normal" beings are born, and live, and die in general "psychic ease and comfort," but without having contributed an iota to civilization and its further development.<sup>288</sup> The modern psychological historian who accepts the Carlylian interpretation of history will need to revise the famous phrase that history is "collective biography" to read that history is the record of the "collective sublimation of the neuroses and psychoses" of the great personalities of history.

It becomes, therefore, quite evident that we can in no way escape the task of applying the new psychological mechanisms to the study of the leading personalities, at least to those in modern times, where we have some adequate body of evidence to serve as the basis for investigation. It is undoubtedly true that we can pass but little

<sup>287</sup> Modern psychology quite reverses the old adage that "as a man thinketh so is he." Rather is it true that as a man's complexes are so will he think.

<sup>288</sup> This fact, with its psychological explanation, is well brought out in the opening chapters of W. Trotter's *The Instinct of the Herd in Peace and War*.

beyond the borderland of exploration in the unconscious of the most of the significant personalities, but we must certainly recognize that without knowing something of their basic complexes our knowledge of the real significance and causation of their thoughts and actions will be most imperfect. Surely no genuine and conscientious historian will stop short of the impossible in the search for the last available item of vital information which will help to clear up our understanding of the past. Especially important is the consideration that even though dynamic psychology may not be able to clear up the problems of the personalities of history, it can at least demonstrate the near worthlessness of the character studies executed in the past according to common-sense psychological concepts and methods.<sup>289</sup>

Space does not here allow any serious attempt to analyze any of the great personalities of history, nor even to call attention to significant work already done in this field, but it may be of interest to call to mind a very few obvious instances where a detailed analysis of personalities on the basis of the mechanisms of the newer psychology might be, or has been, particularly fruitful. Nothing has been more consequential for the subsequent intellectual and social history of mankind than Augustine's notorious "impurity complex," which he fastened upon European thought so successfully and so deeply that we have not yet recovered from it. Even our archaic anti-birth-control legislation directly reflects its influence. It is now well understood that this was wholly a psychic compensation for Augustine's own wild youth and his varied and extensive sexual experiences. The psychoanalyst would have little difficulty in grasping the significance of Abelard's abnormal tendency towards doubting, his revolt against the

<sup>289</sup> A colossal example of the futility of the popular psychology applied to biography is W. A. White's study of Woodrow Wilson. The work of R. F. Dibble and Gamahel Bradford represents about the best which can be achieved by such methods.

authority of the Church Fathers and contemporary theologians, his inability to meet the adult sexual situation in matrimony, and his rationalization in a "delusion of persecution." Petrarch's abnormal introspective tendency should also be pointed out. The strange and mysterious character of that unique genius, Leonardo da Vinci, has inspired an ingenious, if somewhat weird, study by the founder of psychoanalysis. Luther's tremendous mental conflicts in early life, and their final culmination in his open revolt against the "Holy Father" and in his zeal for "devil-mongering" cannot be fully understood except when dealt with in terms of dynamic psychology.<sup>290</sup> One would like to know more about Voltaire's revolt from authority in the light of the psychology of his youthful experiences. Rousseau's whole literary and philosophical product is little more than a continuous sublimation of typical neurotic symptoms. That Napoleon was an epileptic is well known, and the chief source of his immense power and energy may well have been that unusual contact with the dynamic force in his unconscious, concerning which William James wrote so clearly and forcefully.<sup>291</sup> Newman and Manning offer most fertile opportunities for psychoanalytic investigation. Further research along these lines may confirm the hypothesis that the great exponents of anarchy and individualism have elaborated their philosophy as an outlet for their repressions or as a revolt from authority. The derivation of both Kropotkin and Bakunin from autocratic and militaristic Russian society is a fact well known and much commented upon. It is, further, common knowledge that the great individualists of the last century, Jefferson, Spencer and Mill, passed their childhood under an abnormally complete and severe domination and control by their male par-

<sup>290</sup> See Preserved Smith's original and scholarly article on "Luther's Early Development in the Light of Psychoanalysis," in the *American Journal of Psychology*, July, 1913, pp 360-377.

<sup>291</sup> Especially his *The Energies of Men*. See L. P. Clark, "A Psycho-Historical Study of the Epileptic Personality in the Genius," in *Psychoanalytic Review*, October, 1922.

ent or some older male relative—the ideal situation for the development of a violent anti-authority complex. It is not unlikely that we shall one day learn that the obsessed attachment of Cecil Rhodes and Rudyard Kipling for the British Empire, symbolized by Britannia, was motivated by an exceedingly vigorous mother transference.

According to these newer views, the great statesman must be regarded as the product of the nearly perfect adjustment between the fundamental social, economic and political conditions and tendencies of his time and the personality that best expresses these forces and can gather his adherents in a concerted attempt to realize their mutual ambitions. Both the stimulating environment and the personality which responds must be provided to make the ideal statesman. Without a pressing need for a strong central government, Alexander Hamilton could not have functioned as he did, and only a strong economic impulse to states-rights and individualism could call forth and make use of a Thomas Jefferson. Yet we cannot well imagine that with their environment and interests reversed Hamilton could have led a negative state-rights party, or Jefferson the party favoring a great extension of governmental authority. It is in this respect that the type of approach outlined by the dynamic psychologists constitutes a real methodological advance in the study of history. The truly objective political historians, such as Osgood, George Louis Beer, Sydney George Fisher, Andrews and Alvord have at last secularized the study of American history, once sanctified by Bancroft, Palfrey and their kind. Other penetrating students, such as McMaster, Turner, Beard, Dodd, Becker, Schlesinger and Bogart have followed these and have indicated the great importance of social forces and economic interests in American historical development. The works of this latter school, in particular, have made it difficult for even the newer variety of ideologues and theo-

logues, such as Professors E. D. Adams and Shailer Mathews,<sup>292</sup> to conceal certain mundane traces left by the Holy Spirit as it swept over the American continent, leaving its traces in turnpikes, canals, public land scandals, slave plantations, state-banks, frontier lynchings, railroad-owned legislators, monopolized natural resources, and free-silver and agrarian agitation. This was a most important task which required no less courage than insight. What is now needed is to supplement this study of fundamental environmental influences in history by an analysis of the leading personalities who were called forth by the conditions of their time and furnished the leadership which was necessary to give coherence and political expression to the forces and interests struggling for recognition and domination. To risk the charge of sacrilege by analyzing the personalities which the historical epic in America has crowned with an hitherto inviolable halo will require even more courage than to present an economic interpretation of the Constitution. In witness of this, one might refer to the case of one Paul Haffer who was reported to have been convicted of criminal libel on December 29, 1916, and sentenced to four months in jail for having asserted that Washington occasionally cast a glance at the reddening wine and looked with envy upon the pulchritudinous maid-servant of his neighbor.

The application of the new psychology to the interpretation of the personal traits of the leading figures in our history will probably show that few important statesmen can be found who will not present problems for scientific analysis, to the greater clarification of the motives for their public acts and the better understanding of their personal characteristics. Samuel Adams's radicalism and revolu-

<sup>292</sup> Cf. E. D. Adams, *The Power of Ideals in American History*; Shailer Mathews, *The Spiritual Interpretation of History*. Dr. Mathews does, however, give considerable recognition to material and social factors. Cf. his *Theology and the Social Mind*.

tionary tendencies which were but compensation for his failures in the routine labors of his life;<sup>293</sup> Washington, with his unusual "Jehovah complex" combining Olympic detachment with a Jacksonian temper; the prodigious lust of Hamilton for the development of an authoritative political system; the inferiority and anti-authority complexes of Jefferson with their extensive elaboration and justification in ten thick volumes of letters and public documents; the remarkable development of a "spotless soul" in James Monroe after his part in many questionable episodes such as the violation of his word in the publication of the Reynolds' documents, the "Jehovah complex" and the sadism of Andrew Jackson, who was so intolerant of opposition as to be unable to complete a sentence in public debate without choking with anger; the love that Douglas possessed for union and authority which led him to break with the secession element in his party; Lincoln's severe periodic depressions and his abnormal sensitiveness to misery and suffering; Conkling's inflated ego and intense vanity which made it possible for the "Turkey-Gobbler" epithet to defeat and nearly wreck the Republican party; the "psychosis of sanctimony" which could bear the Crusader from Lincoln, Nebraska, unabashed through the slough of agrarianism and free-silver; the remarkable combination in Roosevelt of a Hamiltonian zeal for the "Big Stick" with an almost Jeffersonian sensitiveness to public opinion; Mr. Wilson's flight from reality by means of metaphysical idealism and facile rhetoric;<sup>294</sup> and Mr. Coolidge's compensation for faithful services to the grasping and unscrupulous American plutocracy in a philosophy of frugality, piety, candor, sincerity and uprightness—these are but a few of the interesting cases where the new psychiatry can doubtless contribute very greatly to the more complete mastery of American history.

<sup>293</sup> See R V Harlow, *Samuel Adams*.

<sup>294</sup> See W B Hale, *The Story of a Style*. On Bryan see E. L. Masters "The Christian Statesman," in the *American Mercury*, January, 1925.

In addition to these suggestions as to psychological problems in connection with some distinguished men in American public life one should call attention to the stimulating recent book of Mr. Harvey O'Higgins on *The American Mind in Action*, in which he subjects to analysis some of the leading figures in American literature and industrial life. It can at least be said that the author has traveled in the right direction, even if his guide-posts have been quite inadequate, and that he has apparently made use of the best biographical material in his search for data on the complexes of these notables. He finds Mark Twain to be the victim of an inferiority-complex and the persistent censorship of the mother-image which was continued by his wife, all culminating in a philosophy of despair and pessimism. Lincoln suffered from cyclothemia, a melancholia disorder induced by a mother attachment and rebellion against the father, neither of which was resolved by a happily consummated marriage. O'Higgins overlooks, however, Lincoln's peace of mind after his conversion which followed the death of his favorite son. Emerson's serenity was the product of a Jehovah-complex due to the absorption of God within himself. Repelled by the Puritan culture he became an introvert and fled from reality to a degree which ultimately resulted in serious amnesia. Carnegie was saved by his European youth from the Puritan lesion in early life, and his industry and sweet-temper were due to love for, and desire for approval from, his mother. Anthony Comstock is introduced as one whose Puritanism took the form of direct and belligerent fanaticism, while P. T. Barnum is exhibited as an admirable example of compensatory Puritanism. Franklin is shown to have escaped from Puritanism and conflict through maternal indifference, probably begotten of her despair and preoccupation with the affairs of the enormous family. There was no strong mother-image to pursue and torment him. His energy and activity seem to have been due to a desire to



triumph over the tyranny of older brothers. Longfellow appears as the romantic Puritan. His close relations with a cultured and tolerant mother, free from the savagery of the typical Puritan, gave him ever a romantic and idealistic attitude towards the other sex which freed him from inner conflict.

Walt Whitman and Mark Hanna are presented as illustrations of efforts of Quakers to adjust the clash between the impurity-complex and the biologic urge. O'Higgins rejects the conventional tradition of Whitman as an accomplished *roué* and contends that his erotic verse was but compensation in phantasy for his failure to make a successful revolt against repressions. Mark Hanna is said to have resolved his conflicts through securing the esteem of his fellows as the successful "leader of his gang" in play, business, and politics. Julia Ward Howe illustrates the home-and-mother type brought about by a youth of distressingly thorough inculcation of Puritanical ideals. Anna Howard Shaw is alleged to be the typical Puritan spinster who rebels against male domination in state or family. Her attitude was largely conditioned by youthful revolt against her father. Margaret Fuller completes the list as the æsthetic rebel against Puritanism. Her views were produced primarily by her mother's love of beauty, but she was prevented from full expression of her natural bent because of her father's influence on her education, which was thoroughly Puritan in its cultural content and orientation. Just why Poe was not included is not clear, especially as we have a good psycho-analytic study of him by Miss Pruette.

That many of the sketches are the most suggestive and plausible characterizations of the individuals studied which have yet been set forth is, of course, no final guaranty of their validity. Doubtless much material which would lead to a different conclusion has been overlooked, and perhaps the most significant facts bearing on the lives of these men

and women are nowhere available. The defects of the book are those inherent in any such attempt, but the method is the only rational approach to interpretative biography. Mr. O'Higgins has done the work as well as it is likely to be achieved. No other figure in American literature today possesses an equal command of the facts of dynamic psychology, and he has been further aided by a competent psychiatrist.

Without presenting any claim for finality or completeness in the achievement one may well illustrate the methodology and procedure of the application of the newer psychology to historical biography by examining in an informal way the cases of Hamilton and Jefferson. Among other things, these two men admirably illustrate the characteristics of the extrovert and the introvert, respectively, as defined and described by Jung in his monumental work on *Psychological Types*.

The general setting of the problem is well-known, namely, Hamilton's immoderate love of order and authority and his persistent attempt to bring this ambition into realization, and Jefferson's hatred of authority, his sense of inferiority before the public, and his abnormal sensitiveness to public opinion. About all that is needed is to state the well-known facts and allow them to be translated into the psychological terminology. The major outlines of the fundamentally different attitudes of Hamilton and Jefferson have been admirably summarized by Professor J. P. Gordy in the following paragraph:<sup>295</sup>

The idea for which Jefferson stood was the precise opposite of that which constituted the ruling principle of Hamilton's political life. The ruling idea of Hamilton was his love of justice, stability, and order, the ruling idea of Jefferson was his love of liberty and his belief in its practicability to a greater extent and on a larger scale than the world has ever seen. The one thought the supreme need of society was a government strong enough and intelligent enough to enforce justice and preserve order, the other

<sup>295</sup> J. P. Gordy, *Political History of the United States*, Vol. I, pp. 132-3.

regarded liberty, and a government too weak to curtail it, as the supreme political good. The one saw in the anarchical tendencies of the states and of the ignorant classes of society the greatest danger that confronted the new government; the other saw in the tendency of all governments to govern in the interests of a class the greatest danger that confronted the American people, and in the jealousy of the state governments "a precious reliance" against despotism. Hamilton, despite his fundamental allegiance to order, was devoted to liberty but he thought the centrifugal tendencies of society were so powerful that liberty would degenerate into anarchy unless it should be kept in bounds by a strong government—a government in which the intelligent and property-loving classes be given so large a share of power that they could be used as a dike against the rising tide of democracy. Jefferson, despite his passion for liberty, was a friend of stability. But he believed that stability would grow into tyranny unless it should be entrusted to the intelligent self-interest of the masses. The one thought it better to risk the tyranny of a strong central government—though he would have diminished the danger as much as possible by giving to the representative of the masses the power to veto any law—than to put order and stability in jeopardy, the other would risk the anarchical tendencies of a weak central government rather than endanger liberty. The thought of the one was constantly dwelling upon the turbulence of democracy, upon the necessity of erecting barriers against popular tumults, the other asserted that "whenever our affairs go obviously wrong the good sense of the people will interpose and set them right."

Such is the problem stated in its "manifest content"; let us see what a psychological analysis reveals.

When one keeps in mind the party interests which each represented, it is not difficult to see why they emerged as leaders. In the Federalist party were the capitalistic and commercial classes who wanted a strong and stable national government, to protect business, restore credit and give firmness and permanence to the industrial order. In the Jeffersonian Republican party were the agrarian interests—those who desired to dodge debts and taxes, wanted free trade, and a weak and economically conducted central government. In the doctrines of states-rights, strict interpretation of the constitution and the blessings of liberty and democracy they found the shibboleths under which to mask

their deeper aims and interests.<sup>296</sup> It would be manifestly futile to search for the deeper motives in this contest in the legalistic arguments over the interpretation of the constitution. As Hamilton himself once expressed this point in quite a different context, "The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for among old parchments or musty records. They are written, as with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of the divinity itself, and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power."

It is obvious that the successful leader of the Federalist had to be a man deeply imbued with a loyalty to the ideal of extensive authority and one who would boldly face, indeed, even anticipate, reality and create out of the chaos of the contemporary anarchy of the Confederation a coherent and powerful national state. A man better adapted to meeting this emergency than Alexander Hamilton could scarcely be imagined.<sup>297</sup> There is no large volume of facts extant with regard to Hamilton's childhood, but such details as are known clearly indicate that his youth was spent under conditions ideally adapted to the production of a dynamic and constructive character, searching out after and conquering, rather than retiring from, reality. So loose was the family tie in Hamilton's case that there was a persistent rumor that he was an illegitimate child. That sainted New Englander, John Adams, in a letter to Jefferson in 1813, graciously and generously referred to the departed statesman as "the bastard brat of a Scotch peddler." The facts appear to be that his mother left her first husband, whom she had been forced to marry against her will, and lived in conjugal relations with Hamilton's father until after Hamilton's birth, without having been able to

<sup>296</sup> Cf. C. A. Beard, *Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States*, and *Some Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy*, O. G. Libby, *Geographical Distribution of the Votes on the Constitution in 1787-8*.

<sup>297</sup> For the details as to Hamilton's parentage and personal characteristics see Allen McLane Hamilton, *The Intimate Life of Alexander Hamilton*, Chaps. 1-11; John Church Hamilton, *Life of Alexander Hamilton*; F. S. Oliver, *Alexander Hamilton*, pp. 15 ff.

secure a divorce from her first husband. The charge of illegitimacy was stressed chiefly by slanderous enemies. Yet it is true that Hamilton knew little of the normal family life. His mother died when he was but eleven years of age. His father's business failures threw Alexander upon the support of his mother's family. His contact with his father was very slight from that time onward and offered no opportunity for male parental domination and the development of that anti-authority complex which distinguishes the ardent apostle of liberty. Indeed, all of his biographers note Hamilton's unusual affection for his father, of whom, significantly, he had seen so little. This continued down to his father's death in 1799 and he frequently tried to get his father to come and live with him. By his mother's family he was treated from the first as "a little man" and was quickly put into touch with the practical problems of reality by being placed as a clerk in the warehouse of Nicholas Cruger, a merchant of St. Croix. A letter written to a boyhood friend while a clerk indicates the early appearance of the positive disposition which characterized Hamilton's entire career:

To confess my weakness, Ned, my ambition is prevalent, so that I condemn the grovelling conditions of a clerk or the like, to which my fortune, etc, condemns me, and would willingly risk my life, though not my character, to exalt my station. I am confident, Ned, that my youth excludes me from any hopes of immediate preferment, nor do I desire it, but I mean to prepare the way for futurity. I'm no philosopher, you see, and may justly be said to build castles in the air, my folly makes me ashamed, and I beg you'll conceal it, yet, Neddy, we have seen such schemes successful when the projector is constant. I shall conclude saying, I wish there was a war.

The aggressive and creative faculties, characteristic of the extrovert with his trend towards action rather than thought and reflection, from his youth on put him in the forefront of those who were confronting with courage and resolution the stern realities of the Revolutionary and

"critical" periods. It is significant that at first Hamilton opposed revolution and aligned himself with the Loyalist element, and, that when a visit to Boston had convinced him of the necessity of revolution, he was ever more interested in the creation of a substitute for the political authority of the British Empire than in the assurance of success in the rather negative task of achieving freedom from imperial control. His writings in *Holt's Journal* as early as 1775-6 indicate that he fully sensed the need for a strong union among the colonies. The records of his fragmentary and private writings during the time that he served as Washington's secretary from 1777 to 1781 indicate that he was sublimating the routine of military life in plans for stronger union and an improved system of national finance. From 1780 to the formation of the constitution he was ever active in agitation for the creation of a strong federal government and a reorganization of the national financial system. Late in 1779, he had addressed an anonymous letter to Robert Morris urging a national bank. In the late summer of 1780 he wrote his famous letter to Duane condemning the prevailing political anarchy and Congressional incompetence and urging the establishment of an effective central government. In the spring of 1781 he sent to Robert Morris an elaborate scheme for a national bank. His writings in the *Continentalist* from February to August, 1781, were bitter criticisms of the Confederation and a plea for union under a powerful common authority. At this early date he had said:<sup>298</sup>

An extreme jealousy of power is the attendant of all popular revolutions. In a government framed for durable liberty, not less regard must be paid to giving the magistrate a proper degree of authority to make and execute the laws with rigor, than to guard against encroachments upon the rights of the community. Societies whose true aim and only security against attack lies in a close political union, must either be firmly united under one government, or there will infallibly arise emulations and quarrels, this

<sup>298</sup> *The Works of Alexander Hamilton*, edited by H. C. Lodge, Vol. I, pp. 244, 246, 254, 286-7. This citation has been abridged and arranged

is in human nature. There is something noble and magnificent in the perspective of a great federal republic closely linked in the pursuit of a common interest, tranquil and prosperous at home, respectable abroad, but there is something proportionately diminutive and contemptible in the prospect of a number of petty states, with the appearance only of union, jarring, jealous and perverse, without any determined direction, fluctuating and unhappy at home, weak and insignificant by their dissensions in the eyes of other nations. Happy America, if those to whom thou hast entrusted the guardianship of thy infancy know how to provide for thy future repose, but miserable and undone if their negligence or ignorance permits the spirit of discord to erect her banner on the ruins of thy tranquillity.

Certainly in 1781, when the country had just required four years to be able to agree upon so feeble a central government as that provided by the Articles of Confederation, nothing seemed more remote from realization than the Hamiltonian dream of a strong federal government, but he threw himself into the struggle with vigor. He worked for unity as a member of the Confederate Congress in 1782-3 and carried on a correspondence with Washington in which both agreed that heroic measures were imperative if the country was to be saved from anarchy. In 1786 he turned the Annapolis Convention into a preliminary conference demanding the calling of the federal constitutional convention which met in Philadelphia in the summer of the next year. His plan for a new government, delivered in the convention on June 18, 1787, provided for so extreme a form of centralized power that even he himself scarcely hoped that it would be seriously considered, but it helped towards union by making the more practicable schemes appear less terrifying by comparison. Hamilton's magnificent contributions to the cause of the erection of a strong central government through his writings in the *Federalist* are too well-known to require more than a passing reference, while his personal influence was of the utmost importance in inducing New York state to ratify the constitution. As Secretary of the Treasury in Washington's administration and

the great constructive statesman of early nationalism, he did more than any other man to establish the power of the central government and make order and stability realized facts rather than shallow aspirations. To a very large degree our strong federal government has been but a collective appropriation of the authority-loving and reality-conquering personality of Alexander Hamilton.<sup>299</sup>

At the opposite pole in his attitude towards political authority was the "Sage of Monticello" who led the forces of negation under the mask of democracy and liberty. The evidence regarding Jefferson's early life is as ample as that concerning Hamilton is scanty. It has been gathered especially by his worshipful biographer, Randall.<sup>300</sup> The facts reveal a boyhood experience of exactly the type suited to developing an abnormal anti-authority complex. His father, Peter Jefferson, was a gruff giant with a tremendous temper and was reputed to be the strongest man in that part of Virginia. Thomas, a slight and pallid youth, recoiled in horror from the father when the latter was in his fits of anger. As his father died when Thomas was fourteen years of age, the latter never had an opportunity to bring the "father image" to an adult level, and it always remained to him as the towering, impressive, self-reliant parent. He was brought up by his mother along with six sisters. His mother was an eminently feminine type—cheerful, active and sweet-tempered. In none of his letters or writings does Jefferson ever speak of his mother in a rôle of authoritative guidance. For his eldest sister Jefferson developed a remarkable attachment and grieved

<sup>299</sup> On this subject see H J Ford, *Alexander Hamilton*; W G Sumner, *Alexander Hamilton*, and Olver, op cit., Books II-III

<sup>300</sup> H. S. Randall, *The Life of Thomas Jefferson*, Vol I, especially pp 13-17, 33, 41, 62-4 Cf also H W Pierson, *The Private Life of Thomas Jefferson*; and S N Randolph, *The Domestic Life of Thomas Jefferson*

It is significant that Jefferson's antipathy to his father was so infantile and deep-seated that it was scarcely ever raised to consciousness. He frequently speaks of his father in his writings in a reverential and awe inspired attitude. Thus, of course, made the disguised and substituted forms of outlet for this repressed revulsion all the more vigorous and extreme



deeply at her untimely death. In 1762, at the age of nineteen, he made a rather faint-hearted step towards matrimony. He asked a neighborhood belle, a certain Rebecca Burwell, if she would marry him, but stipulated that he would not be ready to wed until he had finished his legal studies and spent an indefinite period abroad. It can scarcely be a cause for surprise to learn that she married another man within the next few months. Ten years later, he screwed up his courage to the point of marrying the widow of a friend. She died in 1782 and Jefferson never remarried. He always found most pleasure in the company of elderly ladies or those with a philosophic tendency—in other words, those old in wisdom.

The major characteristics of Jefferson's character have long been well-known, though they have not been analyzed according to the principles of the newer psychology. The basic personality pattern or character type in Jefferson's case was that of the introvert, with his tendency towards introspection, reflection, rationalizing, avoidance of positive action, and extreme sensitiveness towards the feelings and attitudes of others. Along with these characteristics are a number of others not entirely unrelated to the introvertive symptoms. First and foremost should be placed his "anti-authority" complex, which was disguised and elaborated in his famous policies and theories of democracy and liberty. This was not a mere objection to political authority, but to all forms of external coercion. In one of his most quoted statements he said: "I have sworn on the altar of God eternal hostility to every form of tyranny over the mind of man." His very advanced attitude in regard to religious matters—namely, his total revolt from all authoritative forms and phases of religion—was so universally known as to make the epithet of "Atheist" a favorite campaign slogan of his enemies. While Jefferson was too much of a philosopher to deny the necessity of some form of political control, he would not admit that any legitimate

government should curb the natural rights of man; rather he held that the sole function of government was to guarantee those rights which man had brought along with him from the state of nature. To such a personality the contract theory of the origin of government, based on the idea of consenting to authority and maintaining a complete popular control over its operation, was much more congenial than the divine-right doctrine. As might be believed of one with "a grudge against the Old Gentleman," Jefferson was especially severe in his criticism of the theory that political authority had originated in the patriarchal family; primitive man, he held, had dwelt in almost perfect liberty. As might be expected, Jefferson obtained a considerable degree of psychic release from this complex by vigorous assaults upon kings, in general, and upon those of contemporary Europe, in particular. Of these most obvious and, to a man of Jefferson's complexes, most repulsive symbolic personifications of authority he said in a typical passage:<sup>301</sup>

While I was in Europe I often amused myself with contemplating the characters of the then reigning monarchs of Europe. Louis XVI was a fool of my own knowledge, and in despite of the answers made for him at his trial. The King of Spain was a fool, and of Naples the same. They passed their lives in hunting and despatched two couriers a week one thousand miles to let each other know what game they had killed on the preceding days. The King of Sardinia was a fool. All these were Bourbons. The Queen of Portugal, a Braganza, was an idiot by nature, and so was the King of Denmark. Their sons as regents exercised the powers of government. The King of Prussia, successor to the Great Frederick, was a mere hog in body as well as in mind. Gustavus of Sweden, and Joseph of Austria were really crazy, and George of England, you know, was in a straight waistcoat. There remained, then, none but old Catherine, who had been too lately picked up to have lost her common sense. In this state Bonaparte found Europe, and it was this state of its rulers which lost it with scarce a struggle. These animals had become without mind and

<sup>301</sup> *The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, Washington edition, Vol V, p 514. As a classified guide to Jefferson's thinking Foley's *Jeffersonian Cyclopaedia* is indispensable.

powerless, and so will every hereditary monarch be after a few generations. Alexander, the son of Catherine, is as yet an exception. He is able to hold his own. But he is only of the third generation. His race is not yet worn out. (However, Jefferson lived to see Alexander become as unbalanced mentally as any of the monarchs mentioned above, unless it be George III.) And so endeth the Book of Kings, from all of whom may the Lord deliver us.

Government, Jefferson held, must not only be conducted so that the majority will be free from the tyranny of the one or the few, but also so that the majority can never illegally oppress the minority. Like Tom Paine he would have no unlimited domination over any part of the citizens. Not only would Jefferson severely limit the governmental authority, but he would also decentralize it and give the widest powers to the local units. "It is," he said, "by dividing and sub-dividing these republics, from the great national one down through all its subordinations, until it ends in the administration of every man's farm by himself; by placing under each one what his own eye may superintend that all will be done for the best." Not only would Jefferson limit and decentralize government, but as an added protection he would provide for a systematic revision of the constitution every nineteen years, so that no generation should be governed by the rules of the preceding—symbolically, perhaps, so that the child might escape from the authority of the parent! Finally, if all these limitations upon authority did not suffice, Jefferson suggested that "a little rebellion now and then is a good thing" and that the "tree of liberty should occasionally be refreshed with the blood of tyrants." Jefferson was so insistent upon maintaining a permanent organ for criticizing the government that he once contended that it was better to have newspapers without a government than a government without a free and fearless press. And, again, is it not quite possible that Jefferson's well-known aversion to the judiciary was due as much to his instinctive dislike of the political organ or department most

generally identified with the maintenance of law and authority as to his personal dislike of John Marshall? Then, it can scarcely be doubted that Jefferson's advocacy of entrusting a greater degree of authority to the people—in other words, his defense of democracy against aristocracy—was quite as much motivated by his hatred of the centralization and extension of authority, especially in the hand of his Federalist opponents, as by any love of the masses, whom he certainly did not trust except when they chose a man with the wisdom of Thomas Jefferson to guide their destinies with safety and moderation. In a very real sense the Jeffersonian democracy can be regarded as an elaborate disguise and secondary rationalization of his innate revolt against authority, and it is as accurate to say that American democracy may be traced back to the recoil of the pallid youth of Shadwell from his gigantic and formidable father as to hold that it derives its origin from the Teutonic folk-moot or opposition to the political and economic program of Hamilton.

With the preceding brief review of Jefferson's attitude towards authority in mind it is not difficult to understand his part in American political life—his work as a radical Revolutionist in 1776 and the enthusiasm with which he evened up the old score with his father by striking off the memorable list of grievances against George III, his teaching of theoretical and practical revolution to the French; his leadership of the opposition to Hamilton's program of centralization and the extension of political authority; his threat of nullification in the Kentucky Resolutions; and his inability as President to take a firm and consistent attitude towards the pressing problems of his time. It has, of course, been alleged that his purchase of Louisiana was a greater extension of governmental authority than any of Hamilton's acts. While this may, perhaps, be so in a legal sense it is not so from the standpoint of the psychology of authority; the addition of Louisiana may have been a severe

strain on the constitution, but it involved no extension of repressive political authority. Indeed, it may well have been regarded by Jefferson as a move to insure greater liberty. He once said that he believed that liberty and democracy could endure only in a state predominantly agricultural, and perhaps he felt that by adding thousands of square miles of virgin territory he was insuring the existence of another century of American liberty.

Along with Jefferson's violent reaction against authority, should be put the complex which frequently accompanies this attitude, namely, the ever-evident feeling of inferiority. It is well known that he was a miserable public speaker; that he avoided delivering speeches when possible and, when he could not escape, read them in an ineffective manner, that as Vice-President he drew up the first elaborate manual of parliamentary procedure in this country in order to avoid being called upon to make sudden decisions unaided in face of a crowd. Unable to meet the public directly from the platform he turned to letter-writing and party organization by intrigue and instigation. As a letter writer no other man in American public life has at all approached him. He showed himself a master of intrigue and shrewd insinuation, of subtle flattery and compelling powers of suggestion. And his ever active tendency towards distrust, suspicion and misgivings led him, even in the days before the typewriter and carbon-paper, to make exact copies of the twenty-five thousand letters that his editors estimate that he wrote during his lifetime. Again, this type of mind is particularly inclined towards finding secret and insidious motives in the acts of opponents and, accordingly, it was not difficult for him to imagine Hamilton and John Adams planning a *coup d'état* to establish a monarchy and insure the rule of the "rich and well-born" or to believe that Hamilton must have been in league with the profiteers that speculated in national securities during the early days

of financial reconstruction. Further, this Jeffersonian type of personality is invariably unduly sensitive to public opinion and is guided by such pressure, if indeed its ultrasensitiveness does not enable it to anticipate slightly the trends in the popular mind and adapt its policies accordingly. It is to this quality that most students of the period usually ascribe Jefferson's great powers as a political leader. Mr. Morse says of this trait in Jefferson.<sup>302</sup>

He never missed an opportunity of dropping his plummet into the mighty depths beneath the upper classes, and if he discovered their profound currents to be in accord with his own tendencies, as he always expected and generally did, he refreshed his weary spirit with the instinctive anticipation that these would control the course of the country at no distant time. Herein lay his deep wisdom, he enjoyed a political vision penetrating deeper down into the inevitable movement of popular government and further forward into the future trend of free institutions than was possessed by any other man in public life in his day.

It is easy to understand how a man with these traits joined to one of the most superb intellects in American history became the most astute political leader of the organizing and instigative type in the history of American government.

It is not supposed that this brief psychological analysis of the opposing characters or personalities of Jefferson and Hamilton—or rather this hasty review of the well-known facts that reveal their personalities—will in any way lessen the value of the analysis of the general social and economic environment which furnished them with the appropriate forces to lead, but it may help in some slight degree to explain why they emerged as leaders and took the positions that they did, and it may indicate that these two basic character types, so familiar to the psychologist, left an unalterable impression upon the formative period of our country's political institutions.

<sup>302</sup> J. T. Morse, *Thomas Jefferson*, pp. 115-16.

**B. Dynamic Psychology and Institutional and Cultural History.**

While it must be always kept in mind that the psychology of the unconscious is in its present development primarily a system of individual rather than social psychology, it can also throw at least some light upon certain problems of more general or mass psychology.<sup>303</sup> Notwithstanding the contrary doctrines of Durkheim, it must be agreed that the social mind is at least based upon the individual minds in the group, even though it may be something quite different from the mere sum of those minds. Therefore, it is obvious that a new psychological discovery of such great import for individual psychology as the demonstration of the significance of the unconscious factors in mental life must necessarily be of interest to the student of the more general problems of the development of thought and culture.

In the field of the history of religious phenomena the new dynamic psychology can be of great aid in clearing up many hitherto perplexing or misinterpreted problems. W. S. Swisher, T. Reik and E. D. Martin have contributed most suggestive, and in many ways revolutionary, interpretations of the origin and nature of religion, laying stress upon the importance of symbolic thinking in religion, the association of religion and sex, the significance of such complexes as the Oedipus and inferiority complexes, as well as of such mechanisms as transference, projection, regression and other modes of escape from reality. While probably not a complete explanation of religion, this approach has done more than all other psychological studies combined to illuminate the fundamental nature and processes

<sup>303</sup> For a scholarly and lucid exposition of the limitations upon at least the Freudian psychology as a system of social psychology I am indebted to an unpublished address of Dr A. A. Goldenweiser before the Psychological Club of Columbia University, 1918. On the whole problem of the possible services of dynamic psychology to social science see O. Rank and H. Sachs, *The Significance of Psychoanalysis for the Mental Sciences*.

of religion.<sup>304</sup> The unconscious symbolism involved in primitive religion, mythology, totemism, art, and ritual has been ably analyzed by Freud, Rank, E. Crawley, J. G. Frazer, E. S. Hartland, Jane Harrison, and Gilbert Murray, but needs a much more thorough analysis.<sup>305</sup> G. Lomer, Binet-Sanglé, H. Schaefer, and especially G. Stanley Hall, have shown how much modern psychology can contribute to a better understanding of the personality of Christ and of the derivation and significance of his teachings. St. Paul's importance in the history of Christianity is proof enough of the necessity of understanding the epileptic personality in relation to religious attitudes and complexes.<sup>306</sup>

The deeper psychological significance of the symbolism in the sacramental system of the Catholic Church is a fertile problem awaiting a more complete investigation than has been accorded to it by Conybeare and others. The reasons for the phenomenal grip of the Catholic Church upon its communicants can never be wholly appreciated until one reflects that with its combination of the Papacy and Mariolatry it provides for an unique dual "transference" of the filial and sexual attachments of both female and male believers to the "Holy Father" and the "Holy Mother," respectively. There can be little doubt that this fact, together with the well-established thesis of genetic psychology that attachments formed in childhood are much more vital and tenacious than those of later life, go further

<sup>304</sup> W. S. Swisher, *Religion and the New Psychology*, T. Reik, *Probleme der Religionspsychologie*, and E. D. Martin, *The Mystery of Religion*.

<sup>305</sup> A study along this line has been made by Dr. Karl J. Carlson, "Psychoanalysis and Mythology," in the *Journal of Religious Psychology*, November, 1914. See also O. Rank, *Das Inzestmotiv in Dichtung und Sage, The Myth of the Birth of the Hero*, C. G. Jung's *Psychology of the Unconscious*, and Freud's somewhat risky work, *Totem and Taboo*, cf. G. E. Smith, "Freud's Speculations in Ethnology," in the *Monist*, January, 1923. The periodical *Imago* contains a large number of such studies.

<sup>306</sup> G. Lomer, *Jesus Christus vom Standpunkte des Psychiaters* (1905), Binet-Sanglé, *La Folie de Jésus* (1908); H. Schaefer, *Jesus in Psychiatrische Beleuchtung* (1910), G. Stanley Hall, *Jesus the Christ in the Light of Psychology*, 2 vols. (1917). See Hall, pp. 162 ff. for a discussion of these psychological studies of Jesus.



towards clearing up the problem of the strength of Catholicism than the important matter of its extensive and efficient formal organization. This also explains how a Catholic may be a violent radical in politics and yet retain a fervent devotion for the Church and its dogmas and ritual. The revolt against the political authority is an unconscious revolt against the male parent, while the Church symbolizes to the male believer his mother, and thereby wholly escapes his anti-authority reaction. To the Protestant, on the contrary, with his chief emphasis on the Old Testament and its patriarchal religious concepts, and his rejection of Mariolatry, both Church and State symbolize the authority of the male parent and are rejected together. Again, only in the light of the newer psychology of the unconscious can one understand how the Catholic clergy have been able, when they have actually done so, to observe successfully the vow of chastity. It is a well-known principle of psychoanalysis that the blocking of the normal outlet for adult sexuality leads to a regression to an infantile sexual level, and in the case of the male adult to a revival of infantile sexual attachment for his mother. In this manner the symbolism and ritual of Mariolatry have proved a veritable godsend to the Catholic clergy, for it has both strengthened their attachment for the Church and afforded a means of sexual release. In the intimate association of the semi-club life of the monastic orders at least a regressive psychic homosexuality has also served as a means of aiding in the process of diverting the sexual impulses from their normal outlet. Further, the phenomenon of religious conversion was inexplicable until it was definitely shown that this was the result of breaking through psychic resistances, tapping the vast stores of new vital energy in the unconscious and destroying symbolically resistance to parental authority.<sup>807</sup>

<sup>807</sup> It has also been shown that the acceptance of God or Christ in conversion is partly a readjustment to the authority of the earthly parent as well as to that of the Heavenly parent. Cf. Martin, *The Mystery of Religion*, Chaps. IV-V

This, of course, throws light not only upon the problem of conversion in general but also upon the great historic instances of conversion like those of St. Paul, Augustine, St. Francis, and Loyola. Finally, while it has long been a common saying that a man's ability to drive a close bargain in a commercial transaction was directly in proportion to the length and resonance of his public prayers, it has only been since we have understood the mechanism of psychic compensation that we have known the scientific reason why excessive and ostentatious piety is normally correlated with hypocrisy. In the light of this orientation one should read Upton Sinclair's *The Profits of Religion*.

In the field of the investigation of ethical and moral problems psychiatry has been of the greatest service. We cannot here deal with the medical contributions in the way of treating the neuroses and psychoses, or even in the way of preventive advice in suggesting healthier and more rational modes of living. In a later chapter we shall deal with the necessity of putting morality on a scientific basis. Here we shall only call attention to the psychiatric revelations as to the pathogenesis of the vice crusader and joy-killer, as represented by such types as Comstock, Sumner, Straton and the obsessed prohibitionists. In the first place, the crusader by his official or "professional" powers and excuses has access to diverse erotic exhibitions and stimulation which would be denied to him in life as an ordinary "decent" citizen, and, by compensatory avowed interest in purity, he can disguise the basic unconscious motivation on the erotic level. In the second place, there is the powerful sentiment of the invidious, which leads other crusaders and "possessed" moralists to find it unendurable to witness others enjoying experiences which are, from one cause or another, denied to them.<sup>508</sup>

<sup>508</sup> See C. Ramus, "Why Censors Enjoy their Jobs," in *Physical Culture*, April, 1923; H. O'Higgins, *The American Mind in Action*, Chap. vi; H. L. Mencken, *A Book of Prefaces*, pp. 197-283; A. Fridon, *Psychoanalysis and Behavior*, pp. 252-66.

In no phase of its achievements has psychoanalysis been more illuminating than in its clarification of art and its symbolic expressions and significance. In the first place, it has shown the close interrelation of art and religion, not merely in the superficial way of indicating the degree to which religion has brought art into its service, but rather by indicating the close emotional affinity between the two in the manner of their derivation and expression. Psychiatrists such as Rank and Wittels have attempted to trace the history and psychology of art and its symbols. They have shown the great importance of the mechanism of sublimation in art, and the driving power of unconscious eroticism. The great artist is revealed as the one who is afflicted with the fewest paralyzing repressions and inhibitions in his emotional expression in the particular field of his unconscious aspirations, and who can draw most freely upon the impulses from his unconscious. And the achievements of the artist reveal in many ways the aspirations and complexes which he has expressed and sublimated in his artistic creations. That these students have been guilty of many excesses in imagination and ingenuity must be admitted, but this approach has been the first one to offer the slightest clue as to the psychology of art.<sup>302</sup>

The bearing of dynamic psychology upon literature and authors has also been elucidated in recent years. What was said about the plastic and chromatic artists above applies equally to the great writer as an artist. Rank, Wittels and others have written along the line of the close interrelation of religion, mythology, art and literature. I. Coriat and E. Jones have attempted to unravel some of the Shakesperian complexes in their studies of the plots of *Macbeth* and *Hamlet*. L. P. Clark has analyzed the epileptic personality of Dostoevsky; Katherine Anthony has studied Margaret Fuller; and Miss Pruette has investi-

<sup>302</sup> See on this subject, C Baudouin, *Psychoanalysis and Aesthetics*, O Rank, *Die Künstler*, F. Wittels, *Alles um Liebe*, S Freud, *Leonardo da Vinci*.

gated the complexes of Edgar Allan Poe. Less technically Freudian but highly penetrating have been VanWyck Brooks' analysis of the personality of Mark Twain, and Thomas Beer's biography of Stephen Crane. Not only do writers unconsciously reveal their complexes, but recently authors acquainted with the psychoanalytic concepts have attempted to construct plots which revolve around some definite psycho-neurotic complex. Examples of this are the remarkable studies of the Œdipus complex and the mother transference in Rebecca West's *The Judge* and D H Lawrence's *Sons and Lovers*. But infinitely the best book of this sort is Elsa Barker's *Fielding Sargent*, which is not only an admirable portrayal of the complexes of a typical psycho-neurotic personality, but also the best popular exposition of the therapeutic methods of psychoanalysis which has yet been executed in any language. Albert Mordell, D. H. Lawrence, Joseph Collins, Harvey O'Higgins and others have attempted general studies of the bearing of dynamic psychology upon literature and literary motives and methods, but the definitive work of this sort is still a desideratum.<sup>310</sup>

It also seems rather definitely established that unconscious impulses are often the causative factor in scientific investigation. The recent careful study of the notebooks of Leonardo da Vinci has demonstrated that he was probably the most unique and remarkable genius in the history of science, and Freud had shown convincingly that his inordinate scientific curiosity was but a sublimation of the blocked and unsatisfied sexual curiosity of his youth. While there are doubtless many other factors at work in the situ-

<sup>310</sup> O Rank, *Das Inzestmotiv in Dichtung und Sage*, F Wittels, *Tragische Motive*, I Coriat, *The Psychology of Lady Macbeth*, E Jones, *A Psychoanalytic Study of Hamlet*, L P Clark, "The Epileptic Personality in the Genius," in *Psychoanalytic Review*, October, 1922, pp 373-8, L Pruette, "A Psychoanalytic Study of Edgar Allan Poe," in *American Journal of Psychology*, October, 1920, A Mordell, *The Erotic Motive in Literature*, D H Lawrence, *Psychoanalysis and Literature*, J Collins, *The Doctor Looks at Literature*, and *Literary Sympathies and Antipathies*, H O'Higgins, *The American Mind in Action*, *The Secret Springs*, and *Some Distinguished Americans*.

ation, one cannot ignore in the psychic make-up of the enthusiastic scientist such elements as sublimated infantile erotic curiosity, inferiority compensation, and response to the insecurity complex.

The importance of the psychological factor in politics has long been recognized; Hume and Adam Smith, for example, comprehended many important psychic elements underlying government and political association, and since their day the literature in this field has been continually expanding, having been especially associated with the development of the different phases of social psychology.<sup>311</sup> But it is now coming to be realized that no sound psychology of political activity can ignore the recent developments in the psychology of instincts, behaviorism, and the unconscious. As a recent writer has very well said:<sup>312</sup>

This aspect of our teaching is perhaps best illustrated by our failure adequately to emphasize the importance of psychological analysis. We are, after all, dealing with an eminently human set of facts, yet there are few teachers who emphasize the impossibility of understanding political phenomena without a grasp of psychology. There are, indeed, few who do not know the change in perspective since Mr. Wallas drove the Benthamite psychology out of the political field. But, to take an obvious instance, we cannot explain the very fact of political obedience unless we are fully equipped with the latest knowledge psychology can offer. Do men obey, as Hobbes said, through fear? Is the real basis consent, as with Rousseau, or habit, as with Sir Henry Maine? The answer to this, and all kindred questions, we shall only know if we try fully to grasp and cautiously to apply, the things we are being taught by men such as Freud and Jung, McDougall and the behaviorists. It ought to be understood that no student is equipped for serious political analysis except upon the basis of a thorough acquaintance with these studies.

How fruitful and suggestive the analysis of political activity and institutions can be when based upon the new

<sup>311</sup> See Ernest Barker's *Political Thought from Spencer to the Present Day*, pp. 148-158. Probably the most suggestive book in this whole field is E. A. Ross's *Social Control*.

<sup>312</sup> *The New Republic*, March 1, 1919, p. 135.

dynamic psychology has been well illustrated by Walter Lippmann's *Preface to Politics*, Graham Wallas' *Human Nature in Politics*, and *The Great Society*, and Seba Eldridge's *Political Action*. It should be clear that these underlying psychological factors are as important for an understanding of political history as they are for an analysis of current political methods and problems

While the limitations upon a direct transference of concepts applicable to the individual-psychic phenomena into the field of the socio-psychic must be recalled, there is little doubt that the basic Freudian concept of repression can be utilized to great advantage in explaining the problems connected with political and social revolutions.<sup>313</sup> In much the same way that excessive and prolonged repression of normal impulses in the individual tends to issue in an explosion in a neurosis or psychosis, so long-continued oppression of any economic, social, or political class is likely to lead to that violent irruption conventionally known as a revolution. The revolt of the peasantry in England at the close of the Middle Ages, and in Germany in Luther's time, the French Revolution and the insurrection of the June Days of 1848 are historic examples which have been often cited in this connection, but probably no other instance in history is quite as pertinent as the contemporary Russian revolution with its unparalleled proletarian upheaval. Mr. Graham Wallas has shown the significance of social repression in producing a general prevalence of what he calls "balked dispositions."<sup>314</sup> The late Professor Carleton H. Parker made clear how the I. W. W. movement in this country is primarily a socio-psychic revolt against intolerable conditions forced upon the working classes in

<sup>313</sup> No good psychological study of revolutions has yet been provided. Le-Bon's ambitious attempt aims primarily to substantiate his own views on social psychology by applying them to the data of the French Revolution and is generally unscientific and unsatisfactory. There are some notable advances over Le Bon in P. Sorokin's, *The Sociology of Revolution*

<sup>314</sup> *The Great Society*, pp. 57 ff

factories, mines and lumber camps.<sup>815</sup> Mr. Ordway Tead has provided a useful summary of the normal human instincts which should find an outlet if the laboring class is to live a happy or contented life, and has made it clear how far most of these instincts are from satisfaction in the modern industrial and political order.

If we accept the results of this suggestive line of work as valid, it must be agreed that most of the great revolutionary upheavals of the past were caused primarily by a psychic explosion after the duration, volume, and acuteness of the repression of the lower class had become no longer endurable. Not only do the revolts against the established order have a vital psychic content, but schemes of social and political reform, like the plots of novelists, are sublimations of the complexes in the unconscious of the reformer and a mode of escape from unpleasant social and political realities. It would probably be most illuminating if it were possible to have a psychoanalytic study to parallel such works as Mumford's *Story of the Utopias*, and Hertzler's *History of Utopian Thought* in order better to appreciate the operation of the mechanisms of the flight from reality and wish-fulfilment.<sup>816</sup> Again, in spite of the frenzied attempts of sociologists and publicists to rationalize the patriotic emotion, no fact could be better established than that patriotism owes its tremendous grip over the human mind to its symbolic power in throwing the mind back upon that age-old instinct of group self-preservation.<sup>817</sup> Finally, as every profound student has freely recognized, the World War has been from its background

<sup>815</sup> See his article on the I. W. W. in the *Atlantic Monthly* for November, 1917.

<sup>816</sup> Cf. S. A. Rice, "Motives in Radicalism and Social Reform," in *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1923, pp. 577-85, and W. F. Ogburn, "Bias, Psychoanalysis, and the Subjective in Relation to Social Science," in *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1922, pp. 62-74.

<sup>817</sup> Cf. F. H. Hankins, "Patriotism and Peace," Founder's Day Address, Clark University, 1919, *Clark College Record*, April, 1919, pp. 114-121, and G. E. Partridge, *The Psychology of Nations*.

to the setting and procedure of the Peace Conference most fundamentally a psychological product, and no hope of an enduring peace can be rationally held unless a favorable psychological environment is created. The psychological mechanisms which emerge in war have been clarified by such writers as Rivers, White, MacCurdy and Ferenczi.<sup>318</sup>

The significance of the modern dynamic psychology for the study of the evolution of social groups and institutions should be readily apparent. Freud has attempted to adapt his psychological system to the explanation of group psychology in his *Totem and Taboo*; and his *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*. The late Professor William Graham Sumner, in his scholarly, suggestive, and comprehensive work on *Folkways*, has shown how the fundamental guide to social conduct in every field is that vast mass of "folkways" and "mores" which have been reduced by habit and repetition to an almost instinctive level, thus making society extremely coercive in enforcing their observance.<sup>319</sup> Sumner did not, however, make sufficiently clear the deeper psychological processes through which these group habits became habitual guides and channels of social conduct. It remained for the English surgeon and social psychologist, Wilfred Trotter, to analyze the nature and effect of that "herd instinct" which has developed as a result of man's having depended for survival and progress upon his life in a social group, which could not have existed and endured without such discipline of its members as was required to give cohesion, unity, and direction to the group. This herd instinct is, however, not merely the basic psychic force preserving and compelling obedience to the folkways and mores, but is also the great factor in enforcing upon the individual mind those repressions of individual impulses and initiative which cause mental insta-

<sup>318</sup> W. A. White, *Thoughts of a Psychiatrist on the War and After*, J. T. MacCurdy, *The Psychology of War*; and E. Jones and S. Ferenczi, *Psychoanalysis and the War Neuroses*.

<sup>319</sup> William Graham Sumner, *Folkways*, particularly Chaps. 1-11, 21, 25.



bility among so large a proportion of the population. Never before was the psychological basis of conservatism so clearly set forth, or its fundamentally instinctive and habitual rather than intellectual nature so clearly proved.<sup>320</sup> A consideration of the whole problem of social dynamics and cultural change, based partly upon anthropology and partly on dynamic psychology, has recently been produced by W. F. Ogburn in his important work, *Social Change*.

Further, it would seem that the modern concept of unconscious factors in psychic life and their relation to group activity furnish the only possible means of reconciling the theory of Durkheim and his school that the social mind is the chief creative force in culture with the doctrines of those who emphasize the all-important nature of individual genius, initiative, and invention.<sup>321</sup> The psychic exuberance and stimulation which comes from close and intimate association in the social group probably results from the fact that this reversion to the intimate association which characterized primitive life puts all the individuals in the group in a more direct contact with the store of psychic energy in their unconscious. It might be objected that this does not touch the matter of those inventive geniuses who have carried on their work in isolation, but it would seem safe to hold that they are only the few exceptions who prove the rule that man's mental activity and enthusiasm for creative work is normally far greater when in intimate association with those engaged upon a similar quest than in isolation. The process of gradually adjusting the individual to social life and institutions through family experiences and education has been well described in Professor E. R. Groves' recent work, *Personality and Social Adjustment*; and Flügel has studied the family from the psychoanalytic point of view. E. D. Mar-

<sup>320</sup> W. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*.

<sup>321</sup> See Durkheim's *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. The contrary view is held in Faguet's *Cult of Incompetence*, W. H. Mallock's *Aristocracy and Evolution*; and E. A. Cram's *The Nemesis of Mediocrity*.

tin has broken new ground in his *Behavior of Crowds*, the first important effort to apply the new dynamic psychology to an explanation of crowd psychology. He has in this work shown that the older explanations of LeBon are obsolete.

There remain to be considered the psychological factors underlying the economic elements in social life. The economic interpretation of history has long been regarded as the last and most effective bulwark of philosophical materialism. Countless pretentious volumes have been directed against it by alarmed idealists and not a few historical scholars have conducted similar attacks.<sup>322</sup> But even before the psychology of the unconscious was generally understood many students of economic history had ceased to claim a primacy for the economic factor as compared with all other elements which make for progress and development, and had held that the psychic factor was obviously the dominant element, though economic processes and institutions might exert a most important influence upon the psychological factors. In an able and suggestive paper Professor William F. Ogburn has carried this line of analysis still further and has pointed out the vital significance of unconscious psychological processes in the field of economic motives and activity. He has shown, among other things, how the economic motives are commonly disguised through the operation of such unconscious mechanisms as displacement, symbolism, projection, compensation, and rationalization. The new psychology would indicate that the greater the emotional indignation which an individual arouses at the charge that his motives are economic at bottom, the more certain we may be that the charge is true. Many minor symptoms indicating the re-

<sup>322</sup> Especially Shailer Mathews in his *The Spiritual Interpretation of History*; and E. D. Adams in his *The Power of Ideals in American History*. There is a judicious interpretation and appraisal of the theory in E. R. A. Seligman's *The Economic Interpretation of History*, and a discriminating application of it in C. A. Beard's *Economic Basis of Politics*.

verse are often but subtle unconscious disguise mechanisms. In a society where economic determinism is not approved no normal man would admit the facts. It was Machiavelli's frankness in this regard that makes his writings startling.<sup>323</sup> If Ogburn's thesis is to be accepted, as it certainly may be in at least a tentative way, it would indicate that the economic factors are more all-embracing and far-reaching than was earlier supposed, and that few are really conscious of the chief driving motives in their lives. In this connection there should also be mentioned the work of Mr. Tead, already referred to, regarding the importance of instinctive psychic reactions in economic life,<sup>324</sup> and the brilliant if incomplete work of the late Professor Parker on both the instinctive and the unconscious psychic factors which lie at the basis of economic life and activity.<sup>325</sup> Thus, it can no longer be denied that even the economic factors in social life cannot be understood in any adequate, fundamental, or dynamic manner without a consideration of these problems in the light of the newer psychology.

<sup>323</sup> William F. Ogburn, "The Psychological Basis for the Economic Interpretation of History," a paper read before the thirty-first annual meeting of the American Economic Association, December, 1918. Printed in the *American Economic Review*, Supplement, March, 1919, pp. 291-305. The tremendous resistance which the newer psychological concepts meet even from original and progressive thinkers may be gleaned from the discussion of Professor Ogburn's paper by Professor Frank Fetter, unquestionably one of the most original of American economists and the most vigorous exponent of the conventional psychological economics. He contemptuously dismissed the Freudian psychology as a "degenerate psychology," giving as his only definite reason the fact that it is rejected by "a number of psychologists and philosophers of the best standing." It was curious that he did not remember that two decades earlier his own now generally accepted views on psychological economics were rejected by most American economists "of the best standing." Cf. Z. C. Dickinson, *Economic Motives*.

<sup>324</sup> Ordway Tead, *Instincts in Industry*.

<sup>325</sup> See his paper on "Motives in Economic Life," read before the American Economic Association, 1917, published in the *American Economic Review*, Supplement, March, 1918. See also his charming biography by his wife, entitled *An American Idyll*, published by the Atlantic Monthly Press, Parker's fragmentary writings, including the valuable papers on "Motives in Economic Life," and "The I W W," are brought together in a volume entitled *The Casual Laborer and Other Essays*. In this connection should also be mentioned Helen Marot's *The Creative Impulse in Industry*, Thorstein Veblen's *The Instinct of Workmanship*; and L. D. Edie, *The Principles of the New Economics*, Part I.

Familiar illustrations from the history of our own country will bear out the assertion that the modern psychological mechanisms will go far towards interpreting more clearly those general policies and attitudes which have played a dominating part in our national history. Especially important in this respect is the application to mass psychology of some of the best known Freudian mechanisms. The significance of this line of approach will be apparent from the citation of a few obvious fields where its application seems likely to be fruitful. How far, for example, was the austere impurity complex of the "glacial age" of New England Puritanism a psychic compensation for economic chicanery in smuggling and the rum-trade? How far were the philosophical discussions and oratorical tirades concerning liberty, natural rights and revolution in the period following 1765 a compensation for and justification of the prevailing system of smuggling? It cannot be without significance that the leading haranguer for liberty in Boston was fed and clothed by the leading smuggler, nor that the most conspicuous name on the Declaration of Independence was that of the most notorious violator of the customs regulations. Again, it would be interesting to know why the public statements of the leading colonial radicals indicate that their fundamental loyalty to Great Britain grew progressively more intense until about July 1, 1776. It has long been suspected and recently been proved that the legalistic arguments over nationalism and states-rights during the first decade of our national history were but the rhetorical drapery which covered the economic interests from which Hamilton and Jefferson drew their supporters. Again, was not Southern chivalry a collective compensation for sexual looseness, racial intermixture and the maltreatment of the negro? The enthusiastic reversion of Southern philosophers before the Civil War to the aristocratic doctrines of Aristotle can be viewed as but a welcome aid to their rationalization of the vested

social and economic interests of slavery. Or, again, as Professor Hankins has suggested, did not the abolitionist zeal of the New England deacons pleasantly obscure the fact that they and their fathers had gained their fortunes from the rum trade with the negroes of the West Indies? Again, were Thad Stevens and his group more eager to preserve the "natural rights" of the Southern negro in the Fourteenth Amendment than were John A. Bingham and his associates to protect thereby the Northern corporation's "nigger in the woodpile"?†

And is the present-day frenzied adulation of the sanctity and fixity of the constitution anything more than the rationalization of a concerted effort to protect and conserve the vested interests that have grown up under the protection of that document and its interpretations? In other words, it is probably but a juristically expressed capitalistic defense-mechanism. Can one well doubt that the elaborate opinions of the Supreme Court in substantiation of its grotesque extension of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the vested interests and to obstruct progressive legislation and constructive labor policies, through such decisions as those in the case of *Lochner vs. New York*, and the *Hitchman Case*, are anything more than a disguise and a secondary rationalization to conceal or dignify its economic sympathies? Is it not most probable that the noble struggle of Judge Gary for the fundamental principles of American liberty and the eternal rights of man in the name of the "open shop" is but a lame effort to arouse public support for an attempt to preserve intact a system of industrial oppression that has been unsparingly criticized in the report of so moderate and distinctly capitalistic an organization as the Interchurch World Movement? <sup>326</sup> Is

†† The most pathological exhibit of this conservative psychosis is contained in the anonymous book, *A History of Organized Felony and Folly*, reprinted from the *Wall Street Journal*. A comparison of Gustavus Myers' *History of the Supreme Court* with J. M. Beck's *Constitution of the United States* would constitute an interesting exercise in psychoanalytic interpretation.

not the unwillingness of the capitalistic press to publish adequate accounts of significant movements and events favorable to socialistic and labor groups analogous to the tendency of the individual to ignore or obscure painful experiences? Certainly the studies made by the *New Republic* of the news accounts of the *New York Times* covering the Bolshevik régime in Russia and the steel strike of 1919 reveal something very similar to the defensive mechanisms of the neurotic patient in avoiding painful or distasteful facts and experiences—in other words, dodging reality. The unwillingness of such conservatives as Ralph Easley and Senator Lusk to recognize the most obvious facts of changing conditions is most certainly evidence of the flight from reality.<sup>327</sup> And such works as the Webbs' *Decay of Capitalist Civilization* are probably but liberal wish-fulfilment rationalizations.

An extremely suggestive attempt has been made to explain the psychology of the American mind as a whole in the above mentioned work of Mr. O'Higgins and Dr. Reede on *The American Mind in Action*. The chapters on this subject constitute the most acute brief analysis of the American psychosis known to the writer and are to be heartily recommended to all Comstockers and Hundred Percenters. The chapters devoted to an indication of the complexes of individual Americans are at times less plausible, but certainly not less stimulating and original. Mr. O'Higgins finds the American to be primarily a Puritan, that is, a Christian of the Pauline variety who views life primarily as an arena for the struggle of the spirit with the ways of the flesh and the devil, which are symbolized and represented by all earthly pleasures, particularly the pleasures of sex. In the new virgin environment of America the Puritan was able to transform a portion of his internal conflict into a struggle with and conquest of nature, a

<sup>327</sup> Cf. W. H. R. Rivers, "Psychology and the War," in *Scribner's Magazine*, August, 1920

feat which has brought him his material prosperity and business sagacity. Rejecting the Catholic mode of securing an anesthetic for the conscience through ritual and sacerdotal intervention, the Puritan achieved the soothing of his conscience (as far as he did it at all) through gaining the esteem of his group. But this was a double-edged device, as it served to render the tyranny of conscience even more comprehensive by making him pathologically sensitive to herd approval and condemnation. The peculiarly important position of the mother in the Puritan family made possible a partial compensation or substitute for the lack of a healthy sexual life and expression by means of a common form of emotional infantilism—the hold-over of the mother-image into the adult life, and the psychic transference to the mother of much of the repressed sexual energy.

In spite of the progress of enlightenment little has been achieved to rid the typical American of the Puritan neurosis, as rational education has not yet entered the field of morals and conduct, and the American still is afflicted in youth by the inculcation of the Pauline view of religion and morals. In some cases education has actually affected him adversely by destroying the efficacy of the forms of orthodox belief and practice, which earlier furnished a means of resolving to some degree his perpetual internal conflict, without at the same time affording direction and guidance in a sane theory of conduct. At the opposite pole in many ways was another early American type, the Virginian, which represented the leisurely and cultured European gentleman transferred to America. But the United States was destined to be an industrial society, and in the economic struggle the urbane Virginian was no match for the shrewd and restless Puritan with his boundless energy created by the necessity of working off his intolerable psychic conflicts.

The treatment of the mind of the American woman is

less important, but significant. It emphasizes the manner in which the impurity-complex prevents any sex-education in the home; how the informal sex education or experience gained through playmates and associates intensifies the Puritan sense of guilt and shame; the psycho-genesis and apotheosis of the "home-and-mother type" of woman in America; the rise of the "chorus-girl" and flapper type as a revolt and her struggle with the home-and-mother type for ascendancy with the American male; and the effect of the intellectual, economic and political emancipation of woman on the feminine mind in America.

Some might urge that Mr. O'Higgins had reversed cause and effect; that the American has not been industrious because he is a Puritan neurotic, but has become the typical Puritan because industry and self-denial were essential to the success of an ambitious but impecunious population in a new and undeveloped country. Doubtless there is much to be said for both viewpoints. And too much of an impression of chastity and celibacy is created in his analysis of the Puritan. There have been few more licentious types than the Puritan, as Mencken and others have repeatedly pointed out, though his lust was usually indulged in an approved and institutionalized fashion, namely, in the family embrace. What the Puritan lost in extra-conjugal amorosity he made up for in domestic uxoriousness, and Drs. Robie and Lay could uncover evidence in support of their "plea for monogamy" by an examination of the series of gravestones in New England cemeteries attesting to the plural sacrifice of wives to the virility of Puritan deacons. And not a little Puritan ardor is known to be but over-compensation for surreptitious achievement.<sup>328</sup>

In concluding this discussion of the relation of instinctive and unconscious mental activity to the psychological

<sup>328</sup> Cf. A. Tridon, *Psychoanalysis and Behavior*, pp. 252-66; and H. L. Mencken, *A Book of Prefaces*, pp. 197-283.



interpretation of history, it should be pointed out that these concepts greatly strengthen the notion of the continuity of history. It means that not only are the external or conscious aspects of culture handed down by education and other agencies, but also a vastly greater and more effective body of psychic motives and impulses are preserved in the realm of instincts and the unconscious.

### III. SUMMARY

In this chapter, after describing certain relevant developments in the field of psychology, the attempt was first made to show the development of scientific historiography to the point where it has provided a vast storehouse of relatively accurate data for the historian; it was then shown that the work in this field of collecting sources and writing narrative political history was beginning to be supplemented by the next natural development of historical science, namely, the interpretation of this vast amount of data in order to learn its significance in explaining the present order of things. Lamprecht's ingenious attempt at a schematic socio-psychological interpretation of history was briefly described and its defects noted; Professor Robinson's views on this subject were then examined and the reasons were stated for believing that his prospectus marked a scientific advance over the system of Lamprecht through its wholly inductive procedure and its greater allowance for the individual psychic factors; finally, the more recent developments in psychology connected with the discovery of the importance of the instinctive and unconscious factors in psychic motives and impulses were mentioned and very briefly described, with a tentative survey of some possible applications of these new discoveries to the interpretation of historical material.

Whatever value one may assign to the psychological interpretation of history it must be admitted that it is yet but in its initial stages, and it would be rash to hope that

it will gain in strength and volume with phenomenal rapidity in the near future. The great majority of "respectable" historians in most countries deny that history should concern itself at all with the problems of interpretation, or that it has any vital function in explaining the relation of the past to the present. Further, among the minority who believe that the interpretation of history marks the completion of scientific method in historiography, there is a division of opinion as to the most fundamental "interpretation." Finally, even those who accept the psychological interpretation of history are likely for some time to come to reject the more startling and original innovations such as the psychology of instincts, behaviorism, and above all, the new dynamic psychology of the unconscious. But no one need despair of a science which could advance from a Gregory of Tours to a Waitz, an Aulard, a Gardiner or an Osgood, and from Aulard and Gardiner to Lamprecht, Turner, Robinson, and Shotwell. We can even imagine that a century hence a knowledge of that branch of psychology which Freud and his followers have elaborated will be regarded as a tool of the historian which is as indispensable to his success as Giry's manual on *Diplomatic* is to the present-day student of historical documents.

## SELECTED REFERENCES

- G. S. Brett, *A History of Psychology*  
 M. M. Davis, *Psychological Interpretations of Society*.  
 W. Dilthey, *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften*  
 A. A. Goldenweiser, "History, Psychology and Culture," in  
*Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*,  
 October 10, and 24, 1918  
 J. K. Hart, *The Discovery of Intelligence*.  
 K. Jung, *Psychological Types*  
 K. Lamprecht, *What is History?*  
 L. Lévy-Bruhl, *Primitive Mentality*.  
 E. D. Martin, *Psychology: What It Has to Teach You*  
 W. L. Northridge, *Modern Theories of the Unconscious*.  
 W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change*

H. O'Higgins and E. H. Reede, *The American Mind in Action*.

G. E. Partridge, *The Genetic Philosophy of Education*.

J. H. Randall, Jr., *The Modern Mind: Its Origins and Development*.

O. Rank and H. Sachs, *The Significance of Psychoanalysis for the Mental Sciences*.

J. H. Robinson, *Mind in the Making*.

F. Wittels, *Sigmund Freud*

W. Wundt, *Elements of Folk Psychology*.

## CHAPTER IV

### SOME CONTRIBUTIONS OF ANTHROPOLOGY TO HISTORY \*

#### I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTHROPOLOGY.

**U**NDoubtedly the first requisite of a chapter on the relation between anthropology and history is to arrive at a clear understanding of what is meant by anthropology. For this purpose the definitions by Professors Marett and Boas will serve fairly well. Marett holds that

Anthropology is the whole history of man as fired and pervaded by the idea of evolution. Man in evolution—that is the subject in its full reach. Anthropology studies man as he occurs at all known times. It studies him as he occurs in all known parts of the world. It studies him body and mind together—as a bodily organism, subject to conditions operating in time and space, which bodily organism is in intimate relation with a psychic life, also subject to the same conditions. Having an eye to such conditions from first to last, it seeks to plot out the general series of the changes, bodily and mental together, undergone by man in the course of his history.<sup>1</sup>

In much the same spirit Professor Boas declares anthropology to be

The science that endeavors to reconstruct the early history of mankind and that tries, wherever possible, to express in the form of laws ever-recurring modes of historical happenings. Since written history covers a brief span of time, and relates in fragmentary records the fates of a few only of the multitude of peoples of the earth, the anthropologist must endeavor by methods of his own to clear up the darkness of past ages and of remote parts of the world. . . .

It implies also a point of view fundamentally distinct from

\* Paper prepared for Section H, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Cincinnati, Ohio, December 29, 1923.

<sup>1</sup>R. R. Marett, *Anthropology*, pp. 7-8

that of history in the narrow sense of the term. In history we are, on the whole, concerned with events only that have had an influence upon the development of our own civilization; in anthropology the life of every people of the world is equally important. . . . It will thus be seen that anthropology differs from history, and resembles the natural sciences in its endeavor to disregard the subjective values of historical happenings that it tries to consider them objectively, simply as a sequence of events, regardless of their influence upon the course of our own civilization.

In the vastness of the outlook over the unwritten history of past ages, the individual is merged entirely in the social unit of which he forms a part, and we see in the dim distance of time and space only the movements of peoples, the emergence of new types of man, the gradual development of new forms of civilization, and a constant repetition of processes of integration and disintegration of peoples and cultures. Prehistoric remains, characteristics of bodily form, traits of language, industrial and economic achievements, peculiar customs and beliefs, are the only evidence that we can use,—evidence that was little regarded by history until the anthropological standpoint began to develop.\*

While in the earlier period of the development of anthropology students of primitive culture tended to interest themselves in nearly every phase of primitive culture, archeological as well as institutional, as is well illustrated by the achievements of such men as Tylor and Lubbock, the general tendency in recent years has been towards a threefold division of labor in the fields of archeology, physical anthropology, and culture institutions.

The foundations of the basic concepts of "prehistoric" archeology go back to the Greek and Roman philosophers and poets, Lucretius having definitely recognized the sequence of the stone, bronze and iron ages. This vague intuition of the great Roman poet-philosopher was reduced to a systematic basis by Thomsen, the curator of the Copenhagen Museum, in 1834, when he classified and arranged his museum exhibits according to a stone, bronze and iron sequence. This feat, however, added nothing to our knowledge of the significance or antiquity of such materials. The next step was to prove that the stone implements were

\* F. Boas, *Anthropology: A Lecture*, pp. 8-9.

those actually used by our human progenitors many thousands of years ago. This discovery was the work of the persistent and industrious French investigator, J. Boucher de Perthes, who began his systematic exploration of the cultural remains of the Somme Valley about 1839, and in 1846 published his work on primitive industry. In this he alleged that these stone implements and weapons of demonstrable geological antiquity were genuine human artifacts. At first ridiculed, his hypothesis was accepted and sustained by the leading archeologists of his day, including Sir John Evans. After the middle of the last century there was a twofold and cumulative progress in archeological work; continuous discovery of new material was paralleled by progress in its sequential classification. In the "sixties" Sir John Lubbock separated the stone age into two distinct periods or ages, the paleolithic and the neolithic. By 1861 E. Lartet had made the discoveries which led him to divide the paleolithic into the upper and lower paleolithic. Before the end of the decade Gabriel de Mortillet, in his *Essai de classification* (1869), had laid the basis for our present detailed subdivisions of the paleolithic from the pre-Chellean to the Azilian. This process was concluded early in the present century by Edouard Piette and Henri Breuil. Along with this work on the paleolithic went corresponding studies of the neolithic, and the labors of R. Munro, F. Keller, W. Bolsche, J. Heierlei, R. R. Schmidt, A. Schenk and O. Montelius led to a subdivision of this age into at least three definite periods: the Campignian, the Robenhausian, and the Carnacean or megalithic. Finally, since 1902, A. Rutot, the ingenious Belgian archeologist, has vindicated the earlier hypothesis of the Abbé Bourgeois as to a pre-paleolithic age, and has definitely established the existence of a long eolithic age preceding the paleolithic. The stone age has been connected with the metal ages, and the chronology of the latter worked out by O. Montelius for Scandinavia, J. Déchelette

for Gaul, Montelius, V. I. Modestov and T. E. Peet for Italy, and R. Dussaud and J. DeMorgan for the near Orient.

Once the general chronology of the pre-literary period had been established through the discovery and classification of the primitive artifacts, the next problem was to develop the archeological synthesis for the various European areas. This was achieved for France by E. Cartailhac, H. Breuil, M. Boule, and J. Déchelette; and Rutot proved the unity of the pre-literary cultures of France and Belgium. Cartailhac performed the task for Spain and adjacent islands. R. R. Schmidt and H. Obermaier have synthesized German archeology, Montelius that of Scandinavia, Modestov and Peet that of Italy, and Rice Holmes, Boyd Dawkins, O. G. S. Crawford, R. A. MacAlister, Harold Peake, and M. Burkitt that of the British Isles. The remaining step was to build upon such great monographs a complete synthesis of the entire pre-literary period for all of Europe. This achievement has been the work of an American scholar, George Grant MacCurdy; and another American worker in the field, H. H. Wilder, has outlined the prehistory of both Europe and America. American archeology was scientifically launched by Frederic Ward Putnam.<sup>8</sup>

Inevitably closely connected with the archeology of the preliterate period has been the development of physical anthropology, or the discovery, study and serial arrangement of the early types of man. The basis for this was laid by J. F. Blumenbach, P. Camper, and A. Retzius before the enunciation of the theory of evolution. It was carried

<sup>8</sup> On this development of archeology see A. C. Haddon, *History of Anthropology*, Chaps. iv, viii, E. O. James, *Anthropology*, Chap. 1, H. F. Osborn, *Men of the Old Stone Age*, pp. 1-47. Representative works are H. F. Osborn, *Men of the Old Stone Age*, J. M. Tyler, *The New Stone Age in Northern Europe*, R. R. Schmidt, *Die deluviale Vorzeit Deutschlands*, H. Obermaier, *Der Mensch der Vorzeit*, E. Cartailhac, *La France préhistorique*, J. Déchelette, *Manuel d'archéologie préhistorique*, T. E. Peet, *The Stone and Bronze Ages in Italy*, V. I. Modestov, *Introduction à l'histoire romaine*, O. Montelius, *Kulturgegeschichte Schwedens*, T. R. Holmes, *Ancient Britain*; M. Burkitt, *Prehistory*, O. G. S. Crawford, *Man and His Past*, G. G. MacCurdy, *Human Origins*, H. H. Wilder, *Man's Prehistoric Past*; J. De Morgan, *Prehistoric Man*.

forward in application to both contemporary and early types of man by Huxley, Broca, Topinard, Virchow and others, until it has been systematized in the great manual of Rudolf Martin, *Lehrbuch der Anthropologie* (1914). Among the most competent physical anthropologists of the present day, in addition to Martin, are Arthur Keith, W. L. H. Duckworth, J. Ranke, and Alš Hrdlička. Working with biologists and comparative anatomists they have established the facts of human physical evolution, and in collaboration with the archeologists they have, as far as possible, correlated and synchronized the skeletal remains with the cultural artifacts and periods. Both archeologists and physical anthropologists have been greatly aided in their chronological and other efforts by the geologists who have shown an interest in the problems of the geological background and setting of human origins, such as A. Penck, E. Brückner, J. Geikie and W. J. Sollas.<sup>4</sup>

The progress of scientific method and the accumulation of concrete information in the field of the study of primitive culture and institutional life paralleled the development of archeology and physical anthropology. The earliest group of workers in this field attempted to apply the concepts of biological evolution to cultural and institutional development. This implied a somewhat uncritical assumption that culture develops in orderly fashion from the simple to the complex. Schemes of institutional evolution were formulated in a partially *a priori* fashion, and concrete evidence then sought to substantiate this framework of development. A vast mass of concrete anthropological material was assembled by this school and the comparative method thoroughly established, but the systems were dubious and the details of their work often highly unreliable. Among the members of this group of workers should be listed Sir John Lubbock, J. F. McLennan, Herbert Spen-

<sup>4</sup>On the development of physical anthropology see A. C. Haddon, *History of Anthropology*, Chaps. 1-11.



cer, E. B. Tylor, Andrew Lang, W. Robertson Smith, J. G. Frazer, E. S. Hartland, E. Crawley, E. Westermarck, F. B. Jevons, A. H. Post, Charles Letourneau, Lewis H. Morgan, and Daniel G. Brinton. Of these Morgan was the most influential, Frazer the most productive, Tylor the most scholarly, and Letourneau the most reckless and unreliable. While most of this early work was done by Europeans, they aroused interest in America. Morgan was, of course, an American scholar. Bastian strongly influenced Daniel G. Brinton who did notable work in ethnic psychology and the study of primitive religions. But American anthropology owes its systematic origins to Frederic Ward Putnam. He founded the departments of anthropology at Harvard and California, established the archeological museums at California, Chicago, New York and Harvard, and was the teacher of Boas and the Harvard archeologists.

A more chastened and careful methodology was introduced by a number of European anthropologists, such as W. H. R. Rivers, A. M. Hocart, R. R. Marett, A. C. Haddon, and N. W. Thomas in England; Durkheim and his followers in France; and H. Schurtz, H. Cunow, F. Graebner, W. Schmidt, and P. Ehrenreich in central Europe. But the greatest progress in anthropological method and in the study of primitive institutional life has been the work of the American anthropologists, particularly Franz Boas and his students. Trained originally in Germany as a physicist, Boas did his first anthropological work on the ethnogeography of the Arctic areas. He then entered a long period of museum work, and explorations in the field, particularly in the cultures of the northwest Pacific area. Finally locating at Columbia University, he has trained up the most scholarly and active group of anthropologists in the world. He has himself mastered every phase of anthropological work from physical anthropology to linguistics, and will probably be the last to do so, on account of the rapid growth of the data and complexity of anthropology.



FRANZ BOAS



The chief distinguishing characteristics of this school are its scientific methodology, its insistence that careful and extensive field work must precede generalizations, and its avoidance of all preconceived dogmas, whether of the older evolutionists or the more recent exponents of the hypothesis of cultural diffusion, such as Graebner, Elliot Smith, and Rivers.<sup>5</sup> Along with Boas's students, C. Wissler, A. L. Kroeber, R. H. Lowie and A. A. Goldenweiser, should be mentioned the enterprising Harvard group, R. B. Dixon, A. M. Tozzer and E. A. Hooton, and a number of industrious members of the staff of the Bureau of American Ethnology. The increasing amount of data and the growth of the complexity of anthropology are illustrated by the tendency of even these students of primitive culture and institutions to specialize in some special phase of the subject, such as Rivers and Lowie on social organization; Goldenweiser on social organization and religion; Durkheim and his school on religion; Lévy-Bruhl, Wundt, Vierkandt, and Preuss on primitive psychology; and W. Schmidt, Sapir, Swanton, and Michelson on linguistics. Of all the social scientists there is little doubt that the anthropologists of the critical school have worked out the most impressive and precise methodology and have executed the most reliable achievements in the elucidation of various phases of human culture and its development. And the chronological sweep and methodological approach of anthropology, as well as its interest in the origins of every aspect of human culture, lead many to look upon it as the best of all introductions to social science and the study of man as a whole.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup>In his *Man and Culture* Wissler seems to have capitulated to the diffusionist group

<sup>6</sup>On the history of institutional and cultural anthropology see Haddon, op. cit., Chaps. VII-XII, A. A. Goldenweiser, in H. E. Barnes (Ed.), *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, Chap. V, "Four Phases of Anthropological Thought," in *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1921. Representative books illustrating the development of the subject are L. H. Morgan, *Ancient Society*, E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, E. Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, W. H. R. Rivers, *The History of Melanesian Society*, F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive*

## II. THE OLDER ANTHROPOLOGY AND CONVENTIONAL HISTORY.

In any attempt to discuss the relation of anthropology to history care must be taken to indicate the type of anthropology and history under discussion, as the difference between the anthropology of Lewis H. Morgan and that of Franz Boas and his disciples is exceeded only by the divergence between the history of Von Ranke and Droysen and that of Breasted, F. J. Turner, or Preserved Smith.<sup>7</sup> While most of the specific positions and theories of the older comparative or classical anthropology from Lubbock to Frazer and Westermarck have been superseded by more tenable doctrines, the older anthropology made one great contribution to dynamic history, however little it may have been appropriated by historians, namely, the comparative point of view and the provision of an enormous amount of ethnographic material to illustrate it. This should have destroyed for all time the notion of the uniqueness of race, institutions or culture, and have overcome much of that chauvinism and bigotry which have been such a fatal burden upon western civilization during the last century. It should also have stimulated the interest in culture as against episodes and anecdotes as the chief occupation of those concerned with the past record of mankind. In short, as to point of view and general orientation, it might well have been nearly as serviceable to the historian as the more reliable cultural anthropology of the present day.

In spite of these potential contributions of anthropology to history in the last century, it was but little exploited. The great majority of historians were not interested in cultural evolution, but rather in dramatic episodes connected with the military, diplomatic and political history of a par-

Man, A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*; A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology*, C. Wissler, *Man and Culture*, and A. M. Tozzer, *Social Origins and Social Continuities*

<sup>7</sup> A. A. Goldenweiser, "Four Stages of Anthropological Thought," in *Publishings of the American Sociological Society*, 1921, H. E. Barnes, "The Past and the Future of History," in *Historical Outlook*, February, 1921.

ticular state. At best, the older history, looking upon the political states as the supreme human institution and the focussing point of all human activities and cultural achievements, provided a detailed description of certain political processes and an analysis of the development and operation of some typical political institutions. Far more frequently the older political history consisted in the most monotonous massing of a vast body of synchronous or consecutive episodes that took place in the political or diplomatic fields, which could have no significance whatever until sifted and utilized by the institutional and interpretative historian.\*

In regard to theories of cultural evolution the general position of the older anthropology was that of independent development of cultural parallelisms and identities, thus emphasizing the element of human originality and inventiveness and the uniformity of the general course of cultural development in all areas, however lacking in synchronism these cultural stages might be in different portions of the globe. With the exception of Buckle, there were few of the older generation of historians who were interested in cultural development or the laws governing it. Some, such as Freeman and Fiske, occupied with proving the Anglo-Saxon claim to supremacy through the Aryan heritage, showed some elementary concern and insight in regard to the institutional evolution of the so-called Aryan peoples, but the conventional historian started from the concept of the unique rather than the comparative and universal, usually not at all interested in culture, to say nothing of the laws of its development and diffusion.†

In general, the only interest shown in cultural progress was manifested by those who were on the periphery of the historical circle—men not really admitted to be true his-

\*The greater part of Goode's admirable *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century* is devoted to a summary description of this type of historical work.

†*Ibid.*, Chap. xviii, *Publications of the American Economic Association*, Vol. V, No. 2, pp. 190 ff., F. M. Fling, *The Writing of History*.

torians by the elect. As examples of this type of approach to cultural evolution might be mentioned Vico, with his notion of the spiral nature of progress, Turgot, with his concept of the cumulative nature of culture and the continuity of historical development, Voltaire's emphasis on national character, which was to be exaggerated by the Romantics, Condorcet's view of the importance of natural and applied science in cultural progress, and Comte's attempt to work out a socio-psychological interpretation of the history of civilization<sup>10</sup> For the most part the historians interested in causation followed Carlyle in assigning the initiating factor to great personalities, adhered to the catastrophic interpretation of Robertson, Symonds, Macaulay and Lamartine, advanced the theological approach of Janssen and Schaff, or combined all three in the spirit of Bancroft.<sup>11</sup>

The contributions of the so-called "pre-historic" archeology in the way of furnishing the proper time perspective for the historian had become assured, definite and important by the time of Mortillet, shortly after the close of the American Civil War. Yet a great majority of the historical works of the last half century conform as well in their orientation to the requirements of a planet and race created in 4004 B. C. as to those of a planet of infinite age and a race with a long animal ancestry and an independent existence of more than a quarter of a million years. In fact, it is highly probable that even many of the greatest of the historians of this age would have willingly subscribed to the doctrine of a special creation of relative recency. The case of Bishop Stubbs is but representative. The oft-cited case of Mommsen—a historian of antiquity—who did not learn of the ice-age until he had completed most of his historical work is an impressive illustration

<sup>10</sup> See J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress*

<sup>11</sup> Goebel, *op. cit.*, Chap. xvii, and pp. 227-8, 294-304, 403-7, 534 ff.; J. S. Bassett, *The Middle Group of American Historians*

of the ignoring of pre-literary history as the key to the approach to the period of written history. Rarely, indeed, did even the historians of national culture begin their researches with an investigation of the remains of the "pre-historic" period. About the only contributions of archeology which were exploited by the older school of historians were those of Champollion and Lepsius in Egypt, Rawlinson in Mesopotamia, and Schliemann in Greece and the Ægean, most or all of these dealing with cultural remains falling well within the period since October 23, 4004 B.C. One cannot imagine any of the older Egyptologists presenting a picture with the perspective and sweep of Professor Breasted's famous lectures on "The Origins of Civilization." Yet even their preliminary "feelers" in the field of archeology held their dangers for the pious chronology, as it later furnished the evidence on which to base the knowledge that the Egyptians had reached a height of civilization sufficient to work out a solar calendar no less than two hundred and thirty-seven years before Adam's cosmic début.<sup>12</sup>

The most impressive proposition of physical anthropology, namely, that man is a part of the animal kingdom with a mammalian heritage and characteristics, was rarely appropriated by the older historians. To have viewed man as an animal making an ever better adjustment to a progressively more complex environment; to have held that the chief reason for his triumph over the other members of the animal kingdom was his superior capacity to stand on his hind legs, thus leaving his forepaws free for the acquisition of ever greater skill in prehensile talent and "handiness"; to have contended that the handiness thus developed was probably one of the chief causes for the unique growth and development of the human brain; and to have maintained that, in spite of these all-important specific superiorities, man is, as Dr. Kunkel has shown,

<sup>12</sup> Gooch, op cit., Chaps. XXIV-XXV.



markedly inferior in many physical traits and capacities to other animals, would have been inexpressibly shocking to the generation of Stubbs and Von Ranke. Most of them looked upon him as the product of a unique divine fiat, ruled by an immortal soul continually wavering before the conflicting impingement of God-given inhibitions and diabolical seductions. This colored their whole attitude towards human motives, responses and conduct. In regard to race they shared the notion of the descent of the present races from the sons of Noah following their dispersal. In most cases, they accepted the view of Gobineau as to the indisputable and comprehensive superiority of the white stock, and of the "Aryan race" within the white group. Historians who considered this problem at all, under the spell of nationalism, almost invariably limited their efforts to aiding the philologists and pseudo-anthropologists in the attempted proof of the exclusive existence of the true Aryan heritage within their own national boundaries. One of the most acrimonious of these conflicts was the clash of Teutonism and Gallicanism, as represented by the Maurers and Fustel de Coulanges; and our own and the English historians were chiefly affected by that aspect of the illusion known today as "the Anglo-Saxon Myth."<sup>18</sup>

In spite of the fact that much valuable work has been done on the relation between culture and the physical environment before 1870 by such men as Montesquieu, Herder, Ritter, Guyot and Peschel, their results were little appropriated by historians. Even in the case of the few who showed an interest in cultural development *Geist* was estimated as of far greater potency than geography. The environmental interpretation seemed to savor of materialism, in spite of the fact that there are most evident mystical and religious strains in the interpretations of both Guyot

<sup>18</sup> Gooch, *op cit.*, pp. 122-55, 209-13, 289-90, 340-52, W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer*, Chap. viii. Cf. John Fiske, *American Political Ideals*, and H. J. Ford, "The Anglo-Saxon Myth," in *American Mercury*, September, 1924.

and Ritter. Buckle alone showed enthusiasm for the geographical hypothesis, and he was not a man of his generation. On the whole, the appropriation of geographical data by historians in this period from 1750 to 1890 was slight, and limited to such phases as the emphasis upon the relation between geography and commerce and colonization by such followers of Montesquieu as Robertson, Raynal and Heeren, the appropriation of certain impulses from Ritter by Curtius, Freeman, Duruy and Riehl, and the investigation of the geographic basis of national origins and expansion by such historians as Michelet, Green and Winsor. Buckle was almost universally condemned by the respectable historians of his generation. And even Buckle was not able to weigh the relative influence of physical and cultural factors with the objectivity and precision of the modern critical anthropologists.<sup>14</sup>

In the field of the analysis of the origin and genesis of religious phenomena and institutions extremely important contributions to the comparative point of view had been worked out by Spencer, Lubbock and Tylor in the days of Ranke, Freeman and Stubbs, but few historians of this age departed from the supernaturalism of Orosius and Augustine, with its whole-hearted acceptance of the unique validity of the Christian Epic. Gibbon, of course, had attempted to treat Christianity from the comparative and objective point of view of Voltaire, but he was a Rationalist of the eighteenth century, while the majority of nineteenth century historians were victims of the pietistic renaissance which began with men like Paley, and the Oxford group and has persisted until our own day. This made it practically impossible for the older historians to take an objective and unemotional attitude towards religious problems in general, to pursue intelligently the study of the genesis of religious beliefs, to deal fairly with the religion and institutions

<sup>14</sup> Gooch, *op. cit.*, pp. 179, 346-52, 357-8, 475-8, 574-7, 585; E. Fueter, *L'Histoire de l'historiographie moderne*, pp. 450, 475-8.

of non-Christian peoples, or to take an unbiased attitude towards the quarrels of Christian sects and creeds. The anecdote of Bishop Stubbs sneaking a rationalistic book from "Johnny" Green and throwing it into a waste paper basket is illuminating and characteristic. Further, this not only invalidated their treatment of religious history, and much related political history, but also produced a highly subjective attitude towards ethical problems. These they generally viewed in terms of the impurity-complex of western Christianity, thus failing to appreciate the greater adequacy of certain "heathen" oriental ethical codes which insisted that proper conduct consisted in more than formal and external sexual purity and required that a man be broadly honest and sympathetic in his relations with his fellow-creatures. Again, this pietistic supernaturalism often combined with nationalism to produce a mystical chauvinism, with its hypothesis of special divine solicitude for the political development and expansion of some particular national state.<sup>16</sup>

Anthropologists had by the time of Morgan executed an impressive, if somewhat dubious, synthesis of the evolution of various forms of social organization, but it was a rare historian who showed any special interest in their achievements. In general, to this generation, whose ideals were well epitomized in Freeman's phrase that "history is past politics," the problems of social organization were largely circumscribed by the evolution of the state. Even here, except for such works as those by Waitz and Gneist, the interest was not in those broad and fundamental questions of political genesis which were dealt with in the works of Spencer, Gumplowicz, Ratzenhofer and Novicow, or Fustel, Maitland, Brunner and Violet, but rather in some particular political issues, institutions or units believed to have a special importance for problems of representative gov-

<sup>16</sup> Goech, *op cit*, Chaps xviii, xxvi-xxvii, E. C. Moore, *Protestant Thought since Kant*, A. Macdonald, *Trade, Politics and Christianity*

ernment or democracy. These consisted mainly in the genesis of representative government and the migration of the "democratic" folk-moot from the forests of primitive Germany to the Parliament of England and the New England town-meeting. There has been no more grotesque error in political history than the allegation of the derivation of democracy from the Teutonic folk-moot, yet all of this mythology could have been nipped in the bud by a proper comprehension of the wide distribution of tribal institutions of a similar sort—a fact of common knowledge to the most elementary student of anthropology even in 1870.

With respect to law, most political historians were far more affected by the natural law theory, the Austinian analytical approach, or the *Staatsrechtslehre* of German students than by the historical jurisprudence of Maine or the comparative point of view of Post and Ihering, both of whom were profoundly influenced by the anthropologists. And as to the institution of property the majority of the historians were thoroughly imbued with the ideals of the Protestant *Ethik* and the new capitalism, and looked upon private property as one of the most sacred and basic institutions, whose foundations were implanted in the very nature of man from the beginning by the designing and benevolent will of God. The few who departed from this notion were mainly Socialistic historians, who went to an equally untenable extreme by appealing to anthropology and history to support the thesis of the natural preference and adaptability of man to that communism which nature had intended to be his lot. A straightforward study of the facts about the genesis of property, such as those by Hobhouse and Lowie, would have been uncongenial to both alike. In regard to the relative importance of individual and social factors, there was little recourse to anthropology to discover the actual facts as disclosed by human organization and development, but rather the definite and dogmatic

assumption of the superiority of the individual-psychic factor. While all did not go to the Carlylian extreme, the great man theory held an almost undisputed supremacy among the historians of the last century, and the great men were believed to be those eminent in military, diplomatic and political history. The dissent of Spencer, Riehl, Freytag, Marx, Buckle and Green was not widely noticed or generally heeded.<sup>16</sup>

### III. CRITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE NEWER HISTORY.

Quite in contrast with the general lack of any significant collaboration between the older anthropology and the conventional episodial political historical writing, has been the very real appropriation of the contributions of the critical cultural anthropology by the exponents of dynamic cultural history. In fact, in many ways one might well regard anthropology as perhaps the most satisfactory and significant background and introduction to cultural history.<sup>17</sup>

In regard to theories of cultural evolution, anthropology has been of great service to the newer history. By its broad sweep in sketching the evolution of human culture in all stages of growth, it has offered an impressive picture of its remarkable unity in time and space, while at the same time indicating many significant differences in matters of detail.<sup>18</sup> In dealing with the matter of the evolution of culture

<sup>16</sup> Gooch, *op cit*, Chaps. xv, xvii, xviii; C. A. Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States*, Chap. 1, P. V. N. Myers, *History as Past Ethics*, T. Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, E. R. A. Seligman, *The Economic Interpretation of History*, H. L. Stewart, "Carlyle's Conception of History," in *Political Science Quarterly*, December, 1917, W. R. Thayer, *The Art of Biography*. For a good summary of the "Folk-moot" stage of institutional political history see G. E. Howard, *Local Constitutional History of the United States*, and Fiske, *American Political Ideals*.

<sup>17</sup> A. A. Goldenweiser, "History, Psychology, and Culture," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, October 10, 24, 1918, F. J. Teggart, "Anthropology and History," *Ibid*, December 4, 1919, W. H. R. Rivers, "History and Ethnology," *History*, July, 1920, W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change*, A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology*, Chaps. xiv-xv.

<sup>18</sup> C. Wissler, *Man and Culture*, Haskovits and Willey, "The Cultural Approach to Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, September, 1923; Kroeber, *op cit*, Chaps. viii-ix; and E. Sapir, "Culture, Genuine and Spurious," in *American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1924.

the critical anthropologists have given up the reliance solely upon the doctrine of independent development, which characterized the classical school, and have shown the significance of such processes as the diffusion of culture and cultural convergence in producing identities and parallelisms. While some, like Graebner and Elliot Smith, have gone too far in emphasis upon diffusion, most of the critical group recognize the importance of all of these processes and are interested chiefly in discovering which has been most potent at any particular time or place in regard to some specific cultural complex. Probably the reason for the far greater development of refined methodology in regard to the analysis of cultural growth in anthropology, as compared with history, is to be found in the fact that the paucity of material at the disposal of the anthropologist necessitated the utmost care in cultural reconstruction, while the great mass of data available for the historian encouraged carelessness about method or the ignoring of method altogether, except in regard to the matter of ascertaining accuracy of text or fact.

This achievement has for the first time given the historian a firm basis for the doctrine of the unity of history. Again, it has furnished him with a proper temporal and cultural perspective and shown the fallacies and futility of the older methods of dividing history into chronological stages or periods. Continuity in either progress or regression, rather than breaks and stages, seems to be the method and process of cultural growth. The more progressive historians have thus come to look upon the periodization of history as a purely artificial device, justifiable only on the basis of pedagogical simplification.<sup>19</sup> Even more important, anthropology has at last convinced some historians that human culture is the dynamic factor and the vital raw

<sup>19</sup> *Evolution in Modern Thought* (Bon and Liveright Modern Library), Chap. ix, F. S. Marvin, *The Living Past, Progress and History, The Unity of Western Civilization*, H. Berr, *La Synthèse en histoire*, B. Croce, *History: Its Theory and Practice*, Part I, Chap. vii.

material of history, and has thus created what may be called in the most accurate sense *Kulturgeschichte*. While theoretical formulations of this approach to history have been chiefly the work of a few men like Lamprecht, Breysig, Steinhausen and others of the Leipzig School, Henri Berr, J. T. Shotwell, and F. J. Teggart have made notable concrete contributions to this field.<sup>20</sup>

To enumerate the vast number of contributors to special phases and periods of cultural development would be quite beyond the scope of this chapter, but one can mention various ambitious efforts to survey the history of human culture as something of a unity. Notable among these has been the famous course of James Harvey Robinson on the history of the intellectual class in Europe, which he has popularized in his two books, *Mind in the Making*, and *The Humanizing of Knowledge*. A similar effort has been made to cover the history of material culture in the west by Professor J. T. Shotwell.<sup>21</sup> F. S. Marvin, in his two stimulating books, *The Living Past*, and *The Century of Hope*, as well as in the volumes of the Unity Series which he has organized and edited, has done much to arouse an interest in the history of civilization among English readers. Even more important have been the efforts to work out great coöperative sets on the history of western civilization. The first of these efforts was that edited by Helmolt. P. Hinnenberg planned a much more comprehensive set of volumes. An even more promising series is now being initiated by Henri Berr, entitled *L'Evolution de l'Humanité*. But even the most progressive historians have not greatly concerned themselves with the laws and processes of cultural development as embodied in the discussion of the relative importance of independent development, convergence and diffusion, though these would be of great service in analyz-

<sup>20</sup> As above, and K. Lamprecht, *What Is History?*, F. J. Teggart, *The Processes of History*, and Gooch, op. cit., Chap. xxviii.

<sup>21</sup> The nature of this course is indicated by my syllabus on *The Social History of the Western World*.

ing the process of the Europeanization of the world since 1500. Yet we may be sure that as the interest in history shifts from events to civilization, there is bound to be more emphasis on the laws of the development of culture and more reliance upon method in cultural reconstruction. Further, there can be no doubt that anthropology has broadened the interest of the historian in another way, namely, by helping to arouse his interest in the cultures of non-European peoples.<sup>22</sup>

The newer type of historian has also greatly profited by the remarkable progress in "pre-historic" archeology in the last generation. The detailed work of many investigators in various areas has been synthesized by Déchelette, Schmidt, Obermaier, Rutot, Osborn, Tyler, De Morgan, Wilder and MacCurdy, and has shown the vast antiquity of European culture, compared with which the period since Romulus and Remus is but the contemporary age. This has rendered necessary a complete revision of all of our chronology of the human past. In the light of the new time perspective, the conventional ancient, medieval and modern history appears to fall within the period of what is actually contemporary or recent history. Modern history may quite rightly be regarded as commencing with the age of metals. There no longer appears to be any sharp break between civilized and uncivilized man. Culture develops slowly, and there is but the most hazy and subjective sort of division between savagery, barbarism and civilization. The origins of civilization and written history no longer seem mysterious and unreal, as they did in the old days when man was supposed to have been created a few milleniums back, and when it was necessary to explain the existence of many high

<sup>22</sup> Lamprecht has considered the laws of cultural development, and stimulated the interest of Graebner. The process of diffusion has been studied by Breasted in his account of Egyptian influences on Oriental antiquity, and by W. R. Shepherd and his students in studying the interaction of European and extra-European cultural influences since 1500. See the suggestive article by E. P. Cheyney on "Law in History," in *American Historical Review*, January, 1924, and H. Ruckert, *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft*.



civilizations synchronous with, or anterior to, the creation of Adam. The pre-literary period glides smoothly and gradually into the age of written history, the only difference, albeit a significant one, being that man had added a technique for recording his thought and deeds. Even in this matter of the origin of language and writing anthropologists have been of real aid to the historian, as is to be seen in the remarkable work of Edward Sapir and others.<sup>23</sup>

The significance of these archeological labors for history has been readily recognized. Instead of being introduced to the history of antiquity through the story of the linguistic confusion at the Tower of Babel or of the congestion during the discharge of the passengers from the Ark, we are confronted with elaborate treatments of "pre-history" from the anthropological point of view. Conspicuous examples of this are Eduard Meyer's *Geschichte des Altertums*, the first volume of the *Cambridge Ancient History*, and the early volumes of the Berr series. Scholarly historians such as Breasted, Robinson, Meyer, Webster and Marvin have disseminated this conception through introductory manuals, and it was the great service of Mr. Wells in his *Outline of History* to have brought the appreciation of the importance of the "pre-historic" period to millions of readers. The threshold to human history has been forever established, and Adam relieved from the heavy responsibility of the heroic procreative activities implied in the position to which he was assigned by Hebraic history and theology. Even the background of American history must be sought in anthropology, as Livingston Farrand, A. L. Kroeber, C. Wissler and H. H. Wilder have amply demonstrated. And in recent years America has, in the Maya culture of Central America, investigated by such archeologists as Bowditch, Maudsley, Spinden, Morley and

<sup>23</sup> See Kroeber, *op cit*, Chaps. v-xi; W. A. Mason, *History of the Art of Writing*, E. Sapir, *Language*, J. Vendryes, *Language, a Linguistic Introduction to History*

Tozzer, contributed one of the most interesting, productive and illuminating fields for archeological research.<sup>24</sup>

Nor have the archeologists working in historic areas and civilizations failed to contribute notably to historical data. De Morgan, by discovering the stone ages in Egypt, deserves to rank with Champollion in unlocking the mysteries of the Nile Valley. We can now trace the origins of civilization in this area from the eolithic to the culture of Hellenistic Alexandria. Much new information has been brought to light on the civilizations of Egypt and Mesopotamia. Winckler, Garstang and others have uncovered the important Hittite civilization in Asia Minor, which was apparently the first to develop an iron culture. The Hittite writings, just deciphered by Hrozný, will doubtless enormously enrich our concrete knowledge of the ancient East. The labors of Sir Arthur Evans, Halbherr and their successors and associates have revealed the notable civilization of the maritime state of Crete, which for the first time makes the early history of Greece intelligible, and furnishes the logical introduction to the work of Schliemann, Dorpfeld and Wace. Dussaud has synthesized this archeology of the Levant area. The further researches in Italian archeology, connecting up historic Rome with the earlier ages, have been synthesized by Modestov, and in part compensate for the lack of written records before 390 B. C. But the most impressive work yet produced by an archeologist is the massive contribution of Déchelette to the pre-literary period of Gaul from the paleolithic to the metal ages. This work, together with that of Jullian, has revolutionized the approach to western European history, even if its significance has not yet been generally recognized by historians. The history of Gaul may now be rescued from the slanders

<sup>24</sup> The best syntheses available in English are H. F. Osborn, *Men of the Old Stone Age*; J. M. Tyler, *The New Stone Age in Northern Europe*; H. H. Wilder, *Man's Prehistoric Past*; G. G. MacCurdy, *Human Origins*, and J. De Morgan, *Prehistoric Man*.

of Julius Cæsar and put in its proper cultural setting, to the detriment of the prestige of Rome and the Teuton alike. A. L. Guérard has summarized the significance of this work for French civilization. The important work of Dawkins, Rice Holmes, MacAlister and Peake on British archeology, and of Montelius on early Scandinavian culture can only be mentioned.<sup>25</sup>

The study of the influence of the geographic environment upon man and culture has been greatly advanced since the days of Ritter. Ratzel, Reclus, Brunhes, Vallaux, Sémple and others have contributed systematic treatises, while quite as important work has been done in special fields by Demolins, Mackinder, Cowan, Hann, Ward, Huntington and others. The cultural anthropologists have weighed this evidence and have made it possible to avoid the two equally undesirable extremes of the usual ignoring of geographical factors in history, and the naive doctrine of geographic determinism which is often set forth by anthropogeographers. It is to the cultural anthropologists, far more than to all other types of social scientists combined, that we owe our present scientific and discriminating appraisal of the influence of the geographic factor in history.<sup>26</sup>

While there is a notable disparity between the available body of scientific information regarding the geographical basis of history, and the appropriation of this material by historians, yet distinct progress has already been made in the way of relating cultural progress to the physical setting. Helmolt has edited a monumental history of civilization

<sup>25</sup> Gooch, Chaps xxiv-xxv; J. H. Breasted, "The Origins of Civilization," in *Scientific Monthly*, 1919-20, "The New Past," in *University of Chicago Record*, October, 1920, King and Hall, *Egypt and Western Asia in the Light of Recent Discoveries*, *The Cambridge Ancient History*, Chap. III, Hilprecht, *Explorations in Bible Lands*, R. W. Rogers, *History of Babylonia and Assyria*, Vol. I, J. Baikie, *The Life of the Ancient East*, H. B. Hawes, *Crete, the Forerunner of Greece*.

<sup>26</sup> A. H. Koller, *The Theory of Environment*; F. Thomas, *The Environmental Basis of Society*, R. H. Lowie, *Culture and Ethnology*, Chap. III, R. B. Marett, *Anthropology*, Chap. IV; A. A. Goldenweiser, "Culture and Environment," *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1916. See above Chap. II.

founded upon the views of Ratzel as to the relation between geography and culture. The historians of oriental antiquity, such as Meyer, Breasted, Winckler, Rogers, and Olmstead have clearly indicated the importance of the river-basin environments for the history of these areas. Zimmern has based a stimulating analysis of Athenian culture on a remarkably adequate presentation of the geographical facts of the Greek peninsula. While Nissen has provided the facts in his great survey of Italian geography, no modern historian has gone beyond Duruy in analyzing the relation of Italian geography to Roman history. Huntington's interesting speculations in regard to climatic oscillations in the Caspian and Mediterranean basins have been taken into account by recent historians in dealing with the causes of the German and Hun migrations, which synchronized with the decline of the Roman Empire in the West. Due to the labors of such students of geography as Vidal de la Blache, Mackinder, Kretschmer, Partsch, Goetz and others, the historians of France, England and Germany, such as Michelet, Green, Riehl and their successors, have been able to found their interpretation of national cultural evolution on an adequate comprehension of the geographic setting of this process. In the United States the geographical factors in our history have been clearly indicated by Professor Brigham and Miss Semple. The most notable and successful attempt to utilize this information in explaining the nature of American history has been executed by Professor Frederick Jackson Turner and his disciples, in their brilliant survey of the extension of the frontier from the Alleghenies to the Pacific coast and the resulting rise of sectionalism. As a group, our historians have given little attention to the theoretical problems involved in the relation between geography and culture, still regarding historical geography as "chromatic politics," but exceptions are to be found in the cases of Professors Turner, A. B. Hulbert, F. J. Teggart, and A. M. Schles-

inger. We are well on the way, however, towards providing for the proper linking up of geography and history.<sup>27</sup>

In the field of physical anthropology revolutionary progress has been made beyond the Aryan mythology of the days of Freeman and John Fiske. Cuno, Posche and Pencka proved the lack of identity between race and language, and made it clear that not all Aryan-speaking peoples were necessarily Aryan in race. There then followed a wild effort on the part of anthropologists and historians in every European state to prove themselves the true Aryans, and to show their neighbors to be of inferior clay. This attempt was brought to a disconcerting end by the labors of Sergi who proved that the Teutons could not be Aryans, and of Ripley, who showed that there was no such thing as an Aryan race in any physical sense. If there are Aryan languages or specific Aryan institutions, they were brought into Europe by the Alpine invaders from Asia. There is not the slightest evidence that the Germanic peoples, once the most aggressive claimants to the Aryan heritage, came into Europe from Asia or produced a single institution once associated with Aryan culture, though this is no argument against the racial capacity of the Teutons. An even ruder shock to the older racial mythology came when Franz Boas offered convincing evidence that differences in cultural development between races could be adequately explained on other grounds than that of assumed racial superiority. Particularly is this true of the European peoples, who merely represent minor variations within the white race. Boas, Ripley and Dixon have also shown how the hopeless intermixture of the European races would make it impossible to present a racial interpretation of European history, even if we could discover determinate

<sup>27</sup> See the article on "The Relation of Geography to the Writing and Interpretation of History," in *The Journal of Geography*, December, 1921, and the literature there indicated. See also A. M. Schlesinger, *New Viewpoints on American History*, Chap. 11, and bibliographical note, and F. J. Teggart, *The Processes of History*, Chap. 11.

differences in capacity as between pure examples of these races. Even more absurd is the attempt to advance a racial interpretation of national cultures, on account of the extreme admixtures of races in nearly every modern European state. While this does not exclude the possibility of fruitful statistical investigation of the mental capacity of the various races, it makes it clear that as yet we have no ground for a racial theory of history.<sup>28</sup> A concrete example may go further than much generalization to convince a reader as to the degree of race mixture in Europe. No better illustration could be chosen than the racial derivation of Charles Darwin, who has been thought to be a model Anglo-Saxon in physiognomy and philosophy alike. Karl Pearson in the *Scientific Monthly* for November, 1920, thus describes Darwin's actual racial heritage:

Too often is this idea of close association of mentality and physique carried into the analysis of individuals within a human group, i.e., of men belonging to one or another of the many races which have gone to build up our population. We talk as if it was our population which was mixed, and not our germ-plasm. We are accustomed to speak of a typical Englishman. For example, Charles Darwin, we think of his mind as a typical English mind, working in a typical English manner, yet when we come to study his pedigree we seek in vain for "purity of race." He is descended in four different lines from Irish kinglets, he is descended in as many lines from Scottish and Pietish kings. He has Manx blood. He claims descent in at least three lines from Alfred the Great, and so links up with Anglo-Saxon blood, but he links up also in several lines with Charlemagne and the Carolingians. He sprang also from the Saxon Emperors of Germany as well as from Bar-

<sup>28</sup> I. Taylor, *The Origin of the Aryans*, Chap. 1, W. Z. Ripley, *The Races of Europe*, Chaps. vi, xvii, F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, Chap. 1, and "The Question of Racial Purity," in the *American Mercury*, October, 1924, A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology*, Chap. iv, R. H. Lowie, *Culture and Ethnology*, Chap. 11, R. R. Marett, *Anthropology*, Chap. 11, R. B. Dixon, *The Racial History of Man*. This literature as a whole is critically surveyed in F. H. Hankins' forthcoming book on *The Racial Basis of Civilization*. A model study illustrating the beginning of a scientific approach to the problem of the mental capacity of racial groups is Kimball Young, *Mental Differences in Certain Immigrant Groups*. Adequate work of this sort, however, will need to be done in the country of the nativity of these "racial" groups. H. A. Miller's *Races, Nations and Classes* is perhaps the best general work in English on the various contemporary problems of race.

barossa and the Hohenstaufens. He had Norwegian blood and much Norman blood. He had descent from the Duke of Bavaria, of Saxony, of Flanders, the Princes of Savoy, and the Kings of Italy. He had the blood in his veins of Franks, Alemans, Merovingians, Burgundians, and Longobards. He sprang in direct descent from the Hun rulers of Hungary and the Greek Emperors of Constantinople. If I recollect rightly, Ivan the Terrible provides a Russian link. There is probably not one of the races of Europe concerned in folk-wanderings which has not a share in the ancestry of Charles Darwin. If it has been possible in the case of one Englishman of this kind to show in a considerable number of lines how impure is his race, can we venture to assert that if the like knowledge were possible of attainment, we could expect greater purity of blood in any of his countrymen? What we are able to show may occur by tracing an individual in historic times, wherever physical barriers did not isolate a limited section of mankind. If there ever was an association of definite mentality with physical characters, it would break down as soon as race mingled freely with race, as it has done in historic Europe. Isolation or a strong feeling against free inter-breeding—as in a color differentiation—could alone maintain a close association between physical and mental characters. Europe has never recovered from the general hybridization of the folk-wanderings, and it is only the cessation of wars of conquest and occupation, the spread of the conception of nationality and the reviving consciousness of race, which is providing the barriers which may eventually lead through isolation to a new linking-up of physical and mental characters.

As a group, historians down to 1914 had been gradually awakening to these advances in physical anthropology and were slowly divesting themselves of the Aryan myth, though they lingered far behind the anthropologists in this regard, and frequently lapsed into the use of such a monstrosity as the term "Indo-Germanic" in regard to the western European peoples. The World War, however, brought a great and deplorable resurgence of racial nonsense. The enemy peoples accused each other of racial inferiority, savagery and incapability of civilization. A great number of historians on both sides, and in every country, including the greatest of living historians, Eduard Meyer, succumbed to the herd pressure and were guilty of the most puerile indiscretions and mistakes of judgment in this regard.

Another source of deception has been the reappearance of a neo-Gobinesque literature. In the pre-war literature there were two notorious books of this sort, Chamberlain's *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, and Schultz's *Race or Mongrel?* To these was added in 1916 the most mischievous book since Gobineau, Madison Grant's *The Passing of the Great Race*, which advanced the thesis that all western civilization had been due mainly to the contributions of the Nordic blonds. This preposterous doctrine has been exploited with variations by William McDougall, Lothrop Stoddard, C. Brigham, C. S. Burr and C. W. Gould, until now it has reached such a grotesque state that attempts are being made to interpret the American Civil War on the Nordic blond hypothesis. Fortunately, most reputable historians have remained immune from the Nordic hysterics, but it has debauched the opinions of not a few publicists and lecturers and has gained immense popularity. It will require a generation of persistent effort on the part of scholars to eradicate this distressing source of error.<sup>29</sup>

Much more important has been the investigation of the fate of various racial stocks throughout history, in particular the problem of racial decay through counter or negative selection. There seems to be a tendency towards a decreasing birth-rate on the part of the upper classes in society, accompanied by high fertility on the part of those inferior types with a lower standard of living. This is especially significant in such cases as those of ancient Rome and the contemporary western world where the operation of the selective process is suspended or mitigated through charity and artificial aid to the lower strata in the population. If this hypothesis of the differential birth-rate is true, it would imply the gradual deterioration of the physical stock of any

<sup>29</sup> This literature is summarized and criticized by Hankins. A fine survey of the history of the racial mythology is contained in T. Sinar, *Etude critique sur la formation de la doctrine des races* (Brussels, 1922). See also the brief critique by J. J. Smertenko in the New York Times *Current History Magazine*, April, 1924, and A. A. Goldenweiser's important discussion, "Race and Culture in the Modern World," in *Journal of Social Forces*, November, 1924.



high civilization, and place definite limits on the continued existence of any such society, unless this tendency is offset by the intrusion of a new ruling class or the adoption of a positive system of eugenics. Perhaps the best brief statement of this important conception is contained in the following summary by Professor S. J. Holmes of the chief thesis in the remarkable and striking work of G. Vacher de Lapouge:

In addition to the natural forces to which lower organisms are exposed, man has come to live in a social *milieu* which constitutes a very large part of what may be called his effective environment. From this circumstance have arisen various selective agencies which tend to favor or reduce the prevalence of certain types of inherited traits according to the nature of the institutions that occur at any particular time and place. The first systematic discussion of those agencies forms the subject-matter of Lapouge's *Les Sélections Sociales* (1896), a work which, although not very critical, has had a considerable influence in stimulating the study of selection in man. Lapouge has described the operation of several forms of social selection, i.e., military, political, religious, moral, legal, economic and systematic, all of which are brought into play as a consequence of the development of civilization. Military selection, according to the author, eliminates the best of the race, political selection, through the effects of civil war, the prison, the scaffold, and exile, gets rid of the more independent spirits and tends thereby to render the population submissive and tractable, religious selection, through the celibacy of the clergy and by persecution, tends to effect the elimination of the more intelligent and independent minds, moral and legal selection in general produce dysgenic effects, and economic selection, while operating in many different ways, acts, on the whole, in the most destructive manner, upon the superior elements of the race. As civilization becomes more advanced the evil effects of the various forms of social selection become more intense. The racial influence of civilization is therefore bad. Progress may be achieved in science, art, literature and in the development of institutions, but this carries with it the seeds of its own destruction. The relatively feeble force of natural selection which still operates on human beings is powerless to stay the havoc which is being wrought by the selective agencies which result from the development of civilization.

Such, in brief, is the rather sombre prospect which Lapouge has held up to our view. There is only one way by which these destructive forces may be overcome, and that is by conscious, sys-

tematic selection, or, as we should now call it, eugenics, but Lapouge is not sanguine over the prospect that human beings will ever bring themselves to supply this remedy in a really effective manner.

While Holmes and other later students are inclined to question Vacher's work in regard to certain details, the best biological opinion of today regards his basic contentions as to the counter-selective influence of civilization in the past as essentially sound and demonstrable. These problems have attracted the attention of Galton, Pearson, Vacher de Lapouge, Dumont, Jacoby, Schallmayer, Carr-Saunders, Holmes, Conklin, Hankins, Pearl and others, and constitute a line of analysis of the greatest importance for historians. Unfortunately, the absence of vital statistics prior to the nineteenth century makes this sort of material highly elusive and unreliable for the historian of early ages, though historians like Tenney Frank have recently suggested that probably the decline of Rome was due in large part to racial decay and mixture, and Beloch has discussed with acumen the population problems of antiquity. But for the historians of modern times, particularly those dealing with new countries affected by imperialism and immigration, this line of analysis will prove of extreme value, a fact already recognized by such progressive historians as Farrand and Schlesinger. Individual and class differences of a psychic and biological type are likely to prove a much more useful key to a certain aspect of history than mythical or indeterminate racial differences. As Professor Hankins has well summarized the matter, "an ounce of eugenics is worth a pound of race prejudice."<sup>50</sup>

<sup>50</sup> See the summary of this material in *Evolution in Modern Thought*, Chap. x; and A. A. Tenney, *Social Democracy and Population*. There is a good history of this literature in R. Gonnard, *Histoire des doctrines de la population* (Paris, 1923). The most important recent books on the subject are S. J. Holmes, *The Trend of the Race*, and A. M. Carr-Saunders, *The Problem of Population*. See also E. M. East, *Mankind at the Cross-Roads*. Cf. T. Frank, "Race Mixture in the Roman Empire," in *American Historical Review*, 1916; M. Farrand, "Immigration in the Light of History," in *New Republic*, December, 1916, and A. M. Schlesinger, *New Viewpoints in American History*, Chap. 1.

It scarcely needs to be mentioned that the assumption of the animal heritage of man, his simian traits, his slow evolutionary development, and the biological basis of his "original nature" constitutes the very foundation of the working hypothesis of every true exponent of the new history.

In the matter of the analysis of religious origins, anthropology has made great strides since the days of Spencer and E. B. Tylor, though it is freely admitted that both of these men made notable contributions to our understanding of the origin and genesis of religious phenomena. Perhaps the most novel and important contribution of anthropology to the proper approach to religious phenomena has been its provision of the essential background for such investigation in the general consideration of the intellectual development of man. Many significant types of work in this field of primitive mentality, whether an intensive concrete study such as Paul Radin's *Autobiography of a Winnebago Indian*, the more generalized work of Lévy-Bruhl on *Primitive Mentality*, of Wundt on *The Elements of Folk-Psychology*, of Vierkandt on *Naturvolker und Kulturvolker*, and of F. C. Bartlett on *Psychology and Primitive Culture*, or the critical and comparative studies of representative theories of primitive mentality such as the last portion of Goldenweiser's *Early Civilization*, have all cooperated in producing the only adequate perspective for a study of such special phases of the psychological evolution of the race as the history of religious beliefs and practices. They also provide the logical introduction to the study of intellectual history, as cultivated by James Harvey Robinson and his disciples.

The most important phase of the specific progress in the history of religion has been the discovery of the fact that the basic aspect in religion of all types is an apprehension of the supernatural world, and the thrill which comes as the emotional core of the reaction to this recognition of the

supernatural. The key to this analysis of the origin of religion was hit upon by Bishop Codrington in his work among the Melanesians a generation ago. His theories were tested out in many other areas and found to be confirmed by an imposing array of data drawn from widely separated regions. The implications of this view, which proves Tylor's theory of animism to explain a later rather than the primordial phase of religion, have been synthesized and applied by such writers as Marett, Hubert, Mauss, Durkheim, Goldenweiser and Lowie. While anthropologists have traced the development of religion from the vague reaction to an undifferentiated supernatural power, through the stages of animism, the classification and hierarchy of spirits, and the elaborate rituals of magic and worship, yet it is clear that the thrill from the supernatural furnishes the vital emotional element in all religions which possess any real life; and all types of ecclesiastical exercises are devoted to one or another form of effort successfully to manipulate supernatural power in the interests of the group. Especially to be noted is the fact that the recent critical students have completely destroyed the validity of Frazer's theory of the distinction between primitive magic and religion, both being interrelated phases of the same complex.<sup>21</sup>

Particularly important for history has been the development of a really scientific comparative religion based upon the latest anthropological researches and methodology. Back in the early eighteenth century, in the period of the Deists, all men were regarded as potentially Christians, even if unconscious of it, because everywhere man was thought to believe in the essentials of the "natural religion," to which Christianity itself conformed. Now, through the labors of Reinach, Carpenter, Moore and the contribu-

<sup>21</sup> R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, R. R. Marett, *The Threshold of Religion*, A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, Chaps. x-xi, and numerous articles and reviews, particularly his "Magic and Religion," in *Psychological Bulletin*, March, 1919, and bibliography appended, R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Religion*.

tors to the great composite encyclopedia of Hastings, it is seen to be as accurate to say that all men are "heathen." The unity and similarity of religious attitudes and institutions the world over are far more impressive than the differences, many of which can be referred to cultural backwardness or advancement which is independent of religion. Before this sort of approach the uniqueness of Judaism and Christianity immediately disappears. By an ingenious compilation, Professors Kroeber and Waterman have shown the Hebrew creation tale in Genesis to be akin to similar mythology the world over. Delitzsch has proved the particular Hebrew variety to be an importation from Babylonia. Robertson Smith, Winckler, Rogers, and Delitzsch have demonstrated that Judaism possesses significant affinities with the religions of the other Semitic peoples in the Orient, sufficient to render absurd any such notion as that the tribal God, Yahweh, could be identical with the omnipotent and omniscient ruler of the universe of universes, though a candid analysis of his character as revealed in the Old Testament should have furnished adequate proof of this centuries ago, as it did, in fact, to Marcion in the second century of the Christian era.

In regard to Christianity, the application of the anthropological method has been equally disconcerting, and has entirely disrupted the Christian Epic. Walter R. Cassels, Percy Gardner, Nathaniel Schmidt, F. C. Conybeare and Edward Carpenter have, among others, applied the methodology of anthropology to the interpretation of Christian origins and have proved that it conforms entirely to the general pattern of genesis and behavior established for other world religions. Biblical criticism, applied to the New Testament, has removed the element of supernaturalism from the biographies of its founders as thoroughly as Old Testament criticism has from those of its heroes. Kalthoff, Gunkel, Deissmann, Pfeiderer, Holtzmann, Hilgenfeld, Hatch, Cumont, Loisy, Renan, Glover, Henry and

Carpenter have studied the influence of contemporary religions on Christianity, and have amply proved that it cannot be regarded as a "faith once for all delivered unto the Saints," but is rather a syncretic product, compounded out of Hebraic lore, Hellenistic philosophy and the purification and salvation ritual of the contemporary mystery cults. The study of the history of Christianity by Harnack, Lea and others has shown that there has been as little of the supernatural in the subsequent development as there was in its origins.<sup>52</sup>

Historians of the progressive camp have not failed to readjust their views to conform with this progress in the study of religious origins. In the histories of oriental antiquity by Meyer, Breasted, Rogers, Olmstead, Winckler and others, Hebrew history is treated in a purely secular manner and not awarded the disproportionate space assigned to it in Patristic and Scholastic historiography. This point of view has at last been brought over into textbook writing by Professor Breasted. In the history of Israel, the supernatural element has been largely eliminated from the days of Wellhausen to the present time. Even in regard to Christianity itself, the alert and courageous historians have attacked the problem in a wholly secular fashion, as evidenced by Shotwell's study of the Eucharist and his consideration of the status of orthodoxy in the light of modern thought, by the monographs of his students on various phases of Christian origins and institutions, by Kirsop Lake's brilliant interpretation of the history of Christianity through the Patristic period, by Preserved Smith's history of the Eucharist in the light of anthropology, and his fine secular study of the period of the Reformation, by Lynn Thorndike's history of medieval magic, and by the works of innumerable European students of various topics in church history. It is still true, however,

<sup>52</sup> I have briefly summarized this development in the *Pedagogical Seminary* for June, 1922. See K. Lake, *Landmarks in the History of Early Christianity*.

that, at least as regards text-books, the taboo upon a secular analysis of Christianity is stronger than that upon a frank treatment of Judaism, as is evidenced by the difference in the character of Professor Breasted's treatment of the Jews and Professor Robinson's analysis of Christian origins in the same text-book series. It was one of the real services of Mr. Wells' recent work to set forth before a great audience a secular statement of the origins and expansion of Buddhism, Christianity and Mohammedanism. It is safe to predict, Mr. Bryan notwithstanding, that in another generation scholarship in the historical field will no longer be impaired by the hypothesis of a unique revealed religion. This does not necessarily carry with it the implication that historians will cease to esteem as valuable to society a rational and dynamic religion.<sup>83</sup>

In the field of the study of social organization, modern critical anthropology has revolutionized the position of Morgan and his disciples. It has shown that there is no proof of uniformity of institutional development among the diverse peoples of the planet. Variation seems to be quite as much the rule as unity and resemblance. Again, it is clear that the old theory of a succession of promiscuity, maternal domination, and paternal control has no substantial foundation. Nor has the notion that primitive democracy is correlated with backward material culture and monarchy with advanced civilization. The "Folk-moot" obsession has been dissipated by showing that the folk-moot was nothing unique, but was a tribal assembly which can be duplicated in many places among existing savages, and by proving through more intensive study that there was nothing essentially democratic in the folk-moot, a fact recognized by Brunner and others in German legal history a generation ago. Democracy is something which is a

<sup>83</sup> The significance of this is probably best indicated by Professor J. H. Robinson in his *Mind in the Making*.

product of a combination of social situations since the Industrial Revolution and the conditions of American frontier life. While, through its study of primitive social organization, anthropology has acquired a reliable technique for the critical analysis of social institutions, the complicated social situations of the present day require the collaboration of sociology, and it is here that anthropology and sociology merge in the service of social analysis. Following the clues offered by sociologists like Spencer, Oppenheimer, Gumpłowicz, Ratzenhofer, Kovalesky, Hobhouse and Small, who relied quite as much upon ethnographic as sociological data, writers like Schmoller, Sombart, Levasseur, Webb, Cole, Gierke, Maitland, Laski, Duguit, Tawney, and Veblen and his disciples have made the most significant contributions yet offered to the analysis of modern social organization, as conditioned by the hitherto unparalleled importance and influence of economic factors. One important result of this line of analysis has been to diminish the relative interest in the state, and to show it to be but one among many important social institutions. Historians as a class have, however, largely failed to make use of this vitally important technique of group and class analysis, even in modern history, though some like M. Beer, Ferrero, Hayes, Becker, Herbert, Shotwell and F. J. Turner have made some faint beginnings.<sup>34</sup>

In regard to law and property the comparative and historical orientation of anthropology has stimulated suggestive new lines of analysis. In the study of law it has prompted better work along the comparative line of approach, and has formed the basis of the new type of historical jurisprudence represented by Maitland, Vinogradoff and others. Anthropology has proved the necessity of going

<sup>34</sup>R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, H. E. Barnes, *Sociology and Political Theory*, G. D. H. Cole, *Social Theory*, R. M. Melfer, *Community: A Sociological Study*, H. J. Laski, *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty*; W. K. Wallace, *The Passing of Politics*



back to primitive origins in any study of law, and has provided the first truly adequate approach to the study of the origins and development of the common law. This mode of approach to legal studies has shown the absurdities of the natural law and analytical modes of legal interpretation, and proved clearly enough that there is nothing mystical about law, which evidences infinite variety in its motives and forms of expression and is justified in its existence only through its serving of definite and indispensable social ends at a particular time or place, a point of view which has been elaborated by Dean Pound and the sociological school.<sup>85</sup>

In its many contributions to the history of the institution of property, the critical anthropology has been of real service to history. Lowie, Hobhouse and others have shown by a wealth of evidence that there is no more proof that the facts of human usage throughout the world support the notion of the primordial and unlimited right of private property than they do the conception of a pure original communism. There are no peoples now in existence who do not have at least some elementary property notions, and the institutions of group and private property have shown the greatest variety of forms and manifestations. Property ideals and practices of types varying from those of Kropotkin to those of Judge Gary, can have no justification save that of superior adaptability to the needs and uses of the particular group at a given time, the determination of which must be turned over to sociologists and economists. Historians have not as yet acquainted themselves with this factual approach to property and its history to any conspicuous degree, and still either stand with a writer like James Ford Rhodes as an implacable exponent of unlimited and uncontrolled private property, or with the equally extreme assailants of capitalism like Gustavus Myers. The

<sup>85</sup> Roscoe Pound, *Interpretations of Legal History*, and *Law and Morals*; and B. N. Cardoza, *The Growth of the Law*. See Lowie, *Primitive Society*, pp. 397-426.

great majority, of course, are found aligned with Rhodes and others of his type.<sup>86</sup>

In approaching the problem of the relative position of the individual and the group, psychology and biology have probably been more effective than anthropology in their influence upon historians, yet ethnographic evidence, often appealed to in this regard, seems to indicate that in primitive society the average individual counted for less and the prominent individual for more than is the case today. In general, it is true that, under the influence of Lamprecht and his disciples, the modern cultural historian tends to lay more stress on the socio-psychic and less on the individual-psychic than was the custom of the conventional political historians of the last generation. Yet, the more original and independent of the newer type of historians take an eclectic position, and allow for the importance of dominating personalities, while always remaining conscious of the necessity of their adaptability to the surrounding environment if they are to be conspicuous or successful.<sup>87</sup>

Summarizing the contributions of cultural anthropology to the newer or cultural history it may safely be maintained that anthropology has furnished the temporal and institutional perspective for history, and is in many ways the true background and threshold of history, that it has for the first time given a concrete and adequate basis for the conception of the unity of history, that it has supplied history with the most perfect of analytical techniques for the interpretation of cultural processes and complexes, that it has worked out in an admirable manner the laws and processes of cultural development, that its wealth of comparative data should furnish the best imaginable antidote for chauvinism,

<sup>86</sup> Lowie, *op. cit.*, Chap. ix, L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, Chap. viii, H. Withers, *The Case for Capitalism*, R. H. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, Chaps. i-v, S. and B. Webb, *The Decay of Capitalist Civilization*.

<sup>87</sup> See the judicious statement by William James, *The Will to Believe*, pp. 218 ff. See also the papers by Webster and Chapin in *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1917, cf. G. Ferrero, *Characters and Events in Roman History*.

bigotry and conservatism, that it has destroyed the racial basis of national arrogance, and that it will prove progressively more valuable as an auxiliary science to history, as the latter comes to be more and more concerned with the explanation of cultural development and less and less absorbed in the narration of political events.<sup>88</sup>

## SELECTED REFERENCES

- H E Barnes, "Representative Biological Theories of Society," in *Sociological Review*, 1925-26  
 F Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*  
 R. B Dixon, *The Racial History of Man*  
 A A Goldenweiser, "Cultural Anthropology," in H E Barnes (Ed.), *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, Chap v  
 A A Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*  
 F Graebner, *Methode der Ethnologie*  
 A C Haddon, *History of Anthropology*  
 A L Kroeber, *Anthropology*  
 R H Lowie, *Culture and Ethnology*  
 H A Miller, *Races, Nations and Classes*  
 J L. Myres, "The Influence of Anthropology on the Course of Political Science," in *Publications of the University of California*, 1916  
 W F Ogburn, *Social Change*  
 W H R Rivers, "History and Ethnology," in *History*, July, 1920  
 T Simar, *The Race Myth*  
 F. J Teggart, "Anthropology and History," in *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, December 4, 1919  
 F J Teggart, *The Processes of History*  
 A M Tozzer, *Social Origins and Social Continuities*  
 C Wissler, *Man and Culture*

<sup>88</sup> These varied and important contributions are probably best combined and synthesized in C Wissler, *Man and Culture*, W F Ogburn, *Social Change*, and A. L Kroeber, *Anthropology*

## CHAPTER V

### SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY •

#### I. SOME ASPECTS OF THE ORIGINS OF HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY.

**I**N reviewing the contributions of the typical writers on historical sociology down to the present time, the most striking fact which is likely to come to the attention of the student is the prevalence of a subjective attitude upon the part of the writer and the pursuance of the *a priori* method, in order to utilize the alleged facts of social development to substantiate some special doctrine of the writer or his school. From Plato until Vico, Hume and Ferguson, if not to Boas and the critical anthropologists, one rarely discovers a writer on the history of human society and social institutions who looked upon the development of society in an objective manner, with the avowed intention of discovering just what the nature and stages of this process have been.

The beginnings of interest in, and reflection upon, the problems of social genesis go back to the primitive attempts to account for the unique and divine origin of early states. Familiar examples of this type of historical sociology are the Osiris Myth, the Gilgamesh Epic and its Hebrew appropriation in the Book of Genesis, and the numerous myths and epics of national derivation and genesis which flourished among the Greeks and Romans.<sup>1</sup> The primitive foundations from which these tales were constructed have been

\* Paper read in part at the St. Louis Meeting of the American Historical Association, December 29, 1921.

<sup>1</sup> See J. H. Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, R. W. Rogers, *Cuneiform Parallels to the Old Testament*, and the easily available Hebrew and classical myths of origin in the Old Testament, Homer, Virgil, etc. See the collection in Kroeber and Waterman's *Source-Book in Anthropology*.

preserved for us in the creation myths of the uncivilized peoples of the present day.<sup>2</sup>

Perhaps the first group of thinkers who thoughtfully and rationally considered the problem of the origins of organized society were the Greek Sophists of the fifth century B C. They seem to have believed in an unregulated state of nature, which was ended when civil society was created through a governmental compact.<sup>3</sup> One of the most complete and remarkable accounts of social genesis produced in ancient times was that set forth by Plato in Book III of his *Laws*. He assumed much the chronological measure of Mr. Wells when he stated that "every man should understand that the human race either had no beginning at all, and will never have an end, but will always be and has been, or that it began an immense while ago."<sup>4</sup> He presented rather a Rousseauian picture of the felicity of the life of primitive people, and traced the gradual break-up of primitive society, as it passed through the patriarchal and tribal period into the civil state, which he clearly held to have been founded by means of a governmental contract.<sup>5</sup> Aristotle gave very little attention to the problems of social genesis, and his brief explanation of the matter was analytical rather than historical. He was chiefly concerned with demonstrating the social nature of man, and traced the progressive expression and realization of this social instinct in the family, the village and the state.<sup>6</sup> An approximation to the historical and comparative method, however, is to be seen in his alleged study of 158 constitutions as the basis of his *Constitution of Athens*.<sup>7</sup> One of the most neglected, and yet one of the most striking, of the early discussions of social and political evolution is that

<sup>2</sup> See the elaborate collection in the *Publications of the Bureau of American Ethnology*, and the great set entitled, *The Mythology of all Races*.

<sup>3</sup> E. Barker, *Greek Political Theory, Plato and His Predecessors*, pp 55 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *Laws*, Jowett edition, VI, 780

<sup>5</sup> *Laws*, III, 676 ff, Cf Barker, op cit, pp 307-11

<sup>6</sup> *Politics*, Jowett edition, I, 2

<sup>7</sup> Aristotle, *On the Constitution of Athens*, translated by Kenyon.

contained in the sixth book of Polybius' *History of Rome*, in which he turned aside from his main theme to indicate the basic reasons for the supremacy of the Roman state. He foreshadowed Hume, Ferguson and Gumpłowicz by his doctrine that the state originated in force. He was in line with Sumner in his postulate as to the customary basis of morality. Finally, he anticipated Spinoza, Hume and Adam Smith by his discussion of reflective sympathy as a social force.<sup>8</sup> Infinitely the most modern and satisfactory of classical theories of the history of society was that offered by the great Epicurean poet, Lucretius, in his effort to indicate the evolutionary and naturalistic character of the development of the universe and society, independent of any aid or interference by the gods. He traced the origins of life, man, society and the state, indicating the various stages of cultural and social evolution with astonishing accuracy. His remarkable *De rerum natura* was far the most notable contribution to historical sociology down to the modern period.<sup>9</sup> The Roman Stoic philosopher, Seneca, is significant for having carried still further than Plato the influential notion of the idyllic life of early man. He contended that man had originally lived in a golden age without avarice, sin or crime until the appearance of private property. This produced jealousy, strife and a general state of war and misery which made necessary the establishment of the state and civil society.<sup>10</sup>

One of the most significant results of the development of this doctrine by Seneca was its adaptation by the Christian Fathers to serve as the accepted Patristic view of the course of social evolution. The Fathers identified Seneca's "Golden Age" with the state of man before the "Fall," and held that the subsequent period of misery, confusion

<sup>8</sup> *The History of Polybius*, translated by Shuckburgh, VI, 5-15

<sup>9</sup> *De rerum natura*, translated by Watson, V, of J. Masson, *Lucretius, Epicurean and Poet*, H. F. Osborn, *From the Greeks to Darwin*

<sup>10</sup> *Epistularum moralium*, XIV, 2, of A. J. Carlyle, *History of Medieval Political Theory*, Vol. I, pp. 20-25

and disorder was none other than that which followed the expulsion from Paradise. The establishment of the state, but more especially the coming of Christianity, served to make mundane existence more tolerable, though but a preparation for the bliss of the elect of the City of God in the world to come.<sup>11</sup> This conception of the history of society prevailed through most of the Middle Ages, though the writers often tended to forget the original felicity and to stress chiefly the miseries of existence before the establishment of the Christian polity.<sup>12</sup>

The most remarkable contribution to historical sociology between Lucretius and Adam Ferguson was embodied in the *Prolegomena to Universal History* of the Muslim scholar and statesman Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406). He not only produced what is regarded by some as the first real philosophy of history, but also, in his description of Arab society, contributed one of the best studies of primitive society down to the rise of modern anthropology.<sup>13</sup>

In the latter part of the seventeenth century there appeared two important contributions to historical sociology in the writings of the French publicist, Jean Bodin, and of the Spanish Jesuit, Jean de Mariana. Bodin distinguished carefully between society, which he believed had developed naturally out of the social instinct, and the state, which he

<sup>11</sup> Justin Martyr, "First Apology," in *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, Vol I, Chap. xvii, Irenæus, "Against Heresies," *Ibid*, Vol I, Book V, Chap xxiv, sec 1; Lactantius, "Divine Institutes," *Ibid*, Vol VII, Book VI, Chap x, "The Workmanship of God," *Ibid*, Vol VII, Chap xv, Tertullian, "Scorpiae," *Ibid*, Vol III, Chap xiv, "Apology," Vol III, Chap xxiv, Athanasius, "Against the Heathen," in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, Vol IV, sec 2, Ambrose, "De officiis," *Ibid*, Vol X, Book I, Chap xxviii, Augustine, "On the Good of Marriage," *Ibid*, Vol III, Sec 1, "The City of God," *Ibid*, Vol II, Book V, Chap xix, Book XIX, Chaps v, xv, St Jerome, letter quoted in Robinson, *Readings in European History*, Vol I, 86-87, Gregory the Great, "Pastoral Rule," in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, Vol XII, Book I, Chap iii, Isidore of Seville, *Etymologies*, XV, 2, Carlyle, op cit, Chaps. viii-xv. See the summary of these doctrines in the *Open Court*, February, 1923, pp 97-108.

<sup>12</sup> Carlyle, op cit, pp 211-12.

<sup>13</sup> R. Flint, *The History of the Philosophy of History in France*, pp 158 ff; G. DeGreef, *Le Transformisme social*, pp 115-18. There is a French translation of the *Prolegomena* by M. S. De Slane.

contended was a product of force and coercion.<sup>14</sup> Mariana's view of social and political development was strangely like that of Seneca and Rousseau. Mankind had originally dwelt in a state of undisturbed happiness, but property brought avarice, crime and general disorder. To secure justice and protection it was found necessary to establish a form of superior civil power, which was done by means of a governmental compact.<sup>15</sup>

The most prevalent type of historical sociology during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was that which traced the evolution of society and the state through a social and governmental compact. The distinction between the social and the governmental compact was first clearly drawn by Æneas Sylvius in the fifteenth century, and was still further elaborated by Richard Hooker in the sixteenth. While such writers as Hobbes, Sydney, Spinoza, Locke, Pufendorf, Rousseau and Kant employed the doctrine of the social contract to substantiate quite different propositions in political theory and practice, they were generally agreed that man originally lived in a state of nature, from the miseries of which he escaped through the medium of an agreement of all to live an orderly life in organized society. Civil government was subsequently established through a contract of the people with the ruler or rulers whom they had chosen. It is interesting to note, however, that the specific historicity of this conception was not regarded as a vital point by many of the advocates of the social contract theory. With Hobbes, Spinoza, Kant, and, to a lesser degree, with Rousseau, it was chiefly a philosophical proposition.<sup>16</sup> One of the most significant results of this body of doctrine for historical sociology was Rousseau's highly imaginary and poetical eulogy of the "noble savage," living a care-free and idyllic existence, from which he had

<sup>14</sup> Jean Bodin, *The Six Bookes of a Commonweale*, translated by Knolles, 1606, F. W. Coker, *Readings in Political Philosophy*, pp. 230 ff.

<sup>15</sup> *De rege et regis institutione*, Chap. 1.

<sup>16</sup> F. Apter, *L'Histoire des doctrines du contrat social*.



been reduced to misery and chains by the development of culture and the institution of private property.<sup>17</sup>

The historical and psychological weaknesses of the social contract theory, as presented in its classic form, were attacked by three writers who may be said to have been the first to restore the historical point of view in sociology to the place it had held with Plato, Polybius and Lucretius. Vico, while not devoting himself particularly to the demolition of the social contract, emphasized the necessity of pursuing an inductive and historical approach to social problems. The possibilities of such procedure he himself demonstrated in the fields of philology and jurisprudence.<sup>18</sup> Hume showed that the social contract theory was a philosophical monstrosity, a psychological impossibility, and something which was denied by the concrete facts of history. He stressed the importance of sympathy in the development of society, and contended that government had its origin in force, and owed its persistence to the gradual perception of its utility by mankind.<sup>19</sup> Even more modern in viewpoint was Adam Ferguson's *History of Civil Society*. He stated the idea of the origin of the state in conquest and force so clearly that Gumpłowicz has claimed him as the first great exponent of this school of sociological thought. Further, he foreshadowed Boas and the critical school of anthropologists by insisting that we must discard preconceived hypotheses as to the nature of primitive man and his institutions, and study primitive society as it actually exists. Another interesting adumbration was his

<sup>17</sup> *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences; Discourse on the Origin of Inequality; The Social Contract*. These appear in a good English edition in the *Everyman's Library*. The standard critical edition with a French text is that by Vaughn. It should not be forgotten, however, that to Rousseau the ideal state of man was that of patriarchal society just prior to the origin of private property and the state. See A. O. Lovejoy, "The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's *Discourse on Inequality*," in *Modern Philology*, November, 1923.

<sup>18</sup> *La Scienza nuova*. There is a French translation by Trivulzi. Cf. B. Croce, *The Philosophy of Vico*.

<sup>19</sup> *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Green and Grose edition, Vol. II, pp. 183, 259-73. *Essays, Moral, Political and Literary*, Vol. I, Part I, Essay V; Part II, Essay XII.

insistence that the current tendency to regard primitive man as widely different from modern man was highly misleading. While Ferguson may have fallen short of his criteria of proper procedure in historical sociology in his own works, which progressively became more conventional, his discussion of method and attitude was of real significance and surprising modernity.<sup>20</sup>

The next impulse to historical sociology came from the philosophy of history and the history of civilization to which Vico was an early contributor. Voltaire's *Essai sur les Moeurs*, Turgot's *Sorbonne Discourses*, Condorcet's *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humaine*, and the works of Saint-Simon represent the more important French contributions to this field, all marked by a greater or less degree of rationalism, skepticism and optimism.<sup>21</sup> In the works of Lessing, Herder, Schiller, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel one finds, along with a gradually fading rationalism, the Romanticist trend in the German philosophy of history, with its emphasis on national character, the in-dwelling of *Geist*, and distinct mystic tendencies.<sup>22</sup> Yet with all its monstrosities, the romanticist impulse was, as Lord Acton has well insisted,<sup>23</sup> remarkable for the scope of the historical interests which it stimulated. In the work of Auguste Comte rationalism and romanticism of a French brand were combined to furnish the historical background of the first formal system of sociological doctrine.<sup>24</sup> While there is little doubt that historical sociology is something far different in method and content from the philosophy of history, yet in its attempt to find some meaning and significance in the flow of events in the past the

<sup>20</sup> Ferguson, op. cit., Part I, cf. W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer*, pp. 65-71.

<sup>21</sup> R. Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History in France* (1894), pp. 262-339, 395-421.

<sup>22</sup> R. Flint, *The Philosophy of History in France and Germany* (1874), Book II.

<sup>23</sup> *Historical Essays and Studies*, pp. 345-6

<sup>24</sup> *The Principles of a Positive Polity*, especially Vol. III.

latter contributed much in the way of both impulse and data to the development of historical sociology.<sup>25</sup>

No little importance must also be assigned to the development of critical historical scholarship in the work of Niebuhr, Ranke and their disciples and students in many countries. While there was little of the sociological orientation or interest in the most of the scientific history of the nineteenth century, yet, by improving the mechanism of research, it did much to advance and refine the inductive method of research in historical sociology and it brought forth a vast amount of concrete material which has either been utilized or still awaits exploitation by the historical sociologist.<sup>26</sup>

The last of the pre-Darwinian influences which may be said to have affected the development of historical sociology was the initial interest in historical economics and economic history evident in the work of Heeren, Sismondi, Comte, Hildebrand, Roscher and Knies. The genetic point of view, the breadth of interest, and concern with social reform which characterized the group brought them exceedingly close to the borders of historical sociology.<sup>27</sup>

Unquestionably the most potent influence contributing to the development of historical sociology was the Darwinian theory of organic evolution and its reaction upon social science. It gave concrete and convincing evidence to substantiate the brilliant intuition of Lucretius and the ancient evolutionists, and indicated that human society, as well as organic life, was the natural product of evolutionary forces operating over an immense period of time.<sup>28</sup> While

<sup>25</sup> P. Barth, *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie*, 1915 edition.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. *Encyclopedia Americana*, Vol. 14, pp. 243-50, G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century*, A. W. Small, *Origins of Sociology*, Chaps. IV-VII.

<sup>27</sup> J. K. Ingram, *History of Political Economy*, Chap. VI, Small, op. cit., Chaps. XI-XIII.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. L. M. Bristol, *Social Adaptation*, pp. 56-102, 162-81, B. Mackintosh, *From Comte to Benjamin Kidd*.



FRANKLIN HENRY GIDDINGS



many grotesque errors grew out of the attempt to carry biological formulæ directly over into sociology, and much effort was wasted in drawing grotesque analogies between biological and social structures and processes,<sup>29</sup> the evolutionary impulse was unquestionably the force that put historical sociology in its contemporary manifestations thoroughly upon its feet.<sup>30</sup> It followed two major lines of development—the social Darwinism of Gumplovicz and his school, and the comparative or classical anthropology of Lubbock, McLennan, Tylor, Lang, Frazer, Westermarck, Letourneau, Post, Lippert, Kovalevsky and Morgan.<sup>31</sup>

What may be narrowly and technically described as the systematic historical sociology of the latter half of the nineteenth century was both created by, and based upon, the comparative anthropology of the writers just mentioned. This is particularly apparent in such special works as those by Westermarck and Howard, and is not entirely absent from the more modernized contributions of Thomas, Webster and Hobhouse. The most masterly synthesis of historical sociology yet produced, Book III of Professor Giddings's *Principles of Sociology*, was based essentially upon both the method and the data of the comparative school, as, indeed, it had to be when written. While the critical historico-analytical anthropology of Boas and his disciples in this country and of Marett and others in Europe has provided a new and far sounder method for studying social evolution, and has destroyed most of the positive conclusions of both comparative anthropology and the earlier historical sociology, it has been but little appropriated by sociology. The primary reason for this is probably the fact that interest in historical sociology, which was, perhaps, ascendant before 1900, has declined to a surprising

<sup>29</sup> F. W. Coker, *Organismic Theories of the State*, Chap. iv.

<sup>30</sup> F. H. Giddings, "Darwinism in the Theory of Social Evolution," in the *Popular Science Monthly*, July, 1909, A. G. Keller, *Societal Evolution*.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Goldenweiser, "Four Phases of Anthropological Thought," in *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1921.

degree in the twentieth century, and sociology has provided few who have been interested in reconstructing our knowledge of social evolution on the basis of the newer and more assured methods and results of the critical anthropology. It is not without significance that the first real attempts to indicate the importance of the scientific anthropology for an accurate history of society have been executed by professional anthropologists, Marett, Wissler, Lowie, Goldenweiser and Kroeber.<sup>82</sup>

In tracing the development of historical sociology we need to consider briefly the growth of a sociological interest on the part of professional historians. The respectable and conventional historical writing of the nineteenth century centered about the state and the achievements of public men, but throughout the century there was developing an ever more effective protest against this narrowness of outlook.<sup>83</sup> The various causes and phases of this movement we may now briefly review. First should probably be noted the assault upon the primacy and causality of the state among social institutions by sociologists and economists. The Hegelian adulation of the state, to which was added the nationalistic ardor of the last century, made the struggle a hard one, but it has gradually been won.<sup>84</sup> This realization of the importance of other than political factors in society soon bore fruit in various ways. Historians became interested in the history of the social life, manners and customs of various ages and peoples. This brought forth such well known works as H. Baudrillart's history of luxury, G. Freytag's sketch of German life, the works of Friedlander, Marquardt, Dill and Fowler on Roman life

<sup>82</sup> R. R. Marett, *Anthropology*, C. Wissler, *The American Indian; Man and Culture*, R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology*.

<sup>83</sup> The best brief survey of the growth of an interest in social history is contained in Carl Becker's article "Some Aspects of the Influence of Social Problems and Ideas upon the Study and Writing of History," in *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1912, pp. 73-107.

<sup>84</sup> Cf. H. E. Barnes, *Sociology and Political Theory*.

and manners, Janssen's analysis of German life on the eve of the Reformation, the work of Green, Ashton, Miss Power, and the collaborators in the Traill and Mann series on social England, Rambaud's history of French civilization, Altamira's study of the civilization of Spain, and the classic works of McMaster and Oberholtzer on social aspects of American history. With such works were closely associated the various contributions to *Kulturgeschichte* by Bueckhardt, Riehl, Gregorovius, Henne-am-Rhyn, Mil-youkov, Brandi, Gothein and Steinhausen.<sup>85</sup>

A step in advance of the typical historians of social life and the normal exponents of *Kulturgeschichte* was taken by a group of historians who were also interested in social life and institutions, but who were not satisfied with merely descriptive work. They sought to view culture and social development as a great moving complex of interacting forces and factors. In general, most members of this group were highly impressed with the prominence of the economic elements in the social process, but few were thorough-going economic determinists. In this list of what might well be called social historians one would certainly include such writers as the members of the German Historical School of economists, Karl Marx, De Tocqueville, Fustel, Maitland, Vinogradoff, the Webbs and the Hammonds, Pollard, Slater, Zimmern, Ferrero, Shotwell, Turner, Beard, Schlesinger, Becker, Dodd, Hayes and Lingelbach. While writers of this group sensed the fact that human history has been the product of many simultaneously operating pressures and factors, they possessed no real technique for the analysis and estimate of this complex social process, and were compelled to content themselves very largely with a serial description of the nature of these various historic forces, social, economic, political, legal, cultural, educational, moral and religious.

A more ambitious program has been outlined by such

<sup>85</sup> See Schaumkell, *Geschichte der deutschen Kulturgeschichtschreibung*.



students of social development as Comte, Buckle, Lamprecht, Breysig, Giddings, Ogburn and others, who have aspired to find some way of measuring, analyzing and determining the exact nature of the operation of the social process in the successive periods in history, which, when assembled, would give one a complete account of social evolution reduced to the level of scientifically ascertainable and demonstrable cause and effect. If this ambition is ever realized, then, and then only, shall we have what may be accurately designated as well-developed sociological history. It may, perhaps, be a realizable goal for the period since reliable statistics of social facts have been kept, but will probably remain a pious and benign wish as far as remote periods are concerned.<sup>36</sup>

## II. THE CONVENTIONAL ATTITUDE OF HISTORIANS TOWARDS SOCIOLOGY.

Much the same subject as the one selected for this chapter was brought up for discussion at a joint meeting of the American Sociological, Economic and Historical Associations in New Orleans in 1903. Professor Franklin H. Giddings set forth his view of the sociological contributions to a theory of human and social development in a very profound and highly generalized paper on "A Theory of Social Causation," which was discussed by representative sociologists, economists and historians. Professors Ephraim Emerton, George L. Burr and Willis Mason West discussed for the historians the possible significance of sociology for history. The central argument in these papers by historians was that history has been, is, and must remain, a branch more nearly of literature than of science, and should be concerned almost wholly with the unique, individual and concrete elements in the history of

<sup>36</sup> See F. H. Giddings, *The Scientific Study of Human Society* (1924), for a suggestion of such social measurement as would be necessary for the creation of sociological history. More rigorously scientific technique is contained in the works of A. L. Bowley, K. Pearson and Raymond Pearl.

mankind. With the mass or collectivity, with reasoning and generalization, with broad synthesis and a comprehensive reconstruction of the evolution of society and civilization, the historian has not dealt, and, therefore, must not concern himself.<sup>37</sup> Professor Emerton even went so far as to suggest that sociology was but that "ancient enemy" of history, the philosophy of history, and that the sooner it was dropped from the curriculum of educational institutions, the better.<sup>38</sup>

Much the same attitude was taken in the scholarly presidential address of Professor George Burton Adams, delivered before the American Historical Association at Richmond in December, 1908, on "History and the Philosophy of History."<sup>39</sup> While perhaps slightly more conciliatory than Professors Emerton and Burr, Professor Adams classified sociology as one more manifestation of that perennially active siren, the philosophy of history, against whose seductive embraces the historian must guard himself with the resolution of a Saint Anthony.<sup>40</sup>

Perhaps the most recent effort to establish the proposition that sociology is irrelevant for the historian and has little or nothing in common with history is contained in Professor F. M. Fling's valuable work on *The Writing of History*. His position is essentially that history is concerned with the unique facts, situations and individuals in history and not with the repetitions, forces and processes which constitute the object of sociological investigation in

<sup>37</sup> Published in *Publications of the American Economic Association*, Third Series, Vol. V, No. 2; see also *American Historical Review*, April, 1904, pp. 448-50. It is only fair, however, to point out the fact that Professor West was much more kindly disposed towards sociology than Professors Emerton and

<sup>38</sup> *American Historical Review*, April, 1904, p. 450. Coming from a Harvard professor in 1903, this exhortation was superfluous.

<sup>39</sup> Published in the *American Historical Review*, January, 1909.

<sup>40</sup> As a further reflection of the attitude of historians toward sociology at this time, one might call attention to Professor A. W. Small's complaint when the Editor of the *American Historical Review* returned his *General Sociology* with the comment that it was not of enough significance to historians to warrant assigning it space for review. A. W. Small, *The Meaning of Social Science*, pp. 67-68.

studying the problems of social evolution. He summarizes his position in the following manner:<sup>41</sup>

It is evident that the historian is concerned with tracing *the unique evolution of man in his activities as a social being*, the unique life record of humanity. If this be history, then history cannot "repeat itself," there cannot be "historical laws," for law is a generalization and a generalization assumes repetition.

It is clear, then, that *history deals with past social facts*, but it is important to note that *all social facts are not necessarily historical facts*. A past social fact becomes an historical fact when it has been made a part of an historical synthesis, for *historical, when applied to human affairs, signifies nothing less than a certain logical way of looking at and organizing past social facts*. When our attention is directed towards the *uniqueness*, the *individuality* of past social facts, when they interest because of their importance for the *unique evolution of man in his activities as a social being*, in selecting the facts and in grouping them into a complex, evolving whole, we employ the historical method, the result of our work is history.

If, on the contrary, we are interested in *what past social facts have in common*, in the way in which *social facts repeat themselves*, if our purpose is to form *generalizations, or laws* concerning social activities, we employ another logical method, the method of the natural sciences. We select our facts not for their individuality or for the importance of their individuality for a complex whole, but for what each fact has in common with others and the *synthesis is not a complex unique whole, but a generalization in which no trace of the individuality of the past social fact remains*. The result of our work is sociology, not history. Thus the work of the historian supplements that of the sociologist. *The historian is interested in quality, individuality, uniqueness; the sociologist in quantity, in generalization, in repetition*.

While one may concede that Professor Fling is accurate in his differentiation between the major emphasis and orientation of the historical and sociological points of view, he has grossly exaggerated this distinction in representing it as a difference in kind rather than degree. It is something of an effort to reintroduce into social science the old debate between the nominalists and the realists. Such a

<sup>41</sup> Fling, op cit, pp. 16-17

conception as "the unique evolution of man" savors distinctly of obscurantism and mysticism. The very fact that one could hold that an historical situation could be fundamentally unique is one of the most evident possible modes of confession of the sad need of the historian for psychology and sociology and the well-nigh complete lack of a knowledge of the principles of social science. Given as the actors in the drama of history the two relatively constant factors of man, with generally permanent psycho-physical characteristics, and stimuli coming from unchanging or slowly altered environmental influences, it should be evident that only in superficial externals is any historical complex unique. Further, in the so-called unique situations the laws and patterns of behavior followed by man and society are in no sense unique.<sup>42</sup> It may readily be granted that history is more descriptive than sociology and more interested in the individual and the concrete, but it should be as easily apparent that this historical narrative of the individual and concrete has significance for anything beyond literature only in so far as it furnishes material for generalizations as to the genesis, organization or decline of the culture and social system in question. The more truly unique the situation or fact the more irrelevant it is likely to be for one interested in the problems of the genesis of society and the evolution of human culture.

Of course, one may allow Professor Fling to define his history as he will, but it is a conception of the subject not now shared by many progressive historians of note. Finally, Professor Fling does not sufficiently emphasize the necessary distinctions between the problems, attitudes and methodology of the various types of historians. Some historians are interested merely in problems of textual criticism, and the gathering and editing of documentary sources.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, A. A. Goldenweiser, "History, Psychology and Culture," in *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, October, 1918; C. Wissler, *Man and Culture*; and H. Eickert, *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft*

Others attempt to construct an artistic narrative therefrom. Still others use both documents and narratives for the purpose of the interpretation of the material therein contained, so that the processes of social and cultural development in the area or period studied may be better understood and their significance appreciated. It is quite apparent that the differences between sociologist and historian will depend very much upon the interests and activities of the historian, and that the gulf which separates the interpretative historian from the historical sociologist is not a wide one or one which it is impossible to bridge. Yet if one could prove that history and sociology are utterly different even in kind, this would constitute no argument against the position that a knowledge of sociology would be helpful to the historian.

These objections are selected as typical of many more which might be readily presented from contemporary American and European historians. One might, for example, call attention to Freeman's statement to "Johnny" Green that if he had left out "the social stuff" he would have written a good history of England. Many now feel that Green's "social stuff" will be gratefully remembered long after the memory of Freeman, his school, and all his works has perished. Reference might also be made to the controversies between Lamprecht and Lenz, and between Schafer and Gothein as an example of a German phase of this debate.<sup>48</sup> In general, historians have either denied the existence of any such "science" as sociology or have held that, though the validity of the subject might be admitted, the achieved results of sociological study are negligible. The sociologists have cordially reciprocated this attitude by contending that the undeniable scholarship of the historians has been utterly sterile, as far as significant results are concerned. It is now, however, high time that arro-

<sup>48</sup> See J. A. Goldfriedrich, *Die historischen Ideenlehre in Deutschland*, pp. 431-65.

gance and recrimination should be replaced by tolerance and coöperation, and that each of these social sciences should recognize the significant contributions of the other.

It is not necessary to add anything more to the already voluminous literature which has been contributed to the discussion of whether history should be chiefly concerned with the individual or the mass, with literary narration or sociological generalization, but it may, perhaps, be worth pointing out that nothing could be more unhistorical than to contend that, because history in the past may not have dealt with the collective phenomena or attempted constructive generalization, it must not be so concerned in the future. History has ever been expanding the scope of its interests and broadening its outlook, while at the same time becoming more accurate in its search for, and accumulation of, concrete facts. History meant something quite different to Polybius from what it meant to Berossos or Hecataeus; to Machiavelli from what it did to Orosius; to Ranke from what it did to Otto of Freising; to Lamprecht, Robinson, Breasted, Turner and Shotwell from what it did to Stubbs, Droysen and Rhodes. Who will deny that fifty years hence historians may be much more in accord with the views of Giddings than with those of Gardiner, Sybel or Freeman? History is first advanced and then retarded by the prevailing notions which dominate historians in any epoch.<sup>44</sup> Many social scientists have seemed to assume that the failure of historians during the nineteenth century to produce many illuminating conclusions concerning the development of institutions and civilization was due to some peculiar and unique psychic defect which character-

<sup>44</sup> These progressive advances in the conception of what history ought to be have been made the central part of my article on "History. Its Rise and Development" in the new edition of the *Encyclopedia Americana*. On contemporary developments see my chapter in E. C. Hayes, *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences*.

These points are well discussed by J. H. Robinson, *The New History*, Chap. II; by G. L. Burr, *American Historical Review*, January, 1917; and by J. T. Shotwell, *Ibid.*, July, 1913, and *Introduction to the History of History*.

ized historians as a class and made it impossible for them to arrive at helpful and enlightening generalizations. This is a manifest absurdity, but it is almost a platitude to point out, nevertheless, that they have actually been prevented from so doing by the inculcated canons and precepts of orthodox historical method, as it was taught by Ranke and handed down by his successors and students.<sup>45</sup> Yet, when one remembers that Ranke had Kant and Hegel as his intellectual environment, it is not surprising that he reacted violently against *a priori* generalization.

The writer might here state that he does not in any way propose to defend or justify the old *a priori* philosophy of history or the older historical sociology, with its pre-conceived or highly deductive theories of social evolution and human development. While one might be able successfully to uphold the thesis that the intuitive genius of Herder, Hegel and Comte allowed them to throw more light upon the nature and processes of human development than the patient and scientific study of somewhat irrelevant material by Ranke was able to reveal, yet their method was deductive, in large part, and was the one which is very generally in disrepute today.<sup>46</sup> The historian would be filled with just and righteous indignation if the sociologist were to form his estimate of history from a perusal of Orosius, Carlyle or Michelet, but this would be as fair a procedure as it is for the historian to condemn sociological work on account of the weaknesses of the crude innovators who brought into existence the sociological approach to historical problems. Sociology has improved immensely since 1850, and has now become, in the hands of its more advanced exponents, one of the most severely inductive of the social sciences. More and more, it has tended to abandon attempts at prearranged schematic organization of

<sup>45</sup> See G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century*, especially Chaps. vi-vii, xviii, xxviii.

<sup>46</sup> See F. H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, Book I, Chap. iii.

material and has devoted itself to the analysis of social institutions, interests, and processes.<sup>47</sup>

It need not be argued that sociology should absorb history or history absorb sociology.<sup>48</sup> Both have a well-defined and indispensable field of service, looking toward the development of the social sciences and the acquisition of knowledge concerning human society and its evolution. My contention will be simply that an adequate knowledge of sociological principles is absolutely indispensable to any social science, which, like history, deals with the development of man and his culture in social relationships. Perhaps much of the opposition of historians to sociology has come from the mistaken view that sociologists desire to have the historians cease to be such and become sociologists. Such an attitude can scarcely be held by any judicious sociologist. What the sociologists demand is merely that the historian acquaint himself with sufficient sociological knowledge to enable him to be the best possible type of historian. The scientific and tolerant sociologist will further grant to the historian the privilege of being very canny and deliberate in appropriating the so-called sociological principles and laws, and of demanding that sociologists first agree among themselves as to the nature and import of these laws and principles. It is gratifying to note that many historians have at least implicitly accepted the sociological point of view, even if some have not openly and frankly recognized and admitted it. Most historians have been frightened more by the name than by the essentials of sociology. Some of the most eminent and respected of historians, such as Green, Maitland, Vinogradoff, Fustel, Seignobos, Rambaud, Lamprecht and his school, McMaster, Breasted, Beard, Robinson, Turner, Shotwell, Dodd and Becker have established their historical reputations pri-

<sup>47</sup> See A. W. Small, *General Sociology*, Part I, F. H. Giddings, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, and *The Scientific Study of Human Society*.

<sup>48</sup> See the discussion of this in P. Barth's *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie*, and E. Bernheim, *Lehrbuch der historischen Methode*.



marily because, consciously or unconsciously, they have adopted much of the sociological method and viewpoint. Yet, however much we may be indebted to the originality and intuitive genius of such writers, it would be far better if historians as a group were consciously to recognize that they cannot adequately or accurately assemble or interpret the facts of history without the aid of sociology, and that this subject is as important as, and is the all-essential supplement of, such auxiliary aids to historical science as the laws of historical criticism, and the sciences of diplomatic and paleography.

Finally, the writer will not contend for the significance of, or the need of, giving more attention to intellectual, social and economic history. While personally possessing a healthy skepticism in the matter, he will, for the sake of agreement, take Dr. Jameson at his word and assume that the majority of respectable historians have capitulated to the assaults of the exponents of the "new history."<sup>49</sup> In discussing the importance of sociology for the newer synthetic history, then, we will assume the established existence, if not ascendancy, of intellectual, social, and economic history, and rest content with indicating why sociology should be of real service to these fields of historical endeavor. And, when using the term "history," unless otherwise specified, it will mean "the new history" and not "past politics," "collective biography," or the literary account of "the unique development of mankind." This does not mean, however, that even strictly political history can be adequately treated without a knowledge of sociology. The state is but one among many forms of human association, and its genesis, nature, operation and relation to the other forms of human grouping can only be properly comprehended when the student possesses accurate knowledge

<sup>49</sup> *American Historical Review*, April, 1921, p. 602. I have attempted to describe and catalogue the nature and literature of the "new history" in the *Historical Outlook*, March, 1922, pp. 90-96. See also my chapter in Hayes, *op. cit.*

of the principles of human association and group behavior in general.<sup>50</sup>

### III. THE NATURE OF SOCIOLOGY AND ITS RELATION TO HISTORY.

In attempting to indicate the nature of sociology and its relation to history, we do not propose to enter into the tedious process of academic definition and scholastic demarcation of fields, which has occupied at least half of the attention of social scientists during the development of their subjects in the last century. It will suffice to state that, in the first place, sociology assumes at the outset the premise, which it has well established by inductive historical study, that human life and culture have developed in a group setting.<sup>51</sup> Indeed, the leading authority on the science of history, Bernheim, has defined history as "the science of men in their activities as social beings."<sup>52</sup> This assumption does not, however, carry with it the doctrine of complete group-determinism. The views of Gumplowicz, which frightened Professor Burr,<sup>53</sup> are but those of an extreme partisan of a particular view of social causation, for sociologists still exhibit the same differences concerning many problems as might be observed in the contrast between the views of such historians as Lamprecht and Lenz, Henry Adams and Ephraim D. Adams, or Andrew D. White and J. J. Walsh. But sociology does insist that, however much must be allowed for individual initiative, human progress has been more sharply conditioned by its social setting than by any other cause operating upon the life of man.<sup>54</sup>

In the second place, sociology seeks to catalogue, esti-

<sup>50</sup> See my *Sociology and Political Theory*, and F. H. Giddings, *The Responsible State*.

<sup>51</sup> See A. W. Small in new edition of *Encyclopedia Americana*, Vol. 25, p. 208; and *Origins of Sociology*.

<sup>52</sup> Bernheim, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

<sup>53</sup> G. L. Burr, in *American Historical Review*, January, 1917, p. 269.

<sup>54</sup> See the articles by W. B. Bodenhafer on the group concept in sociology in *The American Journal of Sociology*, November, 1920, to May, 1921; and M. P. Follett, *The New State*.

mate and analyze the complex influences upon social life and processes which are exerted by material and psychological, by social and individual factors. It gathers up, describes and analyzes the significance of geographical, biological, psychological and economic forces as they operate to affect human group behavior, and to produce the mutations of social systems. It indicates how all of these multifarious forces act as stimuli, the responses to which, in the form of group behavior, constitute the human activities and achievements, the record of which history attempts to chronicle.<sup>55</sup> Because of the comprehensive way in which sociology approaches the study of human society, it is less likely than any other of the social sciences to be guilty of a one-sided or incomplete interpretation of human development. It is the only social science which even attempts to give an all-embracing view of the social processes.<sup>56</sup> It examines the processes of social development, functioning and organization as a whole and as a unity, and then passes fields or phases of these problems over to the special social sciences of economics, political science and ethics for more detailed and specialized investigation and analysis.<sup>57</sup> It is the function of these special social sciences to test out the generalized laws<sup>58</sup> of social behavior in the particular fields

\* See F H Giddings, "A Theory of Social Causation," *loc cit*, "Pluralistic Behavior," in *American Journal of Sociology*, January-March, 1920, and "A Theory of History," in *Political Science Quarterly*, December, 1920. All of these are reprinted in his *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*.

\* See C H. Cooley, *Publications of the American Economic Association*. Third Series, Vol V, No 2, pp 182-187.

"I cannot insist too strongly that I do not regard sociology as the all-inclusive social science or as an "over-science." I look upon it as the preliminary or basic social science, occupying something like the same relation to the special social sciences that mathematics does to the natural and engineering

\* Historians may legitimately inquire as to just what these important social laws and principles actually are which they are asked to acquire from the study of sociology. It is obvious that this question could be answered in detail only through a summary review of the whole field of the history of sociological doctrine. Brief summary statements of the leading sociological principles, processes and laws, as they are viewed by representative sociologists, are to be found in F H Giddings, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, particularly Chaps v, xv, C A Ellwood, *Sociology in Its Psycho-*

of political, economic, moral and religious behavior, revise them, and, in this way, enrich and advance the science of sociology, as well as the special social sciences.<sup>59</sup> The divorcing of sociology from the special social sciences has been disastrous to both, but has resulted in more serious loss to, and distortion of, the latter.

In the case of history the field of its special investigation is the genesis of cultural and social institutions and the factors affecting their growth and change. While sociology furnishes the historian with his knowledge of the laws and principles of social behavior and social change, as tentatively formulated, without which the historian cannot proceed intelligently in many fields, the historian can provide the sociologist with invaluable genetic and comparative data, by recourse to which the sociologist may vastly improve the breadth and accuracy of his subject. In a sense the historian is a field-worker for the historical sociologist.<sup>60</sup> Many progressive historians have, as we have already pointed out, recognized this fact and have readily acknowledged the service which sociology might render to their subject, but others, equally progressive, have been frightened by the name. For instance, a no less original and progressive historian than James Harvey Robinson has extolled the significance of social psychology for history, while implying that the subject, of which social psychology

*logical Aspects*, Chaps xvii-xix; L Gumplowicz, *Outlines of Sociology*, Parts I-III; A W Small, *General Sociology*, Parts IV-VI, E A Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, Chaps iii, vi, vii-ix, L F Ward, *Outlines of Sociology*, Part II, W F Ogburn, *Social Change*, C Wissler, *Man and Culture*, and L T Hobhouse, *Social Development*. Brief summaries of the writings of the leading modern sociologists are to be found in L M Bristol, *Social Adaptation*; and A J Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*. A preliminary effort to write a history of sociology from the Greek period to the present has been made by E. S. Bogardus and J P Lichtenberger.

<sup>59</sup> See particularly, on this point, C A Ellwood, *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*, Chap 1, and *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, Chaps ii-iv, and Robert E Park, "Sociology and the Social Sciences," in *American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1921.

<sup>60</sup> Cf T. D. Elliot, "The Use of History for Research in Theoretical Sociology," in *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1922, pp 628-636.

is but a small, if important, department, has nothing of any particular value to offer to the historian.<sup>61</sup>

Historians have usually frankly admitted that they deal with the various phases of human behavior taking place in social surroundings, but they have rarely attempted to acquaint themselves with the science of pluralistic human behavior, namely, sociology. The critical historian, even of the conventional school, would be among the first to point out the absurdity of attempting to write a history of physics, for example, without possessing in advance a respectable acquaintance with the data and laws of elementary mechanics. Yet, with a few notable exceptions, the most respectable historians have for three thousand years not only been essaying to write valid history without even making an effort to acquaint themselves with the indispensable introduction to the study of history to be found in the sociological principles regarding human and group behavior, but have also often asserted their belief that such information is inconsequential and irrelevant, and many have done their best to stifle the growth of the subject which alone can furnish the substantial foundation upon which the science of history can ultimately be erected. Great and necessary attention has been paid by historians to such so-called "auxiliary sciences" as paleography, epigraphy, philology, diplomatic, archeology, and numismatics, in order to establish the validity and accuracy of the facts sought for, while indifference or contempt has characterized their attitude towards that social science, without a knowledge and utilization of which the facts discovered and verified can have no scientific utility or assured significance.<sup>62</sup>

Not only is sociology truly indispensable to the historian in organizing and interpreting his facts; it may even

<sup>61</sup> *The New History*, Chap. in.

<sup>62</sup> See Langlois and Seignobos, *Introduction to the Study of History*, Book I, and A. W. Small, *Publications of the American Economic Association*, Third Series, Vol. V, No. 2, pp. 175-181.

be doubted if the historian can *gather* his facts any more intelligently without a knowledge of sociological principles than a person could execute an experiment in a chemical laboratory without a preliminary knowledge of the laws, principles and processes of chemistry. It is this attempt to carry on work in the field of a special social science without first learning the elementary laws of social science as a whole which constitutes the major indictment of the historical writing of the past which can be drawn by the sociologist. No one has better stated this than Professor Giddings, when he said that "to teach ethnology, history, political economy, and the theory of the state, to men who have not learned the first principles of sociology, is like teaching astronomy or thermodynamics to men who have not learned the Newtonian laws of motion."<sup>63</sup>

To sum up, then, this part of the argument, sociology is the science of human behavior in both its contemporary and its genetic aspects—the science of social organization and social evolution. History is the attempt to recover as complete a record as possible of human behavior and its material and institutional creations in the past.<sup>64</sup> It thereby furnishes the sociologist with some of his most valuable data, on the basis of which he can formulate and progressively perfect his knowledge of the laws which govern, and the processes which characterize, human society. Professor Ellwood has stated this essential interdependence of sociology and history very clearly and very fairly:<sup>65</sup>

Although written history furnishes but a part of the facts with which the sociologist deals, nevertheless the coöperation between the sociologist and the scientific historian—the historian

<sup>63</sup>F. H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 33. Perhaps the first appreciation of this fact by an American historian appeared in the work of W. H. Mace, *Method in History*, 1897 (New edition, 1914), pp. 1-74.

<sup>64</sup>"For, when all is said, history is human behavior. It is a stream of behavior, rising obscurely in time, making for itself a devious channel, fed by countless tributaries of collective action, and broadly flowing now into the mist that hides an unexplored hereafter." Giddings, "A Theory of History," *loc. cit.*

<sup>65</sup>C. A. Ellwood, *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, p. 52.

who employs scientific methods and who aims at the faithful representation of the social reality—should be of the closest sort. They are both working in the same field and to a large extent have the same aim. The sociologist needs scientific history. He cannot complete his inventory of the social world without its aid. Moreover, sociology cannot content itself, as one author has well remarked, with being merely illustrated psychology, it must also be, at least in its final development, analyzed and compared history. Finally, the historical method of study is of supreme importance to the sociologist, and this fact alone makes a scientific history of all ages and peoples perhaps the greatest desideratum of the sociologist. On the other hand, the scientific historian has need of sociology. Without some knowledge of the principles of social organization and evolution he can scarcely obtain a proper perspective of his facts, nor can he rightly interpret his facts or explain the causes of social changes without reference to such principles. The scientific historian could do his work more scientifically if he had a critical knowledge of sociological laws and principles. We conclude, then, both that scientific history is necessary to the sociologist, and that sociology is equally necessary to the scientific historian.

While the most vital inter-relationship of sociology and history is that described above, another phase of the problem is the different manner in which the two sciences approach the data of social genesis. In tracing human development, the historian quite properly concerns himself primarily with the flow of events, attempting chiefly to recover all apparently relevant facts and to make the record of human achievement as complete and reliable as possible. While he may legitimately be concerned with cause and effect in this interplay of factors and processes, and can aspire to comprehensive synthesis, his first aim is to gather the concrete and descriptive material. The sociologist, however, does not, as such, concern himself to any particular degree with the search for, and accumulation of, concrete information as to the history of human culture. For this he looks to the historian. Securing his data in this manner, the sociologist concentrates much of his attention upon the repetitions in historical development, upon the

constant elements in history, and upon deducing therefrom the laws of historical causation, as revealed by his study of cause and effect in the concrete materials of historical development.<sup>66</sup> Professor Ellwood has set forth this difference in emphasis by historians and sociologists in studying the human past: <sup>67</sup>

Objective history is simply that which actually occurs in human societies, it is the procession of events in the entire life of humanity. History, in this sense, is evidently but a convenient name for the whole movement of human societies from the beginning of human life up to the present. Sociology, on its genetic side, is concerned with the constant factors in that movement, the laws or principles of social evolution. Objective history, if we include in it present social phenomena, is, therefore, the subject-matter of sociology, and in this sense, sociology is the science of history. But objective history is not only the subject-matter of sociology, in its various phases it furnishes the subject-matter for all the social sciences. It is also the subject-matter of that organized body of knowledge which we term written history, or historiography.

Professor Park expresses much the same opinion: <sup>68</sup>

As far as sociology and history are concerned, the differences may be summed up in a word. Both history and sociology are concerned with the life of man as man. History, however, seeks to reproduce and interpret concrete events as they actually occurred in time and space. Sociology, on the other hand, seeks to arrive at natural laws and generalizations in regard to human nature and society, irrespective of time and of place.

Professor Giddings has explained this in even greater detail in the following paragraphs: <sup>69</sup>

It is often said that "History repeats itself." Nevertheless—and this also has been often remarked—while many essential facts in the social organization and career of any people are to

\* Important as this endeavor may be, however, the historian can sound a valid note of warning by insisting that no repetition is ever perfect in history and that it is dangerous to generalize upon one period of historical development from data drawn from another era. Historical circumstances never reproduce themselves in complete entirety.

<sup>66</sup> Ellwood, *op cit*, p. 48.

<sup>67</sup> R. E. Park, *loc cit*, p. 411.

<sup>68</sup> F. H. Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, pp. 8-9.



be found in the organization and career of every people there are differences marking off each nation and each epoch from every other, and giving to each an individual character. The individual or personal elements in history and the distinctive quality of events are not repeated.

Whatever is repeated—in human affairs as in physical things—can be studied by scientific methods. Statistical countings, comparisons, and classifications can be made, and, in the course of time, inductions of law and of cause.

Accordingly, the constant element in history has been made the subject-matter of various sciences, for example, comparative folklore, comparative religion, comparative political economy, comparative jurisprudence, and comparative constitutional law.

The historian has seldom attempted to dissociate the constant elements in history from the unique, the individual, the personal. On the contrary, he very properly has tried to grasp history in its concrete entirety, and, in recording the life of any people or age, to make clear the vital connection between those things that are universal and those that are peculiar or distinguishing. On the strictly scientific side his work may have suffered by such inclusiveness, but on the descriptive and narrative side, and in human interest it has gained. The sociologist confines his studies to those universal or constant portions of ever repeated history that admit of examination by scientific methods. His field, therefore, is less broad, and at the same time less detailed and less concrete, than that of the historian.

Sociology, then, in its relation to history, may accurately be described as a study of the constant elements in history, by the relatively exact methods of the statistician, and an interpretation or explanation of history in terms of the concepts and laws of psychology as developed into a social psychology.

In recent years it has been the ambition of many historians to be scientific in their work, and not a few of them have argued that history may be conceived as a science, or developed into a science. To the extent that the historian is scientific, he is a sociologist.

While these writers just cited, like Professor Fling, probably exaggerate the extent to which sociology should differ from history in the way of being more "scientific" and more abstract, yet these excerpts make clear at least a real difference in degree with respect to these matters. Both of these social sciences have, however, been in error in

their extreme reliance upon either the concrete or the abstract approach. History has tended to become irrelevant through dwelling too much upon concrete and unconnected episodes, while sociology has introduced many inaccuracies by the semi-metaphysical divorcement from concrete facts evident in its penchant for premature generalizations.<sup>70</sup> These very differences of approach, however, serve to make coöperation between these sciences all the more valuable and indispensable.

The question has often been asked whether, as the task of gathering the concrete data of history becomes more nearly completed and the tendency towards synthesis and generalization in history becomes more marked, the fields of the historian and the historical sociologist will not tend to merge. While there is no doubt that they will progressively tend to approximate each other more closely than at present and the historian will, in all probability, perfect his technique by acquiring more and more of the sociological viewpoint, yet there is little doubt that each will be able to maintain an independent existence and that a mutually beneficial division of labor will be preserved. The task of historical compilation, synthesis and interpretation will never be wholly executed, and the sociologist will scarcely reach the period when he will not need to continue to devote himself to the general analysis of social phenomena. He is likely permanently to require the services of the historian in supplying him with the indispensable facts descriptive of social genesis. One of the best assurances of the continued integrity and probable separation and independence of sociology and history in the future, as well as of the probability that greater coöperation between them

<sup>70</sup>I have tried to indicate the defects of history and sociology in the past, which have grown out of these errors in emphasis, in the article in the *Historical Outlook* for February, 1921, and in another on "The Future of Sociology," in the *Publications of the American Sociological Society* for 1920, pp. 194-198.

will be inevitable, is to be found in the nature of the historical events and their documentary record in the period since 1800. The far greater complexity of contemporary society, and the vastly larger body of available and recorded historical data descriptive of this increased complexity, promise an unlimited outlet for the industry of the historian and require more than ever his acquaintance with the principles of sociology.

While what has been said about the relation of sociology to history in general also applies to intellectual, economic and social history, it may be desirable to describe in a little more detail the bearing of sociology upon these important branches of the more progressive types of historical writing.

The significance of sociology for intellectual history should be readily apparent. The real founder of this type of history, Auguste Comte, was also the first distinguished modern sociologist, and the work of Lamprecht, who has done more than any other modern writer to advance the cultivation of this field, has been called by a noted authority on historiography "the ablest product of the sociological school of historians."<sup>1</sup> Inasmuch as sociology is, in one important sense, the science of group behavior, it is evident that it must be of the utmost possible value to historians who view their subject as primarily concerned with the genesis, characteristics and mutations of the collective psychology of any era. The prevailing type of collective psychology is but the product and reflection of the group attitudes and behavior, the nature, genesis and operation of which constitutes, perhaps, the most vital phase of sociological investigation. The collective psychology is only the psychic complex brought about by the operation of socially produced folkways, mores, customs and institutions in creating the so-called social mind. In no field of

<sup>1</sup> J. B. Bury, "Darwinism and History," in *Evolution in Modern Thought* (Boni and Laveright's Modern Library), p. 262. See above pp. 198 ff.

history can coöperation with the sociologist be more fruitful than in that of intellectual history.<sup>72</sup>

The significance of sociology for economics is so obvious that it has been recognized by all who have not clung doggedly to the metaphysics of the Ricardian school and its line of succession. In the processes of production the social factors of cooperation, division of labor, economic specialization by function and area, and class differentiation on an economic basis have been emphasized by writers from Plato to Adam Smith, Kropotkin, Gumpłowicz, Ratzenhofer, Durkheim, Small and Veblen. In the process of valuation and exchange the point of view of the social psychologist has now been substituted for the hedonistic calculus of Bentham, upon which the earlier type of psychological economics was based, and we are just beginning to have a truly psychological school of economists. The importance of custom and fashion in determining economic demand is regarded as of primary significance. Again, much emphasis is being placed upon the socio-psychological potency of suggestion, through which the public is exploited by those who control the changing fads and fashions. Then, the development of social communication will determine very largely the extent of the market and the variety of factors affecting its operation. In the matter of distribution, from both the technical economic aspects of this problem and the popular understanding of its meaning, social factors are of real significance. It is the prevailing social attitude which determines to no inconsiderable degree how far any of the factors of production will be allowed to absorb more of the social income than their actual contribution warrants. A given body of social doctrine and a particular form of social organization have stood behind theories of distribution as widely different as those of

<sup>72</sup> See M. M. DAVIS, *Psychological Interpretations of Society*; and my articles in the *Sociological Review*, 1921, and 1922 3, and in the *American Journal of Sociology*, 1921 2, for summaries of leading efforts of sociologists to analyze the problems of the social mind and collective psychology.

Richard Cobden and Nikolai Lenin. In the problems of the consumption of wealth social factors enter to no inconsiderable degree. There is the field of social and economic welfare, including the problem of the desirable standard of living and economic well-being. Then, one must consider the many problems of the social population, which Malthus, Ricardo and their followers have believed to be the whole essence of the question of economic reform and social relief. While their interpretation is not shared by modern writers without far-reaching modifications, it is true that the matters of population increase and the grades of intelligence and physical excellence in the population are facts of the utmost importance for the economist, as also are the problems of the conflict of social classes, which is based upon opposing economic interests. The significance of sociology for economic processes allied with so many social factors does not need to be argued at length. The intimate relation between the social and economic environment and the prevailing type of economic theory is a basic assumption with all competent historians of economic theory.<sup>73</sup>

In the field of the changes and successions of economic systems—economic history—the sociological point of view is not less important. It is necessary in order to obtain a comprehensive view of the historical process and to secure a broad interpretation of the nature of historical causation. The sociologist discovers the germs of change in the general conditions of the social mind—in the traits of the existing collective psychology. It is this which determines the progress which can be made in pure science, which, in turn,

<sup>73</sup> W C Mitchell, "Human Nature and Economics," in *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, November, 1914, and "Bentham's Felicific Calculus," in *Political Science Quarterly*, June, 1918, Z C Dickinson, *Economic Motives*; W G Sumner, *Folkways*, B M Anderson, *Social Value*, W O Thompson, *Malthusianism, A Study in Population*, E M East, *Mankind at the Cross-Roads*, F A Fetter, "Price Economics versus Welfare Economics," in *American Economic Review*, September and December, 1920, A C Pigou, *The Economics of Welfare*, A W Small, *General Sociology*, W B Bailey, *Modern Social Conditions*; and the numerous contributions of W F Willcox to demography

is the chief factor creating changes in the prevailing system of technology. The status of technology is the primary element which shapes the economic institutions and processes, while these react upon society to produce the whole complex of social conditions and defensive institutions. By thus analyzing the processes of social change as a whole, sociology can do much to clarify our conception of the patterns of economic transformation and social metamorphosis.<sup>74</sup> It is, further, obvious that a more comprehensive social science than economics must be utilized to interpret the reaction of economic changes upon social institutions.

It is probably even less necessary to describe at any length the bearing of sociology upon social history. While the superficial description of social facts in the past may be carried on to some degree independent of a knowledge of sociological principles, no valid synthesis of social factors in history can be hoped for without an adequate acquaintance with the sociological principles and processes involved in the matter of social genesis and social organization, namely, the problems of the social population in reproduction, aggregation, congregation, class building, class conflict, population pressure, migration, and the contact and conflicts of social aggregates.<sup>75</sup>

One related point should, perhaps, be cleared up in this section, namely, the very real difference between social history, in its most general sense, and sociologically guided historical synthesis. Social history, in a broad sense, may include a rapidly flowing and entirely concrete narrative which stresses chiefly social aspects of history, or it may

<sup>74</sup> T. Veblen, *The Place of Science in Modern Civilization; The Vested Interests and the State of the Industrial Arts*, and *The Engineers and the Price System*; J. H. Robinson, *Mind in the Making*, F. Müller-Lyer, *History of Social Development*, A. Loria, *The Economic Foundations of Society*, A. Hansen, "The Technological Interpretation of History," in *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, November, 1921, and the papers by Professors Conrad and Patten in *Proceedings of the International Congress of Arts and Sciences*, St. Louis, 1904, Vol. II, pp. 199-228.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*; L. M. Bristol, *Social Adaptation*; A. W. Small, *Origins of Sociology*; N. S. B. Gras, *Introduction to Economic History*.

mean a study of history as an exemplification of social processes, inductively considered, or, finally, it may mean sociological history, strictly speaking, namely, a generalized and synthetic account of the evolution of human society or a particular portion of it. Of course, each of these types shades into the other, but it should be kept in mind that a gossipy narrative of social phases of human activities is not sociological history. Of these three possible varieties of social history we have excellent examples among the works of well-known historians. McMaster's *History of the People of the United States*, with its continuation in the work of Oberholtzer, is, perhaps, the most extensive and notable product of narrative and descriptive history which stresses social factors.<sup>76</sup> Turner's *The Frontier in American History*, Becker's *The United States: an Experiment in Democracy*, Beard's works on the economic foundations of early national history, and Schlesinger's *New Viewpoints in American History*, are good examples of the presentation of history as an inductive study of social processes. What may be called at least an anticipation of sociological history is to be found in the prospectus of Buckle and the works of Lamprecht and Breysig. Owing to the undeveloped and imperfect state of sociology at the present time and the lack of concern of historians with sociology, sociological history is scarcely more than the "substance of things hoped for." Much that has gone under that name in the past has been little more than a deductive philosophy of history. Yet, without the scientific inductions concerning human development which sociology strives to produce, history can be of little pragmatic value. As Professor Giddings has well said, "History without deductive illumination is chaos. Deduction without verification is undoubtedly the very 'light that never was on sea or land' " " <sup>77</sup> Above all, sociology and the sociological point of view make

<sup>76</sup> Other good examples of this type of social history are Riehl's *Natural History of the German People*; and Freytag's, *Scenes from the German Past*.

<sup>77</sup> F. H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 53

clear the naïveté involved in regarding the writing of successive chapters on economic, social and political topics as a successful achievement in historical synthesis and interpretation. Until the interrelation and interdependence of all of these factors and influences are adequately worked out into a single coherent and unified picture and explanation there is no real synthesis.

One may well emphasize even further the importance for every type of history of the production of illuminating generalizations concerning human development, which has been one of the chief foundations of the opposition of the conventional historian to sociology. It is hard to see how any thoughtful historian can deny that interpretation and generalization form the ultimate end and goal of historical science.<sup>78</sup> It may well be that there has been much premature dogmatizing, that concerning many regions and periods the available sources are so scanty as to make generalization forever risky,<sup>79</sup> that we are scarcely ready for much dogmatic generalization concerning any aspect or period of history, and that a great body of historians will need to keep perpetually at work in order to gather the storehouse of objective facts upon which valid generalization must rest. It may be further conceded that there is great need of urging caution in interpretation, but, after all these concessions are made to the point of view of the conventional historian, one may be sure that without generalization, and until interpretation of the results of research comes, the concrete facts of history will have no more value than the note-books of a field-worker and observer in biology or geography which have never been opened and studied by a constructive scientist.<sup>80</sup> It is probably due to the lack of generalization in the past, necessary, perhaps,

<sup>78</sup> J. T. Shotwell, "The Interpretation of History," in *American Historical Review*, July, 1913.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. W. L. Westermann, "Sources and Methods in Economic History," in *Political Science Quarterly*, March, 1922, pp. 69-74.

<sup>80</sup> Robinson, *The New History*, H. Berr, *La Synthèse en histoire*, Lamprecht, *Die kulturhistorische Methode*.



in the light of the undeveloped nature of the subject, that the scientific history of the last century has had so little real influence upon human thought, while the half-baked generalizations of pseudo-historians, as exemplified by such doctrines as the Aryan myth, national and race superiority moralizing history and the Hegelian view of the state, have done so much to pervert all our thinking on historical matters.

#### IV. SOCIOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AND INTERPRETATIONS IN THE HISTORY OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION.

##### 1. *Social Processes in European History.*<sup>51</sup>

If human history is, in its broadest conception, the record of social evolution, and if both nations and individuals, and the culture they have produced, have developed and functioned only in a social setting and according to laws of social processes and behavior, the conclusion follows inevitably that the science of social evolution and social processes is indispensable to the historian who would correctly understand, interpret and present the historical development of European society. It will be the aim of the remainder of this chapter to indicate some of the more important social processes and sociological problems in the history of western civilization, and to make clear the significance of a knowledge of sociology to the historian who attempts to handle the data of the intellectual, social and economic history of Europe and America.

We shall endeavor to illustrate our thesis from concrete problems in the history of the various peoples of the near Orient and western Europe, but first there should be summarized briefly some of the chief social processes which play a part in the history of every people. First, there is the

<sup>51</sup>I desire here to express my appreciation of the courteous assistance of Professors J. H. Breasted, Lynn Thorndike, Preserved Smith and F. A. Ogg in the revision of this second division of the paper. These scholars read the material in manuscript and offered many most helpful criticisms and suggestions.

problem of the geographical environment, which must be considered, not necessarily because it is a determining factor, but rather as an important conditioning influence in the development of any civilization.<sup>82</sup> Next, there is the question of the ethnic derivation of the population of the region. Though this phase of the background of history has become much less important in recent years, with the destruction of the Aryan myth and other types of pseudo-scientific arguments for a chosen or superior people, yet it cannot be entirely ignored.<sup>83</sup> Even if the biological aspect of the problem of the ethnic composition of a state is no longer regarded as of special significance, or as possible of exact determination, the very fact of the place of origin of a people and their migrations may be of the greatest importance for the historian of material and intellectual culture for quite other than biological reasons, namely, because of the desirability of distinguishing between the original elements in the culture of the component peoples and those which they may subsequently have acquired in the process of their migrations into the area under consideration.<sup>84</sup> Then come the extremely momentous series of problems connected with the settlement of peoples in a given region, the building up of a social system and the establishment of social classes, a process which has been the center of interest of sociologists such as Gumpłowicz, Ratzenhofer, Small

<sup>82</sup> Cf. my bibliographic paper on "The Relation of Geography to the Writing and Interpretation of History," in *The Journal of Geography*, December, 1921, F. H. Giddings, "Theory of Social Causation," loc. cit.; F. S. Chapin, *Historical Introduction to Social Evolution*, Chap. v, F. J. Teggart, *The Processes of History*, Chap. II, R. H. Lowie, *Culture and Ethnology*, Chap. III, and, above all, F. Thomas, *The Environmental Basis of Society*, and L. Febvre, *A Geographical Introduction to History*.

<sup>83</sup> Contrast the older views in J. A. Gobineau's *Essay on the Inequality of Human Races*, and H. S. Chamberlain's *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, with W. Z. Ripley, *The Races of Europe*, Chaps. VI, XVII, E. Pittard, *Race and History*, and F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, Chap. I. The most forceful recent plea for the racialists is contained in L. Stoddard's *Racial Realities in Europe*. With it should be compared F. Boas's "The Question of Racial Purity," in *American Mercury*, October, 1924.

<sup>84</sup> Cf. G. Elliot Smith, *Migrations of Early Culture*, *The Diffusion of Culture*, F. Graebner, *Méthode der Ethnologie*, E. Demolins, *Comment la route crée le type social*, A. C. Haddon, *The Wanderings of Peoples*.

and Oppenheimer, and has received its classic summary presentation in Professor Giddings' *Principles of Sociology*.<sup>85</sup> These problems include settlement, in keeping with environmental opportunities, the exploitation of the resources of the environment, according to a given economic technique and a prevailing system of labor, the resultant development of economic, social, political, juristic and religious classes and institutions, the conflict of social groups and classes, and the final shaping of the social system, with its dominating socio-psychological characteristics.<sup>86</sup>

But no civilization can be studied in isolation; its contacts with other peoples are often more significant than its domestic or internal processes of development.<sup>87</sup> Hence, the history of any people must include an investigation of its contacts with neighboring groups, warlike and peaceful. And this study of group contacts must not be confined, as it has been by most historians, to the relatively sterile and unprofitable narrative of wars, of anecdotes of ambassadors, of diplomatic intrigues and provisions of treaties, but must include the description and analysis of all phases of contact in every field of culture and social development. The fruitful studies of writers like Graebner, E. Smith, Gumplowicz, De Greef, Novicow, Seeley, Shepherd, Abbott, Gillespie, Botsford, Haddon, Demolins and Cowan,<sup>88</sup> from

<sup>85</sup> L. Gumplowicz, *Outlines of Sociology*, Part III, G. Ratzenhofer, *Wesen und Zweck der Politik*, F. Oppenheimer, *The State*, A. W. Small, *General Sociology*, Parts IV-VI; F. H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, Book II, Chap. i.

<sup>86</sup> T. Veblen, *The Instinct of Workmanship, Theory of Business Enterprise*, Chaps. 1, 11, 12, J. A. Hobson, *The Evolution of Modern Capitalism*; W. Sombart, *Der moderne Kapitalismus*, F. Muller-Lyer, *History of Social Development*, A. R. Cowan, *A Guide to World History*, pp. 1-38.

<sup>87</sup> This has been especially emphasized by De Greef in his elaborate *Introduction à la sociologie*. His system of sociology has well been called a study of social contacts. See the thorough analysis of his writings by D. W. Douglas.

<sup>88</sup> See the works of Graebner, E. Smith, De Greef and Gumplowicz mentioned above. Also A. C. Haddon, *The Wanderings of Peoples*, J. Novicow, *The Mechanism and Limits of Human Association*, J. E. Seeley, *The Expansion of England*, Part I, Lecture V, W. R. Shepherd, "The Expansion of

widely different points of view, suffice to indicate the significance of social and cultural contacts in history. Moreover, the analysis of social contacts must include the processes of the mingling of social groups through conquest or immigration, with the types of social institutions which result. These processes of social amalgamation and assimilation have been present in every historic civilization; they constituted one of the major problems of the Roman world, and unquestionably are the chief problem facing American society today.<sup>89</sup>

Finally, there is the complex of problems relating to the investigation of the matter of social stability and social change. These include an examination of those factors which make for stability, repetition, stagnation and "cultural lag," and those which operate to produce change or progress, objectively considered. In other words, this last series of problems comprehend those relating to the estimate and assessment of static and dynamic factors in civilization.<sup>90</sup>

One of the most important ways in which sociology can aid in historical synthesis is in the differentiation of types of society and stages of civilization.<sup>91</sup> For instance, the Europe," in *Political Science Quarterly*, 1919, J E Gillespie, *The Influence of Oversea Expansion on England to 1700*, and J B Botsford, *English Society in the Eighteenth Century*

<sup>89</sup> A Cowan, *Master-Clues in World History*, K J Beloch, *Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt*, see A M Schlesinger, "The Significance of Immigration in American History," in *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1921, H P Fairchild, *Immigration*, S E Simons, "Social Assimilation," in *American Journal of Sociology*, 1901-2, M Farrand, "Immigration in the Light of History," in *New Republic*, December, 1916, and the important *Americanization Studies* edited by A T. Burns, published by Harper and Brothers

<sup>90</sup> Cf W Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*, A J Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*; L M Bristol, *Social Adaptation*, C H Cooley, *Social Process*; J B Bury, *History of the Freedom of Thought*, F S Marvin, *The Living Past*, and *Progress and History*, B Adams, *A Theory of Social Revolution*, H M Hyndman, *The Evolution of Revolution*, E Untermann, *The World's Revolutions*, J H Robinson, *The New History*, Chap viii; W F. Ogburn, *Social Change*, P A Sorokin, *The Sociology of Evolution*, and C. Wissler, *Man and Culture*

<sup>91</sup> This subject has been elaborated for many years by Professor F H Giddings in his lectures on the history of civilization at Columbia University. See my *Sociology and Political Theory*, pp 55-6, 168-74.

sociologist differentiates carefully between tribal and civil society, while recognizing primitive survivals in the latter. He distinguishes between a social system based upon agriculture, and the chief behavior attitudes and processes associated with it, and one founded upon the more dynamic basis of urban life and activities. He estimates the importance of transformations in the collective psychology, the problem to which Lamprecht devoted so much attention. Again, he concerns himself with the physical setting of the great epochs in the progress of western civilization as it passes through fluvial, thalassic and the oceanic stages of development. Whether or not the historian will admit the complete validity of such attempts to characterize the types and stages of civilization as have been postulated by Comte, Spencer, Bagehot, Wundt, Giddings, Lamprecht, Breysig and others,<sup>2</sup> it is safe to hold that there are significant differences between the civilizations of the near Orient in antiquity, of Greece and Rome, of medieval times, of early modern times, and of contemporary society since the Industrial Revolution. In thus helping to distinguish between stages and types of civilization, the sociologist can render a real aid in understanding the progress of society and the differences in the history of, let us say, ancient Egypt and modern England, for, as long as history was confined to an enumeration of regnal lists and dynastic changes, there was a strange similarity between the statement that Amenhotep II was followed by Thothmes IV and the announcement that George the IV was succeeded by William IV. In other words, sociology substitutes for the superficial chronology, based upon the progression of dates, the dynamic concepts and processes of cultural evolution. Though the sociologist distinguishes between stages and eras of civilization, the sociological point of view stresses

<sup>2</sup> A. Comte, *The Principles of a Positive Policy*, Vol. III, H. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, W. Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*, F. H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, Book III

the gradual nature of social transformation, emphasizes the continuity of history, and warns against the validity of catastrophic or cataclysmic theories of social and cultural change<sup>93</sup>

## 2. *Sociological Problems in the History of the Near Orient.*

### A. Egypt.

In the interest of brevity we have chosen not to include the so-called "prehistoric" or preliterate period within the scope of the section illustrating the concrete sociological problems in history. Yet, this long and significant period of human development is unquestionably the one in which the aid of the sociologist is most essential to the historian. Owing to the fact that the records of this period include no specific references to the activities and conversations of the Smiths and the Joneses and no account of the anecdotes passed between the ambassadors from the caves of Le Moustier and La Chapelle-aux-Saintes, those who have interested themselves in the description of the culture of this age have been compelled to rely upon the comparative or sociological method of reconstruction. For this reason, and in spite of the relative lack of data, we have a much clearer notion of the nature and stages of cultural evolution during the prehistoric age than the conventional historians have produced for us regarding the subsequent periods of history. In other words, while we have nothing of the "unique evolution of man" from this age we have some admirable cultural history.<sup>94</sup>

Egypt has always been regarded by social historians as one of the classic examples of the influence of the physi-

<sup>93</sup> Contrast the conventional view in A. R. Cowan's *Guide to World History* with the sociological position as to the continuity of history in Ogburn's *Social Change*.

<sup>94</sup> See, for example, J. De Morgan, *Prehistoric Man*; G. G. MacCurdy's *Human Origins*, J. L. Myres, in *Cambridge Ancient History*, Vol. I, and the popular presentation in M. and C. H. B. Quennell's *The Old Stone Age*, and *The New Stone, Bronze and Early Iron Ages*.

cal environment as a dominant factor in cultural development—as the already threadbare description of Egypt as “the child of the Nile” bears witness. But, in addition to the significance of the Nile as the source of the agricultural prosperity of Egypt—the fact chiefly stressed by historians—there is the sociological factor emphasized by Léon Metchnikoff in his *Les grandes fleuves historiques*. This author brings forth a large amount of cogent evidence to prove that it was not merely the protection afforded by the river basins of the Nile and the Tigris and Euphrates, nor alone their fertility, which made them the areas in which there developed the first important early civilizations. As important as these facts were the sociological elements of coöperation and social selection. Owing to the concentration of population in these river valleys, the possibility of developing those coöperative activities and the division of labor, which have been among the most potent agencies and reliable criteria of the development of civilization, was infinitely greater than in areas like great plains, where the population was relatively sparse, distributed and migratory. Further, the greater density of the population made possible a more rapid action of the processes of social selection and, consequently, swifter progress in social evolution. Again, Cowan has shown how Egypt possessed the ideal protective conditions for the development of a dynamic early civilization. The situation of the Nile valley made possible enough protection to prevent over-frequent and disastrous foreign invasions without at the same time producing so great a degree of isolation as to bring about cultural stagnation. Finally, both Egypt and Babylonia well illustrate the gradual passage from a fen and water to a fluvial culture, something highly characteristic of the earliest historic civilizations.<sup>95</sup>

There is little or nothing of sociological significance concerning the ethnic composition of Egypt, other than that

<sup>95</sup> Andrew Reed Cowan, *Master-Clues in World History*.

it seems to have been an indigenous north African population, which built up its early civilization *in situ*, with relatively little interference from paleolithic days until the Hyksos' invasion in the seventeenth century B. C. The development of the feudal-agrarian society of the Nile valley illustrates several interesting sociological principles. The union of the petty villages or local groups—*Nomes*—into the territorial state is an example of the important era in social evolution which marks the passage from tribal society to the civil state. The fact that this was achieved by peaceful means rather than by forceful conquest, as in most regions, may account for the strength and prestige of the priesthood and the economically powerful feudal nobility, as contrasted to the relative weakness of the military classes and the central administration in Egypt. The failure to secure the complete or permanent ascendancy of a ruling group through military conquest and political subjugation may in large part account for the political anarchy which Professor Breasted believes to have been much the most potent cause of Egyptian decline. Again, the development of the class system, based upon the labor of a servile group, is the first striking example of the development of material and æsthetic culture by means of the social surplus concentrated in the hands of a few through the enforced labor of the many. The value and justice of such a system is still warmly debated, particularly in relation to the contemporary aspects of this problem after its various historic mutations. This differentiation of classes in Egyptian society is, of course, one of the major sociological aspects of social genesis. Finally, the methods of providing for irrigation and pasturage in ancient Egypt admirably illustrate the processes of social coöperation on a large and highly developed scale.

The social contacts of Egypt with neighboring groups were, as usual, significant for the development of all phases of her culture. Her trade with inner and eastern Africa,



Arabia and India, the Mediterranean region and western Asia constituted an important source of her prosperity, material culture and artistic development. The introduction of the horse and wheeled vehicle from Asia by the Hyksos altered her political institutions and laid the basis for imperial aspirations and achievements. Lastly, the contact with the Assyrians, Persians and Romans, who were far superior to the Egyptians in a military way, brought the succession of military conquests and political subjugations which have been the lot of Egypt since the seventh century B. C. The great importance of their contacts with Egypt for the civilization of Mesopotamia, Syria, Crete and the Ægean must not be overlooked.

As to the dynamic and static elements in Egyptian society, it is conceded that commerce and religion supplied the pattern of Egyptian aspirations and the material possibility of realizing those achievements for which Egyptian civilization is best known. The chief factors leading to stability or decline were the decentralized agrarian society, with its inevitable trend towards repetition and political confusion, and the bigoted and class-selfish priesthood, which lent its aid to feudal anarchy in opposing effective political organization and progressive advances in religion and thought.\*

#### B. Babylonia and Assyria.

In Babylonia and Assyria the problem of ethnic elements is of more significance than in Egypt, for these civilizations were built up from at least three different ethnic strains—the Sumerians from the Caspian district, bringing with them the wheeled vehicle and a copper culture; the Kassites from the northern grassland, who intro-

\*Incomparably the most illuminating work on the social history of Egypt has been done by Professor James H. Breasted of the University of Chicago. See his *History of Egypt, History of the Ancient Egyptians, Ancient Times, "The Origins of Civilization,"* in *Scientific Monthly*, 1919-20. See also A. Erman's old but valuable work, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, W. F. Petrie, *Social Life in Ancient Egypt*, and T. Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*.

duced the horse; and the Semites from the southwest, who may or may not have been responsible for the remarkable commercial development of lower Mesopotamia.<sup>97</sup> While the geographic environment of the Mesopotamian region was fundamentally like that of Egypt, in being a river valley location, the geographic setting was much more variegated than that of the Nile valley, and it afforded far less protection to the inhabitants of this region. This accounts, as Cowan and others have indicated, for the greater degree of migration and mixture of peoples in Babylonia and Assyria than in Egypt, and also explains the precarious nature of the civilizations and political organizations in this region. The rich and fertile area at the head of the Persian Gulf offered a perennial invitation to invasion by warlike and marauding peoples, on a lower economic plane or inhabiting less hospitable regions. Social assimilation proved a serious problem for both Babylonia and Assyria and was one of the chief rocks upon which the Assyrian state was wrecked.<sup>98</sup>

The significance of the sociological approach to Babylonian and Assyrian civilization may be illustrated in a number of ways, beyond calling attention, in general, to the processes of social evolution in building up a great civilization from its primitive beginnings in the marshes of the delta of the Tigris and Euphrates. In the same way that the development of the slave economy in Egypt represents the first historic example of the earliest method of extending human power and building up a surplus for civilization, so the remarkable development of Mesopotamian commerce constitutes the first important recorded instance of the developed stage of the second means of increasing human power, namely, through international trade and economic

<sup>97</sup> L. E. King, *A History of Sumer and Akkad*; King and Hall, *Egypt and Western Asia in the Light of Recent Discoveries*, J. L. Myres, *The Dawn of History*, Chaps. iv, vi.

<sup>98</sup> J. H. Breasted, *Ancient Times*, Chaps. iv-vii, "The Origins of Civilization," loc cit; R. W. Rogers, *History of Babylonia and Assyria*, Vol. II; J. L. Myres, op. cit.

specialization. Again, sociology alone can make clear the major historic error involved in treating Babylonian and Assyrian history as a unity. As long as history was chiefly concerned with dynastic and regal succession or the enumeration of battles, there was no difficulty in regarding Babylonia and Assyria as a social and cultural, as well as a political, unity. But the sociological approach indicates at once that Babylonia, as contrasted with agrarian Assyria, was an advanced commercial society, dynamic in character and possessed of a capacity for establishing many cultural contacts and synthesizing them all within her own borders. While Babylonian unity was secured more through conquest than that of Egypt, the arts of peace dominated, and the commercial and priestly classes were more prominent than the military element. Babylonia furnishes an excellent example of an early development of extensive group cooperation in the construction of, and social control over, the irrigation projects of the lower river basin. Further, through the intimate relation of state, religion and business in Babylonia there developed, as Professor Jastrow has indicated, a conception of "law and order" which would have constituted a veritable paradise for Mr. Baer, Mr. Frick, Judge Gary, Ole Hansen, Calvin Coolidge, Ralph Easley and Chancellor Day. Assyria, on the other hand, was economically a primitive agricultural state, long culturally backward, forming social contacts mainly in a warlike manner. Organized for, and constructed upon, military conquest, the Assyrian state exemplified the dominance of the military caste. It is the first perfect exemplification of Gumpłowicz's theory of the state founded upon conquest and subjugation.<sup>99</sup>

On account of its dependence upon industry and trade Babylonian society was relatively dynamic, except for the restraining influence of a stereotyped religious cult and a

<sup>99</sup> Breasted, *Ancient Times*, Chap. iv, M. Jastrow, *Civilization of Babylonia and Assyria*, Chap. vi, A. T. Olmstead, *A History of Assyria*

"stand-pat" priesthood. Its decline came chiefly through inability to provide for a strong military defense, and the resulting conquest by her Assyrian and Persian neighbors, more highly specialized for war. In Assyria there were few or no dynamic forces save the specious one of plunder from warfare. Her parasitic imperial position, her agrarian background, and her military-caste system all condemned Assyria to a swift decline and disintegration, once the possibilities of profitable plundering had been exhausted. Even her culture, built up on the ruins of conquered civilizations, was artificial, reminiscent and external, as is exemplified by the early development of Assyrian classicism. Like Persia, Macedonia and Rome, Assyria illustrates the precarious nature of cultural, economic and political aspirations, for which the culture of a state has not been prepared by the education and discipline of the stages of development which lead naturally to the realization of such ambitions. Yet, Assyria, like Rome later on a larger scale, illustrates the significance for cultural development of enforced peace over an extensive area, with the resulting possibilities for cultural exploitation, assimilation and imitation. Cruel conqueror though she was, Assyria cannot be regarded purely as the great parasite in the history of the Orient. As Professor Olmstead has clearly shown, much of the best and most permanent in the culture of the near Orient in antiquity was due indirectly to the military and political system established by Assyria, and to the Assyrian impulse to appropriate and assimilate the superior cultural contributions of the subject peoples.<sup>100</sup>

<sup>100</sup> For the freshest and most original treatment of the history of western Asia in antiquity one should turn to Professor A. T. Olmstead's *Western Asia in the Days of Sargon of Assyria*, *History of Assyria*, and to his various monographic articles published in the *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures*, the *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, the *American Political Science Review*, the *Proceedings of the American Historical Association*, and elsewhere. They constitute the closest analogue to the remarkable synthesis of Egyptian history by Professor Breasted, and it is to be hoped that we may soon have them assembled in book form as a systematic history of the Western Asiatic Orient.

## C. Persia.

Persia furnishes an admirable sociological proof of the difficulties in attempting to maintain political control over a great area, inhabited by a population highly diverse in ethnic composition, cultural characteristics and economic development. It illustrates the fundamental defects of a political experiment without any geographical foundations or natural frontiers which overreaches the possibilities of social assimilation and either economic unity or economic coördination. Persia was one of the best historic examples of what Spencer would call unstable social equilibrium. Yet Persia, while dominant, did much to forward the imperial idea and to promote social and cultural assimilation in the near Orient.<sup>101</sup>

## D. Crete and the Ægean.

We lack sufficient information about Cretan history to justify much generalization by even the most fearless and undaunted sociologist, but at least it seems fair to assert that Crete offers an example of a society oriented and organized for commerce—a career which was invited by its insular and central position at the entrance to the Ægean Sea. The apparently easy and rapid subjugation of the Cretans by the primitive Greek barbarians from the north in the twelfth or eleventh century B. C. illustrates the weakness of overspecialization for industry and trade when in potential contact with military neighbors. There appears to have been no Cretan Nelson or Von Tirpitz.<sup>102</sup> Troy, Mycenæ and Tiryns offer, as Mr. Walter Leaf has recently and clearly shown, an excellent illustration of the development of flourishing civilizations on the basis of strategic geographic location, which gave them unusual economic advantages at the time. Troy, by being able to

<sup>101</sup> Breasted, *Ancient Times*, Chap. vi; P. M. Sykes, *History of Persia*, Vol. I, article "Persia," in *Encyclopedia Americana*.

<sup>102</sup> J. Baikie, *The Sea Kings of Crete*; H. B. Hawes, *Crete the Forerunner of Greece*.

close the Hellespont, was able to force the Euxine-Ægean trade through her territory, while Mycenæ and Tiryns enjoyed a large revenue through their control over the routes of communication between the Gulf of Argolis and the mainland to the north and west.<sup>103</sup>

**E. Sociological Significance of the History of the Near Orient.**

Finally, one may call attention to the general aspects of the collective psychology of the ancient Orient as a whole,<sup>104</sup> exhibiting as it does what Professor Giddings has called the "military-religious" stage of the development of western civilization. While one must allow for significant variations in degree of development in the separate states of the near Orient, it may be said that the collective psychology was one which functioned towards military expansion; the development of the territorial state; the establishment of absolute monarchy; enforced religious unity, accompanying the imperial impulse in politics; a dominating passion for cultural unity and homogeneity; depreciation of any development of a critical spirit; and the growth of that disregard of the ruling caste for the rights and comforts of the servile mass which has characterized western history from the days of Amenhotep III and Sargon to those of Frick, Gary and the coal operators of West Virginia. While most of the cultural characteristics of ancient oriental history made for the conditions producing a stagnant and arrested civilization, at least two phases of the oriental contributions to history were forward-looking. Through slavery and trade there was developed the possibility of the social surplus and social coöperation which made civilization possible. Through the

<sup>103</sup> W. Leaf, *Homer and History, and Troy A Study in Homeric Geography*.

<sup>104</sup> I shall make no attempt to identify the periods of history with Lamprecht's series of dominant socio-psychic traits—symbolic, typical, conventional, individual, subjective, etc.—though I would not deny that this classification of stages in the development of the European collective psychology may have some validity and no little virtue for purposes of organization and clarification of data.

invention of the art of writing and the laying of the basis of scientific knowledge and a cultural tradition, the way was opened for the further progress of the Greeks towards critical thought, natural science, liberal institutions, and the beginning of the freedom of the individual.<sup>106</sup>

### 3. *Sociological Problems in the History of Classical Antiquity.*

It may justly be insisted that the whole complex of classical history is one which requires a sociological analysis. The technological and economic interpretations of history, taken alone, are not adequate for the task. While developing a far higher type of civilization and culture than the Orient, the economic life of the Greeks and Romans, barring that of Hellenistic Alexandria, was never as advanced as that of some earlier and contemporary oriental states, and the type of economic technique was much the same. Nothing short of the sociological consideration of all the factors operating in Greek and Roman life will prove adequate to the solution of the many problems of the origins, development and decline of classical civilization. Further, the sociologist can detect a real difference in the social systems operated by the divided polity of Greece and the united Empire of Rome. This leads him to the same qualifications and hesitations as beset the historian of thought and culture in attempting to handle the "classical" period as anything of a cultural and institutional unity.

That the physical environment of Greece, with its location at the threshold of the Orient, its adjacency to trading points in the Ægean and Mediterranean, its long coast line, and its natural division into many segregated areas, played

<sup>106</sup> Breasted, "The Origins of Civilization," loc. cit.; "The Eastern Mediterranean and Early Civilization in Europe," in *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1914, and "The New Past," in *University of Chicago Record*, October, 1920, F. H. Giddings, *The Principles of Sociology*, pp. 309-23, F. S. Marvin, *The Living Past*, Chap. III, H. G. Wells, *Outline of History*, Chaps. XVI, XVII, XX.

a part in determining the nature of Greek history, no historian will deny. Yet it is impossible to doubt the truth of Hegel's classical assertion that environment was a conditioning influence rather than a determining factor in Greek civilization. The subsequent inhabitants of the same territory have never made conspicuous progress towards restoring the civilization of the era of Pericles.<sup>106</sup> Nor can one, in spite of the long since disproven nonsense of Francis Galton about the superior cranial capacity of the classic Greek, obtain much satisfaction from an appeal to physical anthropology or ethnography. Of all the inhabitants of the Greek peninsula, the Athenians alone showed any remarkable capacity for cultural improvement; the Spartans, Boeotians and the Thebans were conspicuous only for their stupidity. Further, anthropological research has revealed a general identity between the racial strains which entered into the population of Greece and those which created the founders of Roman society, but no one would suggest any remarkable similarity between the cultures which the two peoples produced independently.<sup>107</sup> One might appeal to the dynamic influence of commerce, and point to the fact that only commercial Athens and Alexandria produced an epoch-making culture, but there had been earlier commercial states which had reached fully as high an economic development without creating Athenian or Hellenistic civilization. These brief observations will suffice to indicate the complicated nature of Hellenic civilization. It can either be explained in part, at least, by a broad sociological analysis or be ignored, as it has been by most conventional historians, who have, like Thucy-

<sup>106</sup> H. Webster, *Ancient History*, Chap. 14; A. E. Zimmern, *The Greek Commonwealth*, pp. 13-64, D. S. Hogarth, *The Nearer East*; M. I. Newbigin, *Mediterranean Lands, and Geographical Aspects of Balkan Problems*; E. Curtius, *The History of Greece*, Chap. 1, J. Cvijic, *La péninsule Balkanique*.

<sup>107</sup> W. Z. Ripley, *The Races of Europe*, pp. 269-70, 406-8, H. Peake, "The Races Concerned in the First Siege of Troy," in *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 1916, W. Leaf, *Homer and History*, Breasted, *Ancient Times*, Chap. 12.



dides, centered their attention on the superficial political, military and diplomatic aspects of Greek history.

The sociological point of view gives a new and more reliable vantage-point from which to study Hellenic origins. Looking upon the problem from the standpoint of the development of culture and social institutions, it is readily apparent to the sociologist that the Hellenic peoples did not, in the early days of their occupation of the Greek peninsula, bring a higher form of culture or accelerate social evolution. Rather, they were culturally far behind the peoples of the Mycenaean period and produced a great cultural and institutional regression. Not for several centuries were they able to rebuild what they had destroyed.

Again, the sociologist can point out what the student would never be led to suspect from the conventional histories and the manuals of Greek history, namely, that the progress of Athenian society from Homeric times to the Periclean age exhibits most of the great stages in social evolution—tribal organization, tribal feudalism, tribal kingdoms, the civil state, pastoral and agricultural economy, and the development of urban commercialism.<sup>108</sup> The civilizations of Periclean Athens and Hellenistic Alexandria are interesting examples of the dynamic effects of cultural and economic contacts.<sup>109</sup> Further, the sociological approach to Greek history, maintaining a consistent attempt to differentiate social systems, would call attention to the inaccuracy and futility of any effort to deal with the history of the Greek peninsula as a coherent unity. The history of Athens and Alexandria, from the standpoint of social, economic and cultural development, is as different from that of Sparta or Thebes as that of Crete was from that of Assyria.<sup>110</sup>

<sup>108</sup> See A. G. Keller, *Homeric Society*; L. H. Morgan's old book *Ancient Society*, Part II, Chaps. viii-x; and Breasted, *Ancient Times*, Chaps. x-xii, xiv.

<sup>109</sup> Breasted, *Ancient Times*, Chaps. xix, xxi, Zimmern, op. cit., J. B. Bury et al., *The Hellenistic Age*.

<sup>110</sup> Breasted, *Ancient Times*, Chaps. xiv-xvi, xxi; G. W. Botsford, *Hellenic History*.

Finally, sociology, in the case of Hellenic civilization, confirms the assertion of the economic historian that no culture can have other than a precarious existence if it does not rest upon adequate technological and material foundations. The Greek contempt for manual labor, for the concrete, the commonplace and the dynamic; the accompanying Greek absorption in the abstract, the transcendental, and the absolute; and the Greek acceptance of the rhetorical slogan of "well-said is well done" led to a neglect of that experimental and applied science which alone could keep Hellenic civilization on a healthy dynamic plane, and it perished in such exemplifications of intellectual dry-rot as rhetoric and neo-Platonism.<sup>111</sup>

While no one could question the significance for Roman history of the peninsular nature of Italy or its peculiar position in the Mediterranean, yet the sociological historian, looking at all the factors involved and considering the history of the Italian peninsula from the early Roman period, can well doubt if all the facts about the environment of the Roman people, so exhaustively catalogued by Nissen and Philippson, offer a sufficient explanation of the course of Roman history.<sup>112</sup> The inhabitants of Italy since 500 A. D. have not, until recently, perhaps, exhibited any of the chief tendencies of their Roman ancestors in their achievements in the field of general culture or politics.

Likewise, with the matter of race,<sup>113</sup> the sociological historian would inquire why, with much the same racial derivation as the Greeks, the Romans exhibited far less intellectual genius than the more civilized Hellenic peoples. Further, he would inquire why the modern Italians have

<sup>111</sup> Zimmern, *op. cit.*, Part III; J. H. Robinson, *The New History*, pp. 110-11, 129; *Mind in the Making*, pp. 111-13, C. Osborne Ward, *The Ancient Lowly*.

<sup>112</sup> H. Nissen, *Italische Landeskunde*; A. Philippson, *Das Mittelmeergebiet*; Newbigin, *The Mediterranean Lands*.

<sup>113</sup> ———, *op. cit.*, *Ancient Times*, Chap. xxii; G. Sergi, *The Mediterranean Race*; T. E. Peet, *The Stone and Bronze Ages in Italy*, Chap. xviii, Gufrida-Ruggeri, "The Origins of the Italian People," in *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Vol. XLVIII, pp. 80-102.

been famous for contributions in just those fields of art, literature, philosophy and scholarship in which the ancient Romans were most notoriously deficient. The ethnic problems of Roman history are not so much those which relate to the racial derivation of the original Latin tribes of Rome,<sup>114</sup> but rather those bearing upon the question of assimilation within the empire. While no informed student doubts the contention that the Roman Empire collapsed primarily on account of economic and social defects which paralyzed the operation of the imperial machinery evolved from Julius and Augustus to Diocletian, yet it is also true that the Roman Empire presents an opportunity for an interesting sociological study of the problem of how far ethnic diversity and wide geographical distribution can be harmonized with the existence of a single and unified political entity and authority. It is, of course, a problem which must be looked upon in its dynamic aspects, as it doubtless must exhibit some correlation between the degree of imperial success and the prevailing state of fiscal technique and economic development and prosperity.<sup>115</sup>

One of the most interesting phases of Roman history, and one which preeminently needs the aid of sociological laws and principles is the process of the shifting of social systems and of class building, which was so well exemplified in Rome, with its rapid transformations, due to the changes in economic life produced by the era of world-conquest. The gradual disintegration of the old tribal society, the development of the aristocratic agrarian republic, the rise of the plebeians, the decline of the old aristocracy and the rise of the plutocracy, which Cato and others decried, the increase in the number of *equites*, or the middle class, and of slaves, the subsequent extinction of, first, the free peasants, and later the *decuriones* or *curiales*, the development of the

<sup>114</sup> G. Sergi, *The Mediterranean Race*, V I Modestov, *Introduction à l'histoire romaine*.

<sup>115</sup> Beloch, *Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-romischen Welt*, and T. Frank, "Race Mixture in the Roman Empire," in *American Historical Review*, 1916.

colonnate and of the economic and personal aspects of the coming feudal system, completing the cycle from tribal<sup>116</sup> to feudal agrarianism, are but a few of the typical sociological phases of Roman history which rest upon the phenomena of mutations of social systems and social classes, and which can be properly interpreted by the historian only after acquiring an adequate knowledge of sociological principles. While recognizing the deplorable relative lack of source-material for Roman social and economic history,<sup>117</sup> it is, nevertheless, evident that the changes in Roman society from 500 B. C. to 500 A. D. offer an excellent illustration of the influence of economic factors in society, the total influence of which can be estimated only by the sociologically trained historian.<sup>118</sup> Likewise the problems and methods of social relief in Rome constitute an admirable field for constructive criticism by social science.<sup>119</sup>

The history of the Roman Empire is an excellent illustration to the sociologist of the social and cultural significance of peace, even though it be the enforced peace of the *Pax Romana*. The unusual degree of cultural expansion and material prosperity which the Mediterranean world enjoyed for some centuries has usually been regarded as a result of the excellencies of the Roman imperial system. More thorough and candid students of Roman government have, however, come to believe that the Roman imperial government, instead of being a great monument to political and administrative genius, was, during a large part of its existence, one of the most monstrous of all historic ex-

<sup>116</sup> See T. Frank, *Economic History of Rome*, pp. 9 ff., for evidence of early feudalism and manorial organization in sixth century (B C) Latium.

<sup>117</sup> Westermann, loc. cit.

<sup>118</sup> F. S. Chapin, *Historical Introduction to Social Economy*, Part II; W. L. Westermann, "The Economic Basis of the Decline of Ancient Culture," in *American Historical Review*, July, 1915; T. Frank, *Economic History of Rome*, *Cambridge Medieval History*, Vol. I, Chap. xix; S. Dill, *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*, Book III; Breasted, *Ancient Times*, Chaps. xxv, xxvi, xxix; O. Seeck, *Geschichte des Untergangs der Antiken Welt*.

<sup>119</sup> Chapin, op. cit., Chap. vi; F. F. Abbott, *The Common People of Ancient Rome*, pp. 179 ff.

amples of graft, corruption and inefficiency. Even a partially adequate imperial system was not evolved until the time of Julius and Augustus, and the first really scientific organization was provided by Diocletian, so late that the previous exploitation had drained the provinces and made it financially impossible to administer effectively the new system of Diocletian. Rather, the advantages of Roman rule were chiefly those produced by the forceful maintenance of peace over the majority of the civilized world. The history of the Roman Empire offers the best concrete proof of the almost incalculable advantages of peace, even when this rests upon force rather than consent, and when existing along with almost immeasurable political depravity, incompetence and corruption.

The importance of external contacts for Rome is obvious. The history of the development and operation of the Empire is in a real sense the record of Rome's contacts with other cities, areas and cultures. As one distinguished writer has well expressed it, the history of the Roman Empire is a record of the "successive extinction of nuisances on the frontier." Roman prestige and power was largely a measure of the Roman capacity for absorption and assimilation.

Finally we may come to the best of all examples of the need of a broad sociological viewpoint in the study of Roman society, namely, the influences making for the decline and disintegration of Roman civilization and political power. Nothing short of sociological training could well provide one with the capacity to estimate the relative or total importance of such a diversity of factors and influences as the great area of the Empire, the variety of peoples, the expense of administration, the decline of patriotism, the inadequate conceptions of capital, the persistence of primitive economic concepts and practices, the reliance upon exploitation rather than production, the development of a parasitic economy, the defects of the system

of public finance and taxation, the debasement and depletion of the coinage, the exhaustion of the land through careless methods in the slave cultivation of great estates, the baneful influence of an unfavorable climatic cycle, depopulation, malaria, plagues and epidemics, the extinction of the middle class, the revival of a corrupt and anarchistic agrarian plutocracy, the lack of creative initiative among the Romans, their contempt for manual labor and for experimental and applied science, and their intellectual degradation, evidenced by their acceptance of the oriental mystery cults, astrology, neo-Platonism, and the capitulation to the intellectual bankruptcy of rhetoric—all of which have been brought forward by students of Roman history to explain the downfall of the great imperial system and the society upon which it rested.<sup>120</sup> Further, the sociologically trained historian, with his knowledge of the slow and gradual nature of social change, would be on his guard against any of the various theories of the disintegration of the society of the Roman Empire which represent it as a sudden and unexpected cataclysm.

In contrasting the classical period as a whole with the achievements of the near Orient the sociological historian would conclude that it was marked by the appearance of some toleration of the diversity of thought and opinion; by the birth of the conception of the individual; by some very significant gains of reason over herd impulse, superstition and formalism; by the enlargement of the circle of the politically free; and by the emergence of a more flexible and dynamic society. Had classical society developed applied science and an adequate economic technique, modern society might have appeared two millenniums earlier than it did.<sup>121</sup>

<sup>120</sup> See G. W. Botsford, *Syllabus of Roman History*, Chap. xvii, and my *Social History of the Western World*, pp. 55-59, and the bibliography there given.

<sup>121</sup> F. S. Marvin, *The Living Past*, Chaps. iv-v, G. B. Adams, *Civilization During the Middle Ages*, Chap. 11, J. B. Bury, *History of the Freedom of Thought*, Chap. 11, L. Thorndike, *History of Medieval Europe*, Chap. 11; M. Beer, *Social Struggles in Antiquity*, Livingstone, *The Legacy of Greece*, and Bailey, *The Legacy of Rome*.

4. *Sociological Problems in Medieval History.*

It has long been maintained by historical sociologists that medieval history offers one of the best laboratories for the study of the cultural and social development of man, in that it presents a recapitulation of the progress of humanity from barbarism to the heights of civilization reached in the age of Machiavelli. The provision of this orientation is, probably, the chief service which sociology has rendered to medieval history. Instead of an age intermediate in culture and social development between that of classical antiquity and that of modern times, the Middle Ages appear to the student of social evolution as a period which began with a great social and cultural reversion to a more primitive type. Though it may be a risky effort at a picturesque statement to suggest, as one writer has done, that Clovis marks a reappearance of the political type of Agamemnon, and Charlemagne of Amenhotep III or Sargon, yet the comparison is an illuminating one, and not without essential accuracy when used in the effort to describe in a rough way somewhat similar stages and processes in political evolution. The Middle Ages, then, appear to the sociological historian as the period in which western Europe gradually attained the cultural level and achievements of the near Orient and classical times, something which it scarcely did until the fifteenth century, just when, however, the discoveries overseas were beginning to produce that unique series of changes which brought on the modern age. From a geographic standpoint the Middle Ages meant the preparation for the transition from the thalassic setting of civilization to the world or oceanic orientation.<sup>122</sup>

<sup>122</sup> See J. T. Shotwell, "The Middle Ages," in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, eleventh edition; G. B. Adams, "Present Problems of Medieval History," in *Proceedings of the International Congress of Arts and Sciences*, St. Louis, 1904, Vol II, pp 125-38, J. W. Thompson, "Profitable Fields of Investigation in Medieval History," in *American Historical Review*, April, 1913, pp. 490-504, W. R. Shepherd, "The Expansion of Europe," in *Political Science Quarterly*, 1919, Newbiggin, *Mediterranean Lands*, Chaps viii-xi,

In analyzing problems of medieval history sociology can be of material assistance, in the first place, in disposing of many of the ethnic monstrosities which have distorted the approach to medieval history for many years. By calling attention to the great diversity and admixture of races in Europe since the beginning of the medieval period, sociology and anthropology are able to discredit the whole effort at a racial interpretation of European history. The facts satisfactorily disprove the assertion that the Romans were an old and effete race and that the Germans were a young and virile people, by showing from anthropology and the historic ethnology of Europe that, on the whole, the Germans were, if anything, older than the Romans as a European race.<sup>123</sup> They also put at rest the Aryan myth, recently and unfortunately revived by Mr. Wells, and show that there is not the slightest ground for holding that the Germans are of Aryan derivation and that the term "Indo-Germanic" is obviously self-contradictory and a scientific monstrosity.<sup>124</sup>

Further, the comparative sociological study of political and legal institutions eliminates the old myth of the unique nature of the Teutonic *folk moot* as the single source of western democracy. It not only shows, as Fustel and Brünner long ago proved, that the Teutonic *folk moot* was about as democratic as a modern Republican national convention, but also demonstrates it to be but a common phenomenon of primitive society in many parts of the world. How destructive this is of the basic ethnic, political and historical philosophy of writers like Kemble, Freeman, Stubbs, Fiske and Burgess will be evident to all. Likewise, there goes to the limbo of anachronisms the myth of Gallic fickleness and political incapacity, which was produced by Julius Cæsar's slanders designed to justify his imperialism,

<sup>123</sup> J. B. Bury, *The Later Roman Empire*, Vol I; J. H. Robinson, *The New History*, pp. 162, 175-7, W. Z. Ripley, *The Races of Europe*, Chap. vi.

<sup>124</sup> Ripley, *The Races of Europe*, Chap. xvii, R. B. Dixon, *The Racial History of Man*, Book I.



and was revived in the reaction against the French Revolution in the writings of Burke and the German Romanticists. The French developed one of the earliest and the strongest of the medieval monarchies, and in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were pointing the finger of scorn at revolutionary England and ununited and anarchic Germany. Finally, it was a sociological line of approach which enabled Maitland, McKechnie, Jenks and others to explode the myth of the alleged democratic, popular and progressive nature of the Magna Carta.<sup>125</sup>

The building up of the political institutions of the Middle Ages illustrates many important sociological processes. Sir Paul Vinogradoff has described the breakdown of kinship society among the Germans between the time of Tacitus and that of Clovis as "one of the most momentous turning-points in the history of the race," but who other than a student trained in anthropology or historical sociology would have the slightest inkling of the significance or justification of this statement? <sup>126</sup> Again, the establishment of fairly permanent and coherent states through military conquest in the early Middle Ages constitutes an excellent exemplification of the theory of Gumplowicz concerning the military nature of political origins and an equally admirable illustration of the class-building process within the state, which accompanies the process of conquest and ethnic and political superimposition.<sup>127</sup>

The typical medieval institutions well illustrate certain significant characteristics of, or certain distinct forms of, social systems. Feudalism, whatever its political, legal, economic and military background and origins, was a

<sup>125</sup> H. Brünner, *Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte*, Fustel de Coulanges, *Histoire des institutions politiques de l'ancienne France*; J. T. Shotwell, "The Political Capacity of the French," in the *Political Science Quarterly*, 1909; F. W. Maitland, *Constitutional History of England*, W. S. McKechnie, *The Magna Carta A Commentary*, E. Jenks, "The Myth of Magna Carta," in *Independent Review*, November, 1904.

<sup>126</sup> P. Vinogradoff in *Cambridge Medieval History*, Vol. II, p. 633.

<sup>127</sup> L. Gumplowicz, *Outlines of Sociology*, Part III, F. Oppenheimer, *The State*, Chap. v.

transitional social system based upon the element of personal relations, and immunities, as contrasted with the earlier bond of kinship and the truly civic relation, which developed in the medieval towns and with the perfection of the national state.<sup>128</sup> Likewise the manor was a socio-economic system which has, perhaps, received more attention from legal, economic and cultural historians than any other earlier or later type of social organization. But, quite as important as the interminable discussion which has centered about the question of the *mark* or *villa* origin of the manor, are the various social characteristics of the manor—its corporate unity; its sense of a square deal, as manifest in such extremes as the inconvenient scheme of scattered holdings; its relative isolation and self-sufficiency; its tendency towards repetition in economic processes and social activities; its unusual trend towards domination by custom and tradition, and its general inclination towards stability, provincialism and stagnation.<sup>129</sup> Yet, in the light of the emancipation movement of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, it would be absurd to hold that the manorial society had no dynamic or progressive tendencies. While much has been made of the democratic origins and contributions in the medieval towns, the possible relation of manorial society to democracy has not been so generally recognized. Certainly there have been few better examples of the coöperative democratic society than the medieval village-community, and, in one of his unpublished lectures,

<sup>128</sup> F. Oppenheimer, *Ibid*, Ch. Seignobos, *The Feudal Régime*; G. B. Adams, "Feudalism," in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, eleventh edition, F. Funk-Brentano, *The Middle Ages*, Chap. II, A. Luchaire, *Social France at the Time of Philip Augustus*, J. W. Thompson, "German Feudalism," in *American Historical Review*, April, 1923, F. W. Cornish, *Chivalry*, Vinogradoff, in *Cambridge Medieval History*, Vol. III, Chap. XVIII, E. Jenks, *The State and the Nation*, Chap. X.

<sup>129</sup> As presented, for example, in W. J. Ashley, *The Economic Organisation of England*, Chaps. I-III, W. J. Ashley, *Economic History of England*, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 33-43, R. E. Prothero, *English Farming, Past and Present*, pp. 1-30, P. Vinogradoff, *The Growth of the Manor*, Ch. Seignobos, *The Feudal Régime*, pp. 3-26, N. S. B. Gras, *Introduction to Economic History*, Chap. III; P. Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid as a Factor of Evolution*, pp. 120 ff., 229 ff.; W. B. Davis, *Life on a Medieval Barony*.

Professor Giddings has suggested that the ideal of human equality has, in part, come to us from the enforced equality of the peasants on the medieval estates.

The socio-economic system represented by the guilds, with their personal basis of industrial relationships, their ideals and practices of social responsibility in production and exchange, their active interest in workmanship and productivity, and their at least partial industrial autonomy, has aroused the interest and admiration of students of social reform from Ruskin and William Morris to Orage, Penty and Cole. In the towns, themselves, we find the most conspicuous evidence of medieval liberalism, from which may be traced the origins of those forces which have produced most of what we now have of political, social and economic democracy.<sup>130</sup>

In the matter of the social attitude towards material wealth and its responsibilities the medieval conception, while much different from our present-day attitudes, had in it much to commend it. The accumulation and use of wealth were regarded from the point of view of their contribution to group welfare and well-being. The purely pecuniary and profit orientation of the present and the essentially individualistic point of view which dominates modern economic life were well-nigh absent. The medieval doctrines with respect to forestalling, engrossing, regrating, the "just-price" and the taking of interest well reflect the salutary conception of the social responsibility involved in material possessions. While it is futile to hope to escape from present problems by a return to the primitive medieval

<sup>130</sup> L. Thorndike, *History of Medieval Europe*, Chap. xvii, G. B. Adams, *Civilization During the Middle Ages*, Chap. xii, Gras, *op. cit.*, Chap. iv, G. Renard, *Guilds in the Middle Ages*, P. Boussonade, *Life and Labor in the Middle Ages*, A. P. Usher, *Industrial History of England*, Chap. iii, vi, W. J. Ashley, *Economic Organization of England*, Chap. ii, Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid*, Chaps. v-vi. For an ecstatic eulogy of the guild social and economic organization see A. J. Penty, *A Guildman's Interpretation of History*. For sobering criticism see A. P. Evans, "The Problem of Control in Medieval Industry," in *Political Science Quarterly*, December, 1921.

economy, we would probably be greatly benefited by a revival of these guiding medieval socio-economic ideals.<sup>131</sup>

The medieval period offers to the sociological historian one of the best illustrations of the important place which art may occupy as a social force. Not only did artistic endeavor, in its more conventional expressions, occupy a far higher position as a dynamic social impulse than at the present time, but the artistic attitude permeated even commonplace aspects of industrial effort to a degree scarcely imaginable today.<sup>132</sup> Then, psychological sociology finds an interesting field for investigation in a study of medieval pilgrimages, crusades, fraternal life, religious manias, and various other popular ebullitions and hysterias.<sup>133</sup> The domination of the Medieval Church is one of the most notable historic examples of the potency of supernatural religion as a social force and a factor in social control. The age of Innocent III marks, perhaps, the culmination of the power of the priesthood in human society. Further, one should note the importance of social contacts for medieval civilization. The rise of the towns, the growth of commerce and economic prosperity, the development of culture in the municipalities, the genesis of urban liberalism—in fact all of the constructive trends in medieval civilization—grew out of these contacts from the Crusaders onward.

Finally, the medieval order as a whole, with its agrarian basis; its general reliance on a barter economy; its lack of the dynamic forces of capitalism; its emphasis on faith rather than science and criticism, offers a sharp contrast with the dynamic, modern capitalistic social order—a con-

<sup>131</sup> L. H. Haney, *History of Economic Thought*, Chap. vi.

<sup>132</sup> See the lecture by Percy Dearmer in Hearnshaw's *Medieval Contributions to Modern Civilization*, and P. Lorquet, *The Art of the Middle Ages*.

<sup>133</sup> Cf. E. A. Ross, *Social Psychology*, pp. 63 ff., 121 f.; A. Luchaire, *Social France at the Time of Philip Augustus*, Chaps. 1, xiii; A. Baumstark, *Abendlandische Palastmeyerpüger*, B. Sidis, *The Psychology of Suggestion*, pp. 318-30; Hecker, *Epidemics of the Middle Ages*; W. W. Ireland, "The Psychology of the Crusades," *Journal of Mental Science*, 1906-7.

trast which some, like Dr. Walsh and Mr. Cram, interpret in a manner altogether unfavorable to the modern order, in part presumably because it has never been their privilege to spend a week of truly medieval life on a medieval manor or in a medieval town.<sup>184</sup>

But even in this stable medieval age there were appearing the humble beginnings of those influences which were to produce modern times and contemporary civilization—the rise of extra-European trade, the emergence of capital, the growth of industry, the increase in the size and number of towns, and the appearance of the *bourgeoisie*. The “age of faith” was doomed. The sociological view of history renders the older view of the cataclysmic termination of the Middle Ages as absurd as the conventional notion of their catastrophic beginning in an abrupt “fall” of the Roman Empire. The notion of Symonds and others that the medieval period was one of a thousand years of complete stagnation, followed by a sudden flowering of culture in the so-called Renaissance, is now completely discredited. The medieval period was one of gradual but very real development and progress, while the Renaissance had strangely little to do with creating the origins of modern society.<sup>185</sup>

### 5. *Sociological Aspects of the Emergence of Modern Times.*

With the coming of modern times the thalassic or Mediterranean basis of civilization, which had circumscribed human activities for three milleniums, became more and

<sup>184</sup> J. T. Shotwell, “The Middle Ages,” in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, eleventh edition; G. L. Burr, “Ancient the Middle Ages,” in *American Historical Review*, July, 1913; W. Stubbs, *Lectures on the Study of Medieval and Modern History*, Chaps. ix-x; E. Power, *Medieval People*; Traill and Mann, *Social England*, Vol. I, pp. 304-17, 532-58; R. A. Cram, *The Nemesis of Mediocrity*, and *Walled Towns*; J. J. Walsh, *The Thirteenth, the Greatest of Centuries*.

<sup>185</sup> G. B. Adams, *Civilization During the Middle Ages*, Chap. xii; P. Boissonade, *Medieval Trade*, *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. I, Chap. xv; P. Smith, *Age of the Reformation*, Chap. xi; L. Thorndike, *History of Medieval Europe*, Chaps. xxxi-xxxiii; H. Pirenne, *Medieval Cities*; K. Brandt, *Das Werden des Renaissance*; W. C. Abbott, *The Expansion of Europe*.

more a memory. As Bryce, Seeley, Shepherd, Abbott and others have shown, the transition from European to world history may almost be regarded as another mode of phrasing the passage of western civilization from medieval to modern times.

In regard to the ethnic factors in modern history the sociologist well trained in the ethnological field can put at rest the mischievous fiction concerning the racial basis of national and cultural development in modern times, which has taken form in such dogmas as the Aryan and Anglo-Saxon myths and the grotesque writings of Gobineau, H. S. Chamberlain and their like. There is no important national state in Europe in which great racial diversity and admixture do not prevail. Further, while there may be psychic differences between "pure" races, these differences, as Professor Boas has shown, do not prove at all the inherent superiority of one race over another. It is the opinion of the best informed specialists that the racial element in modern European history must be pretty generally ignored. While it may not have been without its influence, it is so complex and involved as to be practically insoluble.<sup>186</sup>

In analyzing the passing of the medieval order and the origins of modern times the sociologist observes an unprecedented example of great changes wrought by the operation of geographic and economic factors. The economic historian traces the rise of extra-European trade, the growth of capital, the industrial expansion, and the appearance of a new economic technique in the field of finance, capital and credit institutions in general.<sup>187</sup> The descriptive social historian pictures the development of a more flexible social order; the threatened disruption of the

<sup>186</sup> W. Z. Ripley, *Races of Europe*; F. Boas, *Mind of Primitive Man*, Chap. 1, Dixon, op. cit.

<sup>187</sup> Perhaps the best examples of this type of approach are G. Benard, *Life and Labor in Europe from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century*; W. Cunningham, in *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. I, Chap. xv; and his *Western Civilization in Its Economic Aspects*, Vol. II, Book V, Chaps. ii-iii; and C. Day, *History of Commerce*, Part III.

agrarian system with its stability and repetition; the increased numbers and power of the middle class; new social customs caused by economic changes and new discoveries; the migration of peoples; and the building of new societies in the colonial realm. This point of view is especially significant for an understanding of the beginnings of American history. It shows us, as Payne, Shepherd, Andrews, Osgood, Beer and Bolton have insisted, that our origins can only be understood when viewed as a phase of the expansion movement. Nothing could be more fatal to the correct perspective than the conventional approach through the avenue of the alleged divinely guided antecedents of the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787.<sup>138</sup>

The sociological historian uses the data brought forward by the economic and social historians, but he goes somewhat deeper than either and looks upon the change as a process of supplanting one social system by another. To him it appears as something more than an interesting complex of new concrete facts and events. It is one of the few really epoch-making changes in the social and cultural evolution of the race, comparable to the beginning of regulated social life in tribal society, or the origins of civil society. He tries to discover all the elements entering into and growing out of this significant process of social change and to estimate their relative importance.<sup>139</sup>

<sup>138</sup> By far the best example of this mode of analysis is J. E. Gillespie, *The Influence of Oversea Expansion on England to 1700*, and H. E. Bolton and T. M. Marshall, *The Colonisation of North America*. Significant contributions are also to be found in J. S. Schapiro, *Social Reform and the Reformation*, and in selected chapters in W. C. Abbott, *The Expansion of Europe*, A. F. Pollard, *Factors in Modern History*, J. B. Botsford, *English Society in the Eighteenth Century*, and J. R. Seeley, *The Expansion of England*.

<sup>139</sup> I have tried to organize the phases of the rise of the modern order as a sociologically trained historian might view them in my *Social History of the Western World*, pp. 83-98. No adequate sociological history of the evolution of modern society has been produced. Gillespie's above-mentioned book brings forward much valuable data. W. R. Shepherd's "Expansion of Europe," in the *Political Science Quarterly*, 1919, is a masterly summary of the initial force in producing the modern age. An illuminating concrete study is A. Reichwein, *The Influence of China on Europe in the Eighteenth Century*. The pertinent sections of K. Lamprecht's *Deutsche Geschichte*, and K. Breysig's *Kulturgeschichte der Neuzeit* cover the facts from a socio-

The historian trained as a sociologist looks upon this process in its broadest sense as the result of a contact of cultures, unprecedented in scope and potency. Civilization ceased to rest on a thalassic basis and entered upon the oceanic stage—the chief arena of history shifted, first from the Mediterranean to northern and western Europe, and then to the expansion of Europe overseas. These changes were the products of general European tendencies and were not, as Professor Lybyer has shown, caused by any such catastrophic episode as the Turkish seizure of the trade routes. Beginning with the Crusades, European society came into contact with the ideas, economic products and social institutions of other peoples. As cultural anthropologists and sociologists have long insisted, the contact of cultures is the most effective force in breaking down stability and provincialism and in stimulating curiosity and progressive impulses. One of the great results of this cultural interpenetration was the rise of skepticism, criticism, and interest in science—a general reaction against the premises and aspirations of the “age of faith.”<sup>140</sup> The other was the varied complex of new developments flowing out of the substitution of world-trade for local or thalassic exchange, the rise of capital and its dynamic influences, and the increase in the numbers and the power of the middle class.<sup>141</sup>

In the field of politics the sociologist sees feudalism supplanted, first, by secular, royal absolutism, and then by *bourgeois* parliamentarianism, in each case the change

logical point of view, but with a personal bias in favor of a definite scheme of social evolution. Much profound analysis is contained in the type of works produced by Sombart, Hobson and Veblen. The first important textbook to appropriate something of the sociological point of view was C. J. H. Hayes' *Political and Social History of Modern Europe*.

<sup>140</sup> W. E. H. Lecky, *Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe*; J. B. Bury, *History of the Freedom of Thought*, and *The Idea of Progress*, A. C. McGiffert, *Protestant Thought Before Kant*, Chap. x.

<sup>141</sup> Cunningham, *Western Civilization*, Book V, Chap. 11; Pollard, *Factors in Modern History*, Chaps. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100; C. Day, *History of Commerce*, Part III, W. C. Abbott, *The Expansion of Europe*, Chaps. x, xxi, xxii, Botsford, op cit, J. A. Hobson, *The Evolution of Modern Capitalism*, Chap. i.



being forwarded by the economic transformation.<sup>142</sup> The English, American and French Revolutions thereby lose their unique and epic character and fall logically within the pattern of political behavior produced by the rise of the *bourgeoisie*. Law, likewise, was brought into the service of the new order. Roman law sustained secular absolutism, while appropriate legislation was later devised to protect the new economic and commercial institutions and the growing spirit of business enterprise. Economic and political theories were originated or adapted to defend the *bourgeois* system. *Laissez-faire* and the freedom of trade gradually supplanted Mercantilism, which royal ambitions and early mistakes of the merchants had established in western Europe. The theory of natural rights, the origin of society and government in a bipartite contract, the justification of revolution, the rise of parliamentary government, and the origin of constitutionalism constitute the chief political aspirations and achievements of the middle class.<sup>143</sup>

Even the theology was readjusted to meet the needs of a developing commercial and industrial order. In more than one way the Reformation was a phase of the *bourgeois* revolution. Calvin stressed the virtue in thrift and labor, and attacked the orthodox Catholic opposition to interest-taking. Puritan theology stressed money-making as the most "God-given" of occupations. The man who failed to accumulate pecuniary profit was akin to the unwise steward who wrapped his talent in the napkin. Richard Baxter contended that the man who rejected the utmost possible

<sup>142</sup> C J H Hayes, *Political and Social History of Modern Europe*, Vol I, R. H. Gretton, *The English Middle Class*, C Becker, *The Beginnings of the American People*, and *The Declaration of Independence*, A M Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution*, S Herbert, *The Fall of Feudalism in France*, W K Wallace, *The Trend of History*, Book I

<sup>143</sup> P. Vinogradoff, *Roman Law in Medieval Europe*, W A Dunning, *Political Theories from Luther to Montesquieu*; L H Hancy, *History of Economic Thought*, Chaps VII x, C H Van Tyne, *The Causes of the War of Independence*, C Becker, *The Declaration of Independence*.

pecuniary profit ceased thereby to be "God's steward." Sermons were preached from the text: "Seek ye not your own, but your neighbors' wealth."<sup>144</sup> The Commercial Revolution and its complex results had produced a new world; yet its greatest achievement was to prepare the way for the Industrial Revolution and the creation of contemporary civilization, which was to carry to a far higher development all of the tendencies set in motion by the Commercial Revolution.

6. *The Sociological Background of the Development of Contemporary Civilization Since the Industrial Revolution.*

Though an eminent contemporary American historian insists on telling his class in mediæval history that there are but two events in human history worthy of the historian's attention—the siege of Troy and the French Revolution—most thoughtful historians have admitted, though their chief interest might lie in another period, that the Industrial Revolution of the last two centuries has caused more far-reaching changes in human society than had previously taken place since the period of the union of upper and lower Egypt under Menes. Professor Shotwell puts the matter admirably when he asks: "What is the Renaissance or Reformation, the Empire of Charlemagne or of Cæsar, compared with the empire of mind and industry, which has penetrated the whole world, planting its cities as it goes, binding the whole together by railroad and telegraph, until the thing we call civilization has drawn the isolated communities of the old régime into a great world organism,

<sup>144</sup> P. Smith, *The Age of the Reformation*, pp. 724-9, W. J. Ashley, *Economic History*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 456 ff., M. Weber, "Die protestantische Ethik und der 'Geist' des Kapitalismus," in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, 1905. A critical analysis of the views of Weber was included in a paper by Professor Clive Day on the economic doctrines of the Puritans, read before the American Historical Association at Washington, December, 1920.

with its afferent and efferent nerves of news and capital reaching to its finger tips in the markets of the frontier!" On account of the great social dislocation produced by the Industrial Revolution, the development of contemporary civilization furnishes one of the most convincing sociological illustrations of rapid social transformation and the shifting of economic and social systems. It also constitutes an admirable historical example of the processes of social causation.<sup>145</sup>

England was the natural country in which the Industrial Revolution should have had its origin. It had been most affected by the rising trade and commerce, and by the resulting economic, social and political changes, which had been important aspects of the reaction of the expansion of Europe and the Commercial Revolution upon European society. The middle-class Puritan business man was most numerous in England. The unusual development of skepticism, critical thought and tolerance produced a favorable ground for the rise of natural science, which, in England, took the form of practical and applied science. This made possible the new machine technique and the new steam power. The peculiar type of staple goods, in which England had specialized, was well adapted for the introduction of the machine technique, while the geographical factors of ample supplies of coal and iron in close proximity and a damp climate to aid textile processes cannot be ignored. There was also an unprecedented supply of available and mobile capital and labor. The antecedents of the Industrial Revolution in England thus furnish an almost ideal example of the sociological thesis that many factors must be considered in the analysis of the rise of a new social and economic system. Here we have general cultural antecedents, a new manufacturing technique, and geo-

<sup>145</sup> Cf. J. A. Hobson, *The Evolution of Modern Capitalism*; T. Veblen, *The Theory of Business Enterprise*, Chaps. II, IX, L. Knowles, *The Industrial and Commercial Revolutions*, W. Bowden, *Industrial Society in England towards the End of the Eighteenth Century*.

graphical facts all combining to create a new and much more complex social order.<sup>146</sup>

The spread of the new mechanical technique and its associated economic institutions from England throughout most of the civilized world furnishes the most significant and stupendous of all the examples of the process of the diffusion of culture to be found in the whole history of mankind.

The new technique made necessary the extensive adoption of a transformed method of controlling and disciplining labor—the factory system. This necessitated larger outlays of capital and a different or improved type of economic organization of society. Banking institutions and agencies for international trade increased in number and in the scope of their undertakings. Business organizations became more extensive and more complex. The new attitude towards economic endeavor was exemplified in “the theory of business enterprise” or “the price system,” in which immediate pecuniary profit rather than social service became the main objective of those engaged in industry and trade. Large-scale industry, tending toward monopoly, became the rule.<sup>147</sup>

A series of sweeping social changes followed in the train of the economic transformations. The rise of the factory system produced the new manufacturing towns, and the static agrarian age, which had prevailed in the western world since the period of the farmers of Neolithic

<sup>146</sup> D Russell, *The Prelude to the Machine Age*, F A Ogg, *The Economic Development of Modern Europe*, Chap VII, A P Usher, *The Industrial History of England*, Chaps VIII, X, XII, XIII, Gretton, *op cit*, Knowles, *op cit*.

<sup>147</sup> J L and B Hammond, *The Town Labourer*, A P Usher, *op cit*, Chaps I, XIV; C D Wright, *The Industrial Evolution of the United States*; W A Scott, *Money and Banking*, F W Taussig, *Inventors and Money Makers*, L H Haney, *Business Organization and Combination*, J Moody, *The Masters of Capital*, G Myers, *The History of Great American Fortunes*, Vols II-III; T Veblen, *The Theory of Business Enterprise*, and *The Engineers and the Price System*, T E Gregory, *The Philosophy of Capitalism*; W H Hamilton, “The Price System and Social Policy,” in *Journal of Political Economy*, January, 1918, R H Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*; S and B Webb, *The Decay of Capitalist Civilization*.

age, began gradually to give way before the new and dynamic urban era. Contemporary society, as Professor Gras has well insisted, may be most accurately pictured as founded on a basic metropolitan or regional economy.<sup>148</sup> Population became more mobile. There were great national and international shifts of peoples from country to town, and from the backward agricultural states to those which had adopted the new industrialism. The *bourgeoisie* completed the process of ousting the landlords from social control, and established their ascendancy in modern society. Yet the Industrial Revolution, at the same time, created the urban proletariat which was soon to challenge the supremacy of the capitalist.<sup>149</sup>

Psychological and cultural changes accompanied these profound economic and social transformations. The medieval orientation and outlook were destroyed. Both the employer and the laborer received a wider range of stimuli and acquired an incomparably greater variety of knowledge. Superstition and fear of the supernatural were gradually but surely dissipated. The dynamic effects of capital and invention pervaded every field of life and all strata of society. But, along with these progressive changes, went others of a more doubtful sort. The modern industrial and urban era produced a great increase of nervous strain and made adaptation and adjustment much more difficult than in the old agrarian order, to which man had accustomed himself over a period of ten thousand or more years. Cultural and psychic reactions and criteria tended to become standardized in terms of the operation of the machine

<sup>148</sup> A. F. Weber, *The Growth of Cities*, F. C. Howe, *The City, the Hope of Democracy*, and *The Modern City and Its Problems*; N. S. B. Gras, "The Development of the Metropolitan Economy in Europe and America," in *American Historical Review*, July, 1922, pp. 695-708, and *An Introduction to Economic History*, Chap. v vi.

<sup>149</sup> H. P. Fairchild, *Immigration*, F. A. Ogg, *Economic Development of Modern Europe*, Chap. xvi, P. A. Parsons, *An Introduction to Modern Social Problems*, R. Mayo Smith, *Statistics and Sociology*, Chaps. xiv, xvi, E. A. Ross, *Roads to Social Peace*, Chap. iv, *The Old World in the New*, G. D. H. Cole, *The World of Labour*.

technique. Civilization became, to an unprecedented degree, reduced to a dead-level of standardization and uniformity. A sharp and distinct cleavage developed between capital and labor, which had not been equaled since the days of antique slavery. The laborer could no longer rely upon the stimulus of his craft group or the "instinct of workmanship," and lost his interest in his work, which thereby became all the more irksome and unattractive. In due time he slowly learned from his employer "the theory of business enterprise" and applied it in terms of his own interests as poorer work, shorter hours and higher pay.<sup>160</sup>

The new economic or capitalistic system, following an alleged law of social causation, built up for itself a series of defensive institutions, or, as the Italian sociologist, Loria, calls them, "connective institutions."<sup>161</sup> In the field of politics, constitutional government under *bourgeois* domination became the prevailing type. Herd and tribal instinct was nationalized, and the *bourgeois* state became also the ardently nationalistic state. An increase in the volume of products created a need for more markets, and this led to the search for colonies and spheres of interest, thus producing what is commonly known as modern imperialism. Nationalism and imperialism produced a bellicose psychology and led to the race for armaments. Legal institutions were adapted to protect private property and the "price system" against social interests. Individual rights became the cornerstone of a body of almost theistic, as well as juristic, theory and practice, which, based chiefly on a perversion of the Fourteenth Amendment, reached its most extreme expression in this country in such cases as

<sup>160</sup> E. R. Turner, *Europe 1789-1920*, Chaps. xiv-xv, F. S. Marvin, *The Century of Hope*, G. Wallas, *The Great Society*, Chaps. i-ii; O. Tead, *Instincts in Industry*, H. Marot, *The Creative Impulse in Industry*, T. Veblen, *The Instinct of Workmanship*, L. D. Edie, *Current Industrial and Social Forces*, C. Parker, *The Casual Worker and Other Essays*; R. A. Cram, *The Nemesis of Mediocrity*, J. M. Clark, "The Empire of Machines," in *Yale Review*, October, 1922, Parsons, *op cit*, W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change*, Part V

<sup>161</sup> A. Loria, *The Economic Foundations of Society*

Pollock *v.* Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, Lochner *v.* New York, the Hitchman Coal and Coke Company *v.* Mitchell, and Bailey *v.* Drexel Furniture Company. The Supreme Court was accused by an associate justice of attempting to establish as a constitutional principle and a political theory the super-individualism of Herbert Spencer's *Social Statics*. Economic and political theory, deriving its origins from Physiocratic naturalism and the eulogy of the blessings of competitive individualism by Adam Smith and Ricardo came, in the works of such writers as Nassau Senior, Frédéric Bastiat, and Herbert Spencer to represent social interference with pure individualism as ill-conceived, impish and destructive of the prosperity of the nation. Politicians, such as Cobden and Bright and Bingham and Hanna, introduced these theories into governmental practice.

Theological justification was readily found for the new capitalism. The divine sanction and approval of pecuniary profit was set forth by clergymen with greater assurance and frequency than ever before. God was confidently believed to have approved the existing economic differentiation and status, and those in positions of economic ascendancy naturally come to assume with Mr. Baer that they were "those Christian men to whom God in His infinite wisdom has given the control of the property interests of the country." Chancellor Day denominated Mr. Roosevelt's ultra timid attempt to curb only the grossest abuses of economic power as "the raid on prosperity." Pastor Bigelow cursed the Reports of the Interchurch Committee on the Steel Strike, his disinterested courage and objectivity being warmly commended by Mr. Gary. The educational system came to be as fully based upon the inculcation of the dictum of the sanctity and perpetuity of the existing economic order as that of the Middle Ages was upon the assumption of the sagacity of Aristotle and the enduring nature of the medieval church and empire. Even a Vice-

Presidential anathema was invoked against university professors of a liberal trend, and Wells' *Outline of History* was denounced by the National Civic Federation for its progressive tendencies. Finally, it does not require the fulminations of Upton Sinclair to prove to any observing citizen that the Press has become at once the most servile and the most effective bulwark of the modern order. Yet, thorough-going as this capitalistic control of contemporary society may be, it has not been an unmitigated evil. Wasteful and oppressive as many of its incidental features have been, we owe to modern capitalism many of the benefits which separate us from the barbarism of the medieval age. Perhaps no one has stated this point more forcefully than Mr H. L. Mencken in a letter in the *New York Nation* of April 26, 1922:

The things that I esteem most in this world, to wit, truth, liberty, tolerance, and common decency, are kept alive among us, not by the great masses of men, but by small groups of men most of them very well fed. When the ordinary rights of the citizens were torn to tatters during the late war by Dr Wilson and his patriotic *Polizei*, and men were jailed, beaten and murdered for daring to exercise them, it was not the plain people who protested and called a halt, it was a volunteer committee of lawyers, nearly all of them with money in the bank. It was the money in the bank, in fact, that gave them courage and made them interested in questions of liberty. And when the Pennsylvania State cossacks, two or three years ago, began butchering the poor wops and bohunks in the steel region, it was not the labor unions that exposed the infamy, but a small corps of well-to-do specialists in atrocity. The labor unions, in fact, were against the strikers, and the Gompers crowd did its best to beat them—mainly by acts of treachery so gross that very few men of the dignity and self-respect that goes with money could be imagined as capable of them. I do not here argue for money, which I esteem very lightly, but simply against the banal notion that a rich man is necessarily without imagination and idealistic aspiration. He may be, of course, a mere hyena of the Baer-Gary type, or he may be a jackass of the Rotary Club variety, but it is possible for him to be reflective, tolerant, and even a bit altruistic, and it is my contention that he is all of these things quite as often as his slaves are.



Along this same line it might be remarked that differential biological and psychological sociology have shown how completely erroneous are the assumptions of the egalitarian doctrines of Jacksonian democracy, and compel a serious revision of all the general concepts that were founded upon the optimistic view that egalitarian democracy constitutes the "culmination of modern history." At the same time it should be made clear that much of the current abuse of democracy on the ground of its alleged potency in producing standardization and mediocrity is unfair and inaccurate. Most of these results flow from the machine process, bucolic barbarism and evangelical pietism rather than from democracy as such.<sup>182</sup>

The capitalistic order, with its wide ramifications in the extensive series of defensive institutions, has, naturally, produced an equally one-sided reaction against it in the shape of an effort at proletarian control. The class-struggle has, for better or worse, passed out of a theoretical exhortation from the pen of Karl Marx into the most interesting actuality which faces western civilization today. Proletarian reform doctrines have been proposed which sharply challenge on every point the *apologia* of capitalism, and

<sup>182</sup> Articles, "Democracy, Historical Development of", "Nationalism"; and "World Politics", in *Encyclopedia Americana*, J H Rose, *Nationality in Modern History*, B Muir, *Nationalism and Internationalism*, L Woolf, *Economic Imperialism*; W A Dunning, *Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer*, C E Merriam, *American Political Ideas 1865-1920*, C E Merriam and H E Barnes (Eds.), *A History of Political Theories Recent Times*, C A Beard, *Contemporary American History*, (Chaps III-V, R H Smith, *Justice and the Poor*, Cases, 157 U S, 429, 158 U S, 601, 245 U S, 229, L H Haney, *History of Economic Thought*, Chaps IX-XVII; Gide and Rist, *The History of Economic Doctrines*; J R Day, *The Raid on Prosperity*; and *My Neighbor the Working Man*, U Sinclair, *The Profits of Religion*, *The Goose-Step*, and *The Brass Check*; T. Veblen, *The Higher Learning in America*, E A Ross, *Changing America*, Chap VII, W Lippmann, *Liberty and the News*; *Public Opinion*; W. Weyl, *The New Democracy*; H. L. Mencken, in *Nation*, April 26, 1922, p. 493, E Faguet, *The Cult of Incompetence*, W McDougall, *Is America Safe for Democracy?*, C S Cannon, "American Misgivings," in *Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1922, H H Goddard, *Human Efficiency and Levels of Intelligence*, H L Mencken, *Book of Prefaces*, pp. 197-283, and *Prejudices*, 2nd series, pp. 219-26, 4th series, pp. 43-60, 158-79.

writers like the Webbs have produced appealing, if premature, obituaries of capitalism.<sup>153</sup>

It may be remarked, in passing, that in this very field of social reform sociology can, perhaps, render its most important service both through indicating the necessary concessions demanded from the capitalistic masters of the present order in the interest of social justice and by making clear the unsound aspects of well-meant proletarian doctrines and programs of social reform. Indeed, one of the most thoughtful historians of the development of sociology holds that the subject was called into being chiefly to pass valid constructive criticism upon the multifarious schemes for social reform which were proposed in the middle of the last century.<sup>154</sup> At least, one may submit the platitude that no enduring scheme of social reform can well be divorced from the established principles of sociology. Finally, it may be said that the sociologist sees the problem with Professor Veblen as one in which certain social, ethical, religious and economic phases of the social system are extremely anachronistic and out of adjustment with the technical basis of civilization, due chiefly to the unprecedentedly rapid technological advances.<sup>155</sup>

It is scarcely necessary for one to emphasize the fact that the history of the United States, with its recapitulation of economic and social development, its remarkable illustrations of the relation of physiography to history, its almost unprecedented mixture of ethnic strains, its astonishing economic progress, its depressing standardization of culture and conduct, its evangelical bigotry and intolerance, its ardent impurity-complex and its extreme expression of

<sup>153</sup> Article, "Social Reform Programs and Movements," in *Encyclopedia Americana*, and bibliography appended, and P H Douglas, in C E Merriam and H E. Barnes (Eds.), *History of Political Theories: Recent Times*, Chap. vi.

<sup>154</sup> A. W. Small, *General Sociology*, Chap. iii.

<sup>155</sup> T. Veblen, *The Vested Interests, The Engineers and the Price System*; S. and B. Webb, *The Decay of Capitalist Civilization*.

the best and worst in modern capitalism, furnishes perhaps the most fertile of all fields for the sociological historian interested in the evolution of contemporary society.<sup>156</sup>

## V. CONCLUSION.

We may now bring this long discussion of the relation of sociology to synthetic history to a close by the following summary generalizations, which, I hope, have been established in the course of the paper.

Intellectual history is concerned primarily with the genesis, nature and transformation of the types of collective psychology which have succeeded each other in the development of European society. Psychological sociology alone can carry on a truly scientific study of the laws and processes of group behavior and the building up of folkways, mores and customs, which, taken together, constitute the fundamental factors which create the prevailing type of collective psychology. The intellectual historian must lean heavily upon the psychological sociologist, but may, in turn, provide the latter with a body of extremely valuable concrete data.

Economic activities are but a part, though perhaps the most important portion of the social process and human life. Sociology, investigating the social process as a whole, estimates and analyzes the operation of economic factors as affected by biological, psychological, social and political influences, and the reciprocal reaction of economic forces on the other types of social institutions. The production, valuation, exchange and distribution of wealth are all affected by social influences. We can no longer accept the

<sup>156</sup> F. J. Turner, "Problems in American History," in *Proceedings of the International Congress of Arts and Sciences*, St. Louis, 1904, Vol. II, pp. 183-94; A. M. Schlesinger, *New Viewpoints in American History*, W. Weyl, *The New Democracy*; C. Becker, *The United States. an Experiment in Democracy*; A. M. Simons, *Social Forces in American History*, H. O'Higgins, *The American Mind in Action*, H. L. Mencken, *Prejudices*, 2nd series, pp. 9-99, 136-54; 3rd series, pp. 9-64; 4th series, pp. 1-42. See the plea for a sociological study of American history by W. E. Dodd in the *Nation*, October 11, 1922, pp. 378-9.

premises of the Benthamite felicific calculus and regard man in economic life as an isolated calculating machine. Sociology can view the process of social causation as it advances through general cultural conditions, the state of pure science, the development of applied science and the existing state of technology, economic institutions and technique, social conditions, and the complex of resultant defensive or connective institutions in the state, law, religion, education and the press. Sociology is able to obtain a more comprehensive and objective view of society-building than can any other social science. It has the same genetic approach as history, together with synthetic interest and technique which history has hitherto not possessed. Though the economist and the political scientist can delve deeper into special phases of the process of social causation, they cannot get so comprehensive a view of the whole matter.

Economic history deals with the genesis, domination and decline of economic systems. As sociology is essential to the securing of a broad view of the place of the contemporary economic system in society at large, so it is indispensable as an aid to the economic historian who is attempting to trace the development of economic systems in the past in relation to their general social setting. The sociologist alone can adequately analyze and estimate the general complex of factors which enter into the creation of an economic system, the reaction of an economic system upon society as a whole, and the variety of influences leading to the downfall of any prevailing set of economic institutions.

Social history, while the term may be applied to narrative and descriptive writing on social phases of history, is, in its most fundamental and developed sense, the synthesis of the great successive stages in the evolution of society, social systems and the material aspects of civilization. When viewed in this manner, it is quite obvious that social history must lean heavily upon sociology, as the latter

alone can supply the student with the essential breadth of viewpoint, an adequate knowledge of the laws of social development, and an impulse to a consideration of a sufficient number of factors to insure an approximation to accuracy in the reconstruction of the social past. Only the historian who has been trained as a sociologist can hope to be a successful synthetic historian, even though the chief lines of effort and fields of endeavor may be somewhat different in each case.

## SELECTED REFERENCES

- H. E. Barnes, *Sociology and Political Theory*  
 H. E. Barnes, *The Social History of the Western World: an Outline Syllabus*  
 P. Barth, *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie*  
 H. Berr, *La Synthèse en Histoire*.  
 L. M. Bristol, *Social Adaptation*  
 J. B. Bury, "Darwinism and History," in *Evolution in Modern Thought* (Bonl and Liveright, 1919), pp. 246-63.  
 J. D. Forrest, *The Development of Western Civilization*  
 F. H. Giddings, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*.  
 L. T. Hobhouse, *Social Development: Its Nature and Conditions*  
 F. S. Marvin, *The Living Past*  
 F. Muller-Lyer, *The History of Social Development*.  
 W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change*  
 C. K. Ogden (Ed.), *History of Civilization*  
 A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*.  
 W. K. Wallace, *The Trend of History*.  
 G. Wallas, *Our Social Heritage*

## CHAPTER VI

### THE IMPORTANCE OF THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR HISTORY AND THE SOCIAL STUDIES \*

#### I. THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY.

**T**HE history of science and technology has been a subject of much recent discussion and a field for considerable productive activity, but most of such discussion and activity has been carried on by natural scientists. It is a subject, however, which ought to attract much interest from historians of liberal tendencies, and this chapter will attempt in a very brief way to estimate the significance of the history of science for historiography, to summarize some phases of the progress thus far made in the premises, and to introduce a few generalizations concerning the desirable method of presenting it through the coöperation of historians and scientists.

Estimates of the importance of the history of science as a branch of historiography must necessarily vary with the attitude taken with respect to the nature of history. If one adheres to the standpoint of Vico, Hegel, Kidd and the religionists, or to that of Thierry, Lamartine, Carlyle and the Romanticists, with their eulogy of heroic biography and their definite trend toward obscurantism, then there

\* Revision of a paper read at the Conference on the History of Science at the American Historical Association Meeting, Cleveland, Ohio, December 31, 1919. The Conference was presided over by Professor George L. Burr, and papers were read by Professors T. Wingate Todd of Western Reserve University, Louis C. Karpinski of the University of Michigan, Lynn Thorndike of Western Reserve University, and Henry Crew of Northwestern University. It was the first general session of the American Historical Association ever devoted entirely to the history of science.

can, indeed, be little or no sympathy expected with the history of science. Nor can much interest or approval be hoped for from those who, with Seeley or Freeman, hold that history is the "biography of states" or "past politics," unless perhaps they might grudgingly admit that the invention of gunpowder or the steamboat may have significant results for the growth of national states and world empires, or that the scientific achievements lying back of the art of making modern artillery or steel armor for dreadnoughts may have slightly influenced the course of modern armed conflicts and greatly complicated the problems of national budgets. In fact, little sympathy or interest can be expected from the "eminent" and "respectable" historians as a group. No doubt President Thayer would classify this version as one of the most obvious of the "recent fallacies of historians."<sup>1</sup> The only type of historian who is likely to give serious and sympathetic attention to the history of science is the member of that renegade and outlaw, but ever increasing group which has transcended archaic and illogical conventions and dared to view history as a record of human achievement, conceived in its broadest sense as the progressive establishment of human control over nature, and the increasingly more perfect adaptation of nature to human use.<sup>2</sup> In this process science, pure and applied, has unquestionably been the dominating factor.<sup>3</sup>

One of the most profound and suggestive statements of the vital importance of science and technology for an adequate grasp upon the processes of dynamic history is

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the presidential address of Wilham Roscoe Thayer to the American Historical Association at Cleveland, December 29, 1919, on "Recent Fallacies in History," *American Historical Review*, January, 1920. See also his article on "Vagaries of Historians," in the *American Historical Review*, January, 1919, especially pp. 186 ff.

<sup>2</sup> See the introductory paragraphs to the article on "History" by James T. Shotwell in the eleventh edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. See also James Harvey Robinson, *The New History*, Chap. v.

<sup>3</sup> There is a brilliant passage on this point in Gabriel Tarde's *Les Transformations du Pouvoir*, pp. 188-90. See also F. S. Marvin (Ed.), *Science and Civilization*.

that recently made by Professor James Thomson Shotwell: ‘

Socrates, according to Plato, lamented the passing of that time in Greece when the only known facts about the past were those treasured in the memory of the tribal bard, and the coming of that degenerate age when people no longer would bother remembering things they could read in books. He deprecated the invention of writing. Yet it was by the written page of his pupil Plato that the conversations in the cool gardens on the outskirts of Athens have survived, to secure his own immortality.

This objection of Socrates to the invention of an alphabet was something more than the proposition of a philosopher in need of an argument. It was a protest against mechanism. Making black marks on Egyptian papyrus or skins from Asia—those skins the merchants of Pergamum later made into parchments (pergamenta)—compares with reciting an epic as the use of machinery compares with hand labor. Socrates, we suppose, would have preferred telling the time by a guess at the lengthening shadow on the square rather than by the use of such an instrument as a watch. By ignoring inventions one kept “close to nature.”

This is an attitude to be found throughout the whole history of culture. Its most earnest advocates have been the artists, impatient of anything interposed between nature and the individual. But idealists generally have joined in the denunciation or shared the contempt for mechanism, no matter what their field. Literature has held aloof, except in patronizing, romantic moods, until the present. History has ignored the very implements of progress—the tools of work, the mechanism of effort—even while recording the results. There has, therefore, developed a gulf between “culture” and achievement which has widened with each new invention.

There have been, in recent years, some signs of a revolt against the conspiracy of the poetically minded to ignore the creations of the practically minded, but unless the revolt becomes a revolution we shall never square ourselves with reality. If we are to make anything intelligent out of the world we live in, we must free ourselves from this romantic sentimentality, which goes back to Socrates and beyond. Idealism, left to itself, is futility. There is no sadder fact in the tragic circumstances of the present than that idealism failed to avert the desolation of Europe. It will always fail, so long as it holds itself aloof from the grimy facts of daily life.

Like the forces of nature, ideas must be harnessed and set to

\* J. T. Shotwell, “Mechanism and Culture,” in the *Stevens Indicator*, July 15, 1924, pp. 96-7, reprinted in the *Historical Outlook*, January, 1925. For a sweeping criticism of this point of view see Robert Shafer, *Progress and Science*.



work, or things will remain exactly as they were before. One cannot weave cloth with an idea, but embody the idea in wood and iron and it will replace all the hand-loom workers in the world. Wherever a locomotive sends its puff of steam through the smoke-stack, the idea of George Stephenson is at work—an idea that a forced draught on the fire would give the engine enough power to pull its load. There are spindle whorls in the Grimaldi caves along the slopes of Menton, used by the fingers of spinning women of the late stone age, over 10,000 years ago. How often in all that stretch of years have spinners dreamed of something to carry on the motion of the whorl beside the arm and hand! Out of such longings came—no one knows from where—the simple spinning wheels of the late middle ages. Yet it was only in the eighteenth century that a tinkering watch-maker helped Arkwright to get his roller-frame to work, and the work of spinning passed forever from the fireside to the mill. New cities arose by the marshy waste of Lancashire, and the shipping of Great Britain carrying its goods over-seas, made possible a new world-empire—not created in a fit of absent-mindedness, as an idealist historian declared, but through the might of the Industrial Revolution.

Few students of literature stop to think that its existence depends upon paper and ink as well as thought! The records of history depend upon the cutting of the chisel in the stone, the sharp impress of the scratching stick, on clay or on wax tablet, the scrawl of charcoal or ink on leaves of trees, papyri wrappings or leather. Before these devices were used lie the unnumbered centuries of that period we call the prehistoric, this side of it is the world of history. History begins with writing, the prehistoric, as we use the term, is a synonym for the preliterate. History depends upon that mechanism which transfers thought from brains to material substances, and so enables thought to endure while the thinkers come and go.

It is strange that the extent to which thought depends upon mechanism for its preservation seldom occurs to us except when the mechanism fails. We know that the burning of the library at Alexandria blotted out for all time much of the culture of the distant antiquity which it had gathered in the papyri on its shelves. We know as well that the last classics of Greece and Rome perished in the mouldy rolls of papyri which could not last in the climate of the northern Mediterranean as they do in Egypt. The book trade of the ancients was careless of the future,—as ours is today. But had it not been for papyri rolls dealt in by those astute traders who brought their goods to the wharves of Athens and Ostia, it is doubtful if the literature of classic Greece and Rome would have been produced at all. Had there been nothing better than clay tablets to scratch, how would the Augustan age have achieved what it did? Imagine Dante, in his exile, accumulating the mud cylin-

ders necessary for the *Divine Comedy*. Or, to bring the matter down to our own time, what would our modern literature and journalism amount to if the Arabs had not invented paper? A printing press without paper is unthinkable, and literature cannot exist without them both. We need a *Sartor Resartus* in the history of literature, to show us how naked and helplessly limited is thought except when provided with mechanism.

This alleged importance of the scientific and technological factor in history can best be substantiated by adopting at the outset the more recent anthropological theories regarding the origins of science. Our concepts in this respect were for years perverted by the dubious generalization of Frazer to the effect that all of primitive science was to be found in the realm of the occult, or, more specifically, in magical activities.<sup>5</sup> There has been no more significant revision of our anthropological background of cultural origins than that which has been forced through the critical work of Boas and his disciples, Marett, Myres, Quennell and others, which has finally demonstrated the generic relation of religion and magic and has revealed the origins of science as proceeding primarily from the discoveries growing out of the everyday secular and commonplace activities of primitive peoples, however much such discoveries may later give a certain religious sanctity to their makers.<sup>6</sup> To be sure, this view does not deny the all-pervading religious *milieu* of primitive life in all its phases, and assumes that magic, as a phase of primitive religion, has evident associations with primitive science and economic life. Nor do the more critical anthropologists claim to be able to clear up from a study of primitive peoples all the problems connected with the relations of magic and

<sup>5</sup> J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, Vol. I, pp. 220-243.

<sup>6</sup> An excellent critical review of the leading anthropological theories concerning religion and magic is given by Dr. A. A. Goldenweiser in an article on "Magic and Religion" in the *Psychological Bulletin*, March, 1919, pp. 82 ff. See also R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Religion*. On primitive science see Marvin, *op. cit.*, Chap. I, Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, pp. 132 ff., and M. and C. H. B. Quennell, *The Old Stone Age*; and *The New Stone, Bronze, and Early Iron Ages*.

science in the Middle Ages—a period which is a great historic complex of primitive survivals and advanced cultural states and products. The critical anthropologist admits freely that the medieval period is one preeminently for the historian to deal with, but insists that the historian should start right with an up-to-date and scientific anthropological outlook.<sup>7</sup>

Owing to the absence of the mastery of the art of writing in the pre-literary or “pre-historic” period, our knowledge of this age has, fortunately, depended upon, and been organized about, the history of material culture, which was chiefly primitive science and technology. The successive periods of pre-literary chronology are based entirely upon the advances in technology, whether one takes such general divisions as the stone and metal ages, or sub-divisions like Mousterian, Robenhausian or Hallstatt. The invention of the *coup-de-poinç*, knives, spear-heads, scrapers, planers, traps and the art of fire-making carried man from the eolithic through the paleolithic. The improving skill in building and construction enabled man to advance to the neolithic culture, with its elaborate lake-dwellings and megalithic structures, to which should be added the invention of spinning and weaving, the domestication of animals, the rise of agriculture, and the beginning of the grinding of wheat. The provision of the wheeled vehicle, the mastery of the art of metal-working, the invention of the potter’s wheel and lathes, the control of water supply through irrigation, and the slow elaboration of the alphabet served to carry man from the neolithic to the fluvial historic cultures of the ancient Orient. The origins of navigation produced the thalassic cultures of the Mediterranean lands, which were able to build upon a discriminating appropriation of the achievements of the Orient. The invention of the mariner’s compass made possible the

<sup>7</sup> This subject has been surveyed by Dr. Lynn Thorndike in his *History of Magic and Experimental Science*.

abandonment of the thalassic age and the rise of the oceanic era of world history. The passing on of Muslim science and invention, particularly in the way of mathematics, optics, chemistry and the art of paper-making, to western Europe set in motion those scientific and technological advances which were so powerfully to aid in bringing on the Industrial Revolution, and with it the complexities of contemporary civilization.<sup>8</sup>

When the origins and development of science are viewed in this more accurate manner the history of science has a peculiar significance for the general interpretation of historical development. The vital, and probably causal, dependence of political forms and processes upon economic factors and institutions has now been so well established as to make a reminder of the situation seem almost an antiquated platitude.<sup>9</sup> It has been less frequently and less clearly pointed out, however, that the progress of science and technology has in turn given shape and direction to economic development from the very beginnings of cultural history.<sup>10</sup>

There have been those who have questioned this generalization and who have asserted that pure science has had no genetic connection with applied science and industrial inventions. They have based their position on the alleged derivation of science from primitive magic, which certainly did not direct and dominate, however much it may have been associated with, primitive industry, and on the

<sup>8</sup> On such matters see G. G. MacCurdy, *Human Origins*, J. L. Myres, in *Cambridge Ancient History*, Vol. I, Chaps. 1-11, J. H. Breasted, *Ancient Times*, E. H. Williams, *A History of Science*, and F. S. Marvin, *Science and Civilization*.

<sup>9</sup> Gustav Schmoller has been the most powerful exponent of this position. The literature on the subject is admirably analyzed by Professor E. R. A. Seligman in his *Economic Interpretation of History*, and by Professor C. A. Beard in his *Economic Basis of Politics*. The works of Professors F. J. Turner and C. A. Beard have been the most stimulating American applications of the doctrine.

<sup>10</sup> This was, however, strictly speaking, the actual interpretation given to history by Karl Marx, who put technological changes as basic and primary. See the relevant article by A. H. Hansen, "The Technological Interpretation of History," in *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, November, 1921.

assumption that the inventions which initiated the Industrial Revolution, the greatest economic transformation in human history, bore little sequential relation to previous advances in pure science.

It has already been shown how inaccurate is the assumption of the identity between primitive science and magic. The case of the Industrial Revolution, when critically examined, is not less damaging to the views of this group. Watt's perfection of the steam engine was based upon studies of atmospheric pressure by Torricelli and Von Guericke, Huygens' experiments with the gunpowder engine, Boyle's study of gases and pneumatics, the series of developments following the experiments of Denys Papin, the Marburg physicist, as well as the contemporary work of Joseph Black on latent heat. A large part of the engineering achievements which have made possible modern industrialism and the indispensable means of transportation have been founded upon the progress in mathematics culminating in the calculus, and upon the development of mechanics from Galileo and Newton onward. Even the stock objections to the scientific interpretation which centers about the textile inventions from Kay to Cartwright are not as impregnable as earlier supposed. For example, the spindles and belt wheel of the spinning-wheel from which Hargreaves developed his "spinning jenny," as well as the waterwheel which first propelled these machines, were a combination of several epoch-making inventions of primitive scientists. Moreover, from the late eighteenth century to the present time industrial progress has become more and more thoroughly dependent upon highly scientific technological advances, such as modern industrial chemistry and the progress of modern electrical, mechanical and industrial engineering.<sup>11</sup>

While there can, thus, be little doubt that even in the

<sup>11</sup> On the relation of science to the Industrial Revolution see Marvin, *op. cit.*, Chap. vii.

past pure and applied science has determined economic institutions, it is certain that this relation will become much more intimate in the future—which, as Professor Thorstein Veblen has insisted, is to be preeminently the technological age, in which not only competitive individual economic success but also the “wealth of nations” will depend no longer solely upon superior commercial sagacity but upon even very slight and extremely refined technological superiority. If, then, we may accept the priority of scientific and technological to economic processes, those who adhere to the views of Bacon, Condorcet, Buckle, Draper, Karl Snyder, Andrew D. White and E. E. Slosson have advanced one step beyond the economic determinists in the interpretation of history.

We are not, of course, arguing here for a theory of scientific and technological determinism, such as Marx contended for. This would be an over-simplification of the historic process. But we do maintain that the importance of science and technology has been gravely and fatally ignored by the conventional historians. Perhaps the best formulation of the intelligent and discriminating appraisal and critique of the Marxian determinism is the following by Dr. A. H. Hansen:<sup>12</sup>

1. The theory starts with changes in the technological processes. It does not reach back to the ultimate forces in life—the “drives” inherent in the native instincts and capacities, sensations and emotions, in the acquired equipment of man, and the “stimuli” afforded by the natural environment. Here are to be sought the real wellsprings of individual and social life.

2 The theory assumes that the one external condition to which man must make new adaptations in his social institutions is the technique of production. The assumption is not true. Changes in the natural environment, in climate and geography for example, profoundly alter the face of civilization, as Huntington has so ably shown. No doubt these changes work out their influence to a considerable extent through resulting changes in the modes of production, but not exclusively so.

3 The theory assumes that if no changes took place in the

<sup>12</sup> Hansen, *loc. cit.*, pp. 82-3.

modes of production, social institutions would not change. The mere statement of this view of history shows how extremely mechanical it is. It completely overlooks the instinct of contrivance and invention, the constant effort of human beings through trial and error to find improved adaptations to their environment. Even though man's environment never changed, social institutions would still change because of man's constant effort to find better adaptations to that environment.

4 The theory assumes that all social institutions are adaptations to external environment. It overlooks the fact that social institutions are also adaptations to the instincts, capacities and emotions inherent in man himself. Hence even tho no changes took place in the modes of production man would still seek to contrive superior forms of self-expression. Changes would thus take place, especially in religious, intellectual, and recreational institutions.

5 The theory assumes that but one single adaptation to given conditions is possible. "In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are *indispensable* and *independent of their will*." Hence the dogma of the inevitableness of socialism. But in reality the whole history of man is an application of the method of trial and error. The very fact that we are constantly trying out various solutions, none of which are perfect, indicates that there is no one single solution.

Human beings are phlegmatic. Tradition and inertia are strong. Social institutions change slowly, for the simple reason that any change must get the support of the existing dominant social forces, or else the balance of power must be shifted. Hence, as a rule, social institutions are not changed until some powerful force comes along to pry them loose. The Marxian theory is a brilliant recognition of this fact. In modern times at any rate technological changes are taking place with astonishing rapidity. New social adjustments must necessarily follow. Profound technological changes compel attention to economic problems.

Modern social dynamics cannot be understood without searching out the effect of technology on civilization. It is one thing, however, to search out the influence of a single factor, and quite a different thing to refuse to seek out the influence of other factors. A useful tool need not be made a dogma.

Further, to the importance of the history of science in explaining the development of the most potent instrument by which man has progressed through the adaptation of nature to his use, there should be added the unusual methodological and cultural virtues of the history of science,

combining as it does the genetic concepts of history with the exactness and the severe accuracy of the methodology and procedure of the natural sciences.

An incisive and suggestive confirmation of this point of view is contained in the article by Professor Shotwell cited above:<sup>18</sup>

There have been two great creative epochs in the history of our civilization, that of ancient Greece and that of today. The one produced critical thought, the other applied it to produce machines. Beside these two contributions to secular society, all others rank as minor. The one stirred into activity that critical intelligence, upon which rests our whole apparatus of knowledge, the other made nature our ally not merely by applying its power to do our work, but also by supplying the means for extending knowledge itself, almost to the infinite. Seen in this light the protest of our modern humanists against mechanism has little of that insight into reality which was the characteristic note of Socrates.

What is needed in both humanists and scientists is the Hellenic sense of just proportion, so that neither thought nor machines shall become master of life. For thought turned upon itself, divorced from the setting in a real world, becomes as idle as the speculations of the schoolmen, and machines become, not instruments for human liberation, but the dominant element in society. Education in a modern world must respond to both these demands. It cannot be purely literary or idealistic without losing touch with the spirit of the age in which we live, it cannot be purely technical and remain education.

How many of us realize that a steam engine is as genuinely an historic product, as fittingly the symbol of an age as the feudal castle or the medieval cathedral, that a modern factory is as much the center of historical forces as the ancient city?

Go down to the great power-house where the force is generated to drive these subway trains and see what degree of control over nature has been reached with reference to the needs of civilization. There the power is generated from the coals of Pennsylvania. The heat stored up from suns of geologic ages is released once more under the exacting control of an engineer and adjusted by automatic devices to correspond with the weight upon the floors of the cars, so that it is hardly a figure of speech to say that as you step upon the train a few more leaves of prehistoric forests crackle away in the energy of heat, and that energy becomes a substitute for the human energy of the traveler.

Talk of miracles, with such an annihilation of time and control

<sup>18</sup> Shotwell, *loc. cit.*, pp. 97, 99, 104.



of power! One can imagine that, if Aristotle or Dante were back in the world today, they would be found exploring such mysteries as these and finding in them their inspiration, rather than in outworn philosophies or metaphysical speculation.

The distinguished historian of science, Dr. George Sarton, has designated this cultural function of the history of science as "The New Humanism":

The Philosophy to which the history of science leads is what I have called the *New Humanism*. . . . The name of this philosophy is justified by the fact that it implies a humanization of science, a combination of the scientific and humanistic spirit. I call it New Humanism with reference to the older humanism of the Renaissance to which it may not improperly be compared. The old humanism was a revival of the ancient knowledge and wisdom fallen into neglect during the Middle Ages, its integration with the rest of contemporary culture, it drew its strength and inspiration from the vast treasure of Greek and Latin literature. In the same way, the New Humanism is a revival of the knowledge patiently elaborated and accumulated for many centuries by men of science, but neglected and despised by men of letters and educators—its integration with the rest of our culture, its mainspring is the history of science. It undertakes to bring together for the first time, scientists, historians, philosophers, sociologists, to coordinate and harmonize their points of view, to broaden their horizon without lessening the accuracy of their thought, to make the accomplishment of their higher task easier in spite of the increasing wealth of knowledge. . . . Science is our greatest treasure but it needs to be humanized or it will do more harm than good.

Again, the study of the history of science from the point of view of historical interpretation adds one more reason for believing in its fundamental significance, namely, its relation to intellectual history and the psychological interpretation of history in general, a field opened by John William Draper and since cultivated by a number of progressive historians led by Professor James Harvey Robinson. It has generally been recognized that the history of science forms a most vital phase of intellectual history, but this conception is still further strengthened by the newer view, so effectively expounded by Professor Veblen, espe-

cially in his *Instinct of Workmanship*, *The Theory of Business Enterprise*, *The Vested Interests*, and *The Place of Science in Modern Civilization*, concerning the intimate interrelation between the various stages of intellectual development and the changing state of the industrial arts, which are, in turn, dependent upon scientific advances. It would seem that in formulating a tentative but workable theory of historical causation we should advance from the consideration of the "original nature of man" to the physical environment and its stimuli and pressures. These work themselves out in a definite, if changing, theory of the world and of human behavior. These intellectual states and attitudes determine largely the nature and rapidity of advances in science, technology and industry. Industrial facts tend to shape social, political, legal, religious, ethical, educational and philosophical institutions and attitudes. All of these factors and forces are, to be sure, highly complex variables, not safely to be reduced to a rigid formula, but this view probably expresses the general nature of historical causation.<sup>14</sup> It would appear, then, that the history of science and technology is inseparably intertwined with intellectual history, and provides a most fundamental and illuminating background for the study of the history of civilization, compared with which the history of states and political intrigues dwindles to relatively insignificant proportions.

It may be, and indeed often is, objected that while science may have created modern civilization, in doing so it brought into being a Frankenstein monster which is rapidly getting out of human control and whose ravages science can do nothing to mitigate.<sup>15</sup> The historian would be the last to deny the serious social and economic problems produced by modern industrialism, but he will probably insist that science alone can point the way out. In

<sup>14</sup> See A. H. Hansen, *loc cit.*

<sup>15</sup> See the classic critique in Samuel Butler's *Erewhon*.

support of this view might be cited the achievements of sanitary and medical science, not only in the field of physical disease, but also in its application to social problems and industrial efficiency, and the apparent progress now slowly being made in the direction of at last securing a rational system of ethics based on sound biology and psychology.

This view that science and technology must be the chief agencies that man can make use of in solving the problems of modern industrial society was forcibly stated by the founder of modern *Kulturgeschichte*, Karl Lamprecht, in his address to the general meeting of the Association of German Engineers at Leipzig in 1913 on "The Technics and Culture of the Present Day." After pointing out the general relation between the development of culture and technology he expressed his belief that "it is in the development of technics and modern industry themselves that we must look for an expedient for removing the moral and social evils which have been called forth through a brilliant material progress. No superficial suppression of these evils, no administration of charity, no theories, no political revolution can have any lasting effect in attaining this end, but only the moral self-purification of industrial development in itself, and that change to idealism, which must be accomplished in and from the further development of technics." This same point of view has recently been defended with vigor and insight by such writers as James Harvey Robinson, F. S. Marvin, Stanley Hall, J. M. Clark, and Thorstein Veblen.<sup>16</sup> The contribution of the latter is particularly significant. His suggestion as to a possible way out of the contemporary *impasse*, which has well been described by Mr. Marvin as "the growing complexity of human problems, without a corresponding growth of the

<sup>16</sup>J. H. Robinson, *The Humanizing of Knowledge*; F. S. Marvin, *Science and Civilization*, Chap. XII; G. S. Hall, "The Message of the Zeitgeist," in *Scientific Monthly*, August, 1921; J. M. Clark, "The Empire of Machines," in *Yale Review*, October, 1922; T. Veblen, *The Engineers and the Price System*.

human mind to deal with them," is a more elaborate and discriminating application of the doctrine earlier expressed by Saint-Simon and Comte, namely, to place the present technological age under the control and direction of those who combine an adequate command of scientific and technological facts with the broad and constructive outlook which comes from acquaintance with the social sciences. As a general policy it is most attractive; the specific mode of its practical initiation is more dubious and perplexing. The elements and classes at present in control of society have a vested interest at stake in assaulting and discrediting the position that special capacity and technical training are essential to the control and guidance of public affairs.

Not only is the prospect of internal or domestic social reform to be sought primarily in the further development of science and technology, properly humanized and socialized; there is no other force so international in its nature and influence as the development and methods of science. To quote once more from Sarton's "New Humanism":

The unity of mankind is proved by their common purpose, the creation of spiritual values, mainly the development of science . . . The true internationalism towards which the unity of knowledge and the unity of mankind are steadily driving us, will constitute an immense progress. This progress will be largely due to the development of positive knowledge and scientific methods. It is hardly necessary to add that this internationalism, expressing the common mission of mankind, is essentially different from that futile and sterile cosmopolitanism, which would ignore or belittle national characteristics. It does not in the least attempt to supersede the smaller groups of humanity but strives rather to complete and strengthen them by a supreme organization embracing them all . . . National loyalties must be gradually harmonized into a higher loyalty to the common purpose of mankind . . . If everybody placed the love of truth and justice even above the love of his family or of his country, there would be no reason to fear the disintegration of humanity by a new civil war.

The cultivation of the history of science by historians would do as much to develop an international point of view on the part of students as conventional political history does to

stimulate appreciation of separatism, nationalism and human conflicts.

## II. GENERAL NEGLECT OF THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE BY HISTORIANS.

Aside from a feeling of gratitude and satisfaction over being able to have at one of our Historical Association conferences such a group of eminent scientists, the fact which strikes a historian most vividly with respect to this conference is that at the first session of the American Historical Association on the history of science, three out of four of the formal papers were presented by natural scientists. The situation is all the more significant because this disparity was not due to any determination to go outside the ranks of historians for speakers, but rather was caused by the somewhat embarrassing fact that it reflects very accurately the distribution of the current activity in the history of science, for probably more than seventy-five per cent. of such interest is found among natural scientists. This state of affairs seems particularly strange in view of the fact that there have long been historians and other social scientists who have emphasized the dominating part played by science in the evolution of civilization. Roger Bacon's striking prophecy of the effect of applied science is too well known to call for description in detail. Francis Bacon stressed the unique importance of intellectual history, and had great hopes that human advancement and betterment might be achieved through the application of natural science to human affairs. Voltaire and the French *Philosophes* were greatly impressed with the advances in English science from 1600 to 1750. Turgot, in his Sorbonne lecture of 1750, showed how progress was dependent upon the cumulative social, economic and scientific advances contributed by each generation, and stressed in that way the continuity of history. Condorcet set forth what, at the close of the eighteenth century, looked like an extremely

fantastic, but which in the light of the last century seems a rather conservative, estimate of the general progress that might be expected from the application of natural science to human activities. Henri de Saint-Simon and his disciples, drawn largely from students at the *Ecole Polytechnique*, not only agreed in general with Condorcet, but also advanced a step further by comprehending the vital importance of applied science and by advocating the formation of a social system controlled and directed in its material interests by scientists and engineers. Auguste Comte sketched a philosophy of history in which progress was held to consist in the gradual but sure triumph of the scientific method and procedure over the theological and metaphysical, planned a social system dominated by applied scientists and sociologists, and attempted to secure the establishment of a chair in the history of science at the Collège de France. That interesting mid-century socialist, Wilhelm Weitling, would have handed over the complete control of society to a triumvirate made up of the most eminent living physician, mechanical engineer and physicist. Space forbids more than a mere mention of the well-known fact of the favorable attitude towards science and its history taken by Buckle, Draper, Andrew D. White, Henry Adams, Thorstein Veblen and Lester F. Ward.

Among more recent historians there are a number who have emphasized the significance of science in the evolution of civilization. Some leaders in this movement have been Lamprecht and his associates, Seignobos, Berr, F. S. Marvin, and Professors Burr, Breasted, Robinson, Shotwell, Shepherd, F. J. Turner and Teggart in this country. Then, there have been technical historians of science varying all the way from the ecstatic Karl Snyder to the encyclopedic Duhem and the erudite and cautious, if enthusiastic, Singer and Sarton, who have urged the importance of science and the significance of its history. The work of Mach, Cantor, Wiedemann, Wuerschmidt, Lippmann, Ostwald, Ruska and

Dannemann in Germany; of Mieli and Rignano in Italy; of Duhem, Berthelot, Milhaud, Tannery, Picard, Rey, and Poincaré in France; of Sarton in Belgium; of Merz, Pearson, Shipley, Lones, Singer, Osler, Ross, Thomson, Whetham, and Tozer in England; of Sedgwick, Tyler, Barry, Cajori, Locy, Kremers, Crew, Karpinski, Henderson, Baldwin, Richards, Williams, Cattell, Libby and Garrison in the United States; and of Mikami in Japan is at least representative of the valuable contributions made to the field of the history of science by natural scientists.<sup>17</sup>

The history of technology has been less adequately investigated than the history of science, but here again most of the work thus far accomplished has been done by scientists and technicians. We have the old but still valuable works by J. Percy, E. Baines, W. T. Jeans, S. Smiles, R. H. Thurston, L. Beck, C. H. Cochrane, E. W. Byrn, and others. About the only competent general history of technology is the brief but scholarly work of the Belgian professor, A.

<sup>17</sup> The work of the above writers, and a few others of importance, may be classified according to their fields of activity somewhat as follows: (1) *General history of science*: Sarton, Dannemann, Favre, Libby, Milhaud, Tannery, Rey, Williams, Picard, Whetham, Ross, Henderson, Thorndike, Sedgwick and Tyler, (2) *scientific methodology*: Ostwald, Dilthey, Rickert, Poincaré, Pearson and Cattell, (3) *cosmology*: Duhem, Schultze, Troels-Lund and Arrhenius; (4) *mathematics*: Cantor, Cajori, Hoppe, D. E. Smith, Karpinski, Turrière, Picard, Tyler, Milhaud and Mikami; (5) *mechanics*: Mach, Duhem and Duhring; (6) *physics*: Wiedemann, Wuerschmidt, Crew, Gerland, Keferstein, Favaro, Heller, and Rosenberger; (7) *chemistry*: Berthelot, Thorpe, Lippmann, Ruska, Von Meyer, Kremers, Kopp, Holmyard, Hilditch, Arrhenius, Mieli, Brown and Muir; (8) *biology*: Rignano, Thomson, Burckhardt, Locy, Sedgwick, Osborn, Greene, Tyson and Launois, (9) *medicine*: Sudhoff, Garrison, Libby, Garcia del Real, Ruska, Singer, Osler and Williams, (10) *geography and geology*: Tozer, Keltie, Wright, Heawood, Günther, Weule, Beazley, Hyde and Nar (11) *psychology*: Hall, Brett and Baldwin.

It has not been deemed necessary to be at all complete, in the light of the thorough classified bibliography of the subject by Dr. A. G. S. Josephson referred to below. One might also classify some of these writers on the basis of the period of the history of science in which they have done the most work. Brewster has interested himself in oriental science; the classical period has been studied by Cantor, Tannery, Heiberg, Berthelot, Bouché-Leclercq, Duhem and Lones, Langlois, Eicken, Thorndike and Haskins have covered the medieval age, Duhem and Shipley have dealt with the origins of modern science, and Ostwald, Poincaré, Merz and Picard have reviewed the rise of contemporary scientific thought and achievements.

Vierendeel, *Esquisse d'une histoire de la technique* (1921). There is an admirable popular exposition of the subject in Part II of L. C. Marshall's *Story of Human Progress*, and Miss Osgood's *History of Industry*. Stimulating and illuminating attempts to indicate the importance of the history of technology for the history of civilization are embodied in B. A. Fiske's *Invention: the Master-Key to Progress*, and Charles Richet's *Allgemeine Kulturgeschichte*. Much of importance along this line may also be obtained from F. S. Marvin's composite work on *Science and Civilization*. The obvious relation of science and technology to the remarkable contemporary changes in material culture has received some attention, as may be seen from the mention of such books as E. E. Slosson's *Creative Chemistry*, Slosson and Caldwell's *Science Re-making the World*, F. S. Harris's *Scientific Research and Human Welfare*, the second volume of the Encyclopedia Britannica history of the twentieth century, *These Eventful Years*, and the works of J. A. Thomson and his associates, *The Outline of Science*, and of H. S. Williams, *The Wonders of Science in Modern Life*.

In spite of all this, however, one can point to but few European historians, taking the term in its conventional meaning, who have devoted themselves professionally to the history of science, and it seems that Professors Lynn Thorndike and Charles H. Haskins are the only ones in this country who have cultivated the subject systematically, though one should not forget the valuable monograph of Miss Ornstein on the rise of the European scientific societies. The writer does not recall a single historian, properly and professionally speaking, who has done any extensive work on the history of technology, though some like Professors F. S. Marvin, J. T. Shotwell and J. M. Gambrill, and Miss Osgood have shown a clear grasp of the significance of technological changes for the general history of culture.



The lure of the episodic, the dramatic, the biographical and the political history, produced by the inertia in the heritage from older historical interests and concepts and the development of nationalism in the nineteenth century, has proved too strong for the majority of historians, and has seduced them into a grotesque concern with the irrelevant and into a sad ignoring of the vital elements in historical development. It has not been sufficiently emphasized that there are two chief types of superficiality and inaccuracy in history, the first being that which leads to statements made without a sufficiently thorough and dispassionate study of the sources of information, and the second and equally serious variety being that which leads to a failure to concentrate historical investigation upon those topics which seem likely to reveal most clearly the nature and causes of human progress. It is a strange but interesting fact that those who have been most cautious in avoiding the first type of superficiality have been most frequently and fatally guilty of the latter.<sup>18</sup> It would seem that the chief cause of this has been the unfortunate tendency to make states, political institutions and political figures the chief center of orientation and point of departure for historical study and exposition. This has led to a situation in history not widely different from the procedure of a hydraulic engineer who studied the ice on a river and ignored the depth and rapidity of the current, or of a geologist sent to make a detailed study of the soil and minerals of a particular area who satisfied himself with a report on some conspicuous phases of the topography, or who studied a glacier by noting the debris which had accumulated on its surface and ignored the vast mass of ice moving irresistibly beneath.

One is especially reminded of the significance of the history of science, as well as of its relative neglect, when he

<sup>18</sup> See Karl Lamprecht, *What is History?* Chap. i; James Harvey Robinson, *The New History*, Chaps i, iv, v, viii, and Albion W. Small, *Publications of the American Economic Association*, Third Series, Vol. V, No. 2, p. 178.

reflects upon the vast amount of scholastic energy, as well as increasingly more valuable ink and paper, spent not only upon that chronological succession of guesses as to the cosmic purpose and the nature of reality, which is collectively known as the history of philosophy, but also upon the history of the various methods and avenues in which man has gone wrong in attempting to get control over nature and to adapt it to his use, in particular, the vast number of pretentious volumes devoted to the history of religion, the chief mechanism for hoping to attain a supernatural control over the forces of nature—the contrast of which with the scientific approach has been most effectively drawn by the late Andrew Dickson White.<sup>19</sup> This neglect of the history of science by historians is the more remarkable in the light of the fact that the search for truth, particularly by scientific methods, is both the highest and the most uniquely human of man's activities and endeavors.

### III. PRESENT STATUS OF THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE.

There is much interest developing in the history of science throughout the learned world at present, and it may confidently be expected that this field will soon become one of the most fruitful and exploited of those traversed by scientist and historian alike. We cannot here go into the details of the European situation, but it may be said that the most active figures promoting this movement abroad are Professor Friedrich Dannemann in Germany, Professor Aldo Mieh in Italy, Professor Abel Rey in France, and Professor Charles Singer in England.<sup>20</sup> Professor Singer and

<sup>19</sup> Of course this statement does not imply any reflection upon the very valuable contribution to intellectual and cultural history made by students of the history of philosophy and religion, but simply attempts to make more clear the relative neglect of the history of science.

<sup>20</sup> There is a special department of *Isis* now set aside for current information on the progress in the teaching of the history of science. It is a striking fact that, in spite of the general activity in the history of science indicated in the earlier part of the chapter, there are but two men now on the planet who have as their chief professional activity the promotion of the history of science—Dr George Sarton of Harvard University and Professor Michael Stephanides of the University of Athens. The latter is the only

his associates have recently established an honors course for the advanced degrees at the University of London which will be based on the history and principles of science. That portion of the syllabus devoted to the history of science is reproduced here, both because of the importance of this educational innovation and on account of its excellence as a general prospectus of the field of the history of science:

#### A. GENERAL HISTORY OF SCIENCE

I. *The Beginnings of Science in Early Civilizations.*

II. *The Greeks:* (a) The Pre-Socratics, (b) PLATO and ARISTOTLE; (c) Thinkers of Later Greek, Hellenistic and Roman Imperial Times.

III. *The Middle Ages:* (e) Early Middle Ages Scientific Thought in Europe and the East, (b) Later Middle Ages Scholasticism and Science.

IV. *The Renaissance:* (a) Naturalism and the Rise of Anatomy; (b) Mathematics and New Astronomy before GALILEO

V. *The Seventeenth Century:* (a) Philosophy and the Experimental Method. BACON, DESCARTES, (b) Mathematics and the New Physical Synthesis: GALILEO, KEPLER, NEWTON, (c) Transition from Alchemy to Chemistry MAYOW, BOYLE, (d) Biological Conceptions: HARVEY, MALPIGHI, RAY, (e) Foundation of the Academies.

VI. *General Scientific Tendencies in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries.* Interrelation of Physical and Biological Sciences.

#### B. HISTORY OF PHYSICAL AND MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES IN MODERN TIMES

I. *The Rise of the Academies The Eighteenth Century:* (a) The new instruments and their influence on scientific ideas Air pump, thermometer, barometer and meteorological instruments, optical instruments, pendulum clock; (b) Analytical and projective geometry. The infinitesimal calculus: (c) Universal gravitation and the problem of celestial mechanics, (d) Theories of light, (e) General dynamics and principle of least action (f) Systematisation of chemical knowledge Phlogiston, (g) Discovery and manipulation of gases, (h) "Nonconfinable simple substances." Electric and magnetic fluids, phlogiston, caloric, ether

person in the world who holds a chair specifically in the history of science. Dr Sarton is engaged chiefly in editorial work and research. As a labor of love he collaborates with Dr L. J. Henderson in giving a course on the history of science at Harvard

II. *The Nineteenth Century*: (a) Rise and development of atomic theory. The electrical theory of matter and the structure of the atom, (b) The nature of heat and the conservation of energy; (c) Wave theory of light and development of ether theories; (d) Current electricity and electro-magnetism. AMPÈRE, OERSTED, FARADAY, CLERK MAXWELL, (e) Electro-magnetic theory of light and Herzian waves; (f) Chemistry of carbon compounds. Synthesis of organic substances; (g) Theory of solution. Ionic theory and its implications, (h) Spectroscopy and astrophysics; (i) Refinements of celestial mechanics. Theories of the universe; (j) Age of the Earth and geological principles, (k) Evolution of geophysical theory Air, Sea, Earth, (l) Modern mathematical ideas, (m) The steam engine and other mechanical inventions. The rise of scientific technology.

### C. HISTORY OF BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES IN MODERN TIMES.

I. *The Rise of the Academies. The Eighteenth Century*: (a) Influence of invention of the microscope, (b) Beginnings of systematic biology. (c) Mechanics of the animal body; (d) Respiration, circulation and the entry of chemistry into biology; (e) Theories of the nature of disease.

II *Organic Evolution The Eighteenth Century*: (a) Theories of organic evolution. BUFFON, ERASMUS, DARWIN, LAMARCK, CHARLES DARWIN, DE VRIES, (b) Cell theory and cell structure. Histology and histogenesis, (c) Biogenesis and abiogenesis. REDI, SPALLANZANI, PASTEUR Origin of living things, (d) Quantitative methods in physiology. Mechanism and vitalism, (e) Enzymes. Hormones, nutrition and growth The beginnings of biochemistry, (f) Germ theory of disease, Toxins and antitoxins. Immunity. The study of epidemics, (g) Embryology and the theory of recapitulation The application of experimental methods, (h) Classification of animals and plants as influenced by evolutionary theory; (i) Physiology of the plant. Oecology and the balance of life Symbiosis and parasitism, (j) The animal in relation to its environment Symbiosis, commensalism and parasitism, (k) The geological record Succession of living forms. Antiquity and descent of man, (l) Mendelian inheritance and statistical study of biological phenomena, (m) The physiology of the nervous system and its application to psychology

The status of the teaching of the history of science in the United States before university instruction was disrupted by the War has been described in a valuable study made by Mr. Frederick E. Brasch in a paper entitled "The Teaching of the History of Science: Its Status in Our Uni-

versities, Colleges and Technical Schools," and published in *Science* for November 26, 1915.<sup>21</sup> He studied 352 out of 598 institutions of this type which existed in the country at that time and found that 224 had some course on the history of science and that 128 had none. The first course on the history of science in America appears to have been one on the history of chemistry given by Dr. Theodore W. Richards at Harvard University for the first time in 1890. At practically the same time<sup>22</sup> Professors Sedgwick and Cross at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology began a course on the history of the biological and physical sciences which has been carried on since 1905 by Professors Sedgwick and Tyler. This was the first course in the general history of science given in this country. Perhaps the best known course on the general history of science now offered is that which had been conducted at Harvard, since 1911, by Professor L. J. Henderson. Mr. Brasch found that in 1915 there were many more courses offered on the history of special sciences than on the general history of science, the emphasis being particularly upon the mathematical and physical sciences at the expense of the biological, but he believed that he detected a tendency on the part of these institutions of higher learning to abandon the history of special sciences and to go over to a general course. Most of the large universities were found to offer both general and special courses in the history of science, and an unusual interest in the subject was manifest at the Carnegie Institute of Technology at Pittsburg. A gratifying innovation of a missionary sort was to be seen in the work of Professor L. J. Henderson of Harvard who gave a series of lectures on the history of science to some five middle Western colleges in the spring of 1915. Finally, excellent facilities for detailed investigation in the history of science have been provided for in the John Crerar Library at

<sup>21</sup> Loc. cit., pp. 746-60.

<sup>22</sup> Professor Sedgwick began his lectures in an extra-academic way as early as 1887.

Chicago, the resources of which were, in part, made public in a bibliography prepared by Dr. Josephson in 1911 and brought up nearer to date in a supplement of 1916. Nor should one forget the promising periodical devoted to the history of science—*Isis*—edited by George Sarton, the publication of which was disrupted by the World War, but has subsequently been resumed in permanent fashion. As the basis for a national organization those interested in the history of science have Section L of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and, since 1924, a special society, the American History of Science Society, which has adopted *Isis* as its official publication.<sup>28</sup> This progress in the history of science has been significant and constructive, not merely for the history of science and culture, but likewise for natural science itself. It has done much to promote that indispensable synthetic and coöperative trend so desirable for the natural sciences as a group.

While Mr. Brasch's study thus revealed significant beginnings in the history of science in the United States, it gave no evidence of any interest in the subject on the part of the historical guild. It is doubtful, indeed, if at that time there was any definite course on the history of science offered by an historian. Probably the closest approximations were the courses in intellectual history, the history of civilization, and the expansion of European civilization given by Professors Robinson, Shotwell and Shepherd at Columbia, the composite course on the history of civilization offered at Cornell, and certain advanced senior work on medieval education and intellectual interests given by Professor Haskins at Harvard, with some very evident and productive interest in the subject on the part of Professor Thorndike at Western Reserve University and Professor Teggart at California. This state of affairs suggests the question as to whether matters should remain ever thus,

<sup>28</sup> For a list of the charter members of this society see *Isis*, Vol. VI, No. 19 (4), 1924, pp. 521 ff.

with the historians generally ignoring the subject, and brings one to the final point in this discussion, namely, a consideration of the type of coöperation and division of labor between natural scientists and historians which is desirable in teaching and writing in the field of the history of science.

#### IV. THE NECESSITY OF COÖPERATION BETWEEN HISTORIANS AND SCIENTISTS IN THE FIELD OF THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE.

It is doubtless true that the manner of teaching the history of science should be determined sharply by the result which it is desired to obtain. It is obvious that there are four chief results to be aimed at, each of which calls for a special course: first, a technical knowledge of the history of a certain special natural science, designed to aid experts in arriving at a better command of their particular subjects; second, a more general grasp of the development of all the natural sciences which will make clear the manner in which the progress of the several natural sciences has been interrelated and cumulative; third, an analysis of the history of method, which will clarify the nature and the unique character of the methodology of the natural sciences and the manner in which this methodology and technique have evolved; and, fourth, an introduction to the history of intellectual interests and cultural progress which will indicate the part played by science in the history of civilization, and will reveal scientific progress in its proper perspective in the general evolution of intellectual interests. It is almost certain that the first three types of courses should normally be taught by natural scientists, and the last by historians, though occasionally an alert student of philosophy, such as Morris Cohen or Bertrand Russell, will be found admirably qualified to give the courses on the general history of science and the evolution of the scientific method. But in both the courses on the history of science

and on the history of intellectual interests there should be frank and sympathetic coöperation between scientists and historians.

This cooperation, unfortunately, has not generally existed in the past. The scientist, at least in this country, has generally despised the historian when the latter has upon very rare occasions entered the boundaries of natural science, and the historian has generally escaped this contempt by ignoring the history of science altogether. This mutual lack of respect and interest, and the resulting failure to coöperate has led to a serious loss to both scientists and historians. Scientists, particularly in this country, have exhibited an extremely naive and uncritical attitude in the matter of handling the historical sources dealing with their subject, works of all varieties of age, accuracy and bias often being used in an indiscriminate manner, provided they furnish direct statements of alleged fact. Frequently, some of the most valuable sources of information have been ignored altogether. There also has very often been displayed a painful lack of power in orderly and attractive narration, which would scarcely be found even in a doctoral dissertation in history. The admitted critical and literary superiority of European historians of science to the American may in part be due to the closer coöperation between them and their colleagues in the faculties of letters and in the field of history. Further, the natural scientist has often seemed to assume that the progress of science has been solely a result of individual investigation, experimentation and discovery, while, as a matter of fact, the historian well knows that it has been quite as much the product of circumstances in the general historical environment which have encouraged and made possible scientific endeavor and achievement. In other words, while the progressive historian will freely admit that science has done much to determine the course of historical events, he must insist that historical circumstances have been quite as



effective in conditioning the nature and rate of progress in the natural sciences. The rather austere scorn of the natural scientist for the historian has sometimes led the latter to risk an excursion in the field of science without having checked up his work by consultation with a scientific expert, but more often it has simply been effective in keeping the historian out of the field, and incidentally in preventing college students of history from having an adequate opportunity to become acquainted with what should constitute one of the most vital phases of history.

Of course it is not meant that historians have always recognized the significance of the history of science and have clamored in crowds for permission to enter the field, being deterred only by the lack of encouragement from scientists. The general body of historians have certainly been as naive in ignoring science as have scientists in sifting historical sources. What is asserted is that the few historians who have shown an interest in the history of science have not generally met with a warmly sympathetic welcome from scientists. The scientists should recognize that until the history of science is espoused by a large number of historians it cannot have its deserved recognition in the academic world, and they should cherish, encourage and enlighten the few historians who evince an interest in science with as great care and enthusiasm as a biologist would nurse along the rarest and most interesting sport or mutation which might appear in the evolution of organic life.

The growth of mutual respect, and the stimulation of co-operation between historians and scientists can only be productive of the greatest gain to both. The scientists can receive aid in sifting their sources and arranging their material, while the historians can secure sure and accurate guidance in the technical phases of the subject. It can scarcely be doubted, moreover, that the unquestionably greater objectivity, frankness and candor, and the more

earnest search for truth and vital information which characterizes natural scientists, as contrasted with historians and social scientists generally, will have a salutary reaction upon historians. Further than a mere coöperation in research and exposition, historians and scientists should arrange for a better guidance of their students. Certainly no student majoring in science should regard his scientific training as well rounded out without comprehending the relation of the history of science to general cultural evolution and the history of intellectual interests, and no student of history can be held to be competent in his subject without a decent elementary grasp upon the history of science, for which he may be prepared, if otherwise deficient, by a preliminary course in general science, which should always include some personal contact with and observation of, the exact and painstaking methods of the scientist in laboratory work. It may also be safely asserted that students of science who hope later to teach its history or to write on the subject should during their college period take a thorough course in historical methodology, both in investigation and exposition.

The progress made by natural scientists in teaching and writing in the field of the history of science has already been pointed out and this conference will be welcomed by historians as a harbinger of their closer coöperation with alert students of the newer history.<sup>24</sup> From the historian's side, also, certain significant advances have already been made in this country which to some degree supplant the blank indicated in Mr. Brasch's report on the history of science. Professor James Harvey Robinson in his well-known course on the history of the intellectual classes in

<sup>24</sup> Even more significant was the Cambridge meeting in 1922, held under the joint auspices of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the American Historical Association, and presided over by James Harvey Robinson. It is a melancholy fact that since 1923 the section on the history of science has disappeared from the program of the annual meeting of the American Historical Association but it will undoubtedly return with the gradual passing of the "Old Guard" in that organization.

Europe has provided, especially in his latest syllabus, an excellent prospectus for a synthesis of the history of science and general intellectual interests, and his point of view has affected many of the younger teachers of history and is evident in the text-books of Breasted, Thorndike, Hayes and Schapiro. Professor Shotwell's famous course on the evolution of European civilization centered largely around the progress of pure and applied science and its reaction upon civilization, particularly its effect upon economic life and activities. It is doubtful if any other American historian, with the possible exception of Professors Robinson and Thorndike, has done as much to direct the attention of his students to the significance of the growth of science in determining the progress of civilization as Professor Shotwell. Professor Lynn Thorndike has been both a prolific and scholarly worker in the whole field of European thought and science, from the Roman period to Diderot and the *Encyclopedists*. Professor William R. Shepherd, in his original course on the expansion of European civilization, has for the first time made clear how far the development of European science in modern times has been due to the reaction of world colonization, exploration and commerce upon European thought.<sup>25</sup> The salutary influence of Professor Burr's teaching and writing in stimulating interest in intellectual history has long been recognized and has permeated the text-book of Professor Hulme on the Renaissance and Reformation, as well as having led to the production of many scholarly monographs in the field of intellectual history. While Professor Haskins has not until recently been regarded as a special protagonist of intellectual history no one in Europe or America has done work of a more scholarly nature in this field, and of late he has offered a general course on medieval intellectual history.

<sup>25</sup> Professor Shepherd's original thesis in this matter is to be found summarized in his articles on "The Expansion of Europe" in the *Political Science Quarterly* for 1919. See also J. E. Gillespie, *The Influence of Oversea Expansion on England to 1700*, Chap. viii.

His books on medieval universities and on medieval science have constituted outstanding contributions to our knowledge of medieval intellectual life.

Further, historians and philosophers have at last supplied works that make possible a fairly complete survey of intellectual history. The writings of Breasted, Rogers, Olmstead and Jastrow on the Oriental period; of Zeller, Gomperz, Murray, Zimmern, Fowler, Wissowa, Dill and Cumont on the classical era; of Taylor, Poole, Lea, Har-nack, Burr, Carlyle, Rashdall, Paetow, Thorndike, Haskins, Workman and Lecky on the Medieval age; of Brandi, Voigt, Beard, Preserved Smith, Emerton, Taylor and Hulme on the Renaissance and Reformation; of Shipley on the science of the seventeenth century; of Shepherd, Abbott, Gillespie and Botsford on the expansion of Europe; of Fischer, Croce, Morley, Lecky and Stephen on the thought of the eighteenth century; of Benn, Merz and others on the last century; and of Croce, Dewey, Sandys, Royce, Santayana, Stein, Faguet, Monroe, Hart, Pearson, Hoffding, Reinach, Bury and Dilthey on various topics in intellectual history are only certain conspicuous illustrations of the fertile work done in this field.<sup>26</sup>

There are a few courses in the history of civilization offered in American universities in which the development of science has been or may be introduced with profit to all concerned. A very significant innovation has recently been adopted at Columbia University whereby all freshmen are compelled to enter a course in contemporary civilization containing at least a smattering of the history of science sufficient to indicate the scientific progress which lies back of modern civilization. An admirable introduction to European intellectual history has been prepared for the course by J. H. Randall. It would seem, however, that, though a fruitful interest in the history of science may be

<sup>26</sup> See above, pp 216 ff, for a more thorough list of writers in the field of intellectual history.

aroused in this way, it is rather too early in the college course for the most effective presentation of the history of civilization. It is probable that the courses in the history of the special sciences should come in the junior year and should be followed in the last college year by the courses in the general history of science and in the history of thought and culture. But, important as these details may be, the vital preliminary step is for historians more generally to realize the significance of the history of science, and for the scientists to descend to a plane of coöperation, and the details of the division of labor between the two fields and the pedagogical problems will be early and easily adjusted. The presence of a large number of progressive historians on the membership list of the American History of Science Society is a most promising harbinger. Both groups should, however, get into better *rapproch* with the more intelligent and alert technicians. While at present the scientists show much the greater activity in the history of science, the strength of the conventional in historical interests seems to be weakening and it is not absurd to predict that a generation hence such a book as Merz's *History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century* will be regarded as containing more pertinent historical information than the *Cambridge Modern History* or James Ford Rhodes's *History of the United States since the Compromise of 1850*.<sup>27</sup> Probably no better conclusion for this

\* There is no satisfactory treatment of the problem of the history of science and the method of presenting it for class-room instruction. Valuable suggestions may be obtained from the following easily accessible articles.

C R Mann, "The History of Science," *Popular Science Monthly*, April 1908, pp 313 ff.

Walter Libby, "The History of Science," *Science*, November 6, 1914, pp 670-73, "A Function of the History of Science," *Educational Review*, October, 1919, pp 201-6

F E Brasch, "The Teaching of the History of Science," *Science*, November 26, 1915, pp 746-60

G Sarton, "The Teaching of the History of Science," *Scientific Monthly*, September, 1918, pp. 193-211, and has many admirable articles in *iss* published since 1913

L C Karpinski, "The History of Science," *School and Society*, December 21, 1918, pp 741-49

The subject is discussed from the historian's point of view in F. S.

chapter could be found than the following contrast between the conventional political history and the history of science, taken from the writings of Julius Pagel:<sup>28</sup>

Different from the general history of world events is the history of science. There the roads are marked by blood and smoking ruins, here by the quiet mental labor of the peace-loving, diligent scholar and investigator, there the Machiavellian arts of the diplomats, fraud and intrigue, here truth, honesty and light, there strife of the bodies with weapons of iron and often the supremacy of brute power, here strife indeed,—for without strife and without opposite views no evolution, no progress is possible—but it is a strife of opinions and a manifestation of the free activity of the spirit, there not seldom victory of the unrighteous, here always of the righteous, there often despotism and compulsion, here liberty and inner peace, there hatred and rancor between the nations, here communion of the nations and all civilized countries in noble competition, there secrecy—decades, yes centuries pass before the veil of official secretiveness is lifted, showing the purposes and origins of actions of state,—here full publicity, for only in the light of general publicity can the fruits of science thrive and ripen, there, the value of political events for the happiness and welfare of the people is problematic and doubtful, here each new discovery, each new-found fact not only has an indirect value as a step in the progress of knowledge, but is of direct, positive and material value for the whole of humanity.

#### SELECTED REFERENCES

S. Butler, *Erewhon*

J. M. Clark, "The Empire of Machines," in *Yale Review*, October, 1922

B. A. Fiske, *Invention: the Master-key to Progress*

A. H. Hansen, "The Technological Interpretation of History," in *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, November, 1921

W. Libby, *An Introduction to the History of Science*

H. Magnus, *Die Wert der Geschichte für die moderne induktive Naturbetrachtung und Medizin*

Marvin, "Science and History," *Contemporary Review*, April, 1918, J. H. Robinson, "The Relation of History to the Newer Sciences of Man," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, March 16, 1911, and J. T. Shotwell, "The Interpretation of History," *American Historical Review*, July, 1913, and "Mechanism and Culture," loc. cit.

Sarton's article is especially valuable for its discussion of the requisite knowledge, equipment and pedagogical procedure in teaching the history of science.

<sup>28</sup> Cited by Dr. Aksel G. S. Josephson.

L. C. Marshall, *The Story of Human Progress*.

F. S. Marvin (Ed.), *Science and Civilization*.

C. Richet, *Allgemeine Kulturgeschichte*

G. Sarton, "The New Humanism," in *Isis*, 1924, Vol VI, No. 16.

W. T. Sedgwick and H. W. Tyler, *A Short History of Science*

O. W. Caldwell and E. E. Slosson (Eds), *Science Remaking the World*.

K. Snyder, *The World Machine*

J. W. N. Sullivan, *Aspects of Science*

T. Veblen, *The Theory of Business Enterprise*, Chaps 11, 12

T. Veblen, *The Engineers and the Price System*

A. Vierendeel, *Esquisse d'une Histoire de la Technique*

## CHAPTER VII

### ECONOMIC SCIENCE AND DYNAMIC HISTORY

#### I. THE NATURE OF ECONOMICS.

ANY definition of economics must, of course, be highly tentative and based upon a genetic point of view, for there have been very diverse theories of economics both in relation to the stages of its development and with respect to the viewpoints of particular writers. A comparison of the views of the nature of economics held by Xenophon and Gustav Schmoller, by Nassau William Senior and Sismondi, by John Bates Clark and Thorstein Veblen will suffice to illustrate this divergence. In general, however, it would probably be agreed that the conception of economics as the study of the wealth-getting and wealth-using activities of society is an adequate and accurate working definition, whatever the differences of viewpoint and emphasis among the various schools and groups of thinkers in the economic field. But such activities are rarely carried on by man with no tools beyond his hands or sticks or in isolation from his fellows, unless it be in that hypothetical Robinson Crusoe economy so widely exploited by economists for pedagogical subtleties. Man has usually provided for his material wants through the assistance of a progressively more adequate technology, extending from the *coup-de-poing* to the devices of modern synthetic chemistry and metallurgy, and through the cooperative activities of his social class and group.

Such reflections indicate at once the wide ramifications and relationships of economic science. It is most intimately connected with the history of science and of technology,



which conditions most sharply the nature of economic processes and institutions, and is regarded by many as in reality a legitimate subdivision of economic history. It cannot ignore a consideration of the natural resources which are attacked by the prevailing technology, and is thus brought into close dependence upon economic geography. But beyond the technology and the natural resources is the fact that the exploitation of the physical environment is very directly affected by the group setting in which it is carried on. Economic activities are subject to the general oversight and control of the group through folkways and mores which vary all the way from primitive taboos on certain kinds of food to a protective tariff. In primitive times these folkways utterly dominated economic effort through taboos on food, on types of activity, on work on certain days, and on relations with certain plants, animals, and neighboring groups. With the passage of time has gone a certain secularization of economic life, though the contemporary subordination to fashion is in many ways as striking a proof of the conditioning of economic activities by social forces as the operation of primitive superstitions. At any rate, it is quite apparent that there can be no intelligent study of economics or economic history which is divorced from an understanding of the nature and operation of folkways and of the history of culture. Not only are group activities and customs responsible for the characteristic positive economic efforts in the way of getting a living; they are equally potent in obstructing economic efficiency, all the way from primitive taboos against working on many days during the year to the premises and motives of the "price-system" which are as destructive of economic efficiency as a primitive system which provides a hundred holidays during a year. Social institutions at large affect and at times determine the nature of economic institutions. They condition the prevailing degrees and types of economic coöperation or conflict, of the division of labor, and the

nature of economic contacts between societies and states. They determine the variety, status and flexibility of socio-economic classes, and their relations to each other. Finally, the so-called economic "ideals" are but a reflection of the specific material aspirations of certain classes which are thus obscured, rationalized or dignified. It is, to be sure, equally true, as we point out in many places elsewhere, that technological and economic forces and processes profoundly affect social institutions and points of view. It is apparent, then, that economics is a social science in its most fundamental and important sense, and that an adequate comprehension of the historical and sociological viewpoints is the indispensable prerequisite to any intelligent analysis of economic processes and activities. A good statement of this broad approach to economics is embodied in the following formulation by Professors Kieckhofer and Marshall.<sup>1</sup>

The distinctive contribution of economics to the social studies is the understanding it gives of the processes by which men get a living. A very large part of human activity is devoted to the process of getting a living. One of the most significant things about our world is the fact that nature does not gratuitously supply all, or even many, of the commodities and services desired. In consequence, we "struggle" to get a living, we learn to "economize" (in the broadest sense of that term) in the selection and utilization of effective means of gaining desired ends. These activities are our *economic activities*. They are carried on largely in group life and, even when most individual, are affected by group life. Economics, then, promotes a realization of what it means to live together and an understanding of the conditions essential to living together well, because it helps to explain the organization and functioning of an evolving society from the point of view of the social processes of making a living.

Economics sets forth, for example, certain aspects of our specialization, our interdependence, our associative effort, our technological struggle with nature, our pecuniary organization of the production and sharing of goods, our utilization of labor under the wage system, our market exchange, our international economic relations, our scheme of private property and competitive effort—all of which have become vital parts of our present social organization—and

<sup>1</sup> *Report of the Joint Commission on the Presentation of the Social Studies in the Schools*, p. 5.

it shows how all of these function in enabling us to work and to live together. Concerning these economic processes certain generalizations or laws have been worked out and they are available as standards or guides for individuals and for groups.

To this excellent summary might legitimately be added the fact that such study not only enables one to understand the present economic system in its social setting, but also reveals its weaknesses and defects, and suggests gradual but persistent and constructive modes of improvement and reorganization.

## II. SOME LEADING STAGES IN THE GROWTH OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE.

As has been true of practically every phase of social theory, the history of economic science reflects rather directly and accurately the changing social and economic environments in which the successively prevalent types of economic doctrine were developed. While there were plenty of theories about economic life in the ancient Orient there was, for the most part, little analytical reflection. Most economic thought was but a rationalization of primitive or early historic economic practices, closely related to the religio-ethical system. It is to the Greeks that one must turn for the first significant contribution to the analysis of the theoretical foundations of economic life. Greek economic life, at least down to the Hellenistic age which produced no important economic theorists, was based primarily upon a household and slave economy with little comprehension of capital, large-scale business enterprise or world-wide commercial contacts.<sup>2</sup> It is not surprising, then, that Greek philosophers envisaged economics chiefly as the science of household economics rather than as the philosophy of public or political economy. Theory usually follows practice as a rationalization or defense, and there was

<sup>2</sup> See on this point the illuminating summary characterization of Greek economic life in A. E. Zimmern, *The Greek Commonwealth*,

little which resembled modern economic generalizations. The primitive nature of Greek economic theory is well illustrated by Aristotle, who listed brigandage as a legitimate type of economic activity but frowned upon interest-taking and other indispensable foundations of any large-scale capitalistic business enterprise. The Romans added little directly to the economic theory of the Greeks, but their legal theory gave a rationalized defense and juristic justification of private property and contractual obligations, and, in particular, developed the theory of the corporate personality and organization which has played so important a part in the development and organization of modern industrial life. Like the Greeks, the Romans were never able to grasp in a dynamic manner the nature and significance of commerce, industry and finance, and the leading writers presented a eulogy of the career of the landlord and the dignity of agriculture.<sup>3</sup>

In the medieval period we find this primitivity of the economic outlook and concepts of the Greeks and Romans combined with ethical and humanitarian notions introduced by Christianity. The medieval writers on economic topics for the most part failed as completely as did the Greeks and Romans to grasp the dynamics of capital and business, and their economic horizon was limited chiefly to the supremacy of agriculture, the local economy, and manufacturing for need and consumption rather than for exchange and profit. Christianity added emphasis upon social solidarity and the social responsibilities assumed in the accumulation and use of wealth. Hence, medieval economic thought revolved around such concepts and practices as the theory of a just-price, the taboo upon interest, the outlawry of such "sound principles" of modern business as engrossing, forestalling and regrating, and the current doctrines

<sup>3</sup>L. H. Haney, *History of Economic Thought*, Chaps iv-v; J. Bonar, *Philosophy and Political Economy*, Chaps ii-iv, A. E. Monroe, *Early Economic Thought*, Chaps. i-ii, A. E. Zimmern, *The Greek Commonwealth*; T. Frank, *Economic History of Rome*.

of status and organization in society and industry. There can be no doubt that the social point of view was far more highly esteemed and far more adequately safeguarded in medieval economic theory than in the modern age. At the same time, it can scarcely be contended with accuracy that the change has been wholly due to Protestantism. To a large degree the change has been brought about by the transformation of technology and the revolutions of industrial procedure which have made the medieval point of view more difficult to apply and operate in a widely different form of economic society. That the ethic of Protestantism forwarded the spirit and practices of modern capitalism can, however, hardly be denied by the candid historian.<sup>4</sup>

If with the Greeks and Romans economics was primarily the science of household economy, and with the medievals a branch of ethics, early in modern times it came to be linked up more and more with the practical problems of industry and commerce, of which it was both a stimulus and an apologetic. The history of economic science in modern times has paralleled the economic development of the western nations and has borne a close relation to the progress and nature of economic institutions, methods and processes. Especially important as affecting the nature of economic thought have been the transition from a need-fulfilling economy to the profit-getting economy associated with the commercial revolution and the rise of modern capitalism,<sup>5</sup> and the developments in modern thought connected with the growth of science, critical philosophy and the evolutionary orientation, all of which served to diminish the reign of supernaturalism and provincialism.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Monroe, *op. cit.*, Chaps. II-VI, Haney, *op. cit.*, Chap. VI; P. Smith, *The Age of Reformation*, pp. 724-9, R. H. Tawney, "Sixteenth Century Religious Thought," in *Journal of Political Economy*, 1923-4, C. Becker, *The Declaration of Independence*.

<sup>5</sup> A distinction best developed by W. Sombart in his many writings, particularly his *Der Moderne Kapitalismus*.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. J. Bonar, *Philosophy and Political Economy*, O. F. Boucke, *The Development of Economics, 1750-1900*, A. D. White, *A History of the Warfare Between Science and Theology*, H. Hoffding, *A History of Modern Philosophy*.

The first notable development in economic theory in modern times was the somewhat diffuse and varied body of doctrines making up what is usually known as Mercantilism. This was the apologetic, or perhaps better, the manifesto of the new spirit of European expansion, discovery, colonization and trade. It was definitely associated with the rise of nationalism on the ruins of feudalism, and rather closely connected with the first or absolutistic phase of the development of the secular state in modern times. It laid special stress upon the importance of the precious metals or "Treasure" as the criterion of the wealth of a nation, contended that it was to be increased most certainly and effectively by a favorable balance of trade, and asserted that this could be most readily achieved by various forms of state regulation of economic and commercial life, and, most particularly, of the trade with colonies. In the German states this sort of doctrine emphasized more the matter of state aid to, and regulation of, agriculture and manufacturing industry, largely because of Germany's slight part in the expansion and commercial movements of this age. Here it was known as Cameralism. While there were too many divergencies and subtleties in this body of theory to make it possible to give it a single summary characterization, the two most significant and influential aspects were the emphasis on the wide range of desirable state interference in, and regulation of, all forms of economic life, and the stress laid upon the great importance of commerce and colonialism in the economic and political life of a people.<sup>7</sup>

The merchant and industrial classes, while at first enthusiastic supporters of the court in the Mercantilistic policies, soon found that their freedom and potential prosperity were often greatly restrained and curtailed by the rigid regulation of industry and commerce, and the royal brand of state intervention frequently touched them at a

<sup>7</sup> Monroe, *op. cit.*, Chaps vii-x, xii, xvi; Haney, *op. cit.*, Chaps vii-viii; G Schmoller, *The Mercantile System*; A. W Small, *The Cameralists*, and E. S Furness, *The Position of the Laborer in a System of Nationalism*

sensitive spot through taxation. Hence, they began to lose their enthusiasm for Mercantilism and turned to a defense of an almost diametrically opposed economic and political program, that of *laissez-faire* or complete economic freedom. Few groups or classes in human history have ever been able to master a degree of candor adequate to advancing their aims and aspirations on the plane and level of selfish advantage, but have ever sought some rationalized defense designed to show that their program involved the betterment of mankind and the advancement of God's will. This time the middle class derived their defensive cosmic philosophy from the scientists working in celestial mechanics, particularly Newton, who had shown that certain basic laws, especially the law of universal gravitation, control the movement of the heavenly bodies. From this they deduced the assumption that this natural order and natural law must operate to govern social and economic affairs as well, and that it constituted an affront to God as well as the maximum degree of human folly for man to interfere by legislation in the regulation of economic processes. Only a régime of unlimited competition would insure the certain and beneficent operation of natural law. This body of doctrine was earliest appropriated for economic theory by the French Physiocrats, who were primarily interested in improving the internal political administration and economic life of France, and who eulogized agriculture rather than manufacturing and commerce as the chief source of national prosperity. Progressively, however, Turgot, Condillac and Adam Smith took a more tolerant and sympathetic attitude towards manufacturing and commerce, and by the time of Ricardo and Cobden the *laissez-faire* doctrine had come to be espoused by writers who put manufacturing and commerce in the place which the Physiocrats had assigned to agriculture, and who regarded the landlord class as the common enemy of mankind. In gen-

eral, this laudation of unmitigated competition has remained a permanent element in respectable classical and neo-classical economic theory to the present day, buttressed still further by Spencerian evolutionary philosophy which represented economic and social evolution, like organic development, to be a purely spontaneous process.<sup>8</sup>

The so-called classical political economy was erected upon the basis of an elaborated Physiocracy by Adam Smith, whose most important contribution lay in his work on economic dynamics grounded in the division of labor and economic specialization with chief emphasis upon production rather than distribution. Beginning with Ricardo, however, his followers turned their attention primarily to the problems of value and distribution, and to this day the logic and metaphysics of these issues have absorbed nine-tenths of the cerebral energy expended by the professional exponents of economic science. The method of the school was wholly deductive, and many members were openly contemptuous of the quantitative measurement of economic phenomena, Ricardo once contending that if the facts of contemporary economic life did not square with his well-thought-out theory it was so much the worse for the facts. Their procedure has been well denominated by W. C. Mitchell as "pecuniary logic," and it has reached its highest development in the writings of three contemporary American economists, J. B. Clark, F. M. Taylor and H. J. Davenport. The outlook of the classical school was upon a static economic world tending toward an equilibrium. There was little cognizance taken of the dynamics of economic development or of the remarkable transformations of economic systems in the social development of the past. Even those who recognized that there had been development in the past assumed that economic maturity had been

<sup>8</sup> Monroe, *op cit*, Chaps xiv, xv, Haney, *op cit*, Chaps ix-x; H. Higgs, *The Physocrats*, Boucke, *op cit*, Chap. iii, W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer*, pp. 395 ff



reached by the first quarter of the nineteenth century, and that the existing economic order would endure with no changes in major outlines.\*

Without any probability that Adam Smith so intended it, classical economics speedily became an apologetic for the new large-scale capitalism which came into existence following the Industrial Revolution. Malthus contended that the sole cause of human misery was to be found, not in the low wages and economic injustices of the new industrial order, but in the biological fact of the tendency of the human species to increase more rapidly than the means of subsistence. Only checks on population increase could mitigate the situation. Later writers developed the Malthusian position in the famous subsistence law of wages, which was based on the assumption that wages tended towards the margin of subsistence, and that they could not be safely raised because an increase would diminish profits and cripple industry, ending thus in a still more serious situation for the laborer. Only postponement of marriage could secure plenty and advancement, and the "delights of domestic society," rather than the avarice and oppression of the employers, were the chief menace to the laboring group. James Mill popularized Ricardo, and advocated the entrusting of social and economic life solely to the middle class manufacturers and merchants who best knew how to advance the welfare of humanity as a whole. J. B. Say eulogized the new mechanical technique and the resulting factory system, while Bastiat argued that in the new era the poor were largely mythological. Finally, Nassau Senior defiantly contended that economics was purely a science of wealth and not of welfare, and denounced all types of factory legislation as but the inevitable prelude to

\*Haney, *op cit*, Chaps xi-xii. See the admirable characterization by W C Mitchell in Tugwell, *The Trend of Economics*, pp 4-14. The most thorough work on this group of writers is E Cannan, *A History of the Theories of Production and Distribution in English Political Economy from 1776 to 1848*. On the static outlook see J S Mill's famous chapter on "The Stationary State," in his *Principles of Political Economy*, Book IV, Chap vi.

the destruction of industrial life and the impoverishment of mankind as a race. Senior's view of economics as the science of wealth has been adhered to by most orthodox economists to our own day, though in the course of the Ricardian succession it was more accurately the logic of the wealth-getting activities. Only in the hands of the modern schools of business administration has it been developed into the science and technique of wealth-getting.<sup>10</sup>

The tenets of the capitalistic price economics as the abstract science of wealth, in no way concerned with the welfare of mankind at large, were so preposterous that they began to be undermined almost in the days of Ricardo himself. Lauderdale and Sismondi showed clearly that the method of most rapidly increasing the wealth of a single class in society by no means meant an enlargement of the prosperity of the nation as a whole. Sismondi launched welfare economics by a comprehensive plan of socio-economic reform. The Ricardian Socialists held that Ricardo's premises led quite as logically to radical programs of economic reconstruction as to the doctrine of political quietism. John Stuart Mill made a crucial concession by admitting that only the processes of production were under the strict control of natural law, while distribution, covering the scope of wages, rent, interest and profits, was amenable to artificial human control, thus opening the theoretical road to extensive social legislation. The German historical school, by its insistence upon a careful study of the existing economic system as the basis for valid theory, was led gradually but definitely along the path to the state socialism of Schaffle, Schmoller and Wagner. Whatever one may think of his remedy Karl Marx revealed with pitiless thoroughness the weaknesses of the mid-century capitalistic system and the economic theory which

<sup>10</sup> Cannan, *op cit*, Gide and Rist, *History of Economic Doctrines*, Chaps. 11-13, F. A. Fetter, "Price Economics versus Welfare Economics," in *American Economic Review*, September, 1920

supported it. Finally, Shaftesbury and the factory reformers; Carlyle, Ruskin, Arnold and other literary figures; Buchez, Maurice, Kingsley and the Christian Socialists; and the rising labor organizations assailed the Ricardian tradition and the apology for non-interference in economic matters. The breach thus made in pecuniary logic opened the way for the emphasis on social and economic welfare to be found in our own day in the writings of Pigou, Webb, Hobson, Gide, Ely, Douglas, Peixotto, Small, Commons, Patten, Devine, Seager, T. S. Adams, Fetter, L. C. Marshall, Wolman and the followers of Veblen.<sup>11</sup> The need of a science of welfare to guide the efficient production of wealth in our society was recently eloquently demonstrated in a factual sense by the report of the engineers on *Waste in Industry*,<sup>12</sup> pointing out the distressing inefficiency of industrial America, the country in which the price economy and the price economics have enjoyed the most undisputed sway for nearly a century. It is evident that man needs scientific guidance not only in the way of the methods of making money, but also in its use as a member of society with community responsibilities.<sup>13</sup>

Another interesting deviation from economics as pecuniary logic or the science of wealth has been the development of a school of writers interested in the psychology of economic motives. The Ricardian group had not been greatly interested in human motives, but as far as they considered them they accepted the Benthamite hedonism. This represented man as a cool, deliberate, self-conscious, calculating individual seeking pleasure and avoiding pain, and carefully balancing potential satisfactions in all of his

<sup>11</sup> Fetter, *loc. cit.*, and *Ibid.*, December, 1920, L. H. Haney, "The Social Point of View in Economics," in *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. XXVIII.

<sup>12</sup> New York McGraw-Hill, 1922 This report did not, of course, cover the waste in the consumption of wealth Cf. Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*

<sup>13</sup> Probably the most typical example of welfare economics is J. A. Hobson's book, *Work and Wealth*, 1914, cf. also A. C. Pigou, *The Economics of Welfare*. See J. M. Clark in Tugwell, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-105

economic decisions and choices.<sup>14</sup> If the Ricardians did not widely exploit this psychology, such was not the case with a large group of succeeding writers known as the classical psychological school, who elaborated the concept of subjective utility as the key to economic behavior. Whether they specifically mentioned Bentham and hedonism or not, such men as Jevons, Walras, Menger, Wieser, Böhm-Bawerk, J. B. Clark and Fetter, based their analysis upon the assumptions of Benthamism.<sup>15</sup> This made possible a psychological economics in the light of the psychology of 1850, but not in the light of the psychology of 1900, for, as Graham Wallas has shown conclusively, the Benthamite felicific calculus may be good logic and philosophy, but it certainly is in no way supported by modern dynamic and social psychology.<sup>16</sup> The beginnings of truly psychological economics were laid by men like Tarde, Sumner, Thorndike, McDougall and others who actually endeavored to discover the nature and motives of human conduct, and the manner in which individual impulses are modified by human life in a social setting.<sup>17</sup> The first economist, strictly speaking, to appraise the significance of the new trend for his subject was Wesley C. Mitchell in a comprehensive article on "Human Behavior and Economics," published in 1914.<sup>18</sup> Three years later Carlton H. Parker in an address on "Motives in Economic Life," before the American Economic Association, went still further in linking up dynamic psychology and economic behavior. The next year before the same society W. F. Ogburn still further amplified the subject.<sup>19</sup> During this period we have also had such works as Veblen's *Instinct of Workmanship*; Miss Marot's *Creative*

<sup>14</sup> W. C. Mitchell, "'Bentham's Felicific Calculus,'" in *Political Science Quarterly*, June, 1918.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Mitchell, in Tugwell, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-17.

<sup>16</sup> *Human Nature in Politics*, Part I.

<sup>17</sup> Most directly in G. Tarde, *La Psychologie économique*, 2 Vols., Paris, 1902.

<sup>18</sup> *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, November, 1914.

<sup>19</sup> *American Economic Review*, Supplement, March, 1918, and March, 1919.

*Impulse in Industry*; Taussig's *Inventors and Money-makers*; and a flood of books on applied psychology in relation to labor problems and personnel management. L. D. Edie has attempted to base a systematic textbook on the approach through modern psychology, and Dr. Z. C. Dickinson has brought together in systematic form the varied contributions of contemporary psychology in their bearing upon economic behavior.<sup>20</sup> While psychological economics is still in a state of parturition, the present symptoms promise a safe delivery and a healthy infancy.

The development of an interest in history following the period of Gibbon and Niebuhr, the rise of the genetic point of view in social science in the work of Turgot, Condorcet, Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte, the gradual elaboration of the evolutionary hypothesis after the days of Lamarck, and the concrete evidence of rapidly changing economic conditions accompanying the Industrial Revolution all combined to discredit with many thinkers the static perspective of Ricardian economics. Beginning with Heeren at the close of the eighteenth century and taking more definite form a generation later with Sismondi and Richard Jones, a small group of writers on economic topics showed a tendency to emphasize the fact that sound economic theory must be founded upon the recognition of the interrelationship between economic institutions and processes and the principles to be derived from a study thereof, and to recognize that the wide differences in types of economic life in the past necessitate a tentative, comparative and genetic approach to the problem of economic generalizations. The principles governing economic life in post-Industrial Revolution England are doubtless far different from those which controlled the industrial organization and processes of the Kaffirs or the Huns. The early onslaught of Sismondi and

<sup>20</sup>L. D. Edie, *Principles of the New Economics*; Z. C. Dickinson, *Economic Motives*.



GUSTAV SCHMOLLER



his contemporaries was continued in a more systematic way by the founders of the German Historical School of economists, Wilhelm Roscher, Bruno Hildebrand and Karl Knies. Roscher and Hildebrand were effective chiefly as critics, and in their positive economic doctrine they differed but little from the English classicists whom they attacked in their prolegomena. Knies did, however, make a definite break with tradition and paved the way for Schmoller, Wagner and Ashley. In the writings of Schmoller, in particular, one finds the most thorough and systematic exposition of the historical position. His famous *Grundriss der Allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre* makes elaborate use of biological, ethnographic, statistical and psychological material, all woven together and interpreted from the genetic standpoint. Absolutism in theory is largely abandoned, the metaphysical and logical deductive method eschewed, and great emphasis is laid upon the facts and processes of economic evolution in relation to all the major departments of economic life and activity. One brings from the book an overwhelming impression of the complexity and the dynamic nature of economic phenomena as well as of the futile and misleading nature of dogmatic finality in doctrine. By his genetic approach and his broad sociological sweep in analysis, Schmoller might almost be said to mark the transition from the historical to the institutional school. One must, of course, bear in mind the very real distinction between historical political economy and genetic economics. The former, well represented by Roscher and his followers, is chiefly interested in studying the evolution of economic institutions, so as to aid economics as a general science and body of doctrine. The latter, conspicuously represented by Bücher, is concentrated upon theorizing on the problems of economic development, with no thought whatever of the direct or specific effect of such work upon political economy as a social science. To the historical school proper might



well be added the economic historians, the various types of which will be analyzed more thoroughly later.<sup>21</sup> The economic historians, specifically considered, differ from both historical and genetic economists in assuming to be interested in the progression of economic facts and events and not in questions of theoretical import to any great extent, though some, like Ashley and Gras, have been both historians and genetic economists.

Far and away the most synthetic, comprehensive and dynamic trend in economic theory has been that enrichment and expansion of the historical approach now generally known as "institutional economics." This method of studying economic phenomena insists, in the first place, upon a complete understanding of the sociological background of economic processes. The interrelation of economic and other social institutions and activities must be thoroughly understood. Economic science is viewed as truly a branch of social science. Then the psychological elements in group attitudes and the original nature of man modified by the social setting and the evolution of culture must be clearly understood. We must know the general conditions under which man puts forth the greatest energy in economic effort. The psychological effect of transitions in technology and the economic organization of society must be noted. On the other hand, there must be studied the relation between psychological alterations and economic changes. In every phase of study the genetic point of view must be maintained, for only in this way can one obtain the proper perspective and a perfect understanding of the flow of economic life and the formation of economic institutions. The sociological, psychological and historical attitudes are cultivated with the end in view of making possible a more penetrating and acute analysis of contemporary economic phenomena, for whatever the interest of the institutional

<sup>21</sup> Haney, *op cit.*, Chap xxv, Gide and Rust, *op cit.*, pp 381-407, T. Veblen, *The Place of Science in Modern Civilization*, pp 252-78.

analysts in the economic systems of the past, their primary concern is with contemporary economic life. They are not abstractly and *a priori* opposed to economic theory and generalization in any sense, but they contend that economic theory can only be developed after a thorough study of economic institutions, and that our knowledge of contemporary economic systems is too fragmentary as yet to warrant conclusive and convincing dogmatism in theory. Further, economic institutions are now changing too rapidly to allow much valid theory to be formulated with any hope or probability of more than the most ephemeral pertinence and relevancy. Economic theory that flees from the reality of economic and social facts in order to secure the basis for leisurely constructed dogmatism may be excellent metaphysics, but it is very unsatisfactory economics. The metaphysics of value and distribution must give way to the dynamics of processes and institutions.<sup>22</sup>

But if man cannot hope to construct for the time being an impressive body of economic theory, he can at least know what is going on in the economic world about us, the leading characteristics of the contemporary economic life, and where it is apparently leading us. The sociological approach and the careful attention to the actual situations prevailing in the economic world also naturally make the institutional school unusually well equipped to offer pertinent and cogent advice and guidance to welfare economics and the problems of living together efficiently in society.<sup>23</sup>

As the product of this ever growing and very promising

<sup>22</sup> See e.g. Veblen's comment on J. B. Clark's mode of economic analysis in *The Place of Science in Modern Civilization*, pp. 180 ff. The more moderate institutionalists would probably admit that the study of economic processes and the development of economic theory must proceed together if either line of work is to be cultivated in the most fruitful manner.

<sup>23</sup> See W. H. Hamilton, "The Price System and Social Policy," in *Journal of Political Economy*, January, 1918, and Veblen, *The Engineers and the Price System*.

school of writers who represent the most advanced and synthetic position yet taken in economic science one would include such works as Sombart's monumental study of the development of capitalistic institutions in modern times; Max Weber's stimulating studies of the psychological changes which he alleges were basic and anterior to the alterations in modern economic institutions, particularly the religious thought of Protestantism; the surveys of various results of the Industrial Revolution in the way of economic and social transformations by the Webbs, the Hammonds, Tawney and Hobson; Veblen's notable works on the psychology of capitalism and the leisure class, the premises and technique of business enterprise, the instinct of workmanship and its mutations, and the lack of adjustment between the remarkable revolution in technology and economic institutions since 1750, and the guiding ideas and many associated institutions which still remain dominated by eighteenth century premises and doctrines of natural law; Mitchell's study of the history and significance of business cycles; Friday's work on the dynamics of distribution; Hoxie's institutional approach to trade unionism; Hamilton's brilliant critical work; the excellent quantitative and analytical work on the status of the worker in modern industrial society, family budgets and the standard of living being carried on by Douglas; and, above all, the effect of such writings in producing a growing contempt on the part of the younger economists for the aridity of pecuniary logic.<sup>24</sup>

### III. THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN SOCIETY.

#### 1. *Stages of Economic Evolution.*

The earliest attention given to the economic development of human society was directed to the elaboration of some

<sup>24</sup> See Mitchell in Tugwell, pp 17-19, 25-34. A good brief history of institutional economics is a real desideratum.

theory or scheme of stages of industrial or cultural evolution. This mode of interpretation of the economic evolution of humanity goes back certainly to the Greeks. In Hesiod and Plato, for example, there are passages tracing the technological and the socio-economic stages through which man has passed. Seneca and Lucretius among the Romans presented definite notions concerning the cultural development of the past, and the relation of economic to other phases of development. In Hesiod and Seneca the theory was one of a decline from better times, the classical theory of a decline from a golden age being akin to the Hebrew doctrine of the fall of man. In both Plato and Lucretius, however, one discovers both a noble sweep of perspective and a rather keen appreciation of the gradual development of human technology and accompanying economic institutions and practices. Probably no later writer until the modern period surpassed Lucretius in the completeness of his picture or in the remarkable anticipation which he produced of the findings of contemporary archeology and cultural history. In his *Agriculture*, Cato ascribes a theory of economic stages to the writer, Dicæarchus. Such views, with diverse variations in detail, persisted throughout the medieval and early modern period, and we may turn to a consideration of the development of the "stage theory" of economic development in the nineteenth century.<sup>25</sup>

This marked tendency to propose definite stages of economic evolution, which began to be popular about the middle of the last century, was a phase of a similar trend in every field of social science and the philosophy of history. Comte had included aspects of economic evolution in his famous triadic philosophy of history. The influence of the new biology and the emphasis upon the analogy

<sup>25</sup> See H. E. Barnes, "The Natural State of Man," in *Monist*, January, 1923; "Classical Theories of the Origin of Society and the State," *Ibid.*, January, 1924; "The Development of Historical Sociology," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1921.

between society and the organism was apparent. The geologists, paleontologists and biologists were producing strange and impressive, if not terrifying, tables giving the stages through which organic life had passed from the earliest geologic ages to the present. This suggested the analogy of social development by stages. The evolutionary dogma, particularly of Herbert Spencer, insisted that social and economic institutions, as well as the types of organic life, had undergone a change from the simple to the complex in an orderly and sequential fashion. Finally, the classical or evolutionary school of anthropologists were working out a detailed scheme of the evolution of social institutions which were assumed to follow rigidly and exactly the same pattern of development and transition the world over. This type of doctrine culminated in the work of Lewis H. Morgan on *Ancient Society*. Morgan's views had an immense influence on economists of all schools from Marxians to those under the spell of Spencerianism. The socialists under the leadership of Marx and Engels gave his book wide currency in their group. It is not without significance that Professor R. T. Ely opens his suggestive chapter on "The Economic Stages" with a quotation from *Ancient Society*.<sup>26</sup>

We do not have space here for a complete summary of all the varied proposals of economists and historians in regard to the most accurate and illuminating manner of blocking off the economic progress of man in the past, but a representative selection may be made somewhat in the order of recency and complexity which will indicate the nature and value of such efforts in "epochal" economic historiography. The classifications we shall consider are those of Roscher, Hildebrand, Engel, Schmoller, Bücher, Sombart, Ely, Müller-Lyer, Gras and Giddings.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>26</sup> R. T. Ely, *Studies in the Evolution of Industrial Society*, p. 25. See also E. R. A. Seligman, *Economic Interpretation of History*, pp. 70 ff.

<sup>27</sup> These are taken largely from the anthology in F. Müller-Lyer, *The History of Social Development*.

Roscher proposed a tripartite division of the economic life of the past:<sup>28</sup>

- I. The age in which products were the free gift of nature.
- II The rise of labor with the handicraft technique
- III The era of capitalism, the mechanical technique and large scale coordinated human effort

Hildebrand likewise divided the economic history of man into three stages:<sup>29</sup>

- I. The Natural Economy.
- II The Money Economy.
- III. The Credit Economy.

Engel's scheme was the following:<sup>30</sup>

- I Individual production for one's own needs.
- II. The exchange economy.
  1. Exchange as an occasional phenomenon
  2. Exchange as a regular phenomenon
  - 3 Exchange as an essential phenomenon
- III Capitalistic economy, leading to the production of goods according to the operation of the law of supply and demand

Schmoller proposed a classification based upon the size of the economic unit and the degree of economic organization and contact:<sup>31</sup>

- I. The tribal, village or market economy.
- II The town economy.
- III. The territorial economy.
- IV State or national economy.

Bücher's divisions were based upon the size of the economic organization and the type of prevailing exchange:<sup>32</sup>

<sup>28</sup> F Muller-Lyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 249-50.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid*, p 242

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid*, pp 245-6.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 246.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid*, p 247.

- I. The independent economy. direct consumption without barter.
- II. The town or civic stage. direct barter from producer to consumer
- III. The national economy indirect exchange through intermediaries.

Sombart's classification bears some resemblance to Bücher's:<sup>33</sup>

- I The individual self-sufficing economy
- II. The cooperative activity of economic units, each largely self-sufficing
- III The social economy characterized by a differentiation of producing units and their organization into a coordinated whole.

Ely based his divisions chiefly on the progress of occupations and technique:<sup>34</sup>

- I. Hunting and fishing stage.
- II. The pastoral stage
- III. The agricultural stage
- IV. The handicraft stage.
- V The industrial stage
  - 1 Universal competition.
  - 2 Concentration.
  - 3 Integration.

Müller-Lyer links up social and economic evolution in the following scheme:<sup>35</sup>

- I. Epoch of clan organization.
  1. Early clan phase.
  - 2 Mid clan phase.
- II. Epoch of industrial organization.
  1. Early industrial phase.
  - 2 Mid industrial phase.
- III. Epoch of capitalistic organization.
  1. Early capitalistic organization.

<sup>33</sup> Müller-Lyer, *op cit*, p 249.

<sup>34</sup> Ely, *op cit*, pp 12-73.

<sup>35</sup> Müller-Lyer, *op cit.*, pp 251-3.

2. Mid capitalstic organization
3. Late capitalstic stage.
- IV. Epoch of socialistic organization
1. Early socialistic stage

Gras in a recent work offers the following suggestive scheme of development:<sup>36</sup>

- I. The collectional economy
- II The cultural nomadic economy.
- III The settled village economy
1. The free village economy.
2. The dependent village economy
- IV. The town economy.
- 1 The early or commercial town economy
- 2 The later or commercial and industrial town economy.
- V. The metropolitan economy
1. Organization of the market
- 2 Industrial development.
3. Development of transportation.
- 4 Growth of financial organization.

Giddings has attempted an unusually comprehensive classification which includes the self-sustaining efforts of all types of living matter from the amoeba to the activities of Henry Ford, and also introduces the psychological, as well as the economic and technological, aspects of the problem:<sup>37</sup>

- I. The organic economy (exclusively animal)
- II. The instinctive economy (animal and primordial humans)
- III. The apprehensive or ceremonial economy.
1. Luck
- 2 Magic
3. Sacrifice.
- IV. The ascertaining or business economy
1. Slave labor.
2. Trade
3. Capitalism, mechanical technique, factory, urban life.

There are a number of criticisms which may be legitimately directed against the stage theory of economic de-

<sup>36</sup> N. S. B. Gras, *An Introduction to Economic History*, (1922)

<sup>37</sup> F. H. Giddings, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, Chap. in.



velopment. Most important of all is the fact that no single characteristic such as technology, size of economic unit, type or organization of trade, medium of exchange, or any of the other aspects of economic life which are seized upon as criteria of distinction and transformation as between economic stages and systems, is by itself adequate to serve as the basis for the characterization of a stage or epoch in the economic history of a people. A stage of economic life constitutes a whole complex of interrelated factors in which no one element is of such exclusive and transcendent importance as to eclipse and render of no account all others. If the various aspects of the economic complex are in themselves numerous and complicated, even more so is the whole cultural complex which includes not only economic, but psychological and sociological factors of the highest importance which often change in a radical manner the nature and functioning of the economic elements in the society. The great significance of the general social setting of an economic system can be readily illustrated by the fact that a specific type of technology and economic process may mean far different things if located as an integral part of widely divergent cultural complexes which involve marked contrasts in psychological traits, cultural attitudes, social institutions and political policies. Identical economic and technological conditions by no means produce the same type of culture and society as a whole, as any survey of even the modern world will demonstrate. There is no doubt that any form of economic life will profoundly affect any society in which it is found, but it will certainly not affect all societies in the same way. Hence we can scarcely divide the periods of human development according to economic stages alone because of the importance of a multiplicity of other factors which give color and tendency to epochs of human advancement.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Clark Wissler, *Man and Culture*, Chaps. iv-v; W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change*.

Again, there is in economic as in other phases of history the powerful element of continuity of system or type. There is rarely a sufficiently sharp break to enable one to separate economic stages with clarity, exactness and precision. Nor do all aspects of the economic complex change with the same rapidity. Then the stage theory is not applicable to all peoples in any universal sense. Few groups in any area ever pass through all of the stages assumed in most of these schemes of division, and when they do it is not always in the order assigned. This is particularly true of the hunting, pastoral, agricultural, manufacturing succession which has been so widely accepted. Some fairly highly developed peoples have gone little beyond the hunting and fishing stage. There are agricultural peoples who have never domesticated animals. The handicraft stage when taken specifically and literally has little precision, for it then is seen to include all stages of development from the eolithic age to the Industrial Revolution. The dogma of the absolute order, succession and sequence of economic stages has gone much the same way as the Morganian conception of the sequence of social institutions and relationships which was long ago shattered by the critical anthropologists.<sup>59</sup>

A better term than economic stages would be types of economic life. Yet even as types it must be remembered that they are likely to exhibit different special characteristics as modified by their diverse cultural and social settings. But after all of these qualifications are noted as against a naive acceptance of dogmatic divisions of economic development into sharply separated stages uniformly applicable to all peoples under all circumstances, it must be admitted by all fair-minded students that the differentiation of economic growth into fairly well de-

<sup>59</sup> See C. Wissler, *Man and Culture*; A. A. Goldenweiser, "Anthropological Theories of Political Origins," in C. E. Merriam and H. E. Barnes, *A History of Political Theories: Recent Times*, Chap. II,

finer epochs or types, however much they may differ in detail, is a helpful expedient in clarifying our economic perspective and analysis. It aids greatly in the organization and interpretation of the vast body of concrete details and data accumulated in the process of studying the chronological record of the economic activities of man. More sensible than an outright rejection of the whole notion of stages of economic development is a discriminating utilization of this valuable instrument for clarifying and visualizing the process of economic evolution, always mindful of the tentative and flexible nature of any valid scheme of stages, and the many exceptions to it which are bound to occur in the diversity of human folkways and institutions.<sup>40</sup>

## 2. *Laws of Economic Development.*

Much the same criticism may be directed against the dogma of fixed and invariable "economic laws" applying with uniform pertinence and relevance to all peoples in all stages of culture. Laws can be formulated only on the basis of many observed repetitions of phenomena under identical circumstances. Obviously, human history furnishes no such data with respect to the genesis of culture as a whole or economic aspects of culture in particular. There are few or no cultural complexes or patterns of economic behavior and achievement which repeat themselves or reproduce themselves with completeness or fidelity, and even approximations to repetition may be due to the operation of new and strange factors. As the cultural anthropologists and historians have proved through their famous principle or process of "cultural convergence," identities in form do not necessarily prove identity of origin or development. Cultural similarities may be quite as much the product of accidental or fortuitous convergence as of identical development through conformity to immu-

<sup>40</sup> For much discussion of the various aspects of the stage problem see Müller-Lyer, *op. cit.*, Book III, and W. Sombart in Braun's *Archiv für Gesetzgebung und Statistik*, Bd. XIV, pp. 368-405.

table laws of evolution.<sup>41</sup> Perhaps no one has summarized this view more concisely than Müller-Lyer, even though he does not himself accept it in full.<sup>42</sup>

Since culture is constantly developing fresh phases, since nothing repeats itself—excepting for the case, which we need not here consider, of the progress of backward peoples—and since no link in the great chain of causality is like the previous one, except possibly in external appearance and that delusively, the inference of analogy fails, we cannot say that this condition of culture has already existed once, and that therefore we may expect the same results again. In the process of the development of culture circumstances are constantly changing, thus history teaches us nothing concerning the economic laws of development.

Another obstacle in the way of formulating the laws of economic development lies in the fact that the economic evolution of mankind is not yet a completed process. It is now going on more rapidly than ever before. Hence, even if we could discover enough identities and repetitions in the economic life of the past, we would scarcely be warranted in enunciating rigid universal laws, for we could not be sure that the developments of the future would not completely upset and refute all generalizations based upon the past. The rejection of the conception of rigid and invariable laws of economic development does not, of course, mean that one need accept the hypothesis of chaos and absolute arbitrariness in the past which forms the assumption, tacit or explicit, of the conventional anecdotal and episodic political historians. We may well recognize very definite tendencies in the economic development of certain times and in certain places in the past, a consciousness of which may serve as a very great aid to our understanding of the nature and significance of history, but we should not confuse a local or temporary trend with a universal and cosmic law.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>41</sup> A. A. Goldenweiser, "The Principle of Limited Possibilities in the Development of Culture," *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, July-September, 1913.

<sup>42</sup> Müller-Lyer, *op. cit.*, p. 254.

<sup>43</sup> For a discriminating discussion of the whole problem of historical laws see the stimulating paper by E. P. Cheyney in the *American Historical Re-*

### 3. *A Sketch of the Economic Development of Western Society.*

This possibility of clarifying and illuminating economic history through having it organized about leading tendencies and problems in various periods and areas can be illustrated by a brief and incomplete review of the problems and the approach to their solution which have been suggested by the more important exponents of dynamic and synthetic economic history in the last generation. In the economic development of primitive man one is struck mainly by the slowness of the changes in technology and institutions, and the enormous conservatism and social inertia which prevails. Further, as Professor Giddings and others have insisted, economic life is not that purely secular affair which it has become in our day, but is shot through with an all pervading supernaturalism, emerging in the form of magic, conceptions of luck, and all manner of taboos governing economic behavior. If primitive man is dominated by the supernatural to a far greater degree than we are today, he is also far more at the mercy of nature, for there is no reason to doubt the truth of Buckle's famous generalization that geographic influences become less direct and tyrannical in their sway over man as culture advances. Primitive economic life admirably illustrates the process of slow advancement and accumulation in both technology and institutional life, but also indicates how accumulation tends to become cumulative in its effects and every addition to the technical equipment accelerates the range and degree of economic progress. If it required an enormous space of time for primitive man to attain civilization, at least it must be remembered that prior to the dawn of written history he had worked out in the invention of fire, in the domestication of animals, the origins of agriculture,

*view*, January, 1924. For Muller-Lyer's formulation of the laws of economic development see *op. cit.*, pp. 254-7.

the creation of fixed habitats, and the manufacture of tools and clothing most of those phases of advance in material culture which were to constitute the technological equipment of man until the Industrial Revolution six thousand years later.<sup>44</sup>

In spite of no very great changes in material culture, with the exception of the mastery of the art of metal working and the navigation of inland waters, there were some interesting developments in the economic history of oriental antiquity. The crude superstitions of primitive days were mitigated and rationalized, even though economic life was still closely related to the religious, as the control of the priesthood over Babylonian industry, and the continuation of obstructive and wasteful taboos and holy days amply testify. In an environmental sense the early civilizations established themselves in marshes, fens, hill and plain combinations, and protected valleys, ultimately expanding and stationing themselves in fluvial areas. From the standpoint of technological advancement the most important achievements lay in the way of mastering the art of metal working, the Sumerian provision of the principle of the wheel and the wheeled vehicle, the Kassite introduction of the domesticated horse, the mastery of the art of navigating the seas and of boat-building by the Egyptians and Cretans, and the marked improvement of the processes and technique of trade and commercial transactions by the Babylonians. The Orient also created two great indirect methods of extending human power in the institution of human slavery, earliest systematically achieved by the Egyptians, and the development of commerce on a wide scale primarily by the Babylonians and Arameans. These innovations, of course, forwarded specialization of eco-

<sup>44</sup> Giddings, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, Chap. III; Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, Chaps. VI-VIII; *Cambridge Ancient History*, Vol. I, Chaps. 1-11; M and C H B Quennell, *The Old Stone Age*; and *The New Stone, Bronze and Early Iron Ages*, E Hahn, *Die Entstehung der Pflug-Kultur*; M Hoernes, *Urgeschichte der bildenen Kunst in Europa*; *Kultur der Urzeit*; A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology*, Chap. VI.

conomic effort, itself one of the great achievements in the economic and social history of mankind. For the first time a notable economic surplus was accumulated making possible leisure and culture. Above all, the fertility, ingenuity and man power of the Orient laid the basis for that rich and productive economic life which was to support and stimulate civilization in the western Mediterranean world until the discovery of America.<sup>45</sup>

In the period of the growing ascendancy of Phoenicia, Greece, Carthage and Rome, civilization tended to establish itself in a thalassic rather than a fluvial environment. Supernaturalism still remained powerful, even to the point of furnishing the cause for the classical labor organizations, but it gradually adapted itself more and more to the exigencies of orderly and productive economic activity. In the case of Greece the most instructive thing is the backward and undeveloped nature of Greek economic life, even the much heralded Athenian commerce, as compared with her magnificent achievements in art, literature, and philosophy. Only in Alexandria, industrially and commercially more oriental than Hellenic, did economic life attain a development rivalling or exceeding that of the ancient oriental monarchies. Among the trends and problems in Roman economic development the more significant were the results of the intrusion of a slave system into yeoman farming; the example of a great organizing parasite, conscripting, organizing and coordinating the economic life of the western world and exploiting it in her interests; the disastrous effects of slave labor on the psychology of invention, agriculture and progress in manufacturing indus-

<sup>45</sup>L. Metchnikoff, *Les grandes fleuves historiques*, M. I. Newbigin, *Mediterranean Lands*, Chaps. i-iv; J. H. Breasted, "The Origins of Civilization," *Scientific Monthly*, 1919-20, "The New Past," *University of Chicago Record*, October, 1920; M. Jastrow, *The Civilization of Babylonia and Assyria*, Chap. vi; J. Baikie, *The Sea Kings of Crete*; F. Cumont, *Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism*, Chap. i; W. Cunningham, *Western Civilization in Its Economic Aspects*, Vol. I, A. Moret, *The Nile and Egyptian Civilization*, L. Delaporte, *Chaldeo-Assyrian Civilization*, G. Glotz, *The Aegean Civilization*.

try; the impossibility of stereotyping a changing economic order; and the regressive nature of the change from a municipal basis of life to an era of great estates forming the forerunners of the medieval manorial system. Here in Rome we find also a discrepancy as startling as that noted in Greece. The economic life of Rome was strangely backward and undeveloped, as compared with her political and juristic achievements, Rome being inferior economically in all senses to the politically dependent East, inferior to Carthage commercially, and not even a worthy competitor of Gaul in either agriculture or some branches of manufacturing. Neither the Greeks nor Romans were able to grasp the dynamic concepts of capitalism, and their economic horizon was circumscribed by the limitations imposed by the napkin economy and the agrarian psychosis.<sup>48</sup>

The medieval period is most significant in economic history as a great laboratory for the study of economic evolution from a primitive stage, as exhibited by the northern Germans of the "Invasion" period, to the Fuggers who represented a level never reached in the oriental and classical world. There have been fewer contrasts more thorough-going than that between the conceptions of the medieval economy a half century ago and those which prevail now. A generation ago the Middle Ages were generally looked upon as a period characterized above all by uniformity both as to the state of material culture from 500 to 1,500 and as to the universal prevalence of the two great industrial institutions of the period—the manor and the guild-controlled industry. Nothing could be further removed from the facts. There was a remarkable development of

<sup>48</sup> M. Newbigin, *The Mediterranean Lands*, Chaps v-vii; J. Harrison, *Ancient Art and Ritual*, *Themes*; G. Glotz, *Life and Labor in Greece*; A. E. Zimmern, *The Greek Commonwealth*, J. B. Bury et al., *The Hellenistic Age*, pp 108 ff, T. Frank, *An Economic History of Rome*; M. I. Rostovtzeff, *Economic History of Rome*; S. Dill, *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*, W. L. Westermann, "The Economic Basis of the Decline of Ancient Culture," in *American Historical Review*, July, 1915, P. Louis, *Life and Labor in Rome*,



economic life in the thousand years separating Clovis from Calvin, and the greatest diversity characterized the economic life of the various states and peoples of western Europe at any time during this period. Neither the manor nor the guilds were universal, and their characteristics varied widely among the diverse peoples at any given time, and among the same people at different times.<sup>47</sup>

Geographically, while the highest civilization of the medieval period was yet thalassic, still clinging to the Mediterranean sites of Constantinople and the Italian cities, the trend was more and more to the north and west. In due time the seaboard towns mastered the ocean, the four millenniums of the Mediterranean domination were ended and the oceanic basis of civilization was finally established. In the psychological realm the medieval system produced a great revival of supernaturalism. Christianity substituted spiritual objectives for material, and subjected economic activity to religious and ethical controls which made for a degree of social responsibility in the accumulation and use of wealth rarely equaled before and never since in the western world. It is probable, however, that as far as they were practically effective this was due to the fact that the rudimentary economic life of the period and the existence of a purely need-fulfilling economy presented little incentive for a breach of the religious and ethical control over economic activities. When the new capitalism arose the limitations dictated by supernaturalism were quickly transcended even in Catholic countries. The predominance of agrarian life explains the somewhat static and slowly developing economy of the medieval period, but with the rise of trade and the towns a dynamic factor entered which in due time brought about the new age. The communal and coöperative nature of life on the manors, and the elements of

<sup>47</sup> J. T. Shotwell, "The Middle Ages," in *Encyclopædia Britannica*; J. W. Thompson, in *American Historical Review*, April, 1913, pp. 490-504, R. Kotschke, *Allgemeine Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Mittelalters*.

craftsmanship, fraternal association, and vocational pride in the gild organization are among the more interesting and instructive aspects of medieval economic life, the latter having recently aroused so much attention and approval as to have suggested a leading program of social and economic reconstruction. Commerce and town life are most important as affording the basis for the study of economic dynamics in the medieval period. While trade was kept alive even in the Dark Ages by contacts between Spain and Italy in the West and the Byzantine Empire, the really significant revival began with the Crusades, and the Italian cities led in a movement that was to prove the basis of both their temporary prosperity and their ultimate dethronement. The towns on the Atlantic at last grew impatient and envious over the Italian monopoly of the direct trade with the East, began to explore the western coast of Africa, and in a short time reached India and America, by oversea routes. The Italian hegemony was undermined, and the seaboard towns of the North, which had been created by the commerce that Italy had established, now assumed the leadership in the oversea expansion and the Commercial Revolution which were to produce modern capitalism and the train of consequences which created modern civilization.<sup>48</sup>

The Commercial Revolution put an end to the thalassic basis of world history and economic contacts as effectively as the rise of Crete, Phœnicia, Alexandria and Rome had ended the old fluvial foundations of antique oriental cultures. The new era launched out boldly on an oceanic basis and created an economic and commercial life on a truly world wide scope. Supernaturalism was adapted to

<sup>48</sup> M. I. Newbigin, *Mediterranean Lands*, Chaps. viii-xi, Cunningham, *Western Civilization*, Vol. II, Book IV, Thompson, *loc. cit.*, P. Boissonade, *Life and Labour in the Middle Ages*, E. Lipson, *Economic History of England*, Vol. I, W. S. Davis, *Life on a Medieval Barony*, P. Vinogradoff, *The Growth of the Manor*, G. Renard, *Gilda in the Middle Ages*; A. P. Evans, "The Problem of Control in Medieval Industry," in *Political Science Quarterly*, December, 1921, G. B. Adams, *Civilization During the Middle Ages*, Chap. xii, W. C. Abbott, *The Expansion of Europe*, Vol. I.

the new trends. Max Weber has held that the Protestant sanctions of capitalism and the new profit-getting economy were a prime cause of the economic and commercial changes of this period, while Becker, Tawney and others incline to think that they were a rationalization of, and an adaptation to, already effected economic changes. Be that as it may, Protestantism, particularly Puritan Protestantism, offered enthusiastic theological and psychological support to the new profit orientation and motivation of economic life, and gave assurance that God was on the side of the astute and industrious entrepreneur. The key to the transformation of Europe in an economic sense is to be found almost wholly in the processes and results of oversea expansion. The new commodities brought back stimulated new tastes and aroused new demands. The natives and colonists overseas still further augmented these new demands and enormously stimulated European industry. The strain put upon manufacturing by the new and increased demands for commodities suggested improved technology and better modes of organizing and regimenting the labor supply. In England the domestic or putting-out system was tried for several centuries with indifferent results. The need for more effective methods brought into being the machine technique and the factory system, and the Industrial Revolution created the novel and complicated contemporary civilization. Along with the notable changes in the scope, volume and variety of manufacturing and trade went a corresponding development of modes of industrial and commercial organization, the essential technique and instruments of exchange and credit, such as banks, stock-exchanges, joint-stock companies, and insurance organizations, and the appearance of such theories of economic life as were embodied in Mercantilism and Physiocracy. The earth no longer belonged almost exclusively to the landlord, but came to be inher-

ited to an ever greater degree by the *bourgeois* manufacturer, merchant and banker.<sup>40</sup>

Contemporary society which has been created by the scientific and technological revolutions since 1750 carried to a much higher degree of development the establishment of economic life on an international and world basis. The improvements in ocean navigation and the mechanism of international exchange have made it possible for contemporary society to master and exploit the seas and remote continents to a degree never dreamed of even by the directors of the East India Company in 1750. The fluvial and thalassic settings of culture now have but an antiquarian interest in the face of the realities of the oceanic age. The psychological transition from supernaturalism to secularism in relation to economic life was almost complete. While many of the new industrial lords maintained as a defense mechanism or a compensatory device the old hypothesis of divine interest in, and approval of, private property, unlimited profits and unbridled competition, the prevailing outlook was one of a mechanistic secularism. "Devout observances" have taken on more and more of an exhibitionist and compensatory character. The defense of the new capitalism elaborated by the classical economists and economic liberals was based upon premises alleged to have been drawn from cosmic mechanics rather than the dictates of piety. Spenserianism, which slightly later became another dominant psychic strain in contemporary capitalism, was frankly

\* J Jacobs, *The Story of Geographic Discovery*; H J Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, R H Tawney, "Sixteenth Century Religious Thought," in *Journal of Political Economy*, 1923-4, P Smith, *The Age of the Reformation*, pp 515-62, 724-8, W R Shepherd, "The Expansion of Europe," in *Political Science Quarterly*, 1919, G. Benard, *Life and Labor in Europe from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century*; J E. Gillespie, *The Influence of Oversea Expansion on England to 1700*, J B Botsford, *English Society in the Eighteenth Century*, A. F Pollard, *Factors in Modern History*; R H Gretton, *The English Middle Class*, C Day, *History of Commerce*, Part III.

based on mechanistic evolutionary principles. Social legislation and restriction of unlimited competition were denounced by capitalists as a violation of natural law and the natural order rather than of the express will and command of God, though the old tendency to merge the two was still present to some degree. Even the lower classes began to break away from pietism. Marxianism, anarchism and syndicalism were pretty definitely agnostic and mechanistic in their attitude towards supernaturalism. Finally, all vestiges of the medieval conception of craftsmanship and social service in industry were hopelessly engulfed in the all-pervading search for pecuniary profit.<sup>50</sup>

The Industrial Revolution itself, incomparably the most sweeping transformation ever effected in human and social life, may be envisaged under three main phases: the scientific and technological transition, the rise of the factory system, and the results of this combination upon society at large. The technological revolution placed at the disposal of man the applied resources of natural science, put an end to the tool and handicraft economy which had served man for a quarter of a million years, and brought into existence "the empire of machines." The machine technique necessarily brought in its train the factory system, as the heavy and expensive machinery could not be set up or propelled in the homes of the workers. The factory system produced an altogether novel and effective method of applying and regimenting man-power, but it also created new and less happy psychological attitudes on the part of the laborer. The mechanical technique and the factory, in conjunction, transformed in a revolutionary fashion the whole face of western civilization. The scope, volume and

\* J. A. Hobson, *The Evolution of Modern Capitalism; and Imperialism*; I. Bowman, *The New World*, J. Bonar, *Philosophy and Political Economy*, pp. 355-74; H. Spencer, *Man versus the State*, H. Withers, *The Case for Capitalism*; B. H. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*; T. Veblen, *Absentee Ownership in America*, Part I; J. R. Commons, *The Legal Foundations of Capitalism*, U. Sinclair, *The Profits of Religion*, J. T. Shotwell, *The Religious Revolution of Today*

variety of manufacturing productivity were enormously increased. In countries affected by the Industrial Revolution the methods and spirit of capitalism won a complete triumph. The business classes won an ascendancy in society which was not seriously disputed. Capital was sharply separated from labor, and, with the growth of absentee ownership in industry like that in agriculture in earlier days, was likewise separated in large part from active contact with the management and direction of industry. In the psychology of the business man the theory of business enterprise, with its sole emphasis upon profits to the utter neglect of more than the commercially essential minimum of service and craftsmanship, obtained undisputed sway.<sup>51</sup>

The factory system brought about urban life on a large scale, thus presenting a new social situation requiring extensive readjustment on the part of the human animal to a new and unique habitat. The differential and varied development of economic life in the western world upset the economic and social equilibrium to an unparalleled degree and invited movement from backward agrarian areas to the more highly industrialized countries. Population thus became far more mobile than ever before, moving from country to city and from country to country. All of the new situations, taken together, enormously increased the stresses and strains on the human organism, and the conditions of factory labor destroyed most of those incentives in industrial effort which had slowly built up the "instinct of workmanship" and furnished those impulses to the expenditure of human energy that had led man out of savagery into civilization. Virtual sabotage has come to characterize both employer and employee, the former under the domination of the theory of business enterprise

<sup>51</sup> P. Mantoux, *La Révolution industrielle au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle*; J. H. Clapham, *The Economic Development of France and Germany*, H. V. Faulkner, *American Economic History*, Veblen, *Theory of Business Enterprise*

and the latter under the practice of limitation of output. The bankruptcy of the present type of capitalistic system based upon the conception of getting something for nothing is proclaimed by the candid capitalistic and progressive student alike, but differential biology and psychology are on hand to assure us that even less may be hoped for from a system organized and controlled by the proletariat. While we need not assume with Spengler that Western Civilization has run its course, we may be certain that it is near the end of the old road with no well-formulated or generally agreed upon plan for the future.<sup>52</sup>

No one could recognize more clearly than the writer the incomplete and fragmentary nature of the above review of economic evolution, but if it has been adequate to indicate the impossibility of reducing the economic history of society to a simple formula comprehended under three or four summary and arbitrary captions the purpose of the summary will have been attained. At the same time it is to be hoped that it will be plain that there are distinct and characteristic differences between types of economic life which have prevailed in the great successive areas and ages of dominant civilizations.

#### IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC HISTORY.

While history as a branch of literature and politics has a long past, economic history in any of its aspects or types

<sup>52</sup> P. A. Parsons, *An Introduction to Modern Social Problems*; L. O. Marshall, *The Story of Human Progress*, Parts II-V, E. E. Slosson and O. W. Caldwell, *Science Remaking the World*, J. L. and B. Hammond, *The Town Labourer*, J. M. Clark, "The Empire of Machines," *Yale Review*, October, 1922, C. D. Wright, *The Industrial Evolution of the United States*, T. Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, *The Theory of Business Enterprise*, *The Engineers and the Price System*, and *Absentee Ownership in the United States*, A. F. Weber, *The Growth of Cities*, H. P. Fairchild, *Immigration*, Jenks and Lauck, *The Immigration Problem*; O. Tead, *Instincts in Industry*; W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change*, Part V, J. A. Hobson, *Work and Wealth*, *Problems of a New World*; and *Incentives in the New Industrial Order*; *Waste in Industry* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1922), S. and B. Webb, *The Decay of Capitalist Civilization*; R. H. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, L. Stoddard, *The Revolt Against Civilization*; H. H. Goddard, *Human Efficiency and Levels of Intelligence*

is of relatively recent origin. While writers from Aristotle onward have recognized the importance of economic factors in society, historians remained true to the canons established by Thucydides, Livy, Tacitus and Plutarch, and treated of alliances, wars, dynasties, and political intrigues, giving special emphasis to the personalities involved. Not until the great economic changes accompanying the Commercial Revolution forced upon social philosophers the necessity of defending the growing interests of the middle class was any serious attention given to the importance of economic development. In other words, it was the exigencies of party struggles which led writers to appeal to history to defend their cause. Men of the type of Locke, Harrington, Bolingbroke and others gave some little place to the history of property and the relation of economic to political factors in the past. Then came Montesquieu with his vigorous emphasis on geographic factors and commerce. One of his journalistic followers, G. T. Raynal, essayed to write of the effect of the colonial era on the history of Europe; and Heeren, under the inspiration of the tradition of Montesquieu, produced the first true economic history in his notable account of the effect of commerce on the development of the nations of the ancient Orient. A powerful impulse to the study of economic history also came from the spectacular rise of Holland to a position of commercial preeminence in modern times. French and English writers devoted themselves to a consideration of this striking historical fact, and thus aroused a real interest in commercial history, particularly through reasoning by analogies with classical commercial and imperial developments. The founders of systematic sociology, Saint-Simon and Comte, fully sensed the importance of economic factors in social evolution. The Ricardian, Utopian and Transitional Socialists all emphasized, or perhaps, exaggerated the importance of economic factors in historic and contemporary society, and one of the last group, Louis Blanc, in his



*History of Ten Years*, presented a thorough-going economic interpretation of the Orleanist monarchy.<sup>58</sup>

From the middle of the century onward there have been three notable tendencies in the development of economic history: (1) the cultivation of narrative and monographic economic history, devoting little attention to other than purely economic phenomena; (2) attempts to prove and illustrate the Marxian hypothesis of the economic interpretation of history; and (3) a study, consciously or unconsciously on a sociological basis, of the interrelation of economic and other factors in the history of mankind, with no definite presumption in advance as to economic determinism. Of the three types the first has been that which has received far the most attention and enlisted the service of the majority of writers, who were too God-fearing to flirt with Marxian determinism. The narrative economic history is that which is chiefly devoted to a chronological sketch of the succession of concrete economic events, without engaging in any special investigation of the effect of such events upon the non-economic institutions in society. Representative works of this sort are the well-known economic histories of T. Rogers, H. D. B. Gibbins, W. J. Ashley, W. Cunningham, E. Lipson, K. T. von Inama-Sternegg, J. Mavor, A. S. Bolles, D. R. Dewey, E. L. Bogart, I. Lippincott, T. Frank, T. Van Metre, and the universal economic history edited by G. Renard. The monographic works which specialize upon the history of some special economic institution or process in a particular country at a particular time are too numerous to permit of any enumeration, however superficial. This type of work may be illustrated, however, by the mass of monographs turned out by the students of Schmoller and Vinogradoff, and by such monographs of the Harvard Graduate School pro-

<sup>58</sup> Dunning, *Political Theories from Luther to Montesquieu*; E. Fueter, *L'Histoire de l'historiographie moderne*, 450, 475-82, R. Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History in France*, Chaps vii, x, E. Lowenthal, *The Evidential Socialists*, C. A. Beard, *The Economic Basis of Politics*.

duced under the leadership of Professor E. F. Gay as N. S. B. Gras' work on the English grain market and early English customs systems, A. P. Usher's work on the French grain trade, J. Klein's study of the Spanish Mesta, and J. S. Davis' voluminous work on the history of early American corporations.<sup>54</sup>

While one group of scholarly writers was amassing a vast amount of material on the record of economic events and was ignoring the effect of these on social institutions at large, another more enthusiastic, if in some cases less cautious and scholarly school, was endeavoring to show by an appeal to history how economic factors had determined the nature of the non-economic elements in society and culture throughout the human past. This class of writers received their inspiration from Karl Marx, who was the great apostle, if not the originator, of the doctrine of economic determinism and the economic interpretation of history. This sort of work is well illustrated by M. Beer's work on the conflict of classes in history, the materialistic interpretation of class conflict in classical times by C. Osborne Ward, Kautsky's economic interpretation of the rise of Christianity and of the Reformation, Bax's account of German society at the close of the medieval period, the work of Jaurès and his school on the history of France, particularly of the French Revolution, and the interpretation of American history from the standpoint of economic determinism in the brilliant and suggestive, if somewhat exaggerated, works of Gustavus Myers, A. M. Simons, J. O Neal, A. Lewis and Scott Nearing.

<sup>54</sup> The writers mentioned above certainly differ in the degree to which they consider the reaction of economic forces on social institutions and processes. Ashley, Inama-Sternegg, Cunningham and some of the authors in the Renard series give no little attention to the effect of economic factors upon other elements in the development of human society. A thorough account of the development of economic historiography is much needed. Some guidance can be obtained from the index to G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century*. W. J. Ashley's *Surveys Historic and Economic*, contains reviews and estimates of many important books on economic history written prior to 1900.

While these writers following in the wake of Marx have undoubtedly overworked an excellent historical technique and exaggerated a very potent set of influences, they have been subjected to an unfair degree of criticism and their works have been held in altogether too low esteem. We are amply, continuously and promiscuously warned against being seduced by works written from the Marxian approach, but we are never equally well protected from the infinitely more superficial and misleading historical works which pass current as the infallible products of conventional historians. One might well refuse to accept without many qualifications Gustavus Myer's history of the rise of modern American capitalism and its effect on the American judiciary, but no informed and fair-minded person could well maintain that the picture he draws is more misleading than that embodied in the last two volumes published by James Ford Rhodes, which are reverently commended to the youth and the aged of the land alike as the mature judgment of a reliable historian. It may be successfully contended that even a somewhat sloppy and slightly inaccurate exposition of vital factors in human development is to be preferred to a meticulous accuracy in the assembling and elucidation of largely irrelevant facts, though this may make us deplore the more the haste and carelessness of many socialistic historians. And we should also speedily reject the commonly accepted notion that because a man is a socialist, that very fact will of itself make his historical writing valueless and inherently unreliable, irrespective of the possession of the highest scholarly training and talents.<sup>55</sup>

The third approach to economic history, that of an objective study of the effect of economic factors on other

<sup>55</sup> See, for example, the recent inference by Professor Hazen in the *Brooklyn Eagle* that because René Marchand is a socialist and connected with *Humanité* his edition of the Russian diplomatic documents is worthless. There is a fairly complete review of the history of socialistic historiography before 1902 in E. R. A. Seligman, *The Economic Interpretation of History*. For more recent material see A. M. Schlesinger, *New Viewpoints in American History*, Chap. in.

social institutions and processes, without upholding necessarily the absolute doctrine of economic determinism, has been pursued by various groups of students. The movement was launched by the founders of sociology, Saint-Simon and Comte, and, if adequately and competently carried out, needs to be based upon a mastery of the sociological technique. The work in this field has suffered enormously because of the fact that there have been few historical sociologists since Comte, and that those who have actually cultivated this field of endeavor have not usually been properly trained in the sociological concepts and methods, without which it is difficult to estimate and evaluate the interrelation and reciprocal action of the various factors and elements in human society.<sup>56</sup> Perhaps the greatest volume of work in this field has been turned out by the genetic and historical economists, such as Schmoller, Bucher, Weber, Kovalevsky, Levasseur, Gras, Commons, Usher and Loos. Even more profound and dynamic has been the work of the institutional economists, though the dividing line between them and the genetic economists is not sharp or distinct. In this group the leadership would, as far as the historical approach is concerned, be universally assigned to Werner Sombart and Mr. and Mrs. Webb, but excellent work has been done by the Hammonds and Tawney, and by Veblen and some of his disciples in the United States. The achievements of the genetic economists and the institutional school have stimulated certain progressive historians to make an effort to reinterpret history in the light of the influence of economic factors. In this field we should certainly list the efforts of Lamprecht, Vinogradoff, A. F. Pollard, G. Slater, J. T. Adams, C. M. Andrews, C. A. Beard, W. E. Dodd, W. E. Lingelbach, F. J. Turner and certain of his disciples, J. T. Shotwell, C. J. H. Hayes, A. M. Schlesinger, M. Farrand, C. R. Lingley, U. B. Phillips and others.

<sup>56</sup> See my "Development of Historical Sociology," *loc. cit.*

## V. ECONOMICS AND HISTORY,

While there are conspicuous examples of a marked change in this matter in recent years, it is regrettably true that economics and history have been of surprisingly little mutual service to each other in the past. The respectable historian has scorned economic material as irrelevant to his task of detailing the interplay of personalities and policies in "past politics." Being interested primarily in the activities of gentlemen in political intrigues, diplomatic jockeying and subterfuge, and the collective murder afforded by wars, the conventional historian has disdained the study of the development of the commonplace and mundane affairs of everyday life, and above all the activities and achievement of the common people. Even if he should have wandered off the broad highway of political history and dared to explore the by-paths of economic activities, the historian in the past has rarely been adequately equipped to carry on such activities because of his abysmal ignorance of systematic and institutional economic science. His efforts in organizing and interpreting economic material have usually been well intentioned but extremely amateurish. On the other hand, it is obvious that the economist has been unable to derive much of value from the past researches of the historians because of the paucity of materials bearing on economic matters in their writings. He has, perhaps, profited indirectly by appropriating to some degree the excellent methodology of accurate research and the use of source material which the historians have evolved since the time of Mabillon, Niebuhr and Von Ranke. In so far as he has done so, this has enabled him to use with greater discrimination and accuracy the sources of economic history. Signs that this lack of contact between historian and economist is passing are afforded by the significant contribution of material rich in value to the economists by such historians as Breasted, Meyer, Zimmern,

Frank, Maitland, Vinogradoff, Lamprecht, Beard, Turner, Shotwell and others; and in the admirable mastery of the historical technique by Sombart, the Webbs and their disciples. It is to be hoped that these are harbingers of the new era.

The failure of historians in the past to give due consideration to economic factors in history has probably been the result of two widely opposed and equally distorted tendencies and theories. The historians have tended to dwell in the world of transcendentals and absolutes, of vague ideals and spiritual entities which are supposed to pervade society and mysteriously to produce definite trends in culture. They have shown a truly unreasonable unwillingness to get down to the concrete realities of the everyday life of man and study intensively the specific factors and processes of social dynamics. On the other hand, the most enthusiastic and prolific of the contributors to economic history have been those who frankly expound, or accept with minor qualifications, the doctrine of the economic determination of history. The exaggerations in this respect by many economists and economic historians have served to stimulate, and to some extent to justify, the reluctance of the historian to change his position and alter his rigid mechanism of aversion and avoidance in regard to economic data. It has been a sort of revival, in a different field, of the exaggerations and antagonisms of the realists and nominalists. It does not require any great degree of intellectual sobriety or theoretical subtlety to indicate that the solution of the *impasse* must come in the elimination of undue *a priori* dogmatism and the acceptance of a really open-minded and empirical attitude in the circumstances. There have undoubtedly been periods and areas in the past where the economic factors were not of determining significance, and others where they were distinctly of a determining nature and potency. The historian and economist must be prepared to discover and accept the facts

as they are. Both must cease to feel that there is necessarily anything strange, unique or wrong with the case in point when one or the other of these situations prevails. Incidentally, it may be pointed out that the more advanced methodology of anthropology and cultural history has notably modified the earlier critique of the economic determination of history. Formerly it was held that it was a sufficient disproof of that theory to show that the same economic factors did not produce identical cultural complexes. We now recognize that a cultural complex is the product of a large number of interrelated and interacting forces, and that marked differences in the non-economic forces in cultures would naturally result in a variable and diverse operation of the economic factors, even though the latter were of a determining potency in every case considered. A blow of sufficient force might cause any body to fall, but the speed and direction of the fall would be affected by a multitude of special circumstances.

Whatever the methodological aspects of the problem, however, it is probable that one cannot overemphasize the importance of an acquaintance with the principles of economic science and the materials of economic evolution for the historian. If economic factors in society are not always of a determining character, they are invariably powerful conditioning influences, which can never be safely ignored by the historian. Not even the history of art or literature can be intelligently studied without a proper knowledge of the economic conditions which affect the life and tastes of the people, as historians and critics of art from Ruskin's time to our own have repeatedly insisted. Even a psychological interpretation of an age will be hopelessly superficial without a thorough understanding of the economic orientation and motivation of the period and society, as Tawney and Veblen have amply demonstrated. Of special and indispensable importance is a proper attention to economic factors on the part of all interested in modern

history. It would require the most obsessed disciple of Plato, Kant, Hegel, Eucken, Royce and Company to fail to recognize that, for better or worse, economic factors have certainly exercised a determining influence upon Western society since 1500, and increasingly so since 1750. It is safe to say that we may practically discount the vitality and value of any history of modern times which does not recognize the fact of the overwhelming importance of the expansion of Europe, the Commercial Revolution and the Industrial Revolution in the shaping of the modern order. And there is no sub-division of modern history in which the fact of economic determinism is more apparent than in the history of the United States since 1870.

It is, perhaps, futile to attempt to solve the question of whether economic history is most properly a branch of history or of economics. For the time being we may well be happy to welcome good work done in this field by either economists or historians. It is certain, however, that most attention has been given to it thus far by professional economists, and that it has at least temporarily been lost to history largely by default because of the lofty disdain of historians for the economic factors in social development. If historians desire to win it back, it is obvious that they can do so only by a vigorous assertion of their interest and competence in the field. It is the opinion of the writer that ultimately, perhaps, it will be logical for history as a special and distinct subject to disappear, having justified its long existence and having left an indelible impress upon human culture through having developed a perspective and method which will by that period have conquered all departments of the study of human life and culture. With the growing complexity of social phenomena it means that the longer history continues to maintain itself independent from specialists in literature, art, technology, science and the social sciences, to that degree it must remain more naive and superficial in its efforts. It may, perhaps,



at the proper time abdicate, with the comforting assurance that the genetic method of approach will dominate or receive proper cultivation in all types of approach to human and social problems, and that the historians of the future will find the most efficient and congenial field for their activities in the historical sections of departments of literature, art, science, technology and the social sciences.

When applied to the special problem of this article, this would mean that economic history will naturally become an important phase of economics, and that no subdivision of the study of economics will fail to give proper consideration to the genetic point of view in its specialized field of study of economic phenomena. It would further mean that the final evaluation of the importance of economic factors in their effect upon the totality of the cultural complexes of the past must be handed over to properly equipped historical sociologists. Indeed, even institutional economics may in time be regarded as most logically a department of sociology, and a generation hence its present practitioners may be looked upon as a group of amateurish sociologists who recognized that they were out of place in strictly economic science, but did not recognize just where they belonged. Or it may be that ultimately sociology itself will appear to be primarily a method, and will surrender its place to the special social sciences, having contributed to all of them the synthetic viewpoint, as history has the genetic.

#### SELECTED REFERENCES

- W. J. Ashley, *Surveys: Historic and Economic*  
 C. A. Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States*  
 C. A. Beard, *The Economic Basis of Politics*  
 C. Gide and C. Rist, *History of Economic Doctrines*  
 N. S. B. Gras, *An Introduction to Economic History*  
 L. H. Haney, *A History of Economic Thought*  
 M. M. Knight, H. E. Barnes and F. Fluegel, *An Economic and Social History of Europe*

- A. Loria, *The Economic Foundations of Society*.  
F. Muller-Lyer, *The History of Social Development*.  
F. Oppenheimer, *The State*  
A. C. Pigou, *The Economics of Welfare*.  
A. M. Schlesinger, *New Viewpoints in American History*  
G. Schmoller, *Über einige Grundfragen der Sozialpolitik und der Volkswirtschaftslehre*  
E. R. A. Seligman, *The Economic Interpretation of History*.  
A. W. Small, *Origins of Sociology*  
R. G. Tugwell (Ed.), *The Trend of Economics*  
T. Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*  
T. Veblen, *The Place of Science in Modern Civilization*.

## CHAPTER VIII

### POLITICAL SCIENCE AND HISTORY

#### I. THE NATURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.

**P**OLITICAL science in a broad sense may be looked upon as the study of the agencies, methods and results of the public or official and legalized control over individuals and groups of individuals in organized society. There are, quite obviously, many other potent forms and instruments of social control, in addition to the state, which coerce, guide and direct human activities, such as public opinion, custom, tradition, habit, and the rules of business and of many other types of human groups. Some of these are more elemental and basic than the state, have existed from an antiquity far greater than that which can be claimed by the state, and have no little part in securing for the state that obedience from its citizens without which it could not exist or function for a day. Further, most of the causes for and justification of the existence of the state are not political in nature or origin. The state exists primarily to allow the orderly functioning of economic and social life, and properly to regulate the processes, conflicts and struggles of diverse and contending social and economic groups. Hence, it is readily apparent that no student can obtain the proper perspective with which to approach intelligently the problems of political processes and institutions without that substantial grounding in sociology, anthropology and psychology which will make it possible for him to view the state in the setting of its relation to the other forms of human groupings and organs, of its gradual genesis out of earlier and less formal types of

public and semi-public control of conduct, and of its dependence upon the mechanisms of custom, habit and obedience upon which orderly political relations are founded. Political activity, then, is demonstrated to exist primarily for the purpose of regulating, controlling and at times encouraging and improving the non-political institutions and processes in human life which make individual existence or group life possible.

The state is not, then, for or of itself, or an end in itself. It is nothing mysterious, unique or ineffable, but rather something which is still a rather clumsy and expensive but indispensable instrument for maintaining and advancing the conditions of human existence and social progress. It is as susceptible to intelligent study and analysis as any other form of human association, and its improvement is a subject for legitimate suggestion by competent students and publicists. And the processes and problems of political life will be understood aright only when they are thus studied in a realistic and secular fashion, though it should be borne in mind that a rejection of the mystical and reverent conception of the state does not carry with it the impossibility of entertaining a wholesome respect for political institutions and their place in human society. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how a competent student of the social sciences could fail to respect the function of the state, however much he might feel called upon in candor to condemn the faults and defects of particular states at a specific time or place. Perhaps as good a summary of the scope and problems of political science as has been provided in so brief a space is that submitted by Professors Gettell and Shepard <sup>1</sup>

Political science is a study of the state, a term which includes all forms of political organization. It deals with the life of men as organized under government and law. As its distinctive con-

<sup>1</sup> *Report of the Joint Commission on the Presentation of Social Studies in the Schools*, p. 6

tribution to the social studies, it gives an understanding of social control by means of law and of the promotion of general welfare by means of governmental action.

Political science includes a study of the organization and activities of states, and of the principles and ideals which underlie political organization and activities. It deals with the relations among men which are controlled by the state, with the relations of men to the state itself, and with those aspects of international life that come under political control. It considers the problems of adjusting political authority to individual liberty, and of determining the distribution of governing power among the agencies through which the state's will is formed, expressed and executed.

Political science seeks to develop in individuals a sense of their rights and responsibilities as members of the state, and a realization of the significance of law. It substitutes accurate information and intelligent opinion for emotions and prejudices as a basis for forming judgments in politics and world affairs.

## II. SOME LEADING STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.

Political science as a well-defined branch of human inquiry delimited to a study of the state and its agencies dates from about the last half of the eighteenth century. Previous to that time it had been embedded in the broader and less precise field of speculation known as political philosophy, which included pretty much all that is now embraced in all of the social sciences—sociology, anthropology, economics, political science, jurisprudence and ethics. Not only was political philosophy broader in scope than political science; it was also distinguished primarily by an *a priori* method and deductive analysis rather than by the empiricism, induction and observation which characterize contemporary political science. Certain exceptions could, of course, be cited, such as Aristotle, Bodin, and Montesquieu. Finally, the terminology of political philosophy was much less complete, precise and exact than that which has been worked out in political theory and practice in the last century and a half. These interesting distinctions can best be understood by comparing with a twentieth century college

manual on political science such a work as Samuel Pufendorf's *The Law of Nature and of Nations*, probably the most thorough and comprehensive product of the centuries of political philosophy.<sup>2</sup>

The transition from political philosophy to political science was not abruptly effected nor did political philosophy cease to flourish, as may be discerned from the appearance in the middle of the nineteenth century of such works as those by Lieber, Mulford, Hurd, Brownson and Thomas Hill Green, not to mention the more recent work of Royce and Bernard Bosanquet. There were, however, a number of specific contributions made to the methods of approach to political problems and institutions which ultimately created the technique and attitudes which constitute political science as conceived of today.<sup>3</sup> Among these may be named the further development of the observational and comparative point of view by Voltaire, Montesquieu and Herder; the elaboration of the conception of development and dynamics in political life and institutions by Ferguson, Condorcet, Hegel and Comte; the analysis of the psychological basis of obedience and social groupings by Hume, Adam Smith and Comte; the emphasis on the importance of economic factors in the state by Locke, the American "Fathers," the Physiocrats, Adam Smith, and the Ricardian Socialists; the investigation and classification of geographic influences in politics by Montesquieu, Humboldt, Herder, Ritter and their successors; the indication of the social derivation and setting of the state by Saint-Simon, Hall and Comte; the introduction of the concept of quantitative measurement of political and social phenomena by Quetelet; and the provision of more adequate and precise political nomenclature and phraseology by such Utilitarian writers as Bentham and Austin.

<sup>2</sup> The development of political philosophy can best be traced in the first two volumes of W. A. Dunning's *History of Political Theories*.

<sup>3</sup> The majority of these developments are well described in Dunning's *History of Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer*.

As is usually the case in the development of a distinct and well demarcated science, the first step in the growth of political science was the concentration upon the definition of political terms, the classification of states, forms of government and types of political institutions, and the analysis of the general nature of human conduct made possible under the terms of specific written constitutions which indicated the legitimate degree of state-activity permitted, as well as the nature and types of political liberty and personal immunity enjoyed.<sup>4</sup> It was much the same sort of service that was performed for the biological sciences by Linnæus a century earlier. While often, and perhaps legitimately, criticized as formal and sterile, offering little insight into political processes and affording no guidance for political practice, it is possible to overlook the very real importance of this stage of the development of the subject. Before institutional history and functional analysis could proceed far in the science of politics it was necessary to have a uniform nomenclature and terminology and some clear understanding as to political forms and types. The most serious error which has arisen has been on the part of those who regard this preliminary stage of definition and classification as the completion of the scope, method and purpose of political science. Among the writers most influential in forwarding this type of work in the field would certainly be mentioned Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, J. C. Bluntschli, R. Von Mohl, J. G. Droysen, P. Laband, G. Jellinek, H. Marquardsen, Francis Lieber, Theodore Woolsey, John W. Burgess and W. W. Willoughby.

A step in advance was taken when certain writers refused to be satisfied with a discussion of political forms,

<sup>4</sup>The scheme of classifying the stages and types of political science which is here followed is a revision of that suggested by Professor Charles A. Beard in unpublished lectures. See also Chapter 1 by C. E. Merriam in Merriam and Barnes (Eds.), *A History of Political Theories. Recent Times*, and his *The New Aspects of Politics*.

but insisted on investigating the diverse and interesting products of the various types of political organization in the form of concrete legislation. Such activity consisted primarily in making a comparative study of the nature, content and purposes of contemporary legislation, and has been called by some the "statute law stage" of the development of political science. As among those who have represented this stage of political analysis would probably be included F. J. Goodnow, E. Freund, W. F. Willoughby, S. M. Lindsay, J. A. Fairhe, F. Pollock, W. J. Brown, A. V. Dicey, and M. Esmen.

It was soon perceived, however, that beneath and back of legislation and law-making were the problems and processes of political action and party government which required study and explanation in order that the nature, methods and purposes of legislative activity might be adequately understood and expounded. The mode of choice of candidates for legislative offices, the methods of election, the nature and operation of the party machine, the genesis of platforms, party government in legislatures and committees and the effect of party government on the several departments are all problems which demand careful investigation and analysis. An anticipation of this approach appeared in the work of DeTocqueville on American political life which was published nearly a century ago. But the first conspicuously successful effort to describe the actual working of party government was achieved in Woodrow Wilson's *Congressional Government*, published in 1885. The method was pursued further in certain sections of James Bryce's *American Commonwealth*, and reached its culmination in the works of Ostrogorski. Mention should also be made here of the application of the same method to the analysis of European governments by President Lowell, and to Redlich's analysis of English local government.

Even an acute, candid and accurate exposition of the



nature and operation of party machinery is, however, only a step towards understanding the nature of party government. There still remain a number of basic questions such as what makes the party go; from whence does it derive its support and tenacity; what are the types and modes of pressures exerted upon legislators, and representatives of other branches of government; how does government balance or harmonize these contending interests; in short, what are the real and vital dynamics of government and party life? To answer such questions one must have recourse to sociology and economics, and investigate the origin and nature of social groups, the mode of their organization and conflicts, the nature of the economic interests in society and the manner of their impingement upon law-makers, executives, and courts. While this line of analysis was suggested in an elementary way by Johannes Althusius as far back as the sixteenth century, and was clearly expounded and advocated by John C. Calhoun, its systematic elaboration remained for jurists like Otto Gierke, F. W. Maitland, L. Duguit and Roscoe Pound; sociologists such as Graham Wallas, L. Gumplowicz, G. Ratzenhofer, A. W. Small, R. Michels, and F. Oppenheimer, and such political scientists as A. F. Bentley, C. A. Beard and H. J. Laski.

This effort to get away from the structure and machinery of government to the dynamic forces behind it and the processes characterizing its operation has, of course, gone much further than the study of group pressures, which is but one of the important phases and types of the newer political science. Political behavior being but an aspect of social behavior in general, its thorough investigation necessitates a study of the principles and patterns of human and group behavior as a whole, namely, the introduction of the psychological approach and an analysis of custom, habit, tradition, patterns of behavior, the relative dominance of emotional and rational factors in social and political behavior, and the problem of the possibility of an artificial



CHARLES AUSTIN BEARD



or telic control over society and group behavior.<sup>5</sup> The psychological technique has also given new life and more substantial validity to the old theory of Aristotle that some are born to rule and others to serve. Such assured results as have already come from mental testing have demonstrated beyond all possible doubt that the distribution of human ability conforms to the normal curve descriptive of nature in general. The majority of the citizens of all states fall within the class of the mediocre and defective, while the superior types constitute but a hopeless numerical minority, a fact of real and basic importance which will call for much modification of political theory and practice in the future.<sup>6</sup> But differences of capacity are physical as well as mental, and differential biology must be drawn upon as well as psychology. This leads to the bearing of eugenics and vital statistics upon the state and the improvement of the body politic in health, vigor and intelligence.<sup>7</sup> Biology also suggests the importance of the problem of the adjustment of population to natural resources in the light of existing economic systems and the prevailing type of technology, something of particular importance in dealing with such problems as immigration and standards of living.<sup>8</sup>

From the fact that a large part of state activity is devoted to the control and direction of material factors in life and the mitigation of the struggle of contending economic interests, it is apparent that political scientists must inter-

<sup>5</sup> See chapter by C. E. Gehlke, in Merriam and Barnes (Eds.), *A History of Political Theories Recent Times*, see above Chap. III.

<sup>6</sup> C. J. Cannon, in *Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1922, pp. 145-57, W. McDougall, *Is America Safe for Democracy?*, C. C. Brigham, *American Intelligence*, H. H. Goddard, *Human Efficiency and Levels of Intelligence*.

<sup>7</sup> *Evolution in Modern Thought* (Boni and Laveright), Chap. x; F. H. Hankins, "Individual Differences and Democratic Theory," in *Political Science Quarterly*, September, 1923, A. A. Tenney, *Social Democracy and Population*, K. Pearson, *National Life from the Standpoint of Science*; R. Pearl, *Studies in Human Biology*.

<sup>8</sup> See for example such books as A. M. Carr-Saunders, *The Population Problem*, E. B. Reuter, *Population Problems*; and E. M. East, *Mankind at the Cross-Roads*. For the whole field of the biological factors in society see H. E. Barnes, "Representative Biological Theories of Society," in the *Sociological Review*, 1925 6.

est themselves in a study of the natural resources and physical environment of a state, and their relation to the material prosperity and economic life of the citizens. This has led the more progressive political scientists to take an active interest in the work of the anthropogeographers from Ritter to Ratzel, Semple, Huntington and Brunhes. This has shown that the economic problems which will need attention by the state depend for their nature and character upon the type of natural resources available, the technology at hand to exploit them, the topography and climatic characteristics, and the location of the state in regard to raw materials and markets.<sup>9</sup> In devoting more attention to economic factors in the shaping of political institutions and the creation of significant problems for the statesman, political scientists are but attacking with a greater fund of information and a more adequate methodology a problem which has been recognized by writers on political science from Aristotle to Madison and Calhoun. While the doctrine of the economic determination of all political life may be an exaggeration of a useful concept and working hypothesis,<sup>10</sup> yet to the present time political scientists have unquestionably neglected rather than over-emphasized the economic factor in politics.<sup>11</sup>

It has also become convincingly clear that it is impossible to understand aright political institutions except when viewed in a genetic manner, namely, in the light of their history. The desirable threshold to the history of the state has been provided by anthropology which has indicated the methods of primitive social and group control, described the antecedents of the state, and produced the proper temporal perspective for viewing and estimating the problems and processes of political genesis. Above all

<sup>9</sup> See a review of the literature in Chap. II above, and the Chapter XII by F. Thomas, in Merriam and Barnes, *op. cit.*

<sup>10</sup> See the critique in E. R. A. Seligman, *The Economic Interpretation of History*; and Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, Part IV.

<sup>11</sup> See the stimulating and suggestive summary in C. A. Beard, *The Economic Basis of Politics*.

it has demonstrated the relative recency and modernity of the state as it is conceived in the terminology of political science.<sup>12</sup> A more dynamic type of history has also aided political scientists in pursuing the genetic method. The older history, with its concentration on episodes and anecdotes, on dynastic changes, military strategy and battles, diplomatic negotiations and treaties was of singularly little value to political scientists interested in the growth of political institutions and their interrelation with the genesis of other types of institutional life and culture. But the more recent trend in history towards an interest in the development of institutions and culture has gradually placed at the disposal of political scientists an ever larger body of pertinent material bearing upon political genesis and the shaping of political life by synchronous forces and tendencies in other phases of human life and activity.<sup>13</sup> The net result of this contribution to politics from anthropology and history has been to show the evolutionary and dynamic character of political institutions and to render null and void for all time the assumptions in the field of politics based upon absolutistic and static premises and methods.<sup>14</sup>

As has been suggested above, the state is but one among many forms of human association; hence, it is essential for the political scientist to familiarize himself to some degree with the causes, nature and types of groups and associations in society as a whole. The fundamental principles of group life, functioning and contacts not only apply in one

<sup>12</sup> See A. C. Haddon, *The History of Anthropology* and such works as A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology*; and particularly the chapter by Goldenweiser in Merriam and Barnes, *op. cit.*, and J. L. Myres, "The Influence of Anthropology on the Course of Political Science," in *University of California Publications*, 1916.

<sup>13</sup> See J. H. Robinson, *The New History* article "History Its Rise and Development," in *Encyclopedia Americana*, Vol. 14; and chapter by H. E. Barnes in E. C. Hayes (Ed.), *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences*.

<sup>14</sup> See for example H. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Vols. I II, W. Bagehot, *Politics and Politics*; E. Jenks, *The State and the Nation*, F. Oppenheimer, *The State*.

way or another to the state and its constituent agencies, but it is also necessary to understand their operation in order intelligently to comprehend the problems connected with the relation of the state to other groups, or the attempts at state control over other human associations. This necessitates an acquaintance with sociology on the part of the up-to-date political scientists.<sup>15</sup>

But any of these new modes of approach to the study of political and allied institutions and processes can no longer safely be pursued according to the old *a priori* or deductive method of the political philosopher. The observational method of the natural sciences must be introduced into social and political investigation if the modern study of politics is actually to be political science and not political philosophy. The basis for this technique has been provided in the statistical method which was first organized and applied to political phenomena in a systematic fashion by Quetelet in the first half of the last century, and in the social survey which was systematized by Frédéric Le Play and his associates a half century ago. More and more this quantitative method is making its way into the study of political institutions and processes, as is attested by the vast body of statistical material collected by governmental agencies, and is serving to put political science on a truly factual and inductive basis.<sup>16</sup>

Two other aspects of the newer political science require at least passing mention. One is the growing conviction that no state lives unto itself alone. This means that the political institutions of one country can scarcely be understood except in the light of the recognition of much borrowing and interchange of ideas and practices with its neigh-

<sup>15</sup> H. E. Barnes, *Sociology and Political Theory*; R. M. MacIver, *Community: A Sociological Study*.

<sup>16</sup> See J. Koren (Ed.), *A History of Statistics*; F. H. Hankins, *Adolphe Quetelet as Statistician*; C. A. Ellwood, "The Le Play Method of Social Investigation," in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. II, pp. 662ff., and *Quarterly Publications of the American Statistical Association*, Vol. XIV, pp. 1-121, Vol. XV, pp. 225-91; F. H. Giddings, *The Scientific Study of Human Society*.

bors. Even more important is it to understand that dogmas made concerning the state which rest upon the thesis of the absolute independence and omnipotence of the individual state are extremely shaky and dubious. The economic realities of contemporary civilization, together with other scientific and cultural facts of international scope and character, are ever emphasizing more clearly and definitely the elements of international interdependence in our present civilization. Particularly significant is the bearing of this point upon the older doctrine of absolute and unlimited state sovereignty. It would seem that in spite of the continuing importance of studies of national and local governmental problems, the scientific point of view in political science must progressively become an international one.<sup>17</sup> And, finally, in the growing popularity of political theory one may detect the dawning consciousness that political science comprehends the study of political ideas as well as political structures and functions, and that these ideas have had an important influence upon political institutions and political practices. But it is equally well recognized that the study of political doctrine cannot well be separated from the cultural environment of the theory or its author.<sup>18</sup>

### III. SOME LEADING PROBLEMS IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SCIENCE OF PARTICULAR RELEVANCE TO THE SOCIAL STUDIES.

#### 1. *The Historical Evolution of the State.*

In spite of the fact that history in the past has been primarily devoted to topics and individuals in the political

<sup>17</sup> See Chapter iv by E. M. Borchard in Merriam and Barnes, *op. cit.*; and concrete evidence to support this position in the various books on comparative government by Ogg, Graham, Lowell, Rogers, Macy, and others. Synthetic books like those by Jenks and Holcombe are even more illuminating in this regard.

<sup>18</sup> H. E. Barnes, *Sociology and Political Theory*, Chap. xlii; and the various works on the history of political theory by Janet, Dunning, Gettell, Coker, Merriam, Pollock, and others; *cf.* Chap. iii above.



field, and although the history of the state is certainly one of the most important aspects of political science, it is a rather striking fact that neither the historians nor the political scientists have, when compared with the activities of anthropologists and sociologists, made notable contributions to our present authoritative knowledge concerning the origins and development of the state. The great majority of political historians have dwelt so much at length upon irrelevant episodes and personalities that they have provided little significant information concerning institutional development of any sort. Occasionally a political historian like Bishop Stubbs managed fairly well to subordinate episodic and biographical material to the delineation of the picture of constitutional development, and some such as Waitz, Gneist, Fustel de Coulanges and G. B. Adams actually produced institutional political history, but such writers were the exception rather than the rule in historiography whose anecdotal and episodic traits varied from Freeman to Carlyle. Further, even such historians as Waitz devoted their attention primarily to the history of particular states or constitutions and made little or no attempt to work out syntheses of general import or significance. And even where this was attempted, as by Herbert Baxter Adams and his associates, for example, the work was based upon subsequently discredited premises such as unique Aryan political institutions, the origins of democracy in the Teutonic folk-moot, and the coherent and integrated migration of political institutions from the Black Forest to Chestnut Street, Philadelphia. The political scientists have done even less in the way of tracing political genesis. Maine's effort has long since been undermined, and Woodrow Wilson's attempted rejuvenation of the patriarchal theory a generation after it had been punctured by Bachofen and McLennan is one of the curiosities of methodology in political dynamics. Far and away the most important historical studies made by political scien-

tists have been those executed by the juristic group concerned with the history of law and legal systems, such as Brunner, Viollet, Pollock, and Maitland.

The provision of our knowledge of the antecedents of the territorial state in the period of primitive society has been the contribution of the anthropologists, particularly since the days of such men as Bachofen, Tylor and Morgan. The theory concerning the origin of the state generally accepted down through the middle of the last century was that outlined in the Bible and sponsored by Aristotle, Bodin, Locke, Blackstone, and Sir Henry Sumner Maine, namely, the patriarchal organization of early society and its transformation into the elementary forms of civil society. This doctrine was shattered in 1860 by J. J. Bachofen who established the fact of very early examples of tracing relationship solely through the maternal line, and contended with less substantial foundations for the belief that the earliest form of state had been a matriarchate or government by females.<sup>19</sup> His notions as to the existence of a matriarchate were soon proved false by McLennan, Morgan and others, but he had established the reality of female descent in primitive society. The later anthropologists busied themselves in an attempt to demonstrate an assumed order or sequence of transformation from maternal to paternal society. It was assumed that there was an original state of promiscuity, which was supplanted by a kinship society based upon maternal descent, which was in due time superseded by paternal descent and domination, largely effected through the appearance of wife capture and wife purchase. In due time the paternal society developed into the classical type of patriarchal organization through the strengthening of the power of the dominant male, and the economic evolution which gave his ascendancy a more substantial material basis. This accepted

<sup>19</sup> On the doctrine of the matriarchate by Bachofen and later writers see M. M. Knight, "The Matriarchate and the Perversion of History," in the *Journal of Social Forces*, May, 1924.

doctrine as to primitive social genesis was most thoroughly and impressively summarized by Lewis Henry Morgan in his *Ancient Society*.<sup>20</sup>

Unfortunately, the methodology of these early anthropologists was faulty. They constructed their scheme of social evolution in advance of the facts, and then selected and assorted facts to substantiate their prearranged plan of development. In due time anthropology was put on a scientific and inductive basis, chiefly through the efforts of Franz Boas and his disciples and students. Insisting upon a survey of the data prior to a formulation of theory and synthesis they first devoted themselves to a study of primitive culture areas in the field and to a discriminating appraisal of the concrete descriptive material gathered by others. Then followed a period of assembly of facts, analysis, and such synthesis as the facts would sustain. Even before this time, E. Westermarck had proved false the assumption of universal primitive promiscuity. The Boas "school," made up primarily of Swanton, Lowie, Goldenweiser and Kroeber as far as a study of primitive social organization is concerned, demonstrated that kinship society tracing descent through either males or females exclusively was certainly not universal in primitive groups. Certain extensive areas have merely a family-local-group organization with bilateral inheritance and descent. Further, there is no convincing evidence that maternal descent accompanies a more primitive layer of culture than the paternal. Some of the most advanced of primitive peoples—such as the Iroquois—have been characterized by maternal descent, while some of the most backward have been based on paternal descent. Then, there is little or no evidence that maternal inheritance has ever been replaced by paternal in any specific group except through borrowing the paternal inheritance system from an adjoining group.

<sup>20</sup> Morgan's views have been in part more recently and discriminatingly defended by W. H. R. Rivers in his *Kinship and Social Organization*.

This widely assumed transition thus appears to be anthropological fiction. Neither is there any evidence for the universality of a strong patriarchal organization in advanced primitive societies. The transition from primitive society to the beginnings of state, thus, seems to have been made from the starting-point of the maternal group, the paternal group and the local group with bilateral descent. Finally, the critical anthropologists have shown that the transition from kinship to civil society was by no means a sudden or abrupt one. It was prepared for in primitive days by the development of various forms of semi-public groupings and organizations which cut through the ordinary kinship lines.<sup>21</sup>

The theory of the origin of civil society which was generally accepted by the older anthropologists was that of a conscious transition from tribal relationships to a polity based on territorial foundations, such a change as was effected by Cleisthenes in Athens and alleged to have been executed by Servius Tullius in Rome, or of a gradual evolution of the tribal patriarch into the king. This conception was thoroughly undermined by the anthropo-sociologists who have demonstrated that in the great majority of cases the territorial state has been the product of physical force and the superimposition of the power of a conquering group upon the conquered. This view had been suggested by Polybius, Hobbes (as an alternative to the contractual method) and Hume. It was still further elaborated by Adam Ferguson in his *History of Civil Society*, probably the most significant contribution to historical sociology and politics in the eighteenth century. Herbert Spencer gave the theory his attention and commendation in his *Principles of Sociology*, where he held that the first form of state was the military type specialized for war;

<sup>21</sup> R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, represents the best summary of the newer facts and interpretations. The history of changing doctrines and methods in the field is best set forth by Goldenweiser in Merriam and Barnes, *op cit*, Chap. xi.

and Walter Bagehot, in his *Physics and Politics*, arrived at a similar interpretation of political origins in his chapter on "The Nation-Making Age." But it remained for Ludwig Gumplowicz in his *Rassenkampf* and other writings to develop the thesis in its modern completeness and convincing character. His interpretation was accepted with qualifications by such writers as Ratzenhofer, Small, Ward, Oppenheimer and Jenks, and is today regarded as the historical explanation of the genesis of the modern territorial state.<sup>22</sup>

Some modern writers, falsely believing it possible to transfer the mechanisms and processes of individual organic evolution to the field of social evolution, have exaggerated this useful contribution by dogmatically asserting that war is an indispensable constructive force in human society comparable to the struggle for existence in the organic realm, and by contending that proponents of pacifism and international organization are endeavoring to interpose obstacles in the path of the chief progressive and civilizing agency in social evolution. This so-called "social Darwinism"<sup>23</sup> has been appropriately and effectively challenged by such biologists as Nicolai, who have shown the logical and scientific fallacies in attempting to lift interpretations bodily from the organic realm and to apply them to human society;<sup>24</sup> by sociologists like Novicow, who have indicated the large influence of peaceful economic factors in creating the state and have argued that while conflict is a constructive factor in social evolution and the development of civilization, it must be continually elevated in form from the crude physical warfare of primitive and ancient times to the economic and cultural competition characteristic of the highest civilizations of today;<sup>25</sup>

<sup>22</sup> See the article on Gumplowicz and this group in the *Journal of Race Development*, April, 1919.

<sup>23</sup> Incorrectly designated, for Darwin never sanctioned such views.

<sup>24</sup> G. F. Nicolai, *The Biology of War*.

<sup>25</sup> Novicow, *Les Luites entre sociétés humaines*, and *La Critique du Darwinisme social*; see the *Journal of International Relations*, Vol. XII, pp. 238-65.

and by other sociologists, among them Ratzenhofer, Small and Vaccaro, who maintain that in the process of social and cultural development conflict is ultimately adjusted and leads to coöperation and adaptation, the achievement of which is the real sociological definition and conception of civilization.<sup>26</sup> The prevailing opinion among competent students today is, then, that war has become an anachronism, that the absolute national state is but an epoch or stage in social and political evolution, to be superseded by some form of world organization which will put an end to war and its attendant savagery and suffering.<sup>27</sup> This conclusion does not, of course, prevent the judicious sociologist and political scientist from recognizing the earlier services of war in welding together the small primitive groups and thereby laying the basis for orderly political aggregates and the elimination of the interminable neighborhood wars which characterized primitive society.<sup>28</sup>

In tracing the development of the territorial state the most significant recent advance has been the thorough-going demonstration of the fact that the history of the state can be intelligently studied only in the light of the interaction of economic, social and political factors throughout the past. The dynamic and discriminating students of anthropogeography have indicated the shifting geographical basis of political development by describing the fen, marsh or highland origin of states where protection could be secured, the fluvial or river-basin site of the first extensive and enduring political societies, the thalassic or sea-coast basis of the more advanced civic organizations of the classical and medieval periods, and the oceanic foundation and world-wide contacts of the modern national states. They have also, of course, stressed the importance of geographic

<sup>26</sup> See especially A. W. Small, *General Sociology*, and M. A. Vaccaro, *Les Bases sociologiques du droit et de l'état*.

<sup>27</sup> See in particular, L. T. Hobhouse, *Questions of War and Peace*; and G. Wallas, *Our Social Heritage*.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. G. Tarde, *Les Transformations du pouvoir*, W. Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*.

factors in state boundaries, invitation or obstruction to expansion, facilities for contact and interchange of culture and ideas, and natural resources and struggles for raw materials.<sup>29</sup> The modern type of synthetic historian has placed at the disposal of the political scientist interested in the genetic point of view a vast amount of information bearing upon the history of social and economic institutions and processes and their interrelation with contemporary political life and systems. The mere mention of the work of Heeren, Erman, Meyer, Breasted, Petrie, and Jastrow on the ancient Orient; of Glotz, Zimmern, Ferrero, Frank, Dill, Westermann and Rostovtsev on the classical age; of Fustel, Maurer, Luchaire, Brunner, Vinogradoff, Boissadade, Ashley and Renard on the medieval period; of Lamprecht, Shepherd, Abbott, Weber, Tawney, Pollard, Gillespie, J. B. Botsford and Hayes on the origins of the modern age; and of Mantoux, Beard, Shotwell, Hobson, Fueter, Veblen, Commons, and F. J. Turner on the post-Industrial Revolution era is sufficient to impress one with the magnitude and importance of this contribution to political dynamics.<sup>30</sup> Even more direct has been the service of the historical and genetic economists, such as Cunningham, Schmoller, Sombart, Levasseur, Webb and Hammond, in detecting and emphasizing the influence of economic factors on the history and mutations of the state.<sup>31</sup> And the historical sociologists, such as Comte, Spencer, Giddings, Hobhouse, Oppenheimer, Kovalevsky and Forrest have done a similar service in indicating the changing social settings and backgrounds of the successive forms of political organization.<sup>32</sup> Therefore, however little political scientists may

<sup>29</sup> For the most thorough anthology of this material in English, see F. Thomas, *The Environmental Basis of Society*.

<sup>30</sup> Much of this type of historical writing is subjected to illuminating comment by Carl Becker in his article, "Some Aspects of the Influence of Social Problems and Ideas Upon the Study and Writing of History," in *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1912.

<sup>31</sup> E. R. A. Seligman, *The Economic Interpretation of History*.

<sup>32</sup> See publications of the *American Sociological Society*, Vol. XVI, 1921, pp. 17-83.

actually have availed themselves of this new material there is now extant and accessible the substantial foundations for an accurate and synthetic history of the state in all its forms and manifestations.

## 2. *The Racial Factor in Politics.*

While it has been more common for political scientists to overlook or minimize the non-political factors in the state and its development, and while for the most part other types of social scientists have performed the service of insisting upon the importance of considering the biological, geographic, economic, psychological and cultural factors and elements in the state, political scientists, as well as other social scientists, have been wont to lay great stress upon one assumed element in political life and institutional development which the best modern scholarship is repudiating as a matter of demonstrable positive significance. This is the alleged importance of race as a determining factor in the genesis and character of political institutions and processes. This conception unquestionably was in its origin but the projection into the historic period of the prejudices of primitive man, with his fear and hatred of the stranger. It first appears in the contempt of the Jew for the Gentile and of the Greek for the barbarian. While there were some rather significant developments of racialism and nationalism in the period of the Renaissance, particularly in Italian and German Humanism, yet the first important irruption of this fallacy in modern times accompanied the French Revolution and the reaction of the conservatives against its doctrines and practices. The Romanticist philosophers had laid the basis for this movement by their reaction against rationalism, their obscurantist emphasis on mystical forces in the genesis of culture and institutions, and their assumption of the unique importance of national character in the history of a people. Burke seized upon this philosophy as the intellectual and theoretical



basis of his diatribe against the French Revolution, which rested in part upon a contrast between the orderly development of Anglo-Saxon political institutions and the violence and anarchy characteristic of the French, a position which exactly reversed the French views of a century earlier. This viewpoint of Burke was developed during the nineteenth century into the widely accepted dogma of the remarkable capacity of the Teutonic peoples, including the Anglo-Saxon, for political invention and the erection of orderly and effective civil institutions, and the parallel assumption of the fickleness and incapacity of the French for political life and public affairs. This theory was developed by such distinguished historians and political scientists as Sybel, Treitschke, the Maurers, Kemble, Freeman and Stubbs, Herbert Baxter Adams, John Fiske and J. W. Burgess. It was met by an equally exaggerated and misleading manifesto for Gallicanism by Maurice Barrès, Paul Déroulède and Léon Daudet, along with so distinguished an historian as Fustel de Coulanges. Nor was the Mediterranean race lacking in champions of its cultural and political ascendancy.<sup>22</sup>

In the meantime the racial hypothesis was being nourished and developed with new energy and with a far greater volume of alleged evidence for its justification. The philologists from Bopp to Max Muller assumed that they had established the affinity and unity of culture and language for the peoples of India and Europe, particularly the Germanic peoples of Europe. This culture and linguistic group came to be known as the Aryan, and Müller was rash enough to hazard an assertion, later repudiated by him, to the effect that beneath this assumed cultural unity lay identity of physical race. About this same time

<sup>22</sup> This development can be followed in Dunning, *Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer*, G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century*, and T. Sumar, *Etude critique sur la formation de la doctrine des Races*. There is an interesting article by J. T. Shotwell, "The Political Capacity of the French," in the *Political Science Quarterly*, 1909, pp. 115 ff. Cf. H. J. Ford, "The Anglo-Saxon Myth" in *American Mercury*, September, 1924.

the suggestive and brilliantly written work of the Count Joseph Arthur de Gobineau on *The Inequality of the Human Races* (1854) defended with great vigor the cultural supremacy of the white race, and particularly the Aryan branch. From this time onward it became a matter of significance to prove a people members of the Aryan ethnic aristocracy. A generation later, however, this was made more difficult to achieve when two Germanic anthropologists and philologists, Pötsche and Pencka, showed quite conclusively that linguistic affinities do not prove racial identity beneath them, and, further, that physical differences made it quite evident that not all Europeans could be Aryans. These writers, however, retained the Gobinesque theory of the Aryan ascendancy and located the simon-pure Aryans among the northern Germans and Scandinavians. This did not, however, prevent others from discovering the real seat of the true Aryan culture and race in Europe to be exclusively in France, Italy, England or Russia. The great majority of the philosophies of history and politics in the last half of the nineteenth century were based on the Aryan hypothesis <sup>84</sup>

In due time scientific students of philology, anthropology and history brought forth evidence which completely discredited the whole body of Aryan mythology. Using data drawn from a study of such groups as the American Indians, where there are more than a hundred widely divergent languages and only one physical race, scholars proved the grotesque fallacy of assuming the identity of race and language. Anthropologists and cultural historians indicated the many instances where the same race had produced very different cultures or where different races had built up remarkably similar cultures, thus showing that the premise of the dependence of culture upon race cannot be sustained. Another assault came from the stand-

<sup>84</sup> The best brief sketch of these important developments is contained in I Taylor, *The Origin of the Aryans*, Chap. 1.

point of the physical criteria of race.<sup>35</sup> Sergi demonstrated that the Teutonic or Nordic group could not be regarded as Aryans, and discredited for all time the hypothesis of an Indo-Germanic cultural group.<sup>36</sup> Ripley carried the matter still further in a more scholarly fashion by criticizing the various phases of the Aryan hypothesis in the light of the facts of the derivation and distribution of the European races, and by showing that the group that came from central and western Asia and brought into Europe the so-called Aryan culture and language, was in all probability the round-headed Alpines, consisting mainly of the Celtic peoples and Slavs who had earlier been held up to contempt by the Nordic and Anglo-Saxon "Aryans."<sup>37</sup> Professor Boas, while not denying that there might be distinct differences between the various physical races as far as their cultural expression is concerned, showed that the present divergencies in their cultural achievements might be adequately explained on other grounds than innate superiority or inferiority.<sup>38</sup> It was further indicated that differential biology and psychology proved that greater differences were to be found between members of the same race than those assumed to divide and separate the different races.<sup>39</sup> And whatever the differences in innate ability between the races, we have not yet studied the problem in a sufficiently scientific manner to be able to arrive at any definitive conclusions.<sup>40</sup> And

<sup>35</sup> There are good discussions of this in R. H. Lowie, *Culture and Ethnology*, and in the works of Boas, Goldenweiser and Kroeber.

<sup>36</sup> G. Sergi, *The Mediterranean Race*.

<sup>37</sup> W. Z. Ripley, *The Races of Europe*, especially Chaps. vi, xvii.

<sup>38</sup> F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, Chap. i.

<sup>39</sup> See the writings of Galton and Pearson, and of the differential biologists and psychologists in general. Cf. Chap. xiii by F. H. Hankins in Merriam and Barnes, *op. cit.*

<sup>40</sup> A good illustration of the scientific mode of approach to this problem of ascertaining the fact of differences of intellectual capacity among the various races is to be found in Kimball Young, *Mental Differences in Certain Immigrant Groups*. For the best results such studies would need to be carried out among peoples in their own native habitat.

all studies of this nature must take into consideration the very important matter of the *adaptation* of the racial traits to the particular environment in which the race was originally differentiated.

In spite of the progress of scientific method in dealing with the problem of race the most vicious and absurd development of the racial obsession has appeared within the present century and particularly in the last decade. The basis was laid for it by the eulogy of the Teutonic race by the renegade Scotchman, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, in his suggestive, if preposterous, *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*. As Chamberlain claimed all western culture for the Germanic peoples he found it necessary to give up the strict physical criteria of race, thus making it possible to claim any distinguished European past or present for the Teutonic exhibit. But in Madison Grant's *The Passing of the Great Race*, Chamberlain's claims are united with an acceptance of the physical limitation to the Nordic blond group, who are assumed to have built up all significant western cultures, and to have been characterized in particular by special capacity in politics and war. The doctrine has been widely espoused in this country, having been progressively applied and debased in Burr's *America's Race Heritage*, and Gould's *America: A Family Matter*, until now Mr Eckenrode disfigures an otherwise useful book by exploiting the Nordic myth to explain the causes and outcome of the American Civil War. Even such reputable psychologists as Wilham McDougall, R. M. Yerkes, and C. C. Brigham have succumbed to the delusion to an astonishing degree, and the present immigration act is based upon a tacit acceptance of the premises of the Nordic protagonists.<sup>41</sup>

In spite of the surprising vogue of this misleading con-

<sup>41</sup> This material is lucidly assembled and criticized in F. H. Hankins, loc. cit., and *The Racial Basis of Civilization*.

ception it cannot stand before the assault of the most elementary logical principles and historical facts. The great civilizations of the ancient Orient, which were perhaps distinguished above all else for their military and political achievements, were without exception non-Nordic in racial derivation and constitution. There was a negligible Nordic contingent in the racial composition of classical Greece and Italy. Medieval political institutions were based quite as much on the non-Nordic Gallo-Romanic antecedents as upon the Teutonic contributions. The first well-organized monarchy of the middle ages was established in France. In the age of Louis XIV the Germanic peoples were but an unorganized conglomeration of petty principalities, and the English were looked upon as a nation of anarchists. Even if one were to accept the premise of the unique political and cultural capacity and potentialities of the Nordic, Alpine or Mediterranean race, this would be of no avail or relevance in the interpretation of the culture or political institutions of any major European state with the possible exception of the Scandinavian states and Russia. Germany is nearly as much Alpine as Nordic; France is a mixture of Nordic, Alpine and Mediterranean strains, with the Alpine predominating; and Italy is a mixture of Alpine and Mediterranean, as are most of the Balkan peoples. Hence, whatever may ultimately be discovered concerning determinate and demonstrable racial differences, we cannot hope to have this material of much service in constructing a racial interpretation of European or American history, and the scientific cultivation of politics and social science must be founded upon a repudiation of the whole mass of nonsense concerning the racial hierarchy in history.<sup>42</sup>

\* The best summary of the critical attitude towards the racial dogmas is that contained in three recent articles: J. J. Smertenko, "The Question of Nordic Race Superiority," in *Current History*, April, 1924; F. Boas, "The Question of Racial Purity," in the *American Mercury*, October, 1924; A. A. Goldenweiser, "Race and Culture in the Modern World," in *Journal of Social Forces*, November, 1924.

### 3. *The Forms of the State and the Government.*

In political philosophy and the older political science much of the attention of writers was devoted to such questions as the distinction between the state and the government and the various possible forms of each, usually conceived as monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, with their respective perversions in tyranny, oligarchy and anarchy. No little space was given to the changes from one to another, assumed as inevitable in the recurrent cycles of government postulated by classical writers on political theory. In early modern times when absolute monarchy was replacing feudalism, and later when representative government was challenging monarchy and written constitutions were being forced on chastened monarchs by the *bourgeoise*, there was much discussion as to the nature and advantages of a monarchy versus a republic. With the rise of the proletariat in urban centers and the development of the frontier society in the United States in the nineteenth century, interest shifted to the problems of democracy and its feasibility. Technical political science as represented by such a manual as that of Professor Burgess was largely occupied with an analysis and definition of such forms of government as the presidential and the parliamentary, unitary (or centralized) and distributive, federal and confederate, direct and representative and so on. Woodrow Wilson, A. B. Hart, and others have made much of the distinction between a government of laws based on a written constitution and conforming to specific limitations and precedents, and a government of men founded upon essentially unlimited power and infinite diversity of policy and procedure as long as supported by public opinion. Such portions of these treatises as were not devoted to these definitions and classifications were normally largely given over to a further description of the structure of the various forms of government, treating

such questions as the nature and powers of the executive; the existence and advantage of a unicameral or bicameral legislature, the number of representatives in each house and the mode of their choice; the nature, mode of selection and powers of the judiciary; the relations between the three departments as to ascendancy, leadership or balance of powers, and the prevailing practice as to suffrage.

In the dynamic political science of the present this sort of analysis plays a far less important part. Not that modern political scientists deny the value of consistent and accurate classification or of precise definition, but they regard this stage of political science as largely a completed task and find other problems intriguing their attention. There is, however, a certain tendency to challenge the validity of much of this earlier exact classification and to view it as the partially impossible effort to corral and confine under exact and static rubrics, captions and categories human institutions which are characterized beyond all else by diversity, variety and change. In many cases they scarcely correspond to reality. England is classified as a monarchy and the United States as a republic, but the power possessed by George V in 1918 was most insignificant as compared with that exercised by Woodrow Wilson, and the government is much more susceptible to popular control in England. The United States has been classified as a republic since its origin, but its nature under Washington and Andrew Jackson was vastly different, and nothing could contrast more than the power wielded by Rutherford B. Hayes as president and that asserted by Mr. Roosevelt. Theoretically there is a sharp division of governmental powers in our system, but actually it has never existed with any completeness, and at one period or another president, congress or supreme court has overshadowed the other two departments.

Nor is a liberal suffrage law any proof of democracy. France allowed approximately universal male suffrage

under the Second Empire, and the suffrage arrangements in the German Empire from 1871 to 1918 were much more liberal than those in Great Britain. Democracy is theoretically regarded as the rule of all the people, or at least of a majority of the people, but acute observers are already suggesting that this is an illusion which cannot square with the scientific facts regarding the distribution of ability in human society and the essential machinery of political operations. As Professor Michels has demonstrated at length democracy cannot function in large national states without representation, but representatives tend to lose their sense of responsibility and to develop group arrogance and an oligarchical spirit having the deception, cajoling and pacification, rather than the actual representation of their constituents, as their real objective. Democracy, then, seems inevitably to beget oligarchy. Graham Wallas has shown how the politicians are able to "get away with" such conduct through their exploitation of the emotional potency of party shibboleths, phrases and symbols which attract the loyalty of the exploited and paralyze their critical powers.<sup>43</sup> And Professor Giddings, on the basis of differential biology and psychology, has advanced the thesis that whatever the form of government the ablest and most alert few will always dominate the state.<sup>44</sup> And the far-famed and much emphasized distinction between the government of men and the government of laws holds only in a rough way. Under Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Palmer and Daugherty, the United States has certainly been at least temporarily converted into a government of men, and not without marked gains at times in certain respects.

One could proceed almost indefinitely with these illus-

\* R. Michels, *Political Parties a Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, Graham Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics*. See also W. Lippmann, *Public Opinion*.

<sup>44</sup> *The Responsible State*, p. 19.



trations of the manner in which the flexible, plastic and varied facts of human nature and society flaunt the exact and specific categories of political epistemology and logic, but a much more important reason for the present lack of absorbing interest in classifications of forms of the state and the government is to be found in the shift of interest from the study of the form and structure of government to the problems of its functions and processes. These latter remain much the same beneath many changes in structure; in all cases it is the age-old task of adjusting and reconciling the conflicting interests of social groups, whatever differences may have appeared in the nature, extent and variety of these interests or in the technique which the groups have developed to advance them. Mr. Bentley has well stated the attitude of the more progressive students of political science on this subject of the study of the form and structure of political institutions:<sup>45</sup>

Set opposite to all these various forms of so-called psychological interpretation, we have a dead political science. It is a formal study of the most external characteristics of governing institutions. It loves to classify governments by incidental attributes, and when all is said and done it cannot classify them much better now than by lifting bodily Aristotle's monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies which he found significant for Greek institutions, and using them for measurements of all sorts and conditions of modern government. And since nobody can be very sure but that the United States is really a monarchy under the classification or England really a democracy, the classification is not entitled to great respect. Nor do the classifications that make the fundamental distinction that between despotism and republics fare much better. They lose all sight of the content of the process in some trick point about the form.

Whenever and wherever we study the process of government we never get away from the group and class activities, and when we get these group activities properly stated we come to see that the differences between governments are not fundamental differences or differences of principle, but that they are strictly differences of technique for the functioning of the interests, that they are adopted

\* A. F. Bentley, *The Process of Government*, pp. 160, 320

because of group needs, and that they will continue to be changed in accordance with group needs.

It is also coming to be recognized that only the most bankrupt and superficial type of political thinking can maintain that the mere external form of government is any test of its excellence. Much more significant is the question of the breadth and validity of the policy of social welfare and well-being which it promotes and the efficiency exhibited in the execution of such a policy. Much was made in 1917-18 concerning the alleged infinite superiority of the American democracy over the German imperial system, yet every calm and fact-respecting student will probably have to admit that an abysmal gulf separated the German and American governments in 1914 as to constructiveness and comprehensiveness of public policy and achievements, and administrative efficiency and morale. It has been urged, of course, that while an autocracy or bureaucracy may be more efficient it tends towards militarism and aggression and is not susceptible to popular check and control of corruption. But such arguments receive little confirmation from facts. The French democracy in 1914 permitted as virulent a military aggressiveness as the autocracies of Austria, Germany and Russia, and no brief for the pacifism of democracies can be built up from a study of the United States in 1898 or Great Britain in 1900.<sup>46</sup> As for corruption and graft, a petty functionary in so unimportant a sub-department as the Veterans' Bureau abstracted more money in two years in the United States than was spent by the court during the entire notorious reign of Louis XV in France, long heralded as the supreme example of monarchical extravagance, not to mention the much greater scandals of the war period. It would seem that in all probability this study of the actual programs and policies of governments will soon be com-

<sup>46</sup> See G. H. Blakeslee, "Will Democracy Alone Make the World Safe?" in *Journal of Race Development*, 1918.

bined with a study of governmental functions and processes as the chief center of interest of the progressive political scientist.<sup>47</sup>

#### 4. *The Functions of the State.*

Few problems have attracted more attention from political philosophers and political scientists than the question of relation of the state to social progress and the legitimate functions of the state in regard to interference in social, economic and ethical matters. Opinions have varied all the way from the eulogy of state activity by Mercantilists, Cameralists, State Socialists and Marxians to the extreme individualism of Wilhelm Von Humboldt and Richard Cobden. For the most part, views on this subject have been dogmatic and based on *a priori* premises and assumptions with little of the relativistic and comparative viewpoint in evidence. There is, of course, no sound basis for any dogmatic position as to the contribution of the state to social progress. By supplying the indispensable minimum of physical force and coercion to secure order and prevent the conflict of interest groups from degenerating into anarchy and the destruction of civilization, the state creates the basic prerequisites of all culture and progress. But how far mankind will be advanced by an intrusion of the public authority into realms of action which might be passably exercised by private individuals obviously depends upon a multitude of special circumstances such as the degree of culture and relative equality of knowledge and possessions among the population, the number and complexity of the problems demanding attention and solution, the efficiency of the particular state at a given time, and the probability of maintaining or increasing the morale and effectiveness of public agents. Even more would depend upon the de-

<sup>47</sup> For example, it will probably not be long before such subjects as those covered in Parts III-IV of F. A. Ogg's *Economic Development of Modern Europe* will be regarded as of more vital consequence to the political scientist than the material in his *Governments of Europe*.

gree to which the state devoted its wealth and power to fostering scientific activity, invention and other dynamic factors in society, and to making these available in the highest possible degree for the betterment of the body of citizens as a whole.<sup>48</sup>

Equally futile and unscientific is it to indulge in absolutistic generalizations as to liberty versus authority and natural rights of individuals. The degree of liberty and personal initiative which can legitimately be allowed depends upon the same large number of social circumstances which are mentioned above in regard to the contributions of the state to social progress. Liberty is not an abstract principle functioning in a void but the resultant of the interaction of fundamental sociological forces, the facts of human nature, and the specific factors and elements in some particular period or situation. Further, the degree of liberty which can be permitted in times of peace and plenty must usually be temporarily curtailed when society faces such a crisis as that afforded by war, famine or some cataclysm of nature. Similarly, modern social science rejects the metaphysical doctrine of primordial natural rights which was embodied in much eighteenth century political theory, even though such concepts dominate much contemporary juristic theory and practice. The only valid doctrine of natural rights is to be found in the fact that the process of social evolution may reveal certain types of individual immunities and a certain degree of individual liberty and initiative to be most conducive to social progress and efficiency. It will, however, be quite evident that the nature and amount of such immunities and liberties will be determined by the diverse facts of the various historical circumstances and social surrounding and will not be uniform for any two cultural groups or fixed and stable

<sup>48</sup> See the history of this discussion in W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer*; and H. E. Barnes, *Sociology and Political Theory*, Chap. I.

for any group over a long period of time. The theory of liberty and rights must, then, be revised in light of political dynamics based on the concepts, processes and mechanisms of social evolution.<sup>49</sup>

Exactly the same approach must be made to the analysis of the problem of the legitimate functions of the state. Professor Giddings is unquestionably right when he insists that nothing could be more unscientific than a rigid and dogmatic adherence to either the extreme individualistic position or the state socialist contention.<sup>50</sup> Such circumstances as wide ethnic and cultural differences in the population, sharp differentiation of economic classes, complex and highly developed economic life, and imminent danger from neighbors would invite an increase in the legitimate functions of the state, but the degree to which this would be beneficial and constructive would depend in large extent upon the amount of political intelligence and administrative talent existing on the part of the governing classes. It is highly dubious, for example, whether the admittedly serious anarchical and wasteful conditions prevailing in the railroad and coal mining situation in the United States today would be materially improved by the introduction of government ownership and management as long as our present state of governmental corruption and incompetence continues.

This is rather characteristic of the whole problem of state activity at present. There is no doubt that the greatly increased complexity of economic and social life since the Industrial Revolution and the growth of world society have enormously increased the range and variety of problems that can scarcely be handled adequately through private enterprise. Yet there is grave doubt expressed as to whether man has been able to extend his political capacity and experience to a sufficient degree to be fit to face with

<sup>49</sup> See Barnes, *Sociology and Political Theory*, pp. 139-53.

<sup>50</sup> *Principles of Sociology*, p. 353

assurance and competence these increased responsibilities and tasks. Our present large national states were constructed as a result of dynastic and national aggression and ambition at a time when society was far simpler and the demands upon statesmanship far less, and it is as yet a quite unsettled problem as to whether human intelligence, as it is available for political service, will prove adequate to cope with these increased problems on such a scale as they are presented by the modern national capitalistic state of western society. Little consolation in this respect has been secured from the results of the recent intelligence tests giving quantitative verification to the earlier empirical generalizations as to the stupidity and incompetence of the majority in all modern populations, or by the ever-increasing volume of evidence as to the corruption, selfishness and unscrupulousness of the able leaders of contemporary political groups.<sup>51</sup>

### 5. *Proposals for the Reform and Reconstruction of Political Life.*

These alleged defects in modern political organization and intelligence, in the face of the unprecedented tasks of contemporary society, have suggested a number of expedients and proposals designed to increase the existing political interest and competence. Much stress is laid upon what is known as "functionalism" as a principle of political and social reconstruction, namely, the relinquishment of the attempt to handle all types of social and economic problems through one unified political body or organization, and the turning over of legislation, administration or both

<sup>51</sup> This all important question of the probable discrepancy between the demands made upon political intelligence by modern problems and the capacity exhibited is discussed from various angles in such books as G. Wallas, *The Great Society*, L. T. Hobhouse, *The Elements of Social Justice*, L. Stoddard, *The Revolt Against Civilization*, R. C. Brooks, *Corruption in American Politics and Life*, E. Faguet, *The Cult of Incompetence*, G. D. H. Cole, *Social Theory*, A. W. Small, *Between Eras*, E. A. Ross, *Sin and Society*, *Changing America*, and *The Social Trend*, S. and B. Webb, *The Decay of Capitalist Civilization*, R. Michels, *Political Parties*, and M. P. Follett, *The New State*.

to specialized groups which are most competent in the field of their own activities and interests. The Guild Socialists propose practical legislative immunity or self-government for producers in modern industrial society, reserving to the state legislative and administrative functions in those fields which concern citizens as consumers, namely, education, insurance and welfare legislation, taxation, public defense, international relations, etc.<sup>52</sup> Many would combine with this a substitution of representative government based on vocations or professions for the present territorial representation. The justification urged for this is that greater interest and pride will be taken in election procedure and more competent representatives chosen.<sup>53</sup> The great difficulty arises when a practical plan for its introduction is considered and some scheme is sought to provide a proper weighing or distribution of representatives according to the various vocations. A somewhat more practicable and promising proposal is that which is sometimes known as administrative syndicalism. This arrangement calls for the continuation of the present system of representation based on territorial units. Legislatures thus chosen will pass measures and decrees of a general nature, but their execution will be handed over to trained and competent administrative boards chosen largely from the groups specifically concerned with the operation of the particular measure. In this way it is hoped that special competence and scientific application may be secured.<sup>54</sup>

Another group of progressive writers have attacked the

<sup>52</sup> See G. D. H. Cole, *Self-Government in Industry; Social Theory; Guild Socialism*; and N. Carpenter, *Guild Socialism*.

<sup>53</sup> See the brilliant defense of this system by H. A. Overstreet in the *Forum*, July, 1915, and also in Cole, *Social Theory*. There is a telling critique of vocational representation in the article by P. H. Douglas, "Occupational versus Proportional Representation," in *American Journal of Sociology*, September, 1923.

<sup>54</sup> On administrative syndicalism see H. J. Laski, *Authority in the Modern State. Problems of Administrative Areas*; and *The State in the New Social Order* (Fabian Tract No. 200).

problem of political reorganization from the standpoint of a rejuvenation of, or an increased emphasis upon, regionalism and local government instead of pure functionalism, though in both cases there is new emphasis upon the importance and partial autonomy of the group. One of the major prophets of this development in social and political theory was Frédéric Le Play who laid special stress upon the natural geographic region and its economically and socially unified population. This point of view has been taken up by Patrick Geddes, Victor Branford and others and has merged in part with the scientific town-planning program designed to break up the great congestion of modern industrial cities. Others have been more interested in the purely political aspects of the matter and have concentrated their attention on different types and degrees of municipal socialism. The core of the movement, however, is the growing feeling that our modern national states are too large, top-heavy and complex to arouse the interest of the average citizen or to be directed in any competent degree by his available intelligence. By making the local community or group the center of the more important phases of his political life and activity his apathy and indifference can be shattered and his modicum of political acumen and intelligence most intelligently exploited. Above all, legislation of a sumptuary sort relating to morals and conduct should be left to the local group which is most likely to make rules and regulations which it will respect and obey. Likewise socialism and the ownership of public utilities is, in the present state of political competence and intelligence, most likely to prove a success when executed on the small scale of the municipality and its activities. To secure the advantages of large scale political organization for certain desirable types of collective activity and to present a united front in international policy and relations those who stress the value of an increased importance of local governmental



powers and autonomy would suggest the utilization of a real system of federalism, which many contend has now well-nigh completely disappeared in the United States.<sup>55</sup>

Whatever may be the political future, whether we retain our present system of representative government on a purely territorial basis over a large area, or adopt some form of functionalism or local government scheme, it is quite evident that we shall need greater expert ability in law-making, administration and adjudication alike. This can scarcely be secured without providing for and requiring special educational training as well as practical experience as a vital qualification and prerequisite for the holding of every type of political office. The academic training required should certainly be based upon a substantial grounding in the social sciences, whatever technical requirements in other branches may be added thereto. The complexity and technical nature of the modern problems which have to be attacked by the government preclude the possibility of their successful solution by the intuitive and idealistic method or technique. This fact has been recognized in the administrative branch of the government and embodied in the ever-improving civil service systems, which are far more highly developed in countries like Germany and England than in the United States. The system will certainly need to be extended to legislators and judges if we are to have efficient and competent government, however difficult it may be to do this. In many ways the need for expert and technical knowledge and a profound grasp upon the general principles involved is greater in the legislative and judicial departments of government than in the administrative.

Further, new and improved methods must be found

<sup>55</sup> Various aspects of such proposals are discussed in theoretical and practical aspects in such books as P. Geddes, *Cities in Evolution*; Geddes and Branford, *The Coming Polity*, C. Brun, *Le Régionalisme*, R. M. MacIver, *Community: A Sociological Study*, M. P. Follett, *The New State*, and *Creative Experience*, F. C. Howe, *Socialized Germany*.

for gathering the facts which are essential for the guidance of the public official in every branch of government and for the formation of an intelligent public opinion to aid the mass of the citizens in arriving at accurate estimates of problems and events. The variety, ramifications and difficulties of modern problems have made it no longer possible for mere honesty of purpose to render adequate service as a purveyor of information. A straight-forward and incorruptible, but uninformed lecture platform, pulpit and press can no longer be relied upon to give, when unaided, suitable information to the public. We must have fact-finding bodies whose equipment for research is of a sort fitted to cope with the complexity and difficulties of the facts to be discovered. Their discoveries must also have some avenue for complete, effective and immediate dissemination, something which is not now possible in our press, whether it be controlled by capitalists or laborers, Jews or Gentiles, Protestants or Catholics. This is, of course, by no means a novel or unprecedented contention. Francis Bacon had conceived of a society devoted to research and fact-finding and the subsequent application of such knowledge to human betterment; Comte called for the scientific guidance of the Positivistic commonwealth by highly-trained sociological priests, Proudhon would have put all determination of public policy in the hands of a trained academy of sciences; and Lester F. Ward contended that there could be no scientific government which was not based upon the information supplied by an academy of the social sciences manned by the best-trained social scientists. Perhaps the most effective statement, however, which has been made of this necessity for trained and unprejudiced fact-finding bodies and for adequate avenues of dissemination to the public is that contained in Lippmann's *Public Opinion*.<sup>56</sup> The efficiency of government and the welfare of society will probably be rather closely correlated

<sup>56</sup> See also Lippmann's *Liberty and the News*

with the degree of progress made in this matter of supplanting error and prejudice by fact and candor.

#### IV. PAST AND FUTURE RELATIONS OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE.

One of the most famous and influential definitions of history ever offered was that "history is past politics." This has been literally true in two senses. In the first and most generally understood one it has meant that history has been concerned with the political history of the past ages. In another way, and one little stressed or recognized, it is equally true that the concepts of politics which have guided the historian have usually been of a *past* political science. Rarely have historians dealing with political genesis been abreast of the progress in political thought. Usually their preparation has been one or two undergraduate courses in formal political science, which, more likely than not, were anachronistic even when dispensed to them in their youth. The exceptional cases of historians who have at the same time been in the vanguard of progressive political science, such as Gierke, Maitland, Vinogradoff, Beard and Turner, are as few as they are distinguished. It is for this reason that a discussion of the development and contemporary trends in political science is likely to be helpful to the political historian.

It would seem that in view of the fact of the primary preoccupation of the conventional historians of the last century with political facts, history should have rendered remarkable services to political science, and, in particular, should have developed the subject of political genesis to a very high state of perfection. No other body of social scientists produced any such extensive and imposing body of literary achievement as did the historians in the nineteenth century. Yet it remains the solemn fact that all of this vast body of material was of little aid to the political scien-

tist, and that nearly all of the solid contributions to the history of the state and political institutions were made by anthropologists, sociologists, jurists and a few political scientists interested in the genetic aspects of their subject. What little was done by the historians in the way of enriching the subject matter of genetic politics was achieved outside the scope of the conventional historical works by writers of the type of Waitz, Gneist, Stubbs, E. Jenks, G. B. Adams, Fustel de Coulanges and other contributors to what is known as constitutional history. The vast majority of normal and typical historical works in the last century, while primarily devoted to matters falling within the political, including the military and diplomatic, realm, so faithfully followed the anecdotal or episodical technique that either the events and activities narrated had little or no relation to political evolution, or such relation was in no way made clear. The personal and dramatic held undisputed sway in the selection and narration of events. The contrast between the conventional political history and constitutional history can readily be illustrated by comparing two widely known books by authors of equal distinction in scholarship. The long popular general manual on English history, that by the late Samuel Rawson Gardiner, a *Student's History of England*, was written by a distinguished student of the constitutional struggles of the seventeenth century, yet only a highly trained specialist in English constitutional history could discover in the book any clue to the development of English political institutions, however thoroughly the reader might find himself informed as to dynastic genealogies, diplomatic chicanery and military strategy. On the other hand, if one were to pick up the admirable sketch of the development of the English constitution and political institutions by George Burton Adams he would find here in far fewer pages a lucid and illuminating tracing of the changes in English political structure and processes since the tribal period,

even though he might well wish for more information as to the social and economic basis of such transformations and developments. Indeed, the conventional political history was so laden with irrelevant personal details that it not only made no significant contribution to genetic politics, but actually obscured this field and often diverted attention from it. The historiographical concepts of the ancients and of the modern Romanticists such as Lamartine, Carlyle and Froude, then, brought about the situation which led the historians ignominiously and well-nigh completely to forfeit their glorious and unique opportunity of the last century to put the political scientists deeply and permanently in their debt.<sup>57</sup>

But even the constitutional historians were seriously defective in their methodology and interpretations. Their theory of historical and political causation has usually been what is well designated as the "vacuum theory." Political and legal concepts and institutions are looked upon as either originating in the void anterior to man or society and gradually setting down and mingling with humanity, slowly establishing themselves in positions of respect and authority, or as developing mysteriously, and independent of any non-political influences in society. Hence the fruitful and vital investigation of the interaction of social, economic and political factors and forces has not been effectively pursued, and the conventional constitutional histories are to a deplorable degree devoid of life, reality and true instructiveness. The whole complex of the basic premises of dynamic politics and sociological jurisprudence is ignored, and the history of civilization has no more apparent relation to political history than has political history to the other phases of the development of human culture. This is not only true of the previous generations of consti-

<sup>57</sup> There is an acute and generally adequate characterization of this type of historical writing in G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century*. See also C. A. Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution*, Chap. 2.

tutional historians; it is equally characteristic of distinguished contemporary writers. Indeed, the two leading writers today on American constitutional history, Andrew C. McLaughlin and E. S. Corwin, fall as much within this classification as any writers who could be selected from the generation of Bancroft.<sup>55</sup>

In the few cases where the question of causation has been considered in political evolution and constitutional development it has been explained on the basis of extremely dubious or anachronistic assumptions, such as the great man theory, the hypothesis of special divine guidance, or the thesis of racial superiority and the special gift of some particular race in the political realm. The first dominated the outlook of men like Carlyle, Froude, Motley and, to a lesser extent, Stubbs; the second was exploited by Bancroft; and the third by Sybel, Fustel de Coulanges, Stubbs, Freeman, Fiske and Herbert Baxter Adams and his school. It is not inaccurate, then, to conclude that whatever its value for biography or æsthetics, the great majority of political historiography has been practically worthless for the political scientist, and will remain so until the material has been worked over by political and social scientists from the comparative point of view. But even this task has been rendered very difficult because of the vast body of extraneous and irrelevant material of an episodic and anecdotal type which has been dragged in. The magnificent opportunity of historical writing while under the spell of the

<sup>55</sup> See the somewhat humorous example in the *American Political Science Review*, February, 1924, pp. 180 ff., in which Professor McLaughlin eagerly seizes upon Professor McIlwain's suggestive legalistic interpretation of the constitutional aspects of the American Revolution as a rebuke to all historians who would see any economic element in the struggle, while Professor McIlwain in the very next review enthusiastically commends Dr. J. T. Adams for the admirable way in which he has brought out the fundamental social and economic causes of the revolutionary movement. Professor McLaughlin's argument seems to be that because the legal contentions of the colonists were apparently sound there could be no economic foundation for them. For the wound to Professor Corwin's psyche caused by a vital and realistic study in constitutional history see his review of Beard's "Economic Interpretation of the Constitution," in the *History Teachers' Magazine*, February, 1914.

political fetish to render indispensable and enduring services to political science was thus largely lost because of wrong-headed notions about the desirable content of even political history. What might have been done is indicated by a few such books as Jenks' *The State and the Nation*, Maitland's *Constitutional History of England*, and the fragments by Professor Beard.

While history may make up its past deficiencies in the way of being of real service to political science, it is not likely to do so through a belated execution of numerous and valuable treatises on historical politics. The dominant place which political history has held in the field of historical writing has already been widely challenged, and there is no doubt that in a couple of generations the older type of absorption in political episodes and anecdotes will have become thoroughly discredited. But this will not mean that history will no longer render any services of significance to political science. Rather it will probably have a far more important and vital rôle to play in this respect. The newer dynamic political science and the modern type of synthetic history have much more in common and much more to gain from coöperation than did the older metaphysical and classificatory political science and the episodic and anecdotal historical writing. Political scientists are coming to understand that the state can be intelligently understood only when viewed in its proper relations to its geographic, economic, social and intellectual setting and relationships, in other words, against the background of human culture as a totality. At the same time historians are gradually awakening to the fact, under the stimulation of such writers as Lamprecht, Green, Rambaud, Berr, Robinson, Shotwell, Breasted, Smith, Hayes, Becker, Dodd, F. J. Turner, Farrand and others of their schools, that the field of the historian is the description and analysis of the genesis of human culture as a whole, however much individual historians may be interested in particular fields or

phases of cultural progress. Thus the political scientist who is interested in tracing in a profound and vital manner the growth of the state and political institutions against the background of social, economic and intellectual changes will in due time find that the historians have provided him with cogent and pertinent material in large volume and with accurate content. It is doubtful, however, if any large number of historians, technically and professionally considered, will long continue to maintain a vivid interest in the details of political genesis. The historians are coming to understand that they have actually been intruding on a proper domain of the political scientist, and they will doubtless see fit to observe the proprieties and proper limitations of their field of activity and pass over to the political scientist the task of investigating political origins and developments on the basis of the data furnished by anthropologists and cultural historians. History which is past politics will become also past historiography.<sup>59</sup>

#### V. HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE.

Inasmuch as law is the product of the state, and law-making, administration and adjudication the chief functions of the state, it is obvious that what has been said above about the development of political science and its relation to the changing types of history applies with little or no qualification to the relation between history and jurisprudence. In fact, it is debatable as to whether it is desirable to regard jurisprudence as a special social science distinct from political science. Indeed, probably the tendency so to regard it has been due largely to the development of schools of law separate from faculties of political science, a movement which is chiefly an outgrowth of the fact that we have come to agree that lawyers and jurists need special professional training while no such qualifications or

<sup>59</sup> There is a good discussion of the contemporary controversy over these points in the last chapter of Gooch's *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century*.



requirements are suggested in respect to law makers or administrators. The political field, perhaps the most complex and technical which today challenges the intellect of man, still remains regarded as the one in which neither training nor special talent is required.

But without pressing this debatable contention that jurisprudence is really a subordinate aspect or department of political science rather than a special and distinct social science, few would deny the applicability of the foregoing generalizations to jurisprudence, provided their validity as related to political science is conceded. Jurisprudence has passed through much the same stages as political science in the course of its development. The natural law school, deriving much of their basic philosophy from Socrates and the Stoics, looked upon law as the imperfect human appropriation of the emanation of divine wisdom—the juristic expression of the *Logos*. It existed in essence prior to human society, and has been in potential form and content the same body of transcendental and normative rules irrespective of time and place. Such differences as existed in legal codes were simply expressive of the varying degrees of competence and success in appropriating the legal manifestation of divine wisdom through the operation of the rational nature of man. This metaphysical theory of law played a large part in the political and legal philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and still flourishes in a somewhat mitigated fashion in many court rooms and in the minds of many jurists to the present time. More popular today, however, is the so-called analytical jurisprudence which took form in the hands of Hobbes, Betham and Austin, and is concerned with the specific fact of the nature and content of law as the command of a determinate superior, the state. It does not normally deal with such problems as the genesis of the state or law, or changes in the form of either. Nor does it assign any importance to social forces at large which demand, color and support

law and legal administration. It rests satisfied with a consideration of what the law actually is at a given time and who are the authoritative agents for its enforcement. It is obvious that this is a concrete and convenient theory of law for the judge and attorney, and that it furnishes an admirable juristic orientation for the purely legalistic type of constitutional historian. It has distinguished modern theoretical exponents, among them the well-known jurist, Thomas Erskine Holland. Yet the analytical jurisprudence, whatever its advantages as a working philosophy of law, furnishes no clue to an intelligent understanding of the origins and nature of various legal codes, and no substantial suggestions as to the necessity or methods of legal change and reform.

The weaknesses of the analytical school of jurists in regard to explaining legal origins and development were overcome largely through the efforts of the historical and comparative schools. The historical school takes its origin from such writers as Burke and Savigny, and has been developed, among others, by Sir Henry Sumner Maine, F. W. Maitland, H. Brunner, J. C. Carter and Sir Frederick Pollock. It looks upon law as the product of the diverse cultural forces inherent in the historical development of the nation. It is the gradually accumulated, selected and codified wisdom of the nation. While in modern times law has come to be more and more legislative enactment and hence the literal command of the state, the nature of the legal system as a whole and the content of much contemporary legislation are determined primarily by the past history of the nation and the peculiar institutions of the particular state which have grown out of that past. The comparative school is simply an extension of the historical method in space. Its exponents contend that the "wisdom of a nation" has rarely been accumulated solely within its own borders. Cultural contacts and borrowing are as characteristic of legal as of other institutions. Hence, one

must study from a comparative and historical point of view the great legal systems of the world from the Code of Hammurapi to that of the German Empire as completed early in the present century. The method was in large part suggested by the anthropologists of the comparative school in the last century, such as Lubbock, Tylor, Post and Morgan. Perhaps its chief exponents have been Joseph Kohler and Sir Paul Vinogradoff. It is evident that no sharp line divides the contemporary historical and comparative jurists; men like Pollock and Maitland have done real service in the field of comparative jurisprudence, while Vinogradoff has been one of the most productive contributors to historical jurisprudence.

The labors of the historical and comparative schools did much to clear up the problems connected with the origin of law, but they contributed far less to the problem of the application and functions of law, and of the relation of law to social progress and social reform. This service was reserved for the sociological school, which has been largely a product of the rise of that broader and more comprehensive study of institutions and processes which has been brought about by the development of sociology since the time of Auguste Comte. It is not without its significance that the founder of modern sociological jurisprudence, Ludwig Gumplowicz, was also one of the more distinguished of modern sociologists. The leading members of the sociological school of jurists have been Gumplowicz in Austria; Gierke, Kantorowicz and Berolzheimer in Germany; Duguit in France; and O. W. Holmes and Roscoe Pound in the United States. Had Maitland lived, the later trend of his legal interests indicate that he would have become primarily interested in the sociological approach and application. While possessing a healthy and vivid interest in legal origins as the only method of understanding the past genesis and social basis and effects of legislation, the sociological school is far more interested in the pres-

ent state, applications and results of law. It completely divorces from law any of the supernatural, mystical, transcendental or immutable characteristics which have been assigned to it by earlier schools. It looks upon law as but a natural and secular social product in its origin and development, and is concerned solely with its present effectiveness as an agent of social control and guidance, including therein a lively interest in all possible means for improving the assumptions, content and efficient enforcement of law. With this school law comes to have a pragmatic and telic significance. It is regarded as the great instrument of social engineering, and is viewed quite as much in the light of a vital agent in the task of securing intelligently directed social change as of a leading factor in producing social order and stability. Vitally concerned with the actual contemporary effects and operation of legislation and its enforcement, the sociological school emphasizes the necessity of carefully prepared statistical surveys and reports of the legislative product and the administration of law, civil and criminal.<sup>60</sup>

The older political history, while usually deriving its juristic assumptions and definitions, when it had any, from the metaphysical and analytical schools of jurisprudence, really had few vital relations with law. The analytical jurists being in no considerable way interested in legal origins, such minor contributions as episodic political history might have made to their subject were rarely utilized. Constitutional history of the old sort and analytical jurisprudence both putting the state and law in a social and cultural vacuum for the purpose of detailed dissection or study, there was little need felt on either side for coöperation and little aid actually to be derived from it. On the

<sup>60</sup> There is a good brief survey of the various types of jurisprudence in the article on "Jurisprudence" in the *New International Encyclopedia*. The various schools are described and classified by Patterson in Merriam and Barnes, *op cit*, Chap. v. The best critical discussions are to be found in E. Pound, *Interpretations of Legal History*; *Introduction to the Philosophy of Law*; and *Law and Morals*.

other hand, there is every reason to expect the most fruitful collaboration between the newer synthetic history and the newer sociological jurisprudence. Social history will do much to illumine the problem as to the social background and results of legislation in the past, while sociological jurisprudence will give to the historian an intelligent and adequate technique for studying the history of law and legal concepts. The future, then, would seem to promise, indeed, to demand much closer and more thorough co-operation between history on the one hand and political science and jurisprudence on the other.

## SELECTED REFERENCES

- E. Barker, *Political Thought in England from Spencer to the Present Day*.  
 H. E. Barnes, *Sociology and Political Theory*  
 C. A. Beard, *The Economic Basis of Politics*  
 A. F. Bentley, *The Process of Government*.  
 R. G. Gettell, *A History of Political Thought*.  
 A. N. Holcombe, *The Foundations of the Modern Commonwealth*.  
 E. Jenks, *The State and the Nation*  
 H. Krabbe, *The Modern Idea of the State*  
 H. J. Laski, *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty*.  
 R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*  
 C. E. Merriam, *American Political Ideas*  
 C. E. Merriam, *The New Aspects of Politics*.  
 C. E. Merriam and H. E. Barnes (Eds), *A History of Political Theories: Recent Times*  
 F. Oppenheimer, *The State*  
 R. Pound, "Jurisprudence," in H. E. Barnes (Ed.) *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, Chap. ix  
 R. Pound, *Interpretations of Legal History*  
 W. J. Shepard, "Political Science," in H. E. Barnes (Ed.) *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, Chap. viii.  
 J. T. Shotwell, *Intelligence and Politics*.  
 A. W. Small, *General Sociology*.

## CHAPTER IX

### ETHICS AND HISTORY: A GENETIC VIEW OF THE THEORY OF CONDUCT.

#### I. SOME PROLEGOMENA TO THE CONCEPTION OF CONDUCT AS A SCIENCE.

##### 1. *Methods of Approach to Knowledge.*

MUCH has been written on the contrast between the primitive and the modern mind. The older anthropologists and cultural historians tended to represent the thought of early man and backward peoples as quite different even in kind from that of citizens of contemporary states. More extensive and scientific study has, however, quite changed our opinions on such matters. It would seem that man's neuro-psychic equipment has been much the same for the last twenty thousand years, and the general nature of his cerebration has changed little in this period. The differences in thinking since the Magdalenian period are due chiefly to an alteration of cultural conditions and the accumulation of knowledge. The thinking of primitive man, being unchecked by scientific fact and based to a very large degree upon imagination and intuition, inevitably tended towards the building up of a vast body of myth, superstition and tradition, which was readily accepted as fact and looked upon as a revelation from the supernatural world.<sup>1</sup>

We have as the second great stage in the human approach to the acquisition and exposition of truth the reli-

<sup>1</sup> A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilisation*, Part III, L. Lévy-Bruhl, *Primitive Mentality*.

ance upon rhetoric, or the trust in the efficacy of words. This was doubtless a development from the incantations of the primitive shamans. It reached its highest development in the post-Periclean Græco-Roman world, and found its most valiant champion and systematizer in Quintilian.<sup>2</sup>

Synchronous with the origins of the rhetorical shibboleth came the rise of the logical technique, which was shaped by Aristotle. This provided a guide for disciplined and accurate thinking but no method for the acquisition of new knowledge. As much as mythology and rhetoric it rested upon premises and assumptions of a wholly gratuitous and *a priori* sort, and was quite as impotent as either in the matter of exploring the mysteries of the cosmos, nature, human conduct and social relationships. It was most extensively utilized in the educational system of the Middle Ages, and modern thought was in part initiated by Francis Bacon's famous assault upon Scholasticism in the name of the scientific method and the kingdom of man.<sup>3</sup>

The fourth and final stage in the development of human methods of searching for fact has been the rise of scientific and critical thought. This rests upon no assumption other than that reliable knowledge can be collected only by the observation of the commonplace facts and occurrences of nature, their subsequent classification, continued experimentation and testing, and the tentative formulation of scientific laws. While there are doubtless many ways in which the technique of the modern scientist can be improved, there is little probability that we shall be able to advance beyond the concepts and methods of the natural scientist in our exploration of the mysteries of the universe,

<sup>2</sup> J. B. Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians*, pp. 160 ff; H. O. Taylor, *The Classical Heritage of the Middle Ages*, pp. 34 ff.

<sup>3</sup> A. E. Taylor, *Aristotle*, M. de Wulf, *A History of Medieval Philosophy*; H. E. Barnes, "The Historical Background of the Philosophy of Francis Bacon," in *Scientific Monthly*, May, 1924.

valuable as the philosopher may be in the process of aiding in our assimilation and interpretation of the work of the scientist.<sup>4</sup>

In meeting the problems of modern life we still employ all of the above modes of attack and solution. In the range of science and technology, and to a considerable extent in industry, we utilize the exacting methods of natural science.<sup>5</sup> To a very large degree, however, contemporary business methods rest upon rhetorical exercises and devices, much of the alleged hard-headedness being but a rationalization of verbal exorcism.<sup>6</sup> In politics rhetoric is, as it has been for millenniums, the chief expedient in maintaining the ascendancy of certain sects, parties and classes. Words, in cooperation with various forms of symbolism, serve to delude mankind into accepting as revealed truth the most absurd anachronisms and imbecilities which are represented as the tried and impeccable wisdom of the ages.<sup>7</sup> In religion and ethics the approach is more primitive still. Supernaturalism reigns supreme, and whatever supplementary utilization may be made of logic and rhetoric is merely for the purpose of dignifying and rationalizing primitive illusions and spontaneously accepted dictates of the herd.<sup>8</sup> That these may have had great disciplinary and cohesive value in the past no informed student will deny, but they are today the leading

<sup>4</sup> J. T. Merz, *A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, Vol. II, K. Pearson, *The Grammar of Science*.

<sup>5</sup> T. Veblen, *The Place of Science in Modern Civilization*, Chaps i-ii; Slosson and Caldwell, *Science Remaking the World*, F S Marvin, ed, *Science and Civilization*, esp Chaps vii-xii.

<sup>6</sup> T. Veblen, *The Theory of Business Enterprise*, and *The Engineers and the Price System*; *Waste in Industry*, N Y., McGraw-Hill, 1922, W Feather, "The King of Loafers," in *American Mercury*, October, 1924. An illuminating novel is W E Woodward, *Lottery*.

<sup>7</sup> J. H. Robinson, *Mind in the Making*, Chaps. vii-viii; W B Hale, *The Story of a Style*; H. L. Mencken, in *Civilization in the United States*, pp 21 ff.

<sup>8</sup> T. V. Smith, "The Bases of Bryanism," in *Scientific Monthly*, May, 1923; R. C Givler, *The Ethics of Hercules*, Chap viii, O L. Reiser, "Fossils of the Mind," in *Monist*, January, 1925; and any Catholic apologia



obstacles in the way of a rational and efficient reorganization of society.<sup>9</sup>

## 2. *The Genesis of Ethical Codes.*

The manner in which moral codes actually develop has been admirably described, among others, by Trotter and Sumner. In the process of social evolution one of the chief requirements of survival has ever been group cohesion and discipline, which has never been secured except at the price of unreasoning conformity to the commands of the group.<sup>10</sup> The herd has ever been savage in its punishment of the variate and non-conformist, and we may be sure that much of the potential originality and inventiveness of the race has been eliminated through the extinction of the more daring and independent members of the group. These codes of conduct which the herd has enforced with such rigor and savagery have never been carefully thought out or experimentally tested and verified modes of behavior, but are rather the crude products of superstition and the trial-and-error methods whereby primitive man was able to effect a working adjustment to his environment and perpetuate his kind.<sup>11</sup>

That superstition and accident, elaborated into beliefs and convictions, have normally been the basis of the manners and customs of humanity is amply attested to by the great diversity of attitudes and practices on the part of mankind in every range of human conduct and behavior.<sup>12</sup> But primitive man regards all of his institutions and defensive and justificatory superstitions, though actually slowly and clumsily fabricated by man himself, as the product of divine creation and a special and condescending

<sup>9</sup> W. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*.

<sup>10</sup> Trotter, *op. cit.*, W. G. Sumner, *Folkways*, G. Wallas, *Our Social Heritage*, Chap. iii.

<sup>11</sup> Trotter, *op. cit.*, Chaps. i-ii, Sumner, *op. cit.*, Chaps. i-ii, xv; J. H. Robinson, *Mind in the Making*, Chaps. i, viii; E. C. Hayes, *Sociology and Ethics*, Chap. ix.

<sup>12</sup> Sumner, *op. cit.*, *passim*; J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*

revelation. As Sumner well puts it: "The folkways are habits of the individual and customs of the society which arise from efforts to satisfy needs; they are intertwined with goblinism and demonism and primitive notions of luck, and so they win traditional authority. They become regulative for succeeding generations and take on the character of a social force. . . . At every turn we find evidence that the mores can make anything right and prevent the condemnation of anything."<sup>13</sup> It is in this manner that there arise those guides and standards of conduct which the average person designates as "the old, sturdy virtues of manhood and womanhood," "the tried wisdom of the ages," "the sagacity of the fathers," "the enduring and permanent foundations of our institutions," and other rhetorical elaborations. Only the historical and sociological approach to the study of ethical codes can make completely clear the absurdity of such a view.<sup>14</sup>

At the same time, it does not follow, as some would seem to believe, that all customs thus acquired are necessarily unscientific or harmful. The evolutionary and selective processes in time tend to eliminate those groups which have the least efficient and less adequate types of codes and institutions.<sup>15</sup> The fact that all previous civilizations have disintegrated may legitimately lead to the query as to whether the evolutionary process has not proved that all earlier mores, considered collectively, were inadequate and led ultimately to the downfall of the cultures with which they were associated, even though certain special types of customs within the general complex may accidentally have been remarkably scientific and conducive to social strength and cohesion.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Sumner, *op cit*, Chaps 1, xv

<sup>14</sup> Robinson, *op cit*, Gavler, *op cit*

<sup>15</sup> W. Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*, Chaps. ii-iii, F. H. Giddings, *The Responsible State*, Chaps i-ii, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, Chaps 1, viii, x-xii, xiv, xv.

<sup>16</sup> H. G. Wells, *The Outline of History*; P. V. N. Myers, *History as Past Ethics*.

One of the very best proofs of the fundamentally supernatural basis and objective of our current ethical doctrine is the fact that we supposedly derive it from an alleged sacred book which is held to embody commands directly delivered by God. Hebrew and Christian history, together with biblical criticism, have, of course, proved that these ideas have been but the product of the folkways and mores of the primitive Hebrews, in the case of the Old Testament and the personal views of religious reformers of all grades from Jesus to Paul.<sup>17</sup> And it is equally apparent to students of history that many of the ethical doctrines now in vogue have been the product of post-Apostolic mores, which can be justified on the basis of Scriptural sanction only by allegory and the most heroic exegesis.<sup>18</sup> Further, the basic purpose of moral conduct has been held by orthodox Christians to be the securing of certain entry into immortal bliss after death, and not the assurance of a happier and more efficient life in society during one's mundane existence. Indeed, the whole issue of the improvement of earthly society was regarded with disfavor by the great Christian theologians, lest absorption in an earthly utopia divert attention and interest from the heavenly utopia and end in the loss of immortal souls.<sup>19</sup>

Directly connected with this metaphysical and supernatural conception which exists in regard to the derivation and nature of moral codes is the prevailing illusion as to how man becomes conscious of right and wrong in conduct, and is able to seek the former and avoid the latter. The orthodox and popular view is that there is some metaphysical entity called the "conscience" implanted in every breast, whose "still, small voice" reveals God's uniform, invariable and immutable will to man on all questions from

<sup>17</sup> S. Reinach, *Orpheus*; L. Wallis, *A Sociological Study of the Bible*; W. R. Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*; F. C. Conybeare, *Myth, Magic and Morals*; P. Gardner, *Exploratio Evangelica*.

<sup>18</sup> Myers, *op cit*; Sumner, *op cit*; H. L. Mencken, *A Book of Prefaces*, pp. 197-283; H. O'Higgins, *The American Mind in Action*.

<sup>19</sup> W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories: Ancient and Medieval*, Chap. vi.

shooting craps to casting his vote for president of the United States. It was, of course, always difficult to harmonize this conception with the observed fact that in certain areas this inner conviction led some to prepare for a respectable career by head-hunting and others in a different part of the globe by committing to memory the catechism of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor was it easily possible to explain why God allowed the small voice to speak quite a different language to individuals in the same general cultural group. The key to the dilemma was, of course, the hypothesis of the diabolical seduction of those whose views and conduct diverged seriously from those approved by the majority of the herd.<sup>20</sup> One of the best statements of the conventional supernatural and metaphysical theory of ethics is contained in that recent pompous and pretentious apologia for obscurantism, Louis T. More's *The Dogma of Evolution*:

As for the facts and laws of morality, it is conceded that they have been known for thousands of years. . . . Thus moral progress is not coincident with scientific achievement or even causally related to it. If morals were merely an adaptation to our environment, or if they were conventions of society, then they should rise and fall with the rhythm of rational and scientific progress. Instead of such variation, the standards of morality remain fixed and eternal truths.

This untenable metaphysic has been replaced in modern dynamic psychology by the concept of the censor. From earliest infancy the contact of the child with parents, relatives, friends and associates brings to him a varied but potent body of information, and inculcates ideas, concepts and attitudes which wholly and solely determine his notions of what is right and wrong. It is in this way that the ideas and practices of the great and little herds with which the individual comes in contact are translated into individual belief and action. There is little probability that our con-

<sup>20</sup> Givler, op. cit., pp. 156 ff.; E. C. Hayes, *Sociology and Ethics*, Chap. v.

victions as to right and wrong thus derived bear any relation to the scientific facts in the circumstances, as herd opinion and activities have never yet been founded upon scientific investigation and statistical measurement and verification, but they do represent what our herds believe to be right, and hence constitute a practical guide to life in a given community. The still, small voice, then, appears upon adequate investigation not to be the voice of God, but, as Professor Robinson has facetiously expressed it, "the still, small voice of the herd."<sup>21</sup>

### 3. *The Modern Sex Complex.*

The primitive nature of our *Ethik* can be further illustrated by brief reference to the issues in regard to sex in the current code, particularly because morality is most generally considered today to be purely a matter of formal and external sexual purity—a man may be regarded as a pillar of society and the church, and a model citizen, though he may have accumulated a fortune through stock-gambling and railroad wrecking, has his fortune invested in tax-exempt securities, and is notoriously lacking in sympathy for his less fortunate fellowmen, provided only he shows sufficient sagacity to prevent himself from being publicly detected in making love to the maid or kissing his stenographer.<sup>22</sup>

This curiously narrow and inadequate view of morality has doubtless grown up primarily as a result of the economic ideals and compensatory psychology and ethics of modern Puritanism and capitalism, and has been retained and fiercely defended because of its basic importance for

<sup>21</sup> Sumner, *op. cit.*; Trotter, *op. cit.*; J. H. Robinson, "The Still Small Voice of the Herd," in *Political Science Quarterly*, June, 1917, pp. 312-19; W. H. Burnham, *The Normal Mind*, pp. 234 ff.

<sup>22</sup> H. O'Higgins, *The American Mind in Action*; G. B. Shaw, Introduction to S. and B. Webb, *English Prisons Under Local Government*, pp. lxxv-lxxvii, G. Myers, *The History of Great American Fortunes*. This is frequently illustrated by the disastrous effect upon the subsequent career of a leading business man of a notorious divorce or breach of promise suit.

the modern adherents to the theory of business enterprise, but it is not so simple a matter to explain the nature and existence of our sex mores as a whole. They doubtless go back to primitive mysticism and superstition, and to the Jewish mores, where there was developed that pernicious concept "naked and ashamed," which has been a most damaging obstacle to both art and science, the notions of male ascendancy and domination, and a general condemnation of the æsthetic outlook upon life.<sup>23</sup> Christ's own doctrines were in most ways a negation of the prevalent Jewish mores, but in this respect his views had little influence upon historic Christianity. The most important influence in the Apostolic age was that of St. Paul, who did much more to shape the Christian attitude towards sex than Christ and all the other apostles.<sup>24</sup> His views were given a further impetus by the purification cults that flourished in the later Roman empire, as well as by the ascetic tendencies of the neo-Platonists.<sup>25</sup> The final touch was added by Augustine, whose notions on sex were the product of over-compensation for a sense of guilt concerning a youth of the most notable sexual prowess. So far did he go that he attempted a reformulation of the concept of original sin, representing it to be the beginning of intercourse between the sexes, the responsibility for which, of course, rested with Eve. Woman, thus, became the cause of the fall of man and the miseries of the race, and sex was the chief human weakness exploited by the devil in diverting the faithful Christian from his legitimate and salutary spiritual exercises.<sup>26</sup> The Jewish, apostolic, patristic and Au-

<sup>23</sup> There is an admirable presentation of the case against the Jewish ethic on the sex issue in Harold Frederic's *Damnation of Theron Ware*. We, of course, freely recognize the heroic efforts of Flo Ziegfeld, the Shuberts, and Morris Gest to compensate for the defects of their ancestors.

<sup>24</sup> G. S. Hall, *Jesus the Christ in the Light of Modern Psychology*; F. A. Henry, *Jesus and the Christian Religion*, Parts I, III, O'Higgins, op cit, pp. 2-4; F. C. Conybeare, *Myth, Magic and Morals*, Chap. 1.

<sup>25</sup> F. Cumont, *Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism*, T. Whittaker, *The Neo-Platonists*, J. W. Swann, *Hellenic Origins of Christian Asceticism*.

<sup>26</sup> *The City of God*, Book XIV.

gustinian attitudes combined to produce that most notable of all great collective flights from reality in the field of sex, namely, monasticism, which resulted ultimately and inevitably in those orgies described centuries ago by Boccaccio and more recently in great detail by Henry Charles Lea.<sup>27</sup>

The Protestant Reformation was in part a reaction against this situation, but Puritanism, which represented the chief results of the Reformation on the sex mores, came to be but an exploitation of some of the more ascetic doctrines of the Jews and Paul as a compensation for the practices of the new economy and capitalism—sex bigotry and the impurity-complex were seized upon as a compensation for economic chicanery. Its value was soon seen by the new *bourgeois* class, and, consciously or unconsciously, it has been cherished and treasured as a basic phase and foundation of the sex complex in modern society.<sup>28</sup> This *Ethik* was rationalized and defended by Immanuel Kant through his exploitation of remarkable epistemological and dialectical acumen and profundity to justify his own physical frailty and extremely limited life experiences.<sup>29</sup> Along with these historical, sociological, theological and economic factors in the savagery and primitivity of the conventional attitude towards sex must be put the operation of the sentiment of the invidious, and the compensation for and justification of, one's own unrealized ambitions or lack of success in the sexual realm. These latter elements flourish with unusual virulence in the psychic constitution of the average purist and vice-crusader.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>27</sup> Boccaccio, *The Decameron*, H C Lea, *History of Sacerdotal Celibacy*.

<sup>28</sup> P Smith, *The Age of Reformation*, pp 724-9; R H Tawney, "Sixteenth Century Religious Thought," in *Journal of Political Economy*, 1923-4; A M Earle, *The Sabbath in Puritan New England*, O'Higgins, op cit

<sup>29</sup> Givler, op cit, pp 159-62, E C Moore, *Protestant Thought Since Kant*, pp 47-50; M C Otto, *Things and Ideals*, pp. 61 ff; R. Falkenberg, *History of Modern Philosophy*, pp 383-400, P Kropotkin, *Ethics Origin and Development*, Chap ix

<sup>30</sup> Mencken, as in footnote 18; O'Higgins, Chap vi; C Ramus, "Why Censors Enjoy Their Jobs," in *Physical Culture*, April, 1923; A. Tridon, *Psychoanalysis and Behavior*, pp 252-66.

The disastrous results of this barbarity and imbecility in regard to the handling of sex questions in present day society can best be made clear by a contrast of the vast amount which we pay for such stupidity with the slight or wholly dubious gain therefrom. We have a great number of densely populated state and private hospitals for the insane, which are filled for the most part with types that are the result of an unintelligent and uninformed attitude towards sex. The chief types of functional insanity, the psycho-neuroses, dementia-præcox, manic-depressive insanity and paranoia are caused primarily by family attachments and sexual difficulties, and would be, to a large degree, preventable in a society where sex education of an intelligent sort was possible. Paresis, the most important type of organic psychosis, and locomotor-ataxia, the most prevalent form of organic neurosis, are invariably caused by syphilis, which is an easily preventable disease and could be speedily eradicated if it were not for the opposition to venereal prophylaxis produced by the operation of the impurity-complex. Then there is the large class of epileptics, which could be greatly reduced by adequate sex-education and redirection, together with a rational system of eugenics. Further, there are the vast number of feeble-minded which constitute a great social, economic and cultural burden, and whose presence in the population is due to the opposition of those afflicted with the impurity-complex to eugenics and sterilization. From these psychotic and defective types are also recruited the majority of the criminal classes. And there are huge numbers of neurotic and psycho-neurotic individuals in society, many of them persons of potentially superior intellectual capacity, whose energy is depleted and creative powers sapped by the repression of the most vital and essential of their physical and psychic urges beyond the point where the most heroic efforts at sublimation can solve the difficulties. To these must be added the ravages of venereal



disease, which are actually probably more widespread and serious than is realized even by the average purist fanatic, but could be eliminated in a generation of concerted effort at venereal prophylaxis.<sup>31</sup> And there must not be forgotten the innumerable unhappy and degrading homes produced by the operation of divorce laws which rest for their justification solely upon the barbarous conventional sex mores—the condition pictured in Lewisohn's *Don Juan* is probably reproduced in an even more pathetic manner in more than a hundred thousand homes in contemporary America. Among the most important of the causes of such unhappy families is that widespread ignorance of the vital facts and methods of normal sexual life, so fully revealed by Robie, Lay and others, which is produced primarily by our contemporary impurity-complex.

Then there must not be overlooked the vast number of abortions performed each year by incompetent persons, or much less frequently by competent persons under serious handicaps and difficulties, which are accompanied by the aftermath of thousands of deaths and chronic female invalids; all of which are a result of the fact that our laws forbid contraceptive education and prevent competent physicians from executing simple and relatively harmless early abortions, and yet encourage them to preside with enthusiasm at the delivery of an idiot child by an imbecilic mother. Probably most important of all is the vast increase of population, particularly among the lower and least capable classes, progressively degrading the race and threatening the world with perpetual famine and misery, which is produced by a silly if monstrous theological desire to create more souls, with the resulting opposition to the in-

<sup>31</sup>Sands and Blanchard, *Abnormal Behavior*; W. H. Burnham, *The Normal Mind*, White and Jelliffe, *Diseases of the Nervous System*, W. J. Robinson, *Sexual Problems of Today*, Hoag and Williams, *Crime, Abnormal Minds and the Law*, W. E. Fernald, *The Burden of Feeble-Mindedness*, S. P. Davies, *The Social Control of the Feeble-Minded*, *Civilization in the United States*, pp. 427-56

culcation of the principles and methods of voluntary parenthood and selective fecundity.<sup>82</sup>

Such is the price which we pay for subservience to the sex mores of primitive Judaism, Catholicism and Puritanism; what are the gains to be balanced against these? It must probably be confessed that they are largely hypothetical. We assume them to be chiefly the monogamous family, the dignity of woman, and the reduction in the amount of sexual intercourse, which is in itself held to be a most vile and degrading evil. The monogamous family existed, however, long before Judaism or Christianity, and could probably be assumed to exist in a realm of complete so-called "free love."<sup>83</sup> It rests upon certain psychological factors quite independent of any external rules. And it is only the most naive person who believes that we actually have today any complete prevalence of monogamy. Polygyny of a surreptitious sort is more prevalent among the American urban *bourgeoisie* today than it ever was in an institutionalized form in any Moslem land at any time in history. And only one most alarmingly ignorant of history could claim that woman has occupied a position of dignity and honor under Christianity at all comparable with that which was accorded to her in classical paganism. Christian civilization may have placed higher esteem upon the celibate woman than paganism, but it certainly degraded woman and sex in general. While Christ glorified woman and sex, few persons in history have had a more degrading conception of woman than that held by Paul and Augustine and forced upon the western world in the Christian mores. At the most, it can only

<sup>82</sup> S. J. Holmes, *The Trend of the Race*, E. M. East, *Mankind at the Crossroads*, M. Sanger, *The Pivot of Civilization*, W. J. Robinson, *Birth Control*, W. F. Robie, *Sex and Life*.

<sup>83</sup> E. Westermarck, *The History of Human Marriage*, W. Lay, *A Plea for Monogamy*, Robie, op. cit., M. M. Knight, "The Companionate and the Family," in *Journal of Social Hygiene*, Vol. X, No. 5, pp. 257-67; K. Anthony, in *Civilization in the United States*, pp. 319-36.

be said that our law aids women in the matter of being more helpless to escape from enslavement to their husbands under a double standard of morality. Finally, it is highly dubious if the actual amount of pre-conjugal and extra-marital sexual intercourse is less than it would be in an era of a rational solution of sexual problems. What is certain is that much of what now exists is degraded and robbed of all its ennobling and creative powers, and fraught with alarming dangers to the æsthetic sense, self-respect and physical health.<sup>34</sup>

It is, further, quite apparent to objective students of the problem that in the attempt to repress sex in Puritanic societies, the result has been to create a veritable sexual obsession on the part of the American population, just as monasticism produced the most sexually absorbed class in the history of mankind. The American vice-crusader is infinitely more obsessed in regard to the matter of sex than the most distinguished French or Viennese *roué*.<sup>35</sup> No attempt will be made to take up the matter of the good or evil of sexual intercourse among humans aside from the matter of conscious effort at procreation, but as an historian it might be worth while to ask the exponents of the impurity-complex to explain the fact that, without exception, the great periods of cultural efflorescence have been those characterized by a large amount of freedom in sex-relations, and that those of the greatest cultural degradation and decline have been accompanied with greater sex repression and purity, including even the far famed decline of the Roman empire, so long claimed by the sex-obscurantist and moralizing historian as an ample proof of the culturally degrading nature of sexual freedom.

<sup>34</sup> See the literature on this subject reviewed by H. E. Barnes and W. C. Waterman in *Journal of Social Forces*, November, 1924, pp. 149-54, Havelock Ellis, *Little Essays of Love and Virtue*, and F. Kirchwey (Ed.), *Our Changing Morality*.

<sup>35</sup> See references in footnote 30. Also E. C. Parsons, in *Civilisation in the United States*, pp. 306-16.

The writer is not here concerned with suggesting any way out of this perplexity. He only contends that the above is not an unfair picture of the actual situation and the need for some thoughtful consideration of it. The outlook for progress in the attainment of a scientific attitude towards conduct is not very hopeful, for those who should be the leaders are often as much enmeshed in the current conventions as the most illiterate clerk or the most bigoted clergyman. An American sociologist of international reputation recently expressed himself as wholly satisfied with the current mores, as believing that they represent the result of the best conscious thought and analysis of the ages, and contended that fear and ignorance on the part of youth are the only safe, and quite adequate, agencies for the control of sex. He avowed himself as fiercely opposed to a general dissemination of a knowledge of birth control methods and venereal prophylaxis. And two other equally distinguished sociologists were personally known by the writer to have opposed the appearance upon a program of the American Sociological Society of the most distinguished American sociological authority on the problems of sex, because he had been worsted by the Babbitts in attempting to carry out in practical life scientific theories of sex conduct which had been at least theoretically accepted and approved by these very sociologists in their writings. In the light of such facts who can find heart to condemn the bigotry and obscurantism of the average citizen?

Two thousand years of religion, philosophy and metaphysics have left us no reliable and definitive body of rules for conduct, either personal or social. A hundred years of sociology have done little better. Very few sociologists have presented views on conduct which have been other than their childish theologically derived prejudices, rationalized and elaborated in impressive and obscure nomenclature and expression. Some have generalized vaguely with a false air of scientific objectivity, but when they have

become specific their views have not diverged markedly from the codes of conduct issued by the Catholic and the evangelical Protestant churches. Only in the still embryonic science of mental hygiene have we been favored with anything truly aspiring towards a science of efficient and healthful conduct. But this has, however, been denounced by conventional philosophers and sociologists as obscene and degrading, even though advocates and exponents of mental hygiene have ever advised being as "good" as it is possible to be and still avoid being a neurotic crank or parasite, or an inmate of an insane asylum—certainly not highly lascivious advice.<sup>86</sup>

#### 4. *Science and Ethics.*

The primitive nature of our conventional ethical codes and their rationalized defense and justification can probably best be made clear by contrasting with them our attitude towards matters which have already been brought within the range of scientific analysis and control. If we are ill in any manner or degree, suffer from tooth-ache, have a leak in the plumbing, need a garage erected, require some overhauling of the motor of our car, need a new mainspring in our watch, or desire a radio-set installed, we at once are impressed with the reasonableness and necessity of conferring with a physician, surgeon, dentist, plumber, architect, mechanic, watchmaker, or electrician, but we are willing to accept as valid judgments and adequate guidance upon problems of conduct the standards enunciated, approved and enforced by the unscientifically trained clergyman, the Y. M. C. A. lecturer at large on sex and hygiene, the elderly "man on the street," and the illiterate gossip-mongering housewife.<sup>87</sup>

And the absurdity is even worse than it might seem from

\* It will doubtless prove edifying along the lines of the above discussion to compare the average sociological work with E. R. Groves, *Personality and Social Adjustment*.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. J. H. Robinson, *Mind in the Making*, pp. 7 ff.

the above, for all the problems mentioned there as those for the resolution of which we would normally have recourse to an expert scientist and technician are extremely simple, compared to the matter of scientifically determining and solving the problems of conduct. The sympathetic and wholehearted cooperation of a large number of scientific experts would be essential to arrive at any reliable verdict as to an ethical problem. Hence, there is no reason to assume that any promiscuous dicta uttered without any such solid foundations in research are any more certain to be correct than the conventional views, even though they may be diametrically opposed. There is relatively little to be gained in the replacement of a code of conduct based upon myth, tradition, convention and supernaturalism by one which is founded merely upon righteous indignation at the existing system. To formulate even the most tentative body of ethical doctrine which could be expected to possess any scientific validity, and might command the respect of a critical and skeptical intellect we should require the collaboration of highly intelligent and thoroughly trained representatives of chemistry, biology, physiology, medicine, psychiatry, psychology, sociology, economics and history. To deal with the further problem of the application and enforcement of a code of conduct we would need the aid of the political scientist and the students of jurisprudence, education and journalism.<sup>28</sup>

Perhaps the most striking facts in regard to the deter-

\* Books illustrating the bearing of these sciences upon the problems under discussion are W B Cannon, *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage*; A Keith, *Man*, J A Thomson, *What is Man?*, G W Crile, *The Origin and Nature of the Emotions*; L Berman, *The Glands Regulating Personality*; M J Rosenau, *Preventive Medicine and Hygiene*, R Cabot, *Layman's Handbook of Medicine*, W A White, *Outlines of Psychiatry*, C Beers, *The Mind That Found Itself*, W H Burnham, *The Normal Mind*, J Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, E R Groves, *Personality and Social Adjustment*, J. A. Hobson, *Work and Wealth*, J H Robinson, *Mind in the Making*; A. N. Holcombe, *The Foundations of the Modern Commonwealth*, R Pound, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law*, B N Cardozo, *The Nature of the Judicial Process*, H G Wells, *The Salvaging of Civilization*; J H Robinson, *The Humanizing of Knowledge*; W Lippmann, *Liberty and the News*; Public Opinion, N. A. Crawford, *The Ethics of Journalism*.

mination of a scientific system of ethics are the wide range and diversity of the types of experts required and the fact that the two groups now accorded the custody of conduct determination—the metaphysical moralists and the clergymen—would not be consulted at all. It is infinitely more absurd to refer problems of conduct to the metaphysician and the theologian than it would be to go to a metaphysician for the removal of one's appendix or to have recourse to the theologian to have a chemical analysis performed. There is far greater probability that an average metaphysician would be a competent surgeon, or that a typical clergyman would be a well-trained chemist than that either would possess the highly modern and varied knowledge which would enable them to give specific and reliable information and advice on matters of conduct. And the corps of scientists who should consider the nature and content of a desirable ethical system would determine the whole matter solely with regard to man's human qualities in relation to his most happy and efficient association with his fellow beings while an inhabitant of this planet. The old notions of supernatural ethical revelations and sanctions for conduct, and the related view that the chief objective of right living is to secure an assured entry into a heavenly paradise, must be abandoned as anachronisms as antiquated and insupportable as magic, astrology or witchcraft.<sup>39</sup> This does not involve in any sense the problems, thus far purely philosophical and theological, of the existence of God or an immortal existence after death, for it would require a charge of overt inconsistency against God to assume that the most scientific method of living while a member of human society would meet his disapproval or prevent our rapid and successful translation to the empyrean area.

<sup>39</sup> J. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*; R. C. Givler, *The Ethics of Hercules*, W. M. Davis, "The Reasonableness of Science," in *Scientific Monthly*, September, 1922, E. C. Hayes, *Sociology and Ethics*, Chap. IV. Cf. H. H. Field, "Ethics, Glands and Complexes," in *Christian Work*, April 11, 1925.

In attempting to formulate tentatively the essentials of an efficient and tenable ethical system it would be necessary first to consider man as an animal; to catalogue the various drives, instincts, impulses and motives which dominate him as a member of the biological world.<sup>40</sup> It would then be essential to investigate how far, with regard to man purely as an individual, the direct and immediate expression of these drives and impulses, with the satisfaction thus produced, is desirable and beneficial, and to what degree it is detrimental and should be obstructed, diverted or sublimated.<sup>41</sup> But man cannot be considered solely as an isolated animal existing in a primitive or pre-cultural age. He must be viewed as a member of an advanced and cultivated society with intimate and complicated social relationships, obligations and responsibilities.

The decision as to what is best for him as an isolated animal must, then, be modified in the light of his cultural surroundings and social environment. But it must still be remembered that whatever lessens man's organic efficiency and quality must necessarily ultimately weaken and undermine his culture and social institutions. A proper balance must be struck between those forms of conduct which secure the greatest amount of physical and psychic vigor and efficiency and those which will produce the most notable cultural achievements. That there may be some clash and necessity for compromise here cannot be doubted, but it is highly probable that there is actually far less of an antithesis than is usually assumed between those forms of conduct which advance the physical well-being of a nation and those which impel it on to higher ranges of cultural progress.<sup>42</sup> And our notions of efficiency in the determination of

\* J. A. Thomson, *What Is Man?*, A. Keith, *Man*, P. H. Mitchell, *Textbook of General Physiology*, M. Parmelee, *The Science of Human Behavior*

<sup>40</sup> Givler, *op. cit.*, Chaps. III, VII, F. L. Wells, *Pleasure and Behavior*, S. Paton, *Human Behavior*

<sup>41</sup> This matter is well handled in R. M. MacIver, *Community: a Sociological Study*. See also K. Pearson, *National Life from the Standpoint of Science*; and Hayes, *op. cit.*, Chap. VII.



ethical conduct must be broad enough to include a consideration of æsthetics and the dictates of "the true and beautiful." Indeed, there is much ground upon which to support the contention of Shaftesbury that virtue and morals are a fine art, and that the æsthetic criteria of conduct are perhaps the most valid.<sup>43</sup> In fact, it will probably be desirable to give up entirely the old concept of *morals* or morality, and substitute the more accurate term descriptive of the new objective, namely *morale*. As Stanley Hall has put it: "If there is any chief end of man, any goal or destiny supreme over all others, it is simply this—to keep ourselves, body and soul, and our environment, physical, social, industrial, etc., always at the very tip-top of condition. This superhygiene is best designated as *Morale*. It is the only truly divine power that ever was or will be. Hence it follows that morale thus conceived is the one and only true religion of the present and the future, and its doctrines are the only true theology. Every individual situation and institution, every race, nation, class, or group is best graded as ascendant or decadent by its morale."<sup>44</sup>

And it will hardly be necessary to point out the fact that the future body of moral practice or foundation of morale will be far more comprehensive than anything now prevailing. It will not be limited to formal correctness with respect to a primitive attitude towards sex, but will embrace the necessity of adhering to the principles of honesty, justice, decency, sympathy and kindness in general. Indeed, one may even go so far as to hold that it may actually imply the substitution of the ethical teachings of Jesus Christ for those of modern clergymen, vice-crusaders, and fanatical reformers.

It is also probable that much more should be made of the distinction between the conventionally "moral" man

<sup>43</sup> See the admirable chapter on "The Art of Morals," in H. Ellis, *The Dance of Life*.

<sup>44</sup> G. S. Hall, *Morale: The Supreme Standard of Life and Conduct*; and R. Pound, *Law and Morals*.

and the man of honor, with the consequent setting up of the latter as the preferable ideal of the two. Mencken has well distinguished between these two types by his definition of the man of honor as a person who sincerely regrets a dishonorable act even if he has not been detected in it.<sup>45</sup>

### 5. *Pluralism, Relativity and Moral Conduct.*

Still further to emphasize the complicated and difficult problem of working out an approximately perfect system of conduct, particularly in its applicability to individual guidance, it is necessary to call attention to the significance of individual differences in ability, taste and inclination in this regard. We have more or less been assuming in the above discussion the uniformity of the population in ability and native endowment, and that some valid code of conduct can be worked out which would be equally applicable to all the classes in the population. All men have been held in pietistic tradition to be equal before God. But, as Aristotle intuitively perceived, and Galton, Pearson and their associates and disciples have proved, this is one of the most atrocious fallacies of popular social, political and ethical thought. Wide variations in capacity appear to be the most important single fact about the human race, thus showing that mankind conforms to the general implications of the normal frequency curve descriptive of the variations generally observable throughout the realm of nature.<sup>46</sup> It would seem to follow that there will be certain kinds of conduct which will not be harmful for the abler members of society; which, indeed, may be positively desirable and beneficial; yet which, at the same time, would

<sup>45</sup> Cf. H. O'Higgins, *The American Mind in Action*, Chap. i, especially p. 9; H. L. Mencken, *Prejudices*, Third Series, Chap. i.

<sup>46</sup> See M. M. Willey, in Merriam and Barnes, *A History of Political Theories: Recent Times*, Chap. 11, F. H. Hankins, "Individual Differences and Their Significance for Social Theory," in *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 1922, pp. 27-39, and "Individual Difference and Democratic Theory," in *Political Science Quarterly*, September, 1923, pp. 388-412.

be dangerous for their less capable fellow-citizens, relatively lacking in poise, self-control and intellectual discrimination.<sup>47</sup>

Pluralism thus becomes a problem for advanced ethical theory quite as much as for political theory. It raises the whole problem of man's being his "brother's keeper" in quite a new manner and with different implications. Hitherto it has been assumed that one genius should repress his desires, cramp and paralyze his personality, and destroy much of his power for creative work, so that a dozen morons might potentially obtain a hypothetical harp in a mythological New Jerusalem. In the light of the fact that all of human progress has been due primarily to the work of the able few, the modern student of ethical theory will probably have to admit that it is better to sacrifice a thousand morons rather than handicap seriously a single genius. But whether or not one accepts this generalization, the problem remains of adjusting any scientific moral code to the fact of the vast variations in human capacity and desires and the implications of these diversities for the content and enforcement of a body of ethical doctrine.<sup>48</sup>

And again, no scientifically oriented person would expect that anything more than an approximation to an intelligent and efficient system of ethics could be worked out by pure analysis, even by the most competent group of cooperating scientists in all the interested fields which were mentioned above. We should need to survey history to discover as far as possible the effect of various forms of conduct in the past, and, above all, we should require

<sup>47</sup> A thesis developed with considerable force from the philosophic standpoint by Nietzsche in his distinction between the "Herrenmoral" and the "Sklavenmoral", and popularized in America by H. L. Mencken. A good study from the psychiatric point of view is needed.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. F. H. Giddings, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, Chap. xv; H. M. Kallen, *Culture and Democracy in the United States*, Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, W. James, *The Will to Believe and Other Essays*, E. C. Hayes, *Sociology and Ethics*.

an experimental attitude towards the effects of our new code as applied, with the end in view of constant revision as experience dictates the desirability and necessity of alteration. But nothing could be more revolutionary than this very notion of a tentative and experimental attitude in regard to conduct.<sup>49</sup>

The conventional theory of ethics is that conduct is something dictated by the gods, complete in scope and permanent and eternal in content. The view that it is socially determined, and should be continually revised and readapted to changing social and cultural conditions is diametrically opposed to all orthodox views of ethical theory and practice.<sup>50</sup> And the whole notion embraced in the above discussion regarding the possibility of bringing together an adequate group of scientists to construct a scientific body of ethical doctrine and then getting it accepted by the mass of mankind is largely fanciful and utopian. Any progress in the direction of a scientific, æsthetic and experimental attitude towards conduct will, in all probability, be achieved only very slowly, unconsciously, and in a highly piece-meal manner. The aim of the writer will have been executed if he has made it clear how extremely complicated and technical is the whole problem of the discovery of the nature of what is truly ethical conduct, and how absurdly grotesque it is for us to accept as possessing any validity whatever the views on ethics held by the average metaphysician, clergyman, vice-crusader, house-wife or Main Street gossip, which are today the sovereign guides of conduct for the majority of mankind, and something which it is difficult for even the ablest of our race to disregard with impunity.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>49</sup> W M Davis, loc cit, Dewey, op cit

<sup>50</sup> There is a vigorous critique of the conventional and pietistic view by A Llans, "Morality, the Last of the Dogmas," in the *Philosophical Review*, Vol. V, pp 371-94

<sup>51</sup> See L Hughes, "In Defense of the Ku Klux Klan," in *Humanity and Its Problems*, April, 1924, and J M. Mecklin, *The Ku Klux Klan*.

6. *Practical Significance of the Problem.*

The whole problem of ethical reconstruction is, however, something of more than academic or curious import. Nothing could be more erroneous than the assumption that with the growing complexity of human society and the decline of supernaturalism we can dispense with a serious consideration of the problems of conduct. There can be no question that we are in far greater need today of an adequate body of morality and a proper provision of morale than at any earlier time in the history of human society.<sup>52</sup> An unscientific and inefficient standard of conduct was far less dangerous in a static, simple agrarian society than it is in the complex, dynamic urban age of today. And it will probably be necessary to enforce the desirable standards rather more rigidly than previously, but before we go far in this direction we shall need to discover by scientific means the nature of a valid code of conduct and to be sure that we are not trying to enforce a system which is totally wrong-headed and primitive, the successful execution of which would be socially disastrous.<sup>53</sup> It will further be necessary to understand that any attempt at political enforcement of standards of conduct will be largely futile and harmful unless preceded and accompanied by an adequate campaign of public education and enlightenment.<sup>54</sup> And, finally, it may be safely assumed that it is a matter which is solely up to man. He can expect nothing in the way of divine inspiration and guidance, except in so far as this may be discovered in the fact of his intellectual powers and the potentiality residing therein for remarkable scientific achievement and application. If he fails to meet the re-

<sup>52</sup> Hall, *op. cit.*; and "The Message of the Zeitgeist," in the *Scientific Monthly*, August, 1921; P. Kropotkin, *Ethics. Origin and Development*, Chaps. i-ii, E. C. Hayes, *Sociology and Ethics*, Chaps. x-xii.

<sup>53</sup> Dewey, *op. cit.*; H. Neumann, *Education for Moral Growth*, which is discussed in a stimulating article by M. C. Otto in the *American Review*, November-December, 1924, pp. 666 ff. See also the important chapters in Otto's *Things and Ideals*, especially Chap. v.

<sup>54</sup> W. Lippmann, *Public Opinion*.

sponsibility, the wreck of our civilization will doubtless be the penalty which we shall pay, as our predecessors have invariably paid it in previous ages.<sup>55</sup>

The above discussion should certainly have made it apparent how dangerous, misleading and inaccurate it is to continue to maintain the sharp distinction between character and intelligence which is based wholly upon primitive animism and pure metaphysics. There are, to be sure, many examples of men of high intelligence who are utterly lacking in a sense of honor or decency or in fundamental honesty and fairness, in exactly the same way that there are many arrant scoundrels among the clergy of the United States in the year 1924, but to assume that this constitutes any basis for the divorcement of intelligence from morality is as absurd as it would be to conclude that no clergyman could be moral. While there may be intelligent men who are not moral, there can certainly be no truly moral men who are not intelligent, unless one means by morality unreasoning obedience to the herd. If one accepts this as the criterion of moral conduct, then many animals and most insects are far more thoroughly and highly moral than any man could possibly aspire to be. Indeed, one can probably say that there is no truly or completely intelligent person who is not at the same time moral in the scientific sense of that term. Any deviation from morality would constitute to that degree evidence of shortcomings in his intelligence, in the same way that grave doubts of intellectual acumen on the part of any individual would be raised by his consuming eight custard pies in succession or voluntarily walking into a millpond in January. It should be absolutely clear to any thoughtful and informed person that morality, far from being divorced from intelligence, depends more thoroughly and completely upon intelligence and scientific information than any other phase of human thought and

<sup>55</sup> Hall, *Morale*, and "The Message of the Zeitgeist," loc. cit., J. H. Robinson, *Mind in the Making*, and *The Humanizing of Knowledge*, H. G. Wells, *The Salvaging of Civilization*, E. A. Ross, *Roads to Social Peace*.

action. The relative complexity and difficulties in arriving at an adequate theory of conduct are so great that it is palpably less absurd to declare for a divorcement of mathematics, physics or chemistry from the intellect and intellectual processes, than to contend that morality and intelligence are two different and unrelated entities. In this day and age a writer could give no more perfect evidence of anachronistic and confused thinking than to enunciate the paleolithic thesis of the divorcement of intellect and morality.<sup>56</sup>

## II. ETHICS AND HISTORY.

### 1. *Some Leading Historical Conceptions of the "Good Life."*

An illuminating and important phase of the historical point of view applied to ethics, and of the bearing of ethical interests upon history is to be found in an investigation of the history of the prevailing views about the "good life" which have succeeded each other in the course of western civilization. We are concerned here almost solely with the general attitude of the intellectual class at large, rather than with the views of specific philosophers or of the mass of the people.

In primitive society there was little conscious philosophy of life objectives. The basic conception was that of "luck." The best life was that which secured the greatest assurance of permanence and continuance of the individual and communal luck. Everything which occurred was invariably referred to a supernatural cause and intervention, fortunate incidents being assigned to good spirits, and disaster of various degrees to the intervention of evil spirits. The effective mode of insuring the dominance of the acts of the good spirits—namely, the existence of satisfactory luck—was believed to be that of following with great care the

<sup>56</sup> Neumann, *op. cit.*, Dewey, *op. cit.*

type of life marked out by taboos—the danger signals or “don’ts” of primitive society. If no taboos were violated the good spirits would not be alienated, and would continue their beneficent activities. This led to the rigid domination of the customs which embodied these taboos, as well as certain types of positive directions for human life and social activities. The “good life” to primitive man, then, meant docile subservience to custom as enforced by the herd and its leaders, and this ideal has continued to control the mass of mankind with some slight progressive mitigation to the present time. As Marett sums up the matter: “Custom is king, nay tyrant, in primitive society. When Captain Cook asked the chiefs of Tahiti why they ate apart and alone, they simply replied, ‘Because it is right.’ And so it always is with the ruder peoples. ‘Tis the custom, and there’s an end on’t’ is their notion of a sufficient reason in politics and ethics alike.”<sup>67</sup>

The oriental ideal was much like that of the primitive age as to status and rigidity, but it meant the enforcement of custom on a larger, more magnificent and more forceful scale. The primitive chieftain had been elevated and transformed into the king and emperor, with much greater wealth and power, and more territory and subjects under his dominion. The custom and myth of earlier days had likewise been converted into systematized religious belief and tradition on the one hand, and unalterable and rigidly enforced codes of sumptuary laws on the other. But it was chiefly a change in the scale of activities. Conformity remained the great social and individual ideal, and original thought and reflective analysis were as little encouraged as in previous ages. The machinery for the discovery and impressive rebuke of originality and independence was even more effective and extensive than in primitive society. In no way did the Hebrews exhibit any marked deviation

<sup>67</sup> W. Bagehot, *Politics and Politics*, Chaps. II-III, L. Lévy-Bruhl, *Primitive Mentality*, A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, Part III, J. K. Hart, *The Discovery of Intelligence*, Kropotkin, op. cit., Chap. IV.



from their oriental neighbors in this respect when they were in a position to compel obedience to their folkways and beliefs.<sup>58</sup>

With the Greeks we have a notable change. For the first time a portion of mankind was able to depart from the unreasoning acceptance of custom and tradition, and to begin critical reflection on the meaning and objectives of life. This process was initiated by the critical pre-Socratic philosophers and continued by the Sophists. There was developed a general distrust of the supernaturalistic explanations of causation, which found its most extreme form in the mechanistic evolutionary philosophy of the Epicureans. Custom and tradition likewise fell into disrepute among the critical philosophers. There followed an attempt to construct on the basis of conscious thought and reasoned analysis definite theories of life and happiness. Truth, beauty and self-expression were among the highest ideals of the Greeks. Their criteria as to right living were drawn primarily from mundane considerations. The good life was the best life for man here and now, with little or no reference to the life beyond the grave. There was a real joy in daily life, and much of the Greek religion, ritual and recreation expressed in one way or another this spirit and attitude. The æsthetic rather than the ascetic was the dominant *motif* of life. Along with these must be put the Greek sense of balance and propriety. There was little of the narrow or fanatical in the best ideals of the Greeks. This attitude is well exemplified by Plato's catalogue of the four cardinal virtues: wisdom, justice, courage and temperance; and by Aristotle's conception of virtue as the happy mean between asceticism and indulgence. Tolerance and urbanity, perhaps the two capital tests of civilization, were highly esteemed, and emerge at their best in the *Dialogues*

<sup>58</sup> F. H. Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, pp. 283-6; J. H. Breasted, *Ancient Times*, W. Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*, Chap. iii, F. S. Marvin, *The Living Past*, Chap. iii, P. V. N. Myers, *History as Past Ethics*, Chaps. iii-iv, ix.

of Plato. Serenity, poise and self-confidence were cherished as ideals for the healthy and desirable personal attitude. Further, the Greeks distinguished rather clearly between the *Herrenmoral* and the *Sklavenmoral*. The good life was for those intelligent enough to know it and to live it. There prevailed no false notions of equality and democracy. Even the Stoic conception of the brotherhood of man envisaged only the wise and capable of all nations. Finally, the Greeks put intellectual and cultural considerations ahead of the material. They did not capitulate to "the empire of machines," and "things" were distinctly not "in the saddle." Estimates are always biased by the subjective, but it is the sober opinion of the writer that no other theory of life, with the possible exception of the closely related views of Confucius, constitutes any reasonable approximation to that of the Greeks as the general ideal for humanity from all points of view. It is not without significance that modern psychiatrists and exponents of mental hygiene are continually reverting to the Greeks for their slogans and objectives.<sup>59</sup>

The Romans produced little which was new in regard to the theory of life. Their best minds simply took up and adapted the Greek ideals in this respect. Writers like Marcus Aurelius, Seneca and Epictetus presented the Stoic views in a sympathetic spirit. Lucretius and Horace were equally favorable to the Epicurean attitude, while the balanced Greek view was best set forth by the eclectic expositor, Cicero. The bucolic ideal was somewhat more pronounced in Roman than in Greek thought. It was presented in a crude and savage form by Cato the Elder, and in a much more engaging fashion by Virgil and Horace. Perhaps the chief addition which the Romans made to the

<sup>59</sup> Books like Livingstone's *Legacy of Greece*; Zimmern's *Greek Commonwealth*; Dickinson's *The Greek View of Life*; Burns, *Greek Ideals*, and Murray's *Ancient Greek Literature* set forth the Greek point of view in clear and adequate fashion. See also Myers, *op. cit.*, Chap. x, and Kropotkin, *op. cit.*, Chap. v.

theory of the good life lay in the greater emphasis upon the ideals of order, authority, regimentation, status and obedience, which were in large measure a reflection and justification of the exigencies of the Roman political system and economic and social institutions. Embodied to a considerable degree in systematic Roman law these concepts have played an immense part in shaping our notions and practices in social control.<sup>80</sup>

While Christian theology was largely an attempt to state the nature of the person and mission of Christ in terms of Hellenic transcendentalism, the Christian ideals of life were on most points a complete negation of the Greek position. In the place of the free play of the intellect the Christians substituted a neo-oriental conception of life according to fixed and immutable dogma and rite. Faith supplanted reason as the guide to truth, and credulity instead of critical analysis became the chief intellectual virtue. The Hellenic emphasis upon the importance of a happy and well-balanced life on this planet, and a joy in things mundane, was given up for an all-consuming interest in the life after death. The salvation of the soul rather than the augmentation and clarification of knowledge and the increase of human happiness became the chief objective in life. Things of the flesh were to be crucified ruthlessly as the chief obstacle to salvation. It was scarcely desirable even to speculate about the good life upon the earth, lest this divert attention from the salutary and efficacious spiritual exercises designed to save the soul. A mystical rather than a philosophical outlook upon life was most highly prized. Instead of a glorification of the female form and personality, and a judicious and healthy attitude towards sex, the Christians, following in the wake of Paul's

<sup>80</sup> Among the best books on Roman thought and morality are S. Dill, *Roman Society* (two volumes), L. Friedlander, *Roman Life and Morals*, W. Fowler, *Social Life at Rome*, C. Bailey, et al., *The Legacy of Rome*, E. Benan, *The Influence of the Institutions, Thought and Culture of Rome on Christianity*. See also Myers, *op cit*, Chap. xi.

teachings, looked upon woman as the source of original sin, and viewed sexual activities as the devil's chief instrument in the seduction of the human race. The ascetic replaced the æsthetic as the ideal of personal conduct. In part this was due to the boorishness of the Hebrew ideal which had found expression in the bucolic and primitive philosophy of the typical Hebrew prophets whose chief function seems to have been a persistent effort to prevent the Hebrew peoples from falling into the ways of civilization. Instead of breadth, poise, sanity and balance as the chief ideals and practices of life, we find a narrow, fanatical and panicky attitude. In the place of tolerance and urbanity appeared persecution and the procedure against heresy. Serenity and self-confidence were replaced by fear and self-depreciation. The orthodox Christian was preeminently a person of a single-track mind. It is, of course, true that if one accepted the premises of the Christian Epic these attitudes were logical, if not inevitable. Salvation was too important a thing, and life too brief and uncertain to allow of that leisurely mundane urbanity which alone can produce true culture and civilization. We are not here concerned with a critique or defense of the Christian attitude, but only aim briefly to summarize it. Of all its traits, probably other-worldliness and intolerance stand out as most prominent and most potent.<sup>61</sup>

The Scholastic synthesis which supplanted the Patristic orientation as the characteristic phase of the culture and intellectual life of the height of the medieval period rested firmly upon the general background of the Christian Epic and the Patristic fanaticism, but there was some little compromise with the Aristotelian ideal of the contemplative

<sup>61</sup> Among the important books on this subject are F. C. Conybeare, *Myth, Magic and Morals*; F. A. Henry, *Jesus and the Christian Religion*; A. Harnack, *History of Dogma*, J. E. Carpenter, *Phases of Early Christianity*; P. Gardner, *Exploratio Evangelica*, L. Walsh, *A Sociological Study of the Bible*, H. B. Workman, *Christian Thought to the Reformation*, A. D. White, *History of the Warfare of Science with Theology*. Cf. particularly J. B. Bury, *History of the Freedom of Thought*, Chap. III. See also Myers, *op. cit.*, Chaps. XII-XIII, and Kropotkin, *op. cit.*, Chap. VI.

life. Abelard had proved that Christian dogma could not remain invulnerable when based upon faith, credulity and authority alone. From the days of Peter Lombard to those of Aquinas, Scotus and Occam the effort was made to vindicate Christianity through an appeal to the resources of the logical technique. There was some slight reassertion of the "things of the head" as against the earlier absolute sway of the "things of the heart." But the former were utilized and exploited solely in the interest of the latter. There was no thought of the place or possibility of "idle curiosity," disinterested analysis and tolerant reflection. The other-worldly bias still dominated all thought. But from the thirteenth century onward, with the increase of worldly prosperity and a growing knowledge and appreciation of Greek literature and philosophy, the Patristic-Scholastic complex weakened and mellowed, and gradually prepared the way for a revival of the Hellenic viewpoint in Humanism.<sup>62</sup>

Humanism was primarily the partial revival of the Hellenic outlook upon life which came into being with the recovery of a more complete knowledge of the literature of ancient Greece and Rome. This produced a notable resurgence of an appreciation of things of this life—some joy in life for its own sake. The best of the Humanist philosophers, such as Montaigne, contended that it was the function of philosophy to guide one to the most happy and efficient mode of life upon the earth rather than to teach one how to die so as to be saved. With this appeared to some degree the Greek emphasis upon poise, serenity, balance and contemplation. Tolerance and urbanity increased remarkably. Æsthetic considerations and motives assumed a new importance and vigor. Asceticism was to some degree checked. Significant and pleasing as was this

<sup>62</sup> J. McCabe, *Abelard*; C. H. Haskins, *The Rise of Universities*; M. De Wulf, *History of Medieval Philosophy*; S. L. Poole, *Studies in the History of Medieval Thought*; H. O. Taylor, *The Medieval Mind*; Myers, *op. cit.*, Chap. xv.

revival of the Greek view of life, it was but a feeble approximation to the ancient Hellenism. Petrarch is scarcely to be compared with Aristotle; Erasmus falls far short of Plato or Lucretius. Even in the best of the Humanists there was a strong pietistic trend, and the City of the Devil never gained any considerable triumph over the City of God. Christianity for a time came to tolerate Hellas, but it never surrendered its ascendancy.<sup>63</sup>

The importance of the Humanist outlook upon life was rendered even less conspicuous because of its transient nature. It had scarcely become well established when the Reformation and Counter-Reformation threw Europe back into an intellectual state even lower than that of the best of Scholasticism. The dominating psychology and orientation was that of Paul, Gregory the Great or St. Bernard rather than of Aquinas and Dante. Faith, credulity, fanaticism, intolerance and supernaturalism once more reigned supreme as they had not since the Dark Ages. Only in one direction was there a distinct break with the past, and this lay in the direction of a definite compromise with the materialistic tendencies of the new age associated with the discoveries and the rise of trade, colonialism and capitalism. Luther was sympathetic toward the *bourgeois* growth and expansion which did so much to make his movement a success in Germany. Calvin valiantly defended the dignity of labor and manual effort, thus effecting a definite break with the Greek contempt for such activity, and glorified the acquisition of material riches. The Puritan clerics carried the Calvinistic doctrine still further, claiming that the exercise of business acumen and shrewd economic dealing constituted the most truly divine of human attitudes and activities. This was combined with a compensatory semi-asceticism, which was based upon the theory that while God markedly approved of pecuniary accumulation he

<sup>63</sup> E. M. Hulme, *Renaissance and Reformation*; P. Smith, *Erasmus*; H. O. Taylor, *Thought and Expression in the Sixteenth Century*; K. Pearson, *The Ethic of Free Thought*, Chap. viii, Myers, op. cit., Chap. xvi.

looked askance at the spending of money, which was likely to be associated with the lusts of the flesh. It is probable that this surrender of Christianity to materialism, even though accompanied by an illusory emphasis upon the primary importance of the things of the spirit, is the most novel and significant contribution of the Reformation period to the theory of life.<sup>64</sup>

The abysmal intellectual and cultural gloom of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation was lifted in part by the rise of Rationalism and the development of that intellectual movement known as the Enlightenment. Reason became once more the supreme intellectual process and attitude; and it was the free play of the human faculties rather than the Scholastic exploitation of logic to establish the verities of orthodoxy. Urbanity and tolerance were represented as the chief criteria of true human culture by such writers as Anthony Collins, Pierre Bayle, John Locke, Shaftsbury and Paine. Mundane objectives once more replaced the spiritual and other-worldly. Francis Bacon held that the Kingdom of Man rather than the Kingdom of Heaven should constitute the main center of human interest. Life on this earth came to be looked upon as worthy of improvement. A happy present and a better future were held to depend solely upon a correct and adequate exploitation of the resources of human reason. There was also no little return of that intellectual serenity, appreciation of man as man, and a love of the true and the beautiful which had characterized the Hellenic period, and to a far less extent, the age of Humanism. Over all was spread the orientation of a benign if smug materialism, due chiefly to the *bourgeois* source of the rationalistic thought. Locke held that there were three primordial and inalienable natural rights of

<sup>64</sup> P. Smith, *The Age of the Reformation*; E. M. Hulme, op. cit.; W. E. H. Lecky, *The Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe*, Chaps. 1, 17, Pearson, op. cit., Chap. 11, R. H. Tawney, "Sixteenth Century Religious Thought," in *Journal of Political Economy*, 1923-4, Myers, op. cit., Chap. XVII.

man: life, liberty and property, and the greatest of these was property.<sup>65</sup>

Romanticism, which succeeded Rationalism in the latter part of the eighteenth century as the dominant philosophy of the intellectual classes, tended in part to revert to the pietism and mysticism of the medieval period, but it escaped the asceticism of the earlier age. In its theory of life Romanticism combined in part Christian mysticism and Hellenic naturalism. The emotions were viewed as a better guide to life than pure reason. This led to an appreciation of art, music, literature and life to an even greater degree than had been prevalent among the Rationalists. Of all the fundamentally pious orientations in European history, Romanticism is probably the most attractive.<sup>66</sup>

Unfortunately the pietistic influence of Romanticism exceeded its naturalistic and humanistic trends, and the middle of the nineteenth century came to be characterized by the arid and respectable asceticism of mid-Victorianism and the pietistic reaction, and by the fanatical asceticism begotten of American Puritanism and the frontier and bucolic spirit. But there has been relatively less unity in western civilization since 1850 in regard to the theory of the good life than in earlier ages. Continental ideals have differed markedly from those of England and America. The humanistic and æsthetic tradition has held over much more powerfully in the Continental states. Perhaps the most conspicuous common trend has been the triumph of materialism and the quantitative standards and criteria of success. As Carlyle, Butler and others have made clear,

<sup>65</sup> Lecky, *op. cit.*; J. B. Bury, *op. cit.*, Chaps v-vii; H. Hoffding, *History of Modern Philosophy*, Vol I, W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories from Luther to Montesquieu*, C. Becker, *The Declaration of Independence*; Kropotkin, *op. cit.*, Chaps vii-viii.

<sup>66</sup> Hoffding, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, Book VIII; J. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, W. T. Marvin, *A History of European Philosophy*, Chap xxv, E. Fueter, *L'Histoire de l'historiographie moderne*, Livre V, G. Brandes, *The Romantic School in Germany*; Kropotkin, *op. cit.*, Chap. ix.



the triumph of the machine technique carried with it important psychological and cultural changes. The criteria of success came to be those which could be computed on the ledger and by the adding machine. Standardization and uniformity became highly esteemed. Conformity in conduct has been demanded, and sumptuary legislation has been passed and voluntary organizations founded to enforce it. Critical analysis, independent judgment and cultural pluralism have been frowned upon. These conformist and materialistic tendencies, common in different degrees to all post-Industrial Revolution societies, have been most marked in the United States, where their dominance and ravages have been revealed and denounced by such writers as Sinclair Lewis, Theodore Dreiser and H. L. Mencken. As Veblen has so forcefully shown in his *Theory of the Leisure Class*, pecuniary power and prestige have come to be esteemed above all else, and honorific consumption and conspicuous waste have come to be the most common and approved methods of demonstrating success in life. "Things have come to be in the saddle," and the God of the modern world is business and pecuniary success. Such "pious observances" as remain have come to be chiefly a compensatory and defensive device for the new materialism. The cultural vacuity and shallowness of this attitude have aroused the notice of the oriental peoples, and have impressed them with the necessity of organizing themselves to repel the advances of western mechanized and standardized culture in order that they may retain what seems to them to be the sounder and more satisfactory life of contemplation and leisure on the basis of a simpler technology.<sup>67</sup> This contemporary apotheosis of the business

<sup>67</sup> H. O'Higgins, *The American Mind in Action*, H. Stearns, (Ed.), *Civilization in the United States*; H. M. Kallen, *Culture and Democracy in the United States*, H. L. Mencken, *A Book of Prefaces*, pp. 197-283; *Prejudices*, in four series, T. Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, R. H. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, R. A. Cram, *The Nemesis of Mediocrity*; S. Strauss, "Things Are in the Saddle," in *Atlantic Monthly*, November, 1924, R. Guénon, *Orient et Occident*

man and his mores is well summarized by Professor E. A. Ross in his latest work on *Roads to Social Peace*:

The new rich, whose wealth rests on modern industrial bases, do their utmost to assimilate themselves to the old nobility and thereby enter into its heritage of social prestige . . .

Sections of the wealthy leisure class scheme and plot continually to get themselves looked up to as social superiors and brand with inferiority the rest of society, particularly the workers. For supporting their claim to be superior they have a whole arsenal of tactics. Thanks to their deep purses, they avail themselves of everything clothes can do to hide commonness and transfigure the wearer. With the aid of architects and artists and decorators they provide themselves with noble and splendid backgrounds which deeply impress simple folk. They try to eliminate their not-rich competitors for social prestige by setting up certain reputable expenditures as sure touchstones of social worth. Thanks to their ownership of or influence in the newspapers they obtain much glorifying publicity for their doings, poses and diversions. Seeking to shine by reflected light they snuggle close to all who have social prestige in their own right, such as captains of industry, lofty prelates, high officials, the headmen in the professions, renowned scientists, writers, artists and explorers. They manoeuvre themselves into ornamental and ceremonial posts, such as those of the diplomatic service. They have their children educated in snobbish and exclusive schools, where conviction of the superiority of their class will become a second nature. They marry their daughters to the scions of impoverished European noble families. So far as possible they create about themselves the atmosphere of the aristocracies of other times—the French noblesse, the English lords, the German Junkers, the Southern slave-holding planters . . .

Continually pictured as a superman, a being of tremendous intellectual grasp, beside whom the proletarians are pigmies and the professional men weaklings, the business man at last comes to believe it and takes himself with tremendous seriousness. While it has come to be quite the common thing for the business man to give his boy a college education, so that the college bred in the ranks of business are more frequent every year, there is no reason to suppose that the gap has been much narrowed which separates them from the members of the learned professions. Nevertheless, professional men enjoy no such undisputed community leadership as they did two generations ago. Emboldened by the rush of newspaper flattery to the head, the business men have brushed them aside, seized the reins, and "sold" themselves to the public. In Rotary or Kiwanis club, it is amusing to watch the growing dis-

position of hardware dealers and haberdashers to show the professional men their place . . .

In these groups, lunching together once a week, suggestioned and indoctrinated constantly by higher-ups from outside, the conviction of the wonderful thought-power, will-force, and social value of the business class becomes so intense that they see nothing out of the way in taking into their hands decisions about matters which pertain to the community as a whole, such as parks, police, taxes, bond issues, poor relief and schools. That union men, householders, classroom teachers or other groups should object to the business men self-sacrificingly making these decisions for them seems to them monstrous and intolerable. Anyone who raises a voice against their dictation to city officials or public schools or private charities is a "Bolshevik" and must forthwith be deprived of his means of livelihood, *pour encourager les autres*. When one observes how a knot of smug bankers and merchants will cause to be pursued with the most tireless malignancy the preacher, teacher or employee who ventures to arraign their sordid local domination, one wonders whether ever the world has known poorer sportsmen than the typical organized business men.

Interesting as such a study of the history of the successive theories of the good life, as has been only casually and imperfectly suggested in the above review, might be, it is something far less vital and significant than a candid investigation of the practical effects of the actual modes of living which have characterized mankind throughout history. It is in this way only that history can, if at all, aid the scientific student of conduct in arriving at some accurate judgment as to the actual validity of theories of the good life.

## 2. *Some Leading Types of Approach to Ethical Theory.*

In primitive society and, for the most part, in the ancient Orient there was no real ethical theory beyond the assumption of the divine origin and enforcement of custom. The whole doctrine was embodied in the theory that custom is sacred and must be blindly and unthinkingly obeyed. The very idea that there could be such a thing as a philosophy of ethics would be repugnant to primitive peoples. Nor did active theorizing about conduct in the oriental period be-

come a matter of practical import, even though an occasional sage produced from time to time incisive observations on the subject. The accepted doctrine was that "what is, is right." Right was embodied in primitively derived customs, in sumptuary legislation and royal proclamations. The "why" or the justice of such precepts was a subject which the discreet saw fit not to investigate or pry into too closely. Indeed, it was assumed, as in primitive society, that such guides to conduct constituted the will of the gods in the premises, to violate which would invite national, as well as personal, disaster.<sup>68</sup>

With the Greeks the animistic, customary and theological explanations of conduct were in part abandoned for a metaphysical approach to the problem. Socrates and Plato contended that there were certain transcendental, permanent and immutable norms of right—metaphysical entities which existed even anterior to man and independent of any particular time or place. These might be arrived at and defined by adequate dialectical acumen. The Stoics combined metaphysics and revelation. The wisdom of God in the form of the *logos* permeated the cosmos, and man might appropriate some small portion of this through his rational powers and processes, thus seeing the light and learning the divine pleasure as to intricacies of personal conduct. These metaphysical lines of approach to the problems of conduct have persisted to our own day, though the progressive philosophers of the James-Dewey variety have severely challenged the older premises and postulates. The most striking and original step taken by the Greek thinkers appeared in the writings of the Sophists and Epicureans, who recognized the relativity of right, its customary derivation, and its socio-utilitarian basis. Philoso-

<sup>68</sup> L. Lévy-Bruhl, *Primitive Mentality*, R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*; and *Primitive Religion*, A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, J. H. Breasted, *The Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*; E. W. Rogers, *Cuneiform Parallels to the Old Testament*, M. Jastrow, *Civilization in Babylonia and Assyria*

phers, as such, have probably never succeeded better in grasping the true nature and import of ethical codes.<sup>69</sup>

While the Christians retained much of the Hellenic metaphysics in their theology, their ethical doctrine resembled more the primitive and oriental attitude, namely, the view of definite and specific revelation based upon available and infallible religious texts. The orthodox early Christian did not feel it necessary to arrive at his conclusions in regard to ethical theory on the basis of careful, discriminating and analytical reasoning. His only problem was to read over pertinent sections of Holy Writ, particularly the alleged Mosaic Code and certain New Testament writings, especially the ethical precepts of the Pauline Epistles. To these might be added the commentaries and elaborations of the Fathers and Saints, but in any case the source of guidance was explicit revelation and authoritative command. While the metaphysical and logical technique became rather more important in the Scholastic period than it had been in the Patristic, this influenced theology far more than it did the canons and practices in regard to conduct, and revealed divine pleasure in the premises has remained to this day the uniform and universal source of formal guidance and directions to the orthodox Christians in the field of conduct.<sup>70</sup>

The period of Rationalism was characterized by the growth of an empirical and pragmatic attitude towards the sources of ethical guidance and the validity of codes of conduct—a position resembling the Sophistic and Epicurean approach. There also developed among the Deistic rationalists a type of metaphysic, drawn from the Newtonian natural science and celestial mechanics, which contended that human conduct, like the motion and paths of the planets, and all other processes and manifestations of

<sup>69</sup> T. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, E. Barker *Greek Political Thought*, 2 vols., E. Hatch, *Influence of Greek Thought and Usages on the Christian Church*.

<sup>70</sup> Taylor, *Medieval Mind*, Vol. I; *Classical Heritage of the Middle Ages*; W. R. Cassels, *Supernatural Religion*.

nature, should be based upon conformity to a universal natural norm, order or law, which was of divine origin and sanction. There was some resemblance here to the old Stoic conception of the law of nature, but the Deists differed from the Stoics in their mode of discovering the character and content of natural law. They had little faith in the *logos*, but preferred to discover the valid forms of conduct through empirical results achieved in a social world of benevolent *laissez-faire* and free competition. This represented an extreme breach with the orthodox notion of full human guidance through elaborate sumptuary legislation based upon Scriptural warrant. There were also certain important anticipations of the purely æsthetic approach to moral problems in the writings of Montaigne, Shaftesbury and others. Likewise, in the works of Voltaire, Montesquieu and Ferguson we find the foreshadowing of the comparative and evolutionary approach to problems of conduct and ethical codes exemplified in our own day by Spencer, Ratzel, Sumner, Frazer, Westermarck and others. In Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, finally, we discover what was perhaps the first systematic effort to construct ethical doctrine upon the basis of psychological premises.<sup>71</sup> The ethical doctrine of Romanticism was based upon either the revelation theory of the orthodox, or upon the metaphysical "conscience" premise of Kant and others, with an occasional sly peep by certain writers at the æsthetic approach and evaluation.<sup>72</sup>

The most important advance in ethical theory in the half century following Adam Smith was the development of utilitarianism by Bentham and his associates and disciples. This was founded upon a definite psychological basis—the famous felicific calculus, which represented man as a consciously calculating animal, carefully and discriminately hesitating before every choice, and weighing the relative

<sup>71</sup> References as in footnote 65

<sup>72</sup> References as in footnote 66

possibilities of pleasurable satisfaction likely to result from each and every act and expenditure. Socially considered, this ethic demanded the "greatest happiness for the greatest number," and tested the validity of the ethical import and justification of any act by its potential utility in contributing to this desirable end. When discriminatingly interpreted in harmony with the dictates and discoveries of differential biology and psychology, this utilitarian slogan may be regarded as perhaps the best general statement yet made of the objective of social and individual behavior, but its specific psychological foundation has been proved by Graham Wallas and others to be quite obviously fallacious, and it provided no adequate technique for discovering the exact nature of the "greatest happiness."<sup>73</sup>

Closely related to the ethic of the utilitarian school was the sociological theory of conduct which took form very definitely in the writings of Comte, Post, Spencer and Bagehot in the middle third of the nineteenth century. They accepted either tacitly or explicitly the utilitarian criterion as to the validity of forms of conduct, but they tended more definitely to place the derivation of such conduct on the basis of social evolution, selection, and survival value in institutions and forms of conduct. The evolutionary process, they held, tended to favor socially desirable forms of conduct, and to eliminate the undesirable and detrimental. This evolutionary trend in sociological ethics, together with Darwinian evolutionary biology, gave rise to a definite naturalistic school of evolutionary ethical theory represented by such men as Lecky, Stephen, Kidd, Fiske, Hobhouse, Sutherland, Westermarck, Alexander and others.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>73</sup> W. C. Mitchell, "Bentham's Felicific Calculus," in the *Political Science Quarterly*, June, 1918; W. L. Davidson, *Political Thought in England from Bentham to John Stuart Mill*, E. Albee, *A History of English Utilitarianism*; L. Stephen, *The Utilitarians*, G. Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics*; Kropotkin, *op. cit.*, Chap. x.

<sup>74</sup> L. M. Bristol, *Social Adaptation*; J. P. Lichtenberger, *A History of Social Theory*; A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, F. H. Giddings, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*;

Many of these later trends in the study of the nature and origins of codes of conduct unquestionably laid the foundations for a real science of conduct, if mainly in the way of a direct or indirect critique of the supernaturalistic and metaphysical codes of orthodoxy.<sup>75</sup> But no one of these approaches mentioned above made any real effort to investigate just what forms of conduct produced the greatest happiness for the greatest number. The basis for such a discovery was laid by such sciences as biology, chemistry, psychology and medicine. The sociologists should have quickly exploited this material, but they were extremely tardy in so doing, preferring to build up semi-metaphysical systems of sociology or to construct elaborate rationalized defenses of their own orthodox ethical complexes and beliefs. It thus devolved upon socially minded psychiatrists and educators to step into the breach, and mental hygiene has constituted to date almost the only concerted and well organized effort to get at the facts essential to the discovery of any valid foundations for individual and social conduct. Slowly and very recently some of the more progressive sociologists have taken cognizance of these developments, as has been demonstrated by the recent works of Ogburn, Groves, Bernard and Thomas. When, and only when, the proper liaison has been established between mental hygiene and sociology will there at last be provided after several generations of cooperative study a real science of conduct.<sup>76</sup>

### 3. *Ethics and the Historian.*

There has probably been no phase of historical writing which has had a more distorting and misleading influence than the attempt of numerous historians to pre-

Kropotkin, *op cit*, Chaps xi-xii, R. Mackintosh, *From Comte to Benjamin Kidd*

<sup>75</sup> Myers, *op cit*, Chap. xviii

<sup>76</sup> C. Beers, *A Mind That Found Itself*; W. A. White, *Principles of Mental Hygiene*, W. H. Burnham, *The Normal Mind*, J. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*; J. A. Hadfield, *Psychology and Morals*, W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change*; E. R. Groves, *Personality and Social Adjustment*.



sent a moral or moralizing interpretation of history. Not that any great number of historians have actually written histories of morals, or conceived of history as a branch of ethics. Still, few historians have been able to resist using history to illustrate some moral or immoral principle or process which they have assumed as valid and as exemplified in some phase or period of history. From Dionysius and Tacitus to Charles Kingsley and others since his day, the historian has frequently regarded it as one of his primary functions to pass moral judgments upon the trends and characters in history. The unhappy fate of Belshazzar, David's and Solomon's unfortunate amatory ambitions and achievements, the alleged morally degrading nature of oriental civilization as a whole, the disintegration of the Roman Empire due to the growth of sexual looseness, the unspeakable degeneracy of pagan culture as a whole, the austere morality of the Christian culture of the Middle Ages, the excessive wickedness of the Humanists and the Renaissance Age, the high moral character of the Puritans, the debasing nature of the Rationalistic outlook, the adulteries of Napoleon, and the general position that national integrity and prosperity, and cultural productivity and soundness, are absolutely correlated with strictly enforced monogamy and universal extra-conjugal celibacy, are among the more familiar examples of the moralistic interpretation of western history, which have become as threadbare through constant reiteration as they are historically misleading and insupportable in nearly every case.

While it is true that the ethical interpretation of history, when conceived in the broad and scientific sense of the term, is one of the most fundamental types of historical interpretation, and ethical problems and situations constitute an unusually important field for historical investigation, it is also certain that as yet we are in no manner whatever prepared to offer any ethical interpretation of history. At this stage of our knowledge an ethical interpretation of

history is even more dubious and imaginary than the racial interpretation which has gained such a grotesque popularity in recent years. All scientifically minded persons well recognize that we have as yet but the most imperfect knowledge of what forms of conduct are good for man and society here and now. Indeed, we have not in any general way even recognized that it is desirable to begin research in this field. If, then, we have not even begun systematically to investigate what actually constitutes the "good life," we certainly cannot pass competent judgment upon "good" and "bad" forms of conduct in the human past. We are still so abysmally ignorant of what is scientifically demonstrable of being ideal conduct that any judgments which we might pass upon the conduct of individuals and peoples in the past would be either most superficial and irrelevant or most wildly erroneous. If we do not know with any adequacy what will ruin a nation or augment its strength in our own day, when we have available all the evidence in the case, how much less valid must be our opinions about the past where the evidence for a substantial judgment in such matters is notoriously less if not absent entirely!

In fact, this last point raises the whole issue of the probability as to whether at any future time we shall be able to produce a valid ethical interpretation of history, except for very recent periods. By the time we have discovered what is actually the "good life," we shall doubtless find that its determination rests upon so wide a knowledge of so many and diverse, and often obscure, factors that the sources for anything but contemporary history are so inadequate and incomplete that they are practically worthless for research into moral issues and activities. This should not, however, discourage research into what may well be one of the most vital and important fields of work. But if it is carried on at all, it will not be from the premises and assumptions of the ethical historiography of Bossuet, Charles Kingsley, Anthony Comstock, John Roach Straton or Cardinal

Hayes. It will rather follow the lines marked out by the research into the biological basis of national prosperity, exemplified by the writings of Vacher de Lapouge, Schallmayer, Pearson, Holmes and others; the study of the effect of economic methods and policies by such writers as Weber, Schmoller, Sombart, Webb, Hobson, Veblen and others; a realistic inquiry as to political life in the past, in accordance with the methods of Maitland, Beard, Laski and others; an investigation of the results of various social systems, as studied by progressive social historians and historical sociologists in harmony with the prospectus laid out in crude fashion by Comte and Spencer; the history of the nature and outcome of public hygiene through the ages; and the analysis of the dominant intellectual attitudes and moral codes through the ages from the point of view of the tenets of modern mental hygiene. From the standpoint of the doctrine of scientific social ethics it is scarcely to be doubted that the historian will regard the situation revealed by the engineers' report on *Waste in Industry* and similar studies or *The Pittsburgh Survey* as something far more serious than the revelations of the Chicago Vice Commission's *Report*, even though we may still continue to send those responsible for the former conditions to Washington, and those who produce the latter state of affairs to Joliet and Atlanta.<sup>77</sup>

## SELECTED REFERENCES.

- F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology*  
 W. M. Davis, *The Reasonableness of Science*.  
 J. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*  
 G. Duprat, *Morals: a Treatise on the Psycho-sociological Bases of Ethics*  
 H. Ellis, *Little Essays of Love and Virtue*.  
 R. C. Givler, *The Ethics of Hercules*

<sup>77</sup> Cf. Kropotkin, op. cit., Chap. ii. Interesting examples of this secular approach to ethics are contained in T. D. Eliot, "Some Future Issues in the Sex Problem," in *International Journal of Ethics*, April, 1920; "The Creation of Souls," *Ibid.*, October, 1918; and E. A. Kirkpatrick, "Render unto Caesar," in *Journal of Social Hygiene*, November, 1924.

- E R Groves, *Personality and Social Adjustment*.  
J H. Hadfield, *Psychology and Morals*.  
E. C. Hayes, *Sociology and Ethics*  
L T Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*  
F Kirchwey (Ed ), *Our Changing Morality*  
P. Kropotkin, *Ethics, Origin and Development*  
S Mathews, *The Spiritual Interpretation of History*.  
P V N Myers, *History as Past Ethics*  
M. Parmelee, *The Science of Human Behavior*  
E C Parsons, *Fear and Conventionality*  
S Paton, *Human Behavior*  
S Strauss, "Things Are in the Saddle," *Atlantic Monthly*, November, 1924  
W. G Sumner, *Folkways*  
W J Thomas, *Sex and Society*  
W J Thomas, *The Unadjusted Girl*  
T. Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*.

## CHAPTER X

### HISTORY AND SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE \*

#### I. THE OLD AND THE NEW IN HISTORICAL WRITING.

**T**HAT eminent manufacturer and benefactor of the masses, Henry Ford, is said to have stated that "History is Bunk!" This has led to much contempt and scoffing on the part of historians, but one may be excused for suspecting that, while Mr. Ford did not speak as an expert upon historical documentation, this allegation possesses much validity and vindicates that remarkable shrewdness and insight which Mr. Ford conceals under much that seems upon first sight naive and infantile. The candid and alert practitioner of history must admit that much, if not most, of the historical writing in the past has been essentially "bunk."

In the first place, most of the historical writing down to our own generation was lacking in reliability as to statements of fact. Though this defect has now been largely eliminated, even our most scholarly histories are usually inadequate in the scope of the interests revealed in their content. The great majority of accurate historical works are still filled with meaningless details with respect to dynasties and dynastic succession and changes, battles, diplomatic negotiations, and personal episodes and anecdotes of gentlemen, which have almost no significance in explaining how our present institutions and culture came about, in indicating their possible defects, and in aiding us more intelligently to plan for a better future. History

\* Paper read before the Summer Session of the Southern Branch of the University of California, July, 1923

may have some value as literature, even if its content is not accurate or relevant, but it can safely be asserted that it has only literary significance unless it furnishes us with a clear understanding of the genesis of civilization as a totality. It is a recognition of this fact that, as far as contributing to social intelligence is concerned, the great majority of history is "bunk," which has led writers from "Johnny" Green and Lamprecht to Robinson, Breasted, Fueter, Turner and Shotwell to attempt so to transform our historical writing and teaching that it will possess some practical value to the intelligent citizen, thus fashioning what has been called "the New History."<sup>1</sup>

The historian who would attempt to make his subject more original, attractive and significant encounters the same obstacles which beset the innovator in any field. This is well stated in the preface to Anatole France's *Penguin Island*: "If you have any new insight, any original ideas, if you present men and affairs under an unwonted aspect, you will surprise the reader. And, the reader does not want to be surprised. He seeks in history only the stupidities with which he is already familiar." Yet the friendly reception which has recently been accorded to the well-known books of Robinson, Wells and Van Loon proves that there are exceptions to this general rule, and that there is an intelligent minority which welcomes any serious and well-meant effort to improve and clarify our thinking on historical subjects.

## II. INTELLECTUAL HISTORY AND THE ORIGINS OF CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS.

While there are many types of workers contributing to the development of this newer dynamic and synthetic history, we shall limit ourselves to one line of endeavor, and

<sup>1</sup> I have summarized some chief phases of the new history in the article on "History Its Rise and Development," in the *Encyclopedia Americana*, Vol. 14, pp. 251-60

that the one which is, perhaps, the most interesting and promising of them all, namely, intellectual history, or the record of the changing opinions, attitudes of mind and human valuations on the part of the intellectual classes from oriental antiquity to the present day. This type of history has been exemplified by Draper's *Intellectual Development of Europe*, White's *Warfare of Science and Theology*, Harnack's *History of Dogma*, Lecky's *History of Rationalism*, Bury's *History of the Freedom of Thought*, Thorndike's *History of Magic*, and has recently been popularized to an unprecedented extent by Professor Robinson's *Mind in the Making*, and *The Humanizing of Knowledge*. This view of history rests upon the belief that general opinions and attitudes of mind on the part of the educated classes are the chief unifying and causative factor in historical development. These determine the attitude which will be taken towards scientific endeavor and its applications, which will, in turn, control the nature of industrial development and the resulting social and political institutions. The intellectual historian also insists upon the basic importance of psychology and sociology as indispensable sciences subsidiary to history. While the historian in the past has developed any number of formal auxiliary sciences, such as paleography, epigraphy, diplomatic, and the science of external and internal criticism of sources, in order that his facts may be accurate, he has usually remained wholly ignorant of the psychological and sociological techniques, which alone can allow him accurately and intelligently to utilize or interpret most of these facts. How the historian, who must confine himself almost entirely to the group-conditioned motives and activities of man, can hope accurately to exploit his data without even the slightest modicum of knowledge of the laws and processes governing human thought and group action is a problem which must put a severe strain upon even an historian's imagination. Perhaps it can best be explained by admitting that thus far



---

JAMES HARVEY ROBINSON





the historian has, in general, been content merely to record the formal and external acts of man without attempting to give these significance by investigating their motivation, behavior patterns and consequences.<sup>2</sup>

Limitations of space prevent any detailed effort to review the intellectual history of western society, but at least a few major aspects of the changing European intellectual levels may be broadly blocked out, as a basis for presenting more at length some of the important bearings of this type of historical analysis upon present social problems. First and foremost, is the fact of our long animal heritage. No inconsiderable part of our mental equipment is one which we share in common with the animal kingdom. The great mass of our instinctive urges and drives are those which we have inherited from our animal ancestors. Genetic psychology, then, is the threshold of intellectual history. It holds, in the thought of Stanley Hall, that "mind and body have evolved together in the race, and have developed together in the individual in one continuous process. . . . The mind stretches far beyond the limited experience of the individual. It contains within itself all the past and all the future. . . . It is a product of millions of years of struggle. Its long experience with light and darkness, and with heat and cold, have established many of its rhythms. A long apprenticeship in aquatic and arboreal life has left deep and indelible marks. Sky, wind, storm, flowers, animals, ancient industries and occupations, have directed its fears and affections, and have made the emotions what they now are. It has been shocked and moulded into its present form by labor and suffering, and it shows in every function the marks of the process through which it has passed."<sup>3</sup>

Next we must recognize the long period of savagery

<sup>2</sup> See the articles "Psychology and History," in *American Journal of Psychology*, October, 1919, and "Sociology and History," in *Historical Outlook*, November, 1922

<sup>3</sup> G. E. Partridge, *The Genetic Philosophy of Education*, pp 14-28,

and barbarism that lies back of civilized human endeavor, constitutes far and away the greater portion of human existence, and has left an impress upon our mental operations and attitudes which has by no means yet been effaced. In the days of the older anthropologists and cultural historians it was assumed that the thinking of primitive man was altogether different in kind from that of modern man.<sup>4</sup> Now, however, we are coming to see that the chief distinction lies in the fact that the primitive man did not possess our modern equipment in the way of definitely demonstrable facts wherewith to check and restrain the free flow of his imagination. One naive suggestion and interpretation might follow upon another in the erection of a vast body of myth and legend. Primitive thinking was also more symbolic than that of today. The degree to which we have escaped from the myth-making and symbolic thinking of the savage depends very largely upon the particular field of human intellectual endeavor which we are considering. In the fields of pure science and technology we have departed almost entirely from primitive concepts and methods, while in politics, and especially in ethics and religion, we still think and act much as primitive man did. In both of these fields we still remain satisfied with myth and illusion, and make little or no effort to base our attitudes and actions on the firm realities of fact. As Graham Wallas has made clear, we are nearly as readily hypnotized by the rhetoric of the political spell-binder as were our savage ancestors by the jargon of the shaman.<sup>5</sup>

Coming down to the so-called "historic" period we find that the material basis for culture and free thinking was provided in the ancient Orient, particularly in Egypt and Mesopotamia. These peoples had built upon the founda-

<sup>4</sup>See the contrast of the newer and older interpretations of primitive thought in W. I. Thomas, *Source-Book for Social Origins*, pp. 143-318.

<sup>5</sup>*Cf.* J. H. Robinson, *Mind in the Making*, pp. 81-93, and L. Lévy-Bruhl, *Primitive Mentality*, with W. Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, and *A Preface to Politics*.

tions of the Neolithic contributions and created the chief phases of technological progress mastered by man down to the period of the Industrial Revolution. While freely granting certain minor advances later it is, nevertheless, true that the general pattern of material culture and related institutions which prevailed down to the coming of the machine technique had been provided by 2000 B. C.\* Upon the basis of the technology and commercial practices derived largely from contact with the Orient and the Ægean, Greece wrought out the first culture which included an interest in the speculative problems of human origins, experience and destiny. The fundamental laws of reasoning, the clear statement of the metaphysical as opposed to the scientific mode of approach to the acquisition of knowledge, the codification of existing secular information, some remarkable advances in pure science, particularly in mathematics, static mechanics, optics and astronomy, and the development of a humanistic and naturalistic attitude, particularly in ethics and politics, were the main elements in the cultural heritage passed on by Greece to Rome and the West, to be progressively debased or forgotten through the medieval age. The Greeks failed, however, to apply their scientific discoveries, and to anticipate later English developments by two millenniums. Their interest was in the abstract and transcendental, leaving technology and industry to slaves and menials, and, when the possibilities of this type of intellectual endeavor had been exhausted, Greek civilization inevitably stagnated and ultimately perished through "dry-rot."<sup>7</sup>

Paralleling the decline of the Hellenic intellectual and cultural hegemony came the rise of Christianity, and the fashioning of the Christian Epic by a syncretic process out

\*See J. H. Breasted, "The Origins of Civilization," in *Scientific Monthly*, 1919-20.

<sup>7</sup>Robinson, *Mind in the Making*, Chap. iv, A. W. Benn, *Ancient Philosophy*; C. M. Bakewell, *Source Book of Ancient Philosophy*; F. S. Marvin, *The Living Past*, Chaps. iv-v, A. E. Zimmern, *The Greek Commonwealth*

of the various philosophies, theologies and mystery rites of the oriental and Hellenic world. The history of early Christianity may be interpreted as primarily a process of the burial and partial extinction of the teachings of Christ under a vast mass of Jewish and pagan beliefs and practices, enforced by the majestic political power of the Holy Catholic Church. We have scarcely yet made any notable progress in bringing the teachings of Christ up from beneath the crust of dogma and rite which has paralyzed them for two millenniums and putting them into practice. The precarious nature of such an enterprise has been clearly, if not especially artistically, indicated by Upton Sinclair.<sup>8</sup> The basis of the remarkable intellectual revolution ushered in by Christianity was a tremendous recrudescence of supernaturalism. This took the form of repeopling the heavens and earth with supernatural beings—gods, angels, devils and demons, of the development of an abnormal interest in events supposed to have a supernatural basis and, hence, constituting miracles, of the growth of a special esteem for those holy men—saints, martyrs and monks—who trafficked and specialized in supernatural deeds and contacts, and of the rise of an overpowering concern about the destiny of the soul after death. The latter was probably the most all-absorbing interest of the Christian. His philosophy and efforts came to be concentrated upon death rather than life; theology, the “queen of the sciences,” was the science of preparation for a successful itinerary to the New Jerusalem. To the most of the pagans the condition of the soul after death, provided a proper burial had been secured, was a vague and indifferent one—a dull drab existence not unlike presence in the up-town Broadway subway at four o’clock in the morning. After the Christians had thoroughly absorbed the Persian dualism there was no longer any doubt concerning the condition of one’s immor-

<sup>8</sup> *They Call Me Carpenter*. The problem in its historico-sociological setting is admirably stated by C. A. Ellwood in his *Reconstruction of Religion*, and by V. Smkhovitch, *Towards an Understanding of Jesus*.

tal soul. The only alternatives were unspeakable bliss as a permanent member of the vast celestial orchestra, or indescribable suffering in the domain of Lucifer. It was, then, not strange that mundane culture and interests were strictly subordinated to the assurance of a blessed immortality. Knowledge possessed true relevance only as bearing upon the problems of salvation. All other secular culture belonged by definition to the City of the Devil. This orientation is well brought out by the selection of the birthday of a saint as the date of his translation from this mortal sphere, instead of the day of birth into mundane cares and tribulations. This view of man and the world, synthesized by Augustine in his *City of God*, was combined with Aristotelian dialectic in that harmonious, symmetrical and subtle fabric of metaphysic known as Scholasticism, and dominated medieval thinking until its hegemony was gradually challenged and undermined, when scholars began, consciously or unconsciously, to reorient their activities in accordance with Bacon's aphorism that "nature is more subtle than any argument."<sup>9</sup>

A pious and respectable illusion, tenaciously adhered to by historians, was wont to represent the origin of modern times as having been produced by the Renaissance, the Reformation, or both. It may be admitted that there were some indirect contributions to European advance contained in both of these movements, as, for example, in the impulse which the Renaissance gave to the revival of certain vestiges of the remarkable Alexandrian science and of some of the secular and mundane interests of pagan antiquity, and in the break-up of the unity of Christendom which the Reformation promoted, thus lessening the scope and potency of the Inquisition and ecclesiastical obscurantism. Yet even

<sup>9</sup>I have summarized the Christian point of view in an article on "The Historical Background of Medieval Intellectual Interests," in the *Pedagogical Seminary* for June, 1922. The literature is summarized in the footnotes. The great storehouse of facts concerning medieval intellectual life is Lynn Thorndike's *History of Magic and Experimental Science*, cf. H. O. Taylor, *The Medieval Mind*.

these were in large part offset by the gradual stereotyping of the humanistic curriculum in the universities and the resulting growth of pedantry, and by the great recrudescence of supernaturalism and bigotry produced by the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, the measure of which can best be seen through a comparison of the mental outlook of More and Erasmus with that of Luther and Loyola, or the contrast of the interests of the scholars at the court of Lorenzo de Medici and those of a court handling a representative case during the Witchcraft delusion. In short, both the Renaissance and the Reformation were basically backward-looking and retrospective movements, and we must seek elsewhere for those forces which have produced the modern world.<sup>10</sup>

If the basis for the origins of the modern and contemporary eras cannot be found in the Renaissance and Reformation, it can be located, as Professors Shepherd, Seeley, Abbott, Gillespie and others have clearly shown, in the multifarious forces and influences which have flowed from the ever increasing number and scope of European contacts with outside areas. Anthropologists and cultural historians have long recognized the fact that far the most potent force in breaking down stagnation, provincialism and complacent self-satisfaction in culture is the contact of different civilizations. It is in the varied contacts of the stereotyped European culture of the Middle Ages with the widely divergent cultures of the extra-European areas that we find the dynamic factor in early modern history. This process began with the Crusades and has continued into the period of modern national imperialism since 1870. In the earliest stage this movement brought about an increase of trade and the rise of the towns, as the center of the first true

<sup>10</sup> See J. H. Robinson, *The New History*, pp. 116-18, 154-60. The great work in the English language on this period and its problems, written from the standpoint of the most up-to-date historical concepts and scholarship is Preserved Smith's *Age of the Reformation*. Chaps. 1, x-xiv are particularly to be recommended. See also E. M. Hulme, *Renaissance and Reformation*.

western European culture after the classical period. It brought to Europe the Arabic numerals and the algebraic notation, which were indispensable to the further development of mathematics through the calculus of Newton and Leibnitz. It brought Europe into contact with the optics of Alhazen and the Arabic continuators of the work of Euclid and others in classical antiquity, and laid the basis for those phases of modern science which depend upon the telescope and microscope. It also made Europe acquainted with the art of manufacturing paper in time to provide an adequate material foundation for the introduction of the art of printing in the fifteenth century. Arabic alchemy provided the foundations for the development of modern chemistry. Presumably, if not demonstrably certain, the extra-European contacts also brought to Europe a knowledge of the antecedents of the modern clock, which, in its later developments, alone makes possible dynamic mechanics, the mariner's compass, which was the indispensable prerequisite of oversea navigation, and gunpowder, which was an important technological aid in the disruption of feudalism and the erection of modern national states.<sup>11</sup>

Important as were these new developments from 1100 to 1500, the more remarkable innovations have come from the close of the fifteenth century onward. A new heaven and a new earth, if not those prefigured in the Apocalypse of St. John, a much more impressive duality, were discovered. Copernicus partially revived the knowledge of the best of Hellenistic astronomic science, as set forth by men like Aristarchus and Hipparchus, and interchanged the positions of the earth and sun in the cosmic setting of the revolving fixed starry spheres. Kepler proved the fallacy of the hypothesis of the crystalline spheres, demonstrated

<sup>11</sup> See Lynn Thorndike, *Medieval Europe*, pp. 385-9, C. H. Haskins, *Studies in the History of Medieval Science*, Chaps. I-VII, Hulme, op. cit., pp. 137-43, W. R. Shepherd, "The Expansion of Europe," in *Political Science Quarterly*, 1919, J. E. Gillespie, *The Influence of Oversea Expansion on England*, W. C. Abbott, *The Expansion of Europe*.



the paths of the planets to be elliptical, and discovered a fixed relation between the rate of their celestial ambulations and their distance from the sun. Galileo turned the telescope on the heavens for the first time, beheld the mountains and craters on the surface of the moon, and at last disproved the allegation of Alexander Neckam that they were blemishes on the lunar complexion put there of set purpose by God, as a perpetual reminder to man of the disasters which befell the human race as a result of Adam's excessive and irrepressible interest in experimental pomology. He also laid the basis for dynamic mechanics by his law of falling-bodies, an achievement so basic that the French philosopher Bergson has remarked that modern science came down to man along the incline plane of Galileo. Newton combined the basic contributions of Kepler and Galileo in the first great synthesis of celestial mechanics—the law of universal gravitation. Giordano Bruno became the first notable martyr to the new learning by attempting to elaborate the philosophical and cultural implications of the Copernican system with respect to the plurality of worlds and universes, the physico-chemical affinity or identity of the earth and the heavenly bodies, and the relativity of motion, direction and space.<sup>12</sup>

A new earth was discovered during this same period, as a result of the travels of early Asiatic explorers like Marco Polo, the early explorations fostered by Henry the Navigator of Portugal, and the actual achievements in the way of oversea discovery by Vasco de Gama, Columbus and their successors. While Magellan himself, as the re-

<sup>12</sup> Sedgwick and Tyler, *Short History of Science*, Chaps. x-xi, G. Forbes, *History of Astronomy*, F. S. Marvin, *The Living Past*, Chaps. vii-viii; H. Hoffding, *History of Modern Philosophy*, Vol. I, D. Stimson, *The Gradual Acceptance of the Copernican Theory of the Universe*; W. Bolting, *Giordano Bruno*, F. M. Stalwell and F. S. Marvin, *The Making of the Western Mind*. For a general summary of the intellectual background of the transition from the medieval to the modern age see H. E. Barnes, "The Historical Background and Setting of the Philosophy of Francis Bacon," in the *Scientific Monthly*, May, 1924.

sult of an altercation with the natives of the Philippines, reached the New Jerusalem instead of returning to his native Portugal, some of his sailors returned to Spain with definite concrete proof of the sphericity of the earth and a firm conviction of its hitherto unsuspected dimensions. While vast areas of the earth remained untouched by white man until after the middle of the nineteenth century, yet these explorations of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries served to break down completely the old medieval geographic limitations which viewed the planet as a small slab of earth and water—a rim of turf about the Mediterranean sea—both of which were supported in the midst of the void by some mystical divine power or by the actual concrete labors of some superhuman anthropomorphic servant of the Diety. The new earth was no less a reality than the new heavens, and its discovery possessed infinitely greater practical consequences for mankind.<sup>18</sup>

The results of these celestial and mundane explorations were most diverse, numerous and far-reaching. Both types of discovery were not only significant phases of modern science in themselves, but promoted many other types of scientific curiosity and achievement, which, in their totality, constitute the remarkable scientific revival of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As a result of this, western Europeans first advanced beyond the scientific attainments of Hellenistic Alexandria, in the contributions to mathematics by Descartes, Napier, Newton, Leibnitz and Euler, to physics by Galileo, Newton, Toricelli, Von Guericke, Huygens and the early experimenters in the field of electro-physics, to chemistry in the works of Boyle, Stahl, Boerhaave, Lavoisier and Priestley, to biology by Vesalius, Hooke, Swammerdam, Malpighi, Grew, Leeuwenhoek, Redi, Borelli, Linnaeus, Cuvier, Haller, Hunter and

<sup>18</sup> Keltie and Howarth, *History of Geography*, Chaps. 15-21, J. Jacobs, *The Story of Geographic Discovery*, E. J. Payne, *A History of the New World Called America*, Shepherd, loc. cit.

Morgagni, and to geology by Steno, Ray, Woodward, Moro, Werner and Hutton.<sup>14</sup>

These scientific advances stimulated serious reflection upon their significance for humanity. Francis Bacon pointed out the limitations of the dialectical approach to the search for knowledge, became the great rhetorical herald of the experimental method, and constructed a utopia based upon the notion of the remarkable possibilities for human improvement inhering in the application of the scientific discoveries to social welfare. Most important of all, he succeeded in reorienting the best philosophy of modern times, so that its chief concern was the Kingdom of Man instead of the Kingdom of Heaven, and in substituting ignorance and anachronistic tradition for the old concept of the Devil as the chief enemy of human well-being and progress. The old debate as to the efficacy of faith and reason was proved futile through showing the inadequacy of both, as compared with the potency of observation and experimentation. The Deists and other philosophers and theologians appropriated the implications of the new science in such a way as to enlarge the concept of God and to recast the views of his nature and methods in harmony with the requirements of the contemporary advances in the knowledge of the cosmos and its laws. Not only was God enlarged, he was also dignified and ennobled. Men like Shaftesbury at last began to save him from the slanders of his alleged friends, the orthodox theologians, and to initiate the process of rehabilitating his reputation, which had suffered so severely from the libelous definitions and exegesis of Patristic, medieval and early Protestant theology. Shaftesbury was probably the first to insist that we must at least assume God to possess the qualities of a cultured and urbane English gentleman of the first decade of the eighteenth century. Supernaturalism—eschatology,

<sup>14</sup> Sedgwick and Tyler, *op. cit.*, Chaps. xi-xiv, A. E. Shipley, *The Revival of Science in the Seventeenth Century*.

miracle-mongering, diabolism, witchcraft and saint-worship—was gradually dissolved by the growing rationalism. The new critical philosophers, for practical and immediate, as well as broad philosophical and cultural, reasons urged the value of toleration and denounced the contemporary repression and persecution. Diderot and the Encyclopedists for the first time executed a systematic compilation of the new learning and philosophy, and made it available in a practical form for the perusal of the educated classes.<sup>16</sup>

The political, economic and social effects of European expansion were not less significant. The political results fall into two chronological or sequential phases, royal absolutism, and the rise of parliamentary or representative government under *bourgeois* auspices. The kings were able to use the new income from colonization and trade to hire officials and armies to aid in crushing feudalism, but their dynastic absolutism soon tended to obstruct the aspirations of the new middle class, and they ultimately were required to give up their pretensions to divine right and other rationalized defenses of the vanishing fact of princely omnipotence. The transformation of economic life was equally marked. Commerce ceased to be overland or thalassic in nature and came to be world-wide in its scope. The volume and variety of commodities carried increased to a phenomenal degree. The technique and ideals of modern business enterprise were worked out in an elementary way, and the pecuniary basis laid for the ascendancy of the capitalist in the modern age. More than anything else, the economic developments created the needs, impulses and potentialities which produced the Industrial Revolution, the most profound and far-reaching upheaval and transformation in the history of mankind up to the present time. From the standpoint of social changes the events of this period were

<sup>16</sup> J. B. Bury, *History of the Freedom of Thought*, Chaps. v-vii; *The Idea of Progress*; A. C. McGiffert, *Protestant Thought Before Kant*, W. E. H. Lecky, *The Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe*, J. M. Robertson, *A Short History of Free Thought*, Hoffding, op cit.

most significant in shaking the domination of the landlord class, which had controlled human destinies since the passage of the primacy of the primitive shepherd and herdsman, in creating his enemy and ultimate conqueror, the middle-class business man, in increasing the flexibility and dynamic nature of social relations and institutions, and in extending the scope and variety of human needs, wants and aspirations.<sup>16</sup>

The changes in thought and science since 1750 have been as revolutionary as the transformations in technology and industry, which the former did so much to promote. Modern astro-physics has produced results more impressive than the progress from Copernicus to Newton. The immensity and complexity of the cosmos has been revealed as transcending human capacity for appreciation, and our planet demonstrated to be but a puny and unimportant celestial juvenile. Cosmic and biological evolution has shown the whole material universe of universes, from the most gigantic sun to the microscopic insect, to have been the product of gradual development over a period of time which defies human standards of measurement and apprehension. Biblical criticism has removed the textual basis for the creation tale of *Genesis*, which not even the most heroic and unabashed exegesis can reconcile with the temporal perspective required by the evolutionary hypothesis. In the principle of radio-activity there appears to have been discovered something approximating that which was searched after from the days of Thales to the early modern alchemists, namely, the basic constituent and creative principle of the universe, the key to the transmutation of elements, and the foundation of the most successful technique yet devised for rejuvenation. In electro-physics and the

\*A. F. Pollard, *Factors in Modern History*; R. H. Gretton, *The English Middle Class*, S. Herbert, *The Fall of Feudalism in France*; C. J. H. Hayes, *A Political and Social History of Modern Europe*, Vol. I, C. Seignobos, *Contemporary Civilization*, W. Cunningham, *Western Civilization*, Vol. II; C. Day, *A History of Commerce*, Part III; W. K. Wallace, *The Trend of History*, Book I; W. C. Abbott, op. cit.

development of the radio time and space have been practically eliminated with respect to the communication of information. The progress in each of the natural sciences since 1800 has been so great that few if any professional chemists, physicists or biologists can pretend to a mastery of the whole of their respective fields, whereas a century ago a single distinguished scientist might have had at his command nearly the entire range of the physical or biological sciences. These scientific advances have been applied to the reduction of death and disease, and to the creation of those impressive and varied technological achievements which lie at the foundations of the Industrial Revolution. Such a work as Merz's *History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century* describes by far the most crucial and far-reaching transition in the intellectual history of humanity.

The Industrial Revolution, while it may ultimately prove as disastrous to humanity as the presentation of a Colt's automatic pistol to a child of five by an over-indulgent parent, has certainly done more to change the material basis of human culture than all other events and movements combined since the close of the Neolithic age. The major phases of this great transition may be considered under three headings: the technological revolution, consisting in the substitution of the machine for the handicraft technique, the rise of the factory system, as a relatively novel method of controlling, administering and disciplining labor effort, and the diverse reactions of the combination of the machine technique and the factory system upon contemporary civilization. The mechanical inventions and the applications of science in the fields of the textile industry, the manufacture of iron and steel, mining and the new chemical and rubber industries have given man an unprecedentedly efficient technique for exploiting nature, but in the process of appropriating this new machine technique, he has, in part, as Professors Thorstein Veblen, J. M. Clark, Walton

Hamilton and others have so clearly indicated, capitulated to its tyrannical dominion with results which cannot yet be foreseen. The factory system has replaced the older gild and domestic systems, and, through facilitating and forwarding efficient formal administration of labor, the division of industrial processes and the growth of technical specialization, it has coöperated with the mechanical technique in making possible an enormously greater productivity per capita of the population than was ever before known. In combination, the mechanical technique and the factory system have increased the volume of the world's trade, led to a search for new markets, brought to completion the theory of business enterprise and the era of purely pecuniary valuations, assured at least a temporarily complete dominion of the capitalist, led to the origins of the urban era, induced extensive intra-national and international migration, both broadened the outlook and reduced the illiteracy of the modern citizen, while at the same time increasing the strains and stresses to which he is subjected in the unprecedented variety and volume of stimuli in the dynamic urban environment of today, put the capitalist in political as well as economic ascendancy, while simultaneously giving birth to the proletariat to challenge this dominion, and stimulated that clamoring and striving for new colonial and investment areas, which have been so potent a factor in forwarding national egotism and rivalry. But, most important of all, the Industrial Revolution has introduced an ever-accelerated rapidity of change in material civilization, in the place of the stagnation and repetition of the agrarian era, which characterized the overwhelming majority in human society from the age of the lake-dwellers of the Neolithic era to the close of the eighteenth century in western Europe.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>17</sup> F. L. McVey, *Modern Industrialism*, F. A. Ogg, *The Economic Development of Modern Europe*; *Social Progress in Contemporary Europe*; A. P. Usher, *Industrial History of England*, P. Mantoux, *La Révolution industrielle*; J. L. and B. Hammond, *The Town Labourer*; T. Veblen, *The Theory of*

### III. THE SOCIAL STUDIES AND SOME MAJOR CONTEMPORARY ISSUES.

The appalling transformation of our material civilization, which the Industrial Revolution has produced, is scarcely appreciated by any save those who have made the subject one of special study and reflection. Not only would George Washington be far more at home on an Egyptian estate in the days of Tut-ankh-amen than in Richmond, Virginia, today, but, and what is even more impressive, Abraham Lincoln would have been less amazed and dumfounded, from the standpoint of material culture, in the court of Assurbanipal than in that of Calvin Coolidge. As Professor Schlesinger has well said, in a paraphrase of a statement by Professor Cubberley: <sup>18</sup>

If Lincoln were to return now and walk about Washington, he would be surprised and bewildered by the things he would see. Buildings more than three or four stories high would be new. The plate-glass show windows of the stores, the electric street-lighting, the moving-picture theatres, the electric elevators in the buildings and especially the big department stores would be things in his day unknown. The smooth-paved streets and cement sidewalks would be new to him. The fast-moving electric street-cars and motor vehicles would fill him with wonder. Even a boy on a bicycle would be a curiosity. Entering the White House, someone would have to explain to him such commonplace of modern life as sanitary plumbing, steam heating, friction matches, telephones, electric lights, the Victrola, and even the fountain pen. In Lincoln's day, plumbing was in its beginnings, coal-oil lamps and gas-jets were just coming into use, and the steel pen had only recently superseded the quill pen. The steel rail, the steel bridge, high-powered locomotives, refrigerator cars, artificial ice, the cream separator, the twine binder, the caterpillar tractor, money orders, the parcel post, rural free delivery, the cable, the wireless, gasoline engines, repeating rifles, dynamite, submarines, airplanes—these and hundreds of other inventions now in common use were all alike unknown.

*Business Enterprise; The Theory of the Leisure Class; J. A. Hobson, The Evolution of Modern Capitalism, Imperialism, R. H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society, Hayes, op cit., Vol. II; G. Wallas, The Great Society.*

<sup>18</sup> *New Viewpoints in American History*, pp. 247-8



To many this might seem all good, and a clear gain to humanity, but such is far from the case. The new technique and its application through the factory system contains enormous advantages in the way of increasing material productivity, but it brings with it certain responsibilities in the way of the social domination, control and direction of this process which man has as yet scarcely recognized, much less mastered. Instead of building up a new system of social principles, controls and ideals adequate to the assurance of an efficient and equitable utilization of this new scientific and technical equipment, society has thus far done little more than to complete and ossify the intellectual and institutional trends and developments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which were of dubious adequacy for the guidance and control of even the embryonic technology and industrial life of that era. Not only are our ideas and opinions on social, economic and political processes, and the institutions of which they are in part an outgrowth and a rationalized defense, pathetically insufficient and anachronistic, but they are ever becoming more so. While they impotently stagnate, our technological advances dance merrily onward at a rate which would have made Arkwright or Robert Fulton dizzy. There is no reason to believe that technology will settle down for a benevolent snooze, so that our institutional life, cultural valuations and psychic attitudes will overtake it on the highway of progress. It will, as Professor Robinson and Graham Wallas have made woefully apparent, require an unprecedented *tour de force* of our social and institutional inventive capacity to allow us to get within hailing distance of our material culture.<sup>19</sup> Professor Veblen has well summarized the situation:<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup> J. H. Robinson, *Mind in the Making; The Humanizing of Knowledge*; G. Wallas, *The Great Society, Our Social Heritage*.

<sup>20</sup> This is a brief informal summary. See in more detail his *The Vested Interests and the State of the Industrial Arts*; and *The Engineers and the Price System*.

Seen as a period of transition and institutional growth, the late Middle Ages and the early Modern Times show a continued modification of the established order—innovation and obsolescence in the system of law and morals as well as in the principles of knowledge and belief, to answer to the continued alteration of the material conditions of life. Out of it has come such matters as the modern Nation, the code of Natural Rights, the Material Sciences, the Machine Industry, and the later organization of Business. The past 150 years may fairly be called a period of Industrial Revolution. Sweeping changes have taken effect in the ways and means of industry and have greatly altered the material conditions of life and have thereby altered civilized men's habits of life in detail. These changes in the habitual ways and means of living have been and continue to be large, swift and profound, beyond example, while the resulting changes due to follow in the habits of thought which govern civilized men's conduct and convictions have been and continue to be slight and slow, by comparison. So that it is now an open question whether the civilized peoples will be able to bring their principles of conduct up to date and into passable consonance with these new material conditions of life.

The great need of the present day is, then, to bring our social, economic and political institutions and technique up to something like the same level of efficiency and objectivity which has been reached in science and technology. We have not yet learned the first lessons of peace, efficiency or economy in the exploitation of our natural resources or in the governing of our relationships in this process. Waste, exploitation and war are unquestionably running our civilization into the ground. Those of us who live in America, which is still blessed with certain remains from the wasteful exploitation of a virgin continent, find it hard to realize in what a precarious state western civilization finds itself today. Yet we do not have to turn to the socialist indictment to find proofs. The admitted facts printed in the most respectable capitalistic books and periodicals unite in their testimony that Europe is in a worse condition today than at any previous time since the Thirty Years' War. The report of the avowedly capitalistic group of engineers on "Waste in Industry" has demonstrated that, due to the inadequate methods of determining social

needs and meeting them effectively through efficient planning of industrial operations and energetic efforts of laborers, we are today operating our elaborate industrial technology at about fifty per cent of its potential productivity.<sup>21</sup> And this in spite of the fact, so clearly demonstrated by Professor Bowley, that the only way out of our present poverty and misery is to be found in increased productivity!<sup>22</sup> Then, a capitalistic journalist and publicist, Mr. Will Irwin, has made it so clear that the respectable citizen with an IQ of 80 ought to be able to comprehend the fact that western civilization cannot weather another general world war. Yet Europe is exceeding all prior speed-limits in rushing along to invite inevitable cataclysm.<sup>23</sup> In the old days of the "age of faith" people might be forgiven for believing that somehow God would take care of them, even though He was never observed to do so, but the evolutionary philosophy has proved that we can no longer take refuge in this regressive delusion. Wells was probably right in his *Education of Joan and Peter*, when he represented God as putting man's future up to man; we shall have exactly what we deserve to have, and if the race, by inadequate intelligence in meeting the problems of the modern dynamic world, merits extinction, this will, in all probability, be our lot. Even those who recognize that something needs improvement scarcely go to the bottom of the matter, and are like sailors who are enthusiastically painting the deck while the hold is rapidly filling with water. Notable among this type of well-intentioned folk are the ardent exponents of the League of Nations or disarmament as an adequate panacea for war, in

<sup>21</sup> *Waste in Industry*, New York McGraw-Hill, 1923. The all-important Veblenian contributions to this subject are condensed and translated into lucid English by Professor W. H. Hamilton in an article entitled "The Price System and Social Policy," in the *Journal of Political Economy*, January, 1918.

<sup>22</sup> A. L. Bowley, *The Division of the Product of Industry*.

<sup>23</sup> W. Irwin, *The Next War*, and Christ or Mars? M. E. Ravage, *The Melody of Europe*; C. A. Beard, *Cross-Currents in Europe Today*; A. Fabre-Luce, *La Victoire*.

the face of the observed savagery of modern states in their relations one with another.

In spite of the fact that General Grant would today be more appalled at the sight of Euclid Avenue, Cleveland, in his own native state of Ohio than he was by the task of overcoming the armies of the Confederacy, our opinions and attitudes on social, economic and political problems have not changed to any notable degree since the days of Black Friday and the Whisky Ring, in fact, in many important ways, scarcely since the beginning of the Christian era, while in others our reactions are distinctly primitive. Man's zeal for antiques as furnishing and equipment for his sitting-room seems excelled only by his lust for them to serve as the lining of his cerebral space. Respectable modern citizens are not only unabashed at exhibiting antiques in the realm of general opinion; from the lowly village blacksmith to the President of the United States they exult in them. And it is only in this range of social, economic, political, ethical and religious matters that man is thus fatally insistent upon anachronistic equipment. When he desires to have a tooth pulled or a spark-plug replaced he feels it necessary to have recourse at once to an expert along these lines of endeavor, but he is prepared to regard as wholly adequate the opinions on economic and political matters of the "man on the street" which date from the period of the ox-cart and the practice of knocking out decayed teeth with a stone hammer. A prosperous Hundred Percenter, who would be fatally embarrassed to be seen in a 1924 Rolls-Royce car, will proudly and promiscuously flaunt an economic, ethical or political anachronism of a demonstrable antiquity greater than the chariot of Elijah.<sup>24</sup>

We continue to assume that "the wisdom of the Fathers," "the tried wisdom of the ages," "the findings of

<sup>24</sup> See on this especially, J. H. Robinson, *Mind in the Making*, Chaps. vii-viii, *The Humanizing of Knowledge*, H. G. Wells, *The Salvaging of Civilization*, W. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*

mankind," and other postulated and rationalized entities are wholly adequate to the needs of the present day. History completely denies this persistent assumption, and in so doing renders its chief service in promoting the cause of social intelligence. As one historian has suggested, perhaps the greatest lesson which the history of the past teaches us is that man does not seem able or willing to learn anything from the lessons of the past. Granting that this is presumably true, we may legitimately hold that the second greatest lesson of history is that, on account of the great differences in culture and institutional situations, the past has no direct lesson for the present in the way of analogies and forecasts. History casts very serious reflections upon the adequacy of the so-called "wisdom of the Fathers," even when considered in relation to the relatively simple demands of their own days. The fact that every civilization prior to our own has ended up in a hopeless wreck should be fairly adequate proof of the frailty of patristic wisdom in all the ages of man. If the "tried wisdom of the ages" or "the sturdy virtues of manhood and womanhood" were not able to save the civilizations of Egypt, Sumeria, Babylonia, Assyria, Phœnicia, Persia, Greece, Rome or medieval Europe, how can we assume that they will be adequate to meeting successfully the infinitely more complex and baffling problems of the United States in the twentieth century? The upshot of the whole matter seems to be that we are grotesquely wrong in assuming that there has been any great amount of true wisdom in the past, and that we must confess that there is pathetically little promise of there being much available in the present or immediate future.<sup>25</sup>

Yet, even if we could assume that in the past there has

<sup>25</sup> W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change*; O. Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*; W. Lippmann, *Drift and Mastery*, *Public Opinion*, E. A. Ross, *The Social Trend*, J. K. Hart, *The Discovery of Intelligence*

been wisdom equal to needs contemporaneous with these antique sages, it would be most readily apparent that this would be no proof whatever of the sufficiency of such omniscience for the problems of today. Experimental students of animal behavior have discovered that it is fairly easy to teach an ape to master the problems of operating and directing a tricycle, but not even the most exuberant apologist of simian erudition, polish and capacity, would claim that he could be taught to manipulate an aeroplane successfully. But it is not in any sense an exaggeration to represent the social, economic, political and ethical problems of our age to be as much more complicated than those of Washington's time as the mechanism of an aeroplane is more involved and difficult than that of a velocipede. Therefore, in our efforts to solve contemporary problems on the basis of the "wisdom of the past," we are somewhat more absurd in our attitude and conduct than the animal trainer who would strap his pet anthropoid in the seat of an aeroplane on the ground of his prior mastery of the technique of the tricycle. Not even a Texan Methodist Kleagle would think of taking his car to Moses, Joshua, Luther or George Washington to have the carburetor adjusted or the valves ground, yet we assure ourselves and our fellowmen that we ought to continue to attempt to solve our contemporary problems of society, economics, politics and conduct on the basis of methods, attitudes and information which in many cases far antedate Moses. It is high time, then, that we should understand that rhetorical exorcism of the spirit of the Fathers will accomplish nothing, that we must be done with "air-driven politics," as we are with air-driven science and technology, and that we must build anew for the solution of our present difficulties on the basis of a scientific attitude and demonstrable fact.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Robinson, *Mind in the Making*, Chaps i-ii; *The Humanizing of Knowledge*, passim; J. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, W. Trotter, *Instincts of the*

Some, among them the historian Lamprecht, have held that this essential introduction of scientific concepts and methods into social science will, if at all, be executed by natural scientists, who will insist upon bringing their methodology and attitudes into an analysis of the various phases of human and social relations. This is likely to be a futile hope, for, owing to the over-specialization of our modern scientific curriculum, the natural scientist is rarely a person of well integrated intelligence who possesses any general knowledge or appreciation of the humane and social sciences. He is usually highly competent in his own narrow specialty and a barbarian in other fields. This may go even so far, as in cases known to the writer, where a professor of bacteriology in a reputable university denounces evolutionary biology and upholds Moses, or where a prominent geologist defends the six-day creation hypothesis. Usually, however, the situation is one in which the chemist, physicist or biologist will possess strictly 1925 views upon his own and closely related subjects and boast of 1825 ideas and attitudes on matters pertaining to law, politics, economic life, ethics and religion. A physicist may be thoroughly grounded in the physics of Michelson, but in politics adhere to the view of his grandfather who was born under the astral auspices of the Democratic donkey, or a physiologist may be up to the minute on endocrinology but derive his firm convictions about sex conduct from a solicitous and indulgent grandmother who was a benighted follower of John Wesley or Dio Lewis. We shall most certainly have to await the further development and more general acceptance of the teachings of the social sciences before we can hope for a safe and efficient re-ordering of society. The need for this, as the most important educational development of the twentieth century, has

*Herd in Peace and War*; G. Wallas, *Our Social Heritage*; G. S. Hall, "The Message of the Zeitgeist," in *Scientific Monthly*, August, 1921; A. B. Wolfe, *Conservatism, Radicalism and Scientific Method*.

been well stated by President Walter Dill Scott of Northwestern University in a stimulating address on "The Discovery of Truth in Universities":<sup>27</sup>

Advance in the physical and the biological sciences during future decades will certainly prove as helpful as at any previous time. But the most fruitful researches during the twentieth century will probably be conducted not in the natural sciences but in the social sciences. We are at last coming to see that the proper study of mankind is man. We are beginning to direct our researches to the whole life of mankind—to the nature of man as a social and political being and to the achievements of man recorded in languages, literature and institutions. There is recognized a need for a thorough rewriting of all our texts on history, economics, politics, sociology, psychology, aesthetics, pedagogy, ethics and religion. The social sciences are fostering a progress that may be measured not in mere billions of dollars, but rather in the finer though less tangible terms of appreciation, service and sacrifice. Research in the natural sciences has been effective in aiding the race to adjust itself to its physical environments. No such discovery of truth in the social sciences has been made in aiding the race to adjust itself to its human environments. Men are not now working together happily and effectively. There is said to be a lack of control in the home, restlessness in the school, apathy in the church, shirking in the shops, dishonesty in the counting houses, grafting in politics, crime in the city and bolshevism threatening all our institutions. All our human relations will be improved as rapidly as we make progress in the social sciences, and I am convinced that our universities will make as great a contribution here during the twentieth century as they did by the discovery of truth in the natural sciences during the nineteenth century.

Such is the indisputable need, but the prospect of its immediate realization is not bright. In the first place, as Lester F. Ward pointed out a generation ago, the social sciences are still primarily in the metaphysical stage of defensive and justificatory rationalization, and have scarcely begun as yet a fearless search for truth by the

<sup>27</sup> Address delivered at the annual meeting of the Board of Trustees, 1922. Thorstein Veblen's *Higher Learning in America*, and Upton Sinclair's *Goose-Step* contain much material designed to check our exuberant optimism concerning the rapidity with which the American universities will rush headlong into the effort to establish truth in the several social sciences.



historical, observational and quantitative methods. The great majority of our sociological work, for example, has been a product of the hopeless confusion and cancelling of efforts due to the combination in most sociologists of the salutary sociological "hunch" with the necessity of rationalizing and justifying the fact that their mental and cultural equipment and outlook are not far from that of an average clergyman or metaphysical moralist. Nothing is more pathetic than the flounderings of many sociologists when they attempt to treat such problems as ethics and religion, with the resulting spinning out of vague and semi-disguised rationalized defenses of positions which are much more honestly, frankly and clearly set forth in the crisp sermons of John Roach Straton, or the foggy exegesis of economists in their efforts to disguise somewhat their possession of ideas much more frankly and adequately expressed by Mr. Baer, Judge Gary and Mr. Grace. There is no greater reflection upon the scientific tardiness and earlier irrelevancy of sociology than the fact that it remained for John Dewey to write his *Human Nature and Conduct* thirty years after the project should have been better executed by a sociologist.<sup>28</sup>

Fortunately there are at present some signs on the horizon of a gradual change for the better in the social sciences, due very largely to the infusion of biology, psychology, anthropology, history and statistics. Examples of this indispensable break with the traditional methods are to be seen in pluralistic and psychological political theory, institutional and statistical economics, and the newer type of biological, psychological, cultural and statistical sociology. Yet we have a long way to go before we shall be able to realize the dream of Auguste Comte and Lester F. Ward in making social science the basis and ac-

<sup>28</sup> *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1920, pp. 174-202; *Ibid.*, 1922, pp. 62-74; Robinson, *Mind in the Making*, pp. 40-47; J. Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*.

ceptable guide of practical statesmanship. In addition to the necessary improvements in social science, we have a much more difficult problem ahead in converting the mass of the population to the belief that we must rely for guidance upon scientifically ascertained fact instead of animism and rhetoric.<sup>29</sup>

At present we have a generally suspicious, if not contemptuous, attitude toward the high-brow. As Walter Lippmann has well said, "we have a public opinion that quakes before the word highbrow as though it denoted a secret sin." This general attitude of popular repugnance for the highbrow and the expert is particularly virulent towards the various types of social scientists. To a certain minor extent this has been overcome with respect to practical administrative experts in political science and economics, but there is a complete suspicion and recalcitrance towards men in these fields who have original ideas with respect to the fundamental problems of government or the basis of economic institutions, the only subjects in which expert opinion possesses any great significance for the solution of the vital problems of today. Men in public life and private economic enterprise welcome advice from political scientists and economists only when it tells them how to operate more smoothly or gainfully the manifestly inadequate existing machinery and institutions. No one would think of calling into consultation men like Duguit, Laski, Pound, Beard, Veblen, Hamilton, Friday, Webb or Tawney, except in so far as they might incidentally possess technical information of practical import. Their views on basic institutions and general situations would not be solicited or tolerated. With sociology the situation is even more flagrant and deplorable. Not one citizen in ten in our noble Republic knows what a so-

<sup>29</sup> Cf. H. E. Barnes (Ed.), *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*; and E. C. Hayes (Ed.), *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences*; W. F. Ogburn and A. A. Goldenweiser (Eds.), *The Social Sciences*.

ciologist is, and to be introduced as one puts the speaker in a situation of lower prestige before his audience than as though he had been presented as a mesmerist or magician, unless, perchance, he may be lending the support of his erudition to the Republican party, the cause of prohibition, or the suppression of improper books. The separation of the sociologist from public life and activities is even more eloquently demonstrated by the glaring lack of contact between sociologists and the social economists and social workers. And the public will not entertain for a moment the suggestion that there can be such a thing as a science of conduct or a scientific student of ethics. Such an intimation at once suggests rape, polygamy, drug-addiction, dancing and surreptitious perusal of the *Arabian Nights*, *Jurgen* and *Women in Love*. In spite of the fact that human conduct is the most complicated of terrestrial problems and, properly guided, calls for the collaboration of a greater number and variety of experts than any other human perplexity, this is, along with religion, the one field which we reserve for the sovereign authority of the herd as expressed by the clergyman and the illiterate "man on the street." In short, it will avail little to go ahead with the very salutary process of improving the scientific level of the social sciences, unless we are able to parallel this development with the securing of a better connection between the social sciences on the one hand, and public opinion and practical statesmanship in business and politics, on the other.<sup>50</sup>

The above desultory review of certain historical factors involved in the present situation has some bearing on the time-honored controversy between the conservatives and the radicals. It has long been argued that the conservative is necessary to offset the impulse of the radical

<sup>50</sup> J. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, W. Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, W. M. Davis, "The Reasonableness of Science," in *Scientific Monthly*, 1922; J. Q. Dealey, "Eudemics, the Science of National or General Welfare," in *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1920.

to over-rapid change—in other words, he is required as a salutary brake upon progress. The historian of culture and opinion will at once retort that society is by far the most perfect automatic self-braking device which has yet been constructed. Society's brakes have often locked, with the result of disastrous skidding and overturns, but they have never failed to take hold. Custom, convention, tradition, and intellectual inertia furnish us with ample brakes without the conscious and positive intervention of the conservative. His contribution has been to sit on the emergency brake while society has been slowly and painfully crawling up the grade of civilization and progress. The conservative has so functioned in the past as invariably to obstruct the normal march of change and invite and foster the expensive, violent and revolutionary alterations of the social order. The so-called radical may be like the over-hasty and optimistic person who jumps in his car and rams in hard on the starter without filling his gasoline tank or turning on his ignition, but at least this utopia builder has the right hunch in desiring to go ahead.

More fundamentally, however, we ought to give up as futile the debate about conservatives and radicals, and the old dichotomy of society as conservative and radical should cease. In the first place, there are no true radicals to be discovered among humanity today, in spite of the fact that they recently appeared as numerous to Senator Lusk as did the Teutonic invaders of the Roman Empire to Charles Kingsley. So ruthless has been the process of social selection operating through herd pressure to secure social solidarity, conformity and discipline, that the really radical and progressive strains in the human race were long ago obliterated. The search for a true radical would need to be carried on by the "pre-historic" archeologist and physical anthropologist among the skeletal remains of the Paleolithic era, and not by William J. Burns in con-

temporary America. There are only varying degrees of conservatives left among mankind, and the radicals of whom Mr. Coolidge wrote so feelingly in the *Delineator* are in reality only the somewhat less than averagely benighted moss-backs. In the second place, the classifications of conservatives and radicals are so subjective and contradictory as to be worse than worthless. What shall be said of a catalogue of contemporary radicals which includes such figures as Upton Sinclair, H. L. Mencken, Samuel Gompers, W. Z. Foster, James Harvey Robinson, Scott Nearing, Bill Haywood, Hiram Johnson, Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, Eugene Debs and Roscoe Pound! In the third place, and much more significant than the above, the vital classification of society should be into that of the able, intelligent, informed and experienced, on the one hand, and the mediocre, stupid, ignorant and incompetent, on the other.

There will then be no difficulty in deciding as to which group we shall entrust the future destinies of mankind. More and more, history, biological science, psychology, educational philosophy and social science are uniting upon the position that we can hope for nothing better than the chaos of today unless we discover some more effective way for installing in positions of control and authority the capable minority, while at the same time securing some guaranty that they will not lose their sense of responsibility to the majority. This is the great challenge to democratic theory and practice, and the solution of it is a basic problem before contemporary civilization. Yet the comprehension of this fact is by no means novel; no one understood it better than Plato and Aristotle. Our superior scientific equipment, however, offers us at least slightly greater hope for the realization of this indispensable achievement. A prerequisite for this will be a reorganization of our educational practice and philosophy in such a manner as to encourage and specially instruct

the able minority, instead of merely temporarily incarcerating and disciplining the mass of mediocrities.<sup>21</sup> And the variety and complexity of our contemporary difficulties will readily suggest the necessity of securing the utmost tolerance and freedom in discussion, in order that we may have the assurance of the fullest possible development of human creative ingenuity in this all-important field of social invention. We await another Bentham a century after his demise!<sup>22</sup>

## SELECTED REFERENCES

- H. E. Barnes (Ed.), *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*  
 J. B. Bury, *The History of the Freedom of Thought*  
 C. Day, *This Simian World*  
 H. Dingle, *Modern Astrophysics*  
 R. Flint, *A History of the Philosophy of History*  
 G. S. Hall, "The Message of the Zeitgeist," in *Scientific Monthly*, August, 1921  
 J. K. Hart, *The Discovery of Intelligence*  
 E. C. Hayes (Ed.), *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences*  
 W. Lippmann, *Public Opinion*  
 F. S. Marvin (Ed.), *Progress and History*  
 J. H. Randall, Jr., *The Modern Mind: Its Origin and Development*  
 J. H. Robinson, *Mind in the Making*  
 J. H. Robinson, *The Humanizing of Knowledge*  
 G. Wallas, *Our Social Heritage*  
 L. F. Ward, *Applied Sociology*  
 A. D. Weeks, *The Control of the Social Mind*  
 H. G. Wells, *The Salvaging of Civilization*  
 A. B. Wolfe, *Conservatism, Radicalism and Scientific Method*

<sup>21</sup>J. H. Robinson, *The New History*, Chap. viii, *Mind in the Making*, pp. 179-211, John Morley, *On Compromise*, B. Russell, *Proposed Roads to Freedom*, Introduction, H. L. Mencken, *In Defense of Women*, Introduction, F. S. Marvin, *Progress and History*, *The Living Past*, *The Century of Hope*, F. H. Hankins, "Individual Differences and their Significance for Social Theory," in *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1922, and "Individual Differences and Democratic Theory," in *Political Science Quarterly*, September, 1923; H. S. Pritchett, *Annual Report of the President of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advance of Teaching*, 1922.

<sup>22</sup>J. H. Robinson, "Freedom Reconsidered," in *Harper's Magazine*, 1923; G. Wallas, "Jeremy Bentham," in *Political Science Quarterly*, March, 1923; J. A. Hobson, *Problems of a New World*, B. Russell, *Prospects of Industrial Civilization*, H. G. Wells, *Men Like Gods*.



## INDEX

*Note* This index is designed to be useful rather than complete and exhaustive. The entries indicate the more significant references to the authors and subjects involved.

- Abbott, Wilbur Cortez, 19, 38, 221  
 Adams, Ephraim Douglas, 33, 231  
 Adams, George Burton, 319  
 administrative syndicalism, 504  
 Allport, Floyd H., 81  
 Altamira, Rafael, 202  
 America, geography of, 59  
 American history, psychology of, 261, 383, 532  
 American mind, 233, 261ff, 383, 532, 553  
 anachronisms in thought, joy of conservatism in, 587  
 Andrews, Charles McLean, 38, 463  
 "Anglo-Saxon myth," 277, 280, 490  
 anthropogeography, history of, 40ff  
 anthropology and history, 23, 34, 178ff, 269ff, 276ff, 305  
 anthropology,  
     cultural, 278ff  
     development of, 269ff.  
     physical, 272, 279  
 Arabic science, 575  
 Arbuthnot, John, 43  
 archeology,  
     history and, 20ff, 278ff, 287ff  
     history of, 19ff, 270  
 art, psychology of, 252  
 "Aryan myth," 277, 292, 343, 491  
 Ashley, Sir William James, 19, 436, 460  
 Augustine, Saint, sexual prowess and compensatory theories, 527  
 Babylonia and Assyria, social history of, 350  
 Bacon, Francis, 205, 578  
 Bagehot, Walter, 153ff  
 Baldwin, James Mark, 98ff.  
 Beard, Charles Austin, 463, 474 note, 476, 512  
 Becker, Carl Lotus, 19, 36, 303, 325, 340  
 behaviorism in psychology, 136ff  
 Bentham, Jeremy, 433, 559, 597.  
 Bentley, Arthur Fisher, 476, 498  
 Bernard, Luther Lee, 140ff, 561  
 Bernheim, Ernst, 327  
 Berr, Henri, 286  
 Biblical criticism, 299ff.  
 biology and history, 295  
 Blanc, Louis, 459ff  
 Boas, Franz, 34, 184ff, 269, 292, 484, 492  
 Bodin, Jean, 42, 61  
 Bogardus, Emory Stephen, 81  
 Bolton, Herbert Eugene, 372  
 Bowman, Isaiah, 60  
 Brasch, Frederick, 409  
 Breasted, James Henry, 62, 301, 349  
 Breysig, Kurt, 201, 203, 340  
 Brinton, Daniel Garrison, 178ff  
 Bryce, James, 25, 475  
 Brunhes, Jean, 50, 53  
 Buckle, Henry Thomas, 49, 61  
 Bucher, Karl, 435, 441, 463  
 Burgess, John William, 474  
 Burr, George Lincoln, 36, 221, 317, 327, 387 note, 416  
 Bury, John Bagnell, 199, 218, 568  
 business man, nature of modern, 555  
 Cajori, Florian, 404  
 Cameralism, 427  
 censor, social significance of, 525  
 Chamberlain, Alexander Francis, 183  
 Chamberlain, Houston Stewart, 295, 493  
 Charcot, Jean Martin, 147  
 Cheyney, Edward Potts, 19, 447 note  
 Christianity, ethical theories of, 548ff., 558  
 Christianity in the light of history, 299ff.  
 chronology, the new historical, 21  
 classical antiquity, social history of 356ff.  
 classical economic thought, 424  
 "classical" political economy, 430ff  
 climate and history, 52



- "Columbia School" of historians, 38  
 commercial geography, 54  
 Commercial Revolution, 24ff, 27, 30, 370ff, 453  
 Commons, John Rogers, 19, 432  
 Comte, Auguste, 403  
 conservatism versus radicalism, 594ff  
 contemporary period, social history of, 375ff  
 continuity of history, 20, 266, 285  
 conventional history, 4ff, 69, 276, 319ff, 387, 406, 459, 509ff  
 Cooley, Charles Horton, 80, 140  
 Cowan, Andrew Reid, 51, 348  
 cultural anthropology, 178ff  
 cultural evolution, theories of, 276ff, 286  
 cultural historians, 19, 217ff  
 cultural interpretation of history and society, 178ff  
 custom, social significance of, 154ff, 164, 257, 523, 545  
  
 Dannemann, Friedrich, 407  
 Darwinism, 295ff, 314  
 Dealey, James Quayle, 594 note  
 Déchelette, Joseph, 289  
 democracy, 302, 497, 596  
 Demolins, Edmond, 51  
 DeMorgan, Jacques, 289  
 Dexter, Edwin Grant, 53  
 Dewey, John, 138ff, 193, 592  
 dialectic of individual and social development, 101ff  
 differential psychology, 150ff, 477, 596  
 Dilthey, Wilhelm, 219  
 discussion, social and cultural importance of, 158ff  
 Dixon, Roland Burrage, 292  
*Documents Inédits*, 6, 28  
 Dodd, William Edward, 19, 325, 463  
 Douglas, Paul Howard, 438  
 Duguit, Léon, 476, 593  
 Dunning, William Archibald, 32, 221  
 dynamic psychology and history, 146ff, 221ff  
  
 economic determination of history, 461ff  
 economic geography, 54  
 economic historians, 460ff  
 economic history, development of, 458ff  
 economic interpretation of history, 32, 461  
 economic life, psychology of, 255ff, 259ff  
 economic stages, 438  
 economics, history of, 424ff  
     nature of, 421ff  
     relations of with history, 421ff, 464ff  
 education and political life, 506  
 Egypt, social history of, 347  
 Eldridge, Seba, 141, 255  
 Ellwood, Charles Abram, 80, 331, 333  
 Ely, Richard Theodore, 440, 442  
 Emerton, Ephraim, 31, 319  
 Engel, Frederick, 441  
 episodic historical writing, 5, 69, 276, 219, 387, 406, 459, 509  
 ethics, importance of for history, 561  
 ethics and history, 519ff, 544ff  
 ethical codes, genesis of, 522  
     unscientific nature of modern, 533ff  
 ethical theories in European history, 544ff  
 ethical theories, types of, 556  
 Europe, geography of, 56ff  
     intellectual history, of, 569ff  
     expansion of, 24, 65, 72, 344, 372, 416, 514  
  
 factory system, 456ff  
 Faigrievé, James, 55  
 Farns, Ellsworth, 140  
 Farrand, Livingston, 66, 288  
 Farrand, Max, 19, 38  
 Febvre, Lucien, 55  
 Ferguson, Adam, 313  
 Ferrero, Guglielmo, 202  
 Flng, Fred Morrow, 319ff  
 folk-psychology, 176  
 France, Anatole, 567  
 Freeman, Edward Augustus, 4  
 French Revolution, 374  
 Freud, Sigmund, 148, 221ff, 257  
 Fueter, Eduard, 488  
 functional theory of the state, 476, 503  
 functions of the state, 500  
 future of history, 36ff  
  
 Gaul, importance of in European history, 22ff, 289ff  
 Gay, Edwin Francis, 19, 461  
 Geddes, Patrick, 52, 505  
 genetic economics, 435, 463  
 genetic psychology, 92ff, 99ff, 196  
 geographers, contribution of to history, 55ff

- geography and history, 32, 40ff, 55ff, 61ff, 280, 290
- geography and the social studies, 74
- geography and the state, 477, 487
- "German Historical School" of Economists, 435
- Gettell, Raymond Garfield, 471
- Giddings, Franklin Henry, 69, 74, 76, 315, 318, 331, 333, 340, 344, 443
- Gierke, Otto, 476
- Gild socialism, 504
- Gobineau, Joseph Arthur de, 280, 491
- Goldenweiser, Alexander, 190, 275, 298
- Gooch, George Peabody, 8, 219
- "Good Life," theories of the nature of, 544ff
- Goodnow, Frank Johnson, 475
- Gothein, Eberhard, 201
- government, forms of, 495
- Graebner, Robert Fritz, 285
- Grant, Madison, 295, 493
- Gras, Norman Scott Brien, 436, 443
- "Great Man" theory of history, 32, 87ff
- Greece, social history of, 356ff
- Greece and Rome, economic history of, 450
- Greeks, ethical theories of, 546ff, 557
- Green, John Richard, 3, 322
- groups, influence of on man, 85, 327
- Groves, Ernest R., 258, 561
- Gumplowicz, Ludwig, 315, 343, 352, 366, 486
- Guyot, Arnold Henry, 46
- habit, social importance of, 83
- Hall, Granville Stanley, 91ff, 569
- Hamilton, Alexander, character of in light of psychology, 235ff
- Hamilton, Walton, 438
- Hankins, Frank Hamilton, 262, 295 note, 297
- Hann, Julius, 52
- Hansen, Alvin H., 395
- Hart, Albert Bushnell, 495
- Hartmann, Eduard von, 147
- Haskins, Charles Homer, 411, 416
- Hayes, Carleton Joseph Huntley, 303, 373 note, 463
- Hayes, Edward Cary, 525ff, notes
- Helmolt, Hans, 61
- Henderson, Lawrence Joseph, 410
- Henne-am-Rhyn, Otto, 61, 202
- herd instinct, 122ff
- Hildebrand, Bruno, 441
- Hippocrates, 40
- historian, relation of to ethical theories and practices, 561ff
- historians, geographical work of, 61, 68ff
- historians or, anthropology, 272 note, 273 note, 275 notes, 276 note
- art, 218ff
- economics, 424ff. notes
- ethics, 218ff
- geography, 40 note
- jurisprudence, 218ff.
- literature, 218ff
- political science, 218ff, 472ff notes
- psychology, 81 notes
- science, 403ff
- sociology, 328 note, 58
- social intelligence, 204ff, 566ff
- historians, relations of to, anthropology, 19, 23, 276ff
- archeology, 19, 278, 288
- art, 218ff
- biology, 279, 295ff
- economics, 464
- ethics, 561
- geography, 60
- history of science and technology, 402, 412
- jurisprudence, 513
- literature, 218ff
- political science, 508
- psychology, 195ff
- sociology, 318, 327
- social intelligence, 566, 588
- historical anthropology, 274, 284ff.
- historical characters, 221ff
- historical economics, 435ff, 460
- historical ethics, 544, 559ff
- historical geography, 42ff, 55ff
- historical jurisprudence, 515
- historical laws, 446
- historical political science, 481ff.
- historical psychology, 91ff, 183, 195ff
- historical sociology, 309ff, 486
- historical writing and war, 10
- history, anthropology and, 23, 34, 178ff, 269ff, 276ff, 305
- archeology and, 20ff, 278ff, 287ff.
- biology and, 295ff
- continuity of, 20, 266, 285
- conventional, 4ff, 69, 276, 219ff, 387, 406, 459, 509ff
- development of, 26ff, 323
- economic, 458ff
- economics and, 421ff, 464ff
- economic determination of, 491ff.
- ethics and, 519ff, 544ff.
- future of, 36ff

- history,  
   geography and, 40ff., 60ff  
   history of science and, 412ff  
   interpretation of, 26ff.  
   jurisprudence and, 513ff  
   new or synthetic, 14ff, 71ff, 284ff,  
     336, 488, 512, 567  
   political science and, 470ff, 508ff  
   psychological, 205ff  
   psychology and, 76ff., 567ff.  
   purpose of, 15  
   scope of, 17ff  
   social, 339  
   social intelligence and, 566ff  
   sociology and, 307ff  
   unity of, 26, 285  
 Hobson, John Atkinson, 438  
 Holmes, Samuel Jackson, 296  
 Hooton, Earnest Albert, 275  
 Humanism, 27, 398, 550  
 Huntington, Ellsworth, 40, 50, 52  
  
 idealistic interpretation of history, 33,  
   231  
 imitation, social function of, 104, 113,  
   140ff, 171ff  
 impurity-complex, social cost of, 529  
 individualism, 379ff  
 Industrial Revolution, 25, 375ff,  
   455ff, 581  
 instinct of the herd, 122ff  
 instincts, criticism of theory of, 140ff  
 instincts, social significance of, 84,  
   112, 116ff  
 institutional economics, 436ff  
 intellectual history, 204ff., 217ff, 417,  
   519ff, 569ff  
 international relations, 480  
 interpretation of history, 11, 26ff  
 inventions, social significance of, 104,  
   173  
  
 James, William, 82ff  
 Jameson, John Franklin, 326  
 Jefferson, Thomas, character of in  
   light of modern psychology,  
   241ff  
 Jenks, Edward, 9, 486, 512  
 Jewish ethics, 524, 527  
 Joerg, W L G, 55, note 43  
 jurisprudence and history, 513ff.  
 jurisprudence,  
   development of, 513ff.  
   analytical, 514  
   comparative, 515  
   historical, 515  
   natural law school, 514  
   sociological, 516  
  
 Kant, Immanuel, 528  
 Khaldun, Ibn, 61, 310  
 Knight, Melvin M, 483 note  
 Kohl, Johann Georg, 47  
 Kroeber, Alfred L., 191  
*Kulturgeschichte*, 201, 286, 317  
  
 Lake, Kirsop, 301  
 Lamprecht, Karl, 198ff, 336, 400  
 Laski, Harold Joseph, 219, 476,  
   593  
 law, evolution of, 283, 303  
 law in history, 496  
 Le Bon, Gustave, 161ff, 259  
 Lecky, William Edward Hartpole, 19,  
   218, 568  
 LePlay, Frédéric, 52, 71, 480, 505  
 Lévy-Bruhl, Lucien, 36, 298  
 liberty, 501  
 Lingelbach, Wilham, 463  
 Lippmann, Walter, 255, 507, 593  
 literature, psychology of, 252  
 Loria, Achille, 379  
 Lowell, Abbott Lawrence, 475  
 Lowie, Robert Harry, 188  
 Lucretius, 270, 309  
 Lybyer, Albert Howe, 24, 373  
  
 Mace, William Harrison, 331, note 63  
 Mackinder, Halford John, 52, 59  
 magic, religion and science, modern  
   theories of, 391  
 Maine, Henry Sumner, 483  
 Maitland, Frederic William, 219, 303,  
   476, 515  
 Malthus, Thomas Robert, 430  
 man,  
   a biological product, 279, 296ff  
   mental evolution of, 92ff., 101ff,  
     110ff, 193, 298  
 Marett, Robert Ranulf, 269  
 Marshall, Leon Carroll, 405, 432  
 Martin, Everett Dean, 248, 258, 259  
 Marvin, Francis Sydney, 19, 33, 36  
 Marx, Karl, 395, 431, 461  
 matriarchate, fallacy of, 483  
 McDougall, William, 115ff  
 McMaster, John Bach, 340  
 Mead, Richard, 42  
 medieval economic theory, 425  
 medieval period, social history of,  
   364ff  
 Mencken, Henry Louis, 381, 554  
 mental evolution of man, 92ff,  
   101ff, 110ff, 193, 298  
 mental testing, nature and social sig-  
   nificance of, 150ff  
 Mercantilism, 427

- Merriam, Charles Edward, 221, 474  
 note  
 Merz, John Theodore, 26, 418, 581  
 Metchnikoff, Léon, 52, 348  
 Meyer, Eduard, 288, 294  
 middle ages, economic history of, 451  
 Mieh, Aldo, 407  
 Mill, John Stuart, 431  
 Milyoukov, Paul, 202  
 Mitchell, Wesley Clair, 433, 438  
 modern civilization, weaknesses of, 585ff  
 modern thought, basis of, 580  
 modern times,  
   economic basis of, 452ff.  
   social origins of, 370ff  
 Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, 43  
*Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, 5, 6, 28  
 moral code,  
   need for adequate and scientific, 542  
   requirements of a scientific, 534ff  
   unscientific nature of modern, 533ff  
   origin and nature of, 522  
 moral conduct,  
   basis of, 114, 251  
   pluralistic and differential theory of, 539ff  
 morale, 89, 96ff, 538  
 morality, necessary dependence upon intelligence, 543  
 morals, art of, 538  
 Morgan, Lewis Henry, 274, 282, 440, 484  
 Muller-Lyer, Franz, 442, 447  
 Myres, John Linton, 62  
  
 national character, 167  
 natural rights, 501  
 Newbigin, Marion, 56  
 new history, 14ff, 71ff, 284ff, 336  
 "New Humanism," 398, 401  
 Nicolai, Georg Friedrich, 486  
 "Nordic Myth," 295, 493  
 Novicow, Jacques, 496  
  
 Ogburn, William Fielding, 194, 259, 433  
 O'Higgins, Harvey, 233, 263  
 orient,  
   economic history of, 448ff  
   social history of, 347ff.  
 Pagel, Julius, 419  
 Park, Robert Ezra, 333  
 Parker, Carleton Hubbell, 255, 260, 433  
 Paul, Saint, 527  
 Peschel, Oscar, 48  
 physical geography, 55  
 Physiocracy, 429  
 Pigou, Arthur Cecil, 432  
 pluralism and morals, 539  
 pluralism, political, 86  
 political fetish in history, 5, 8ff, 12  
 political history, 5, 8ff, 12, 508ff.  
 political philosophy, 472  
 political science,  
   analytical stage of, 475  
   constitutional law stage of, 474  
   development of, 472ff  
   functional stage of, 476  
   history and, 470ff, 508  
   statute law stage of, 475  
 politics, psychology of, 254, 476  
 Pollard, Albert Frederick, 19, 463  
 Polybius, 309  
 Pound, Roscoe, 75 note, 304, 476, 516, 593, 596  
 Prince, Morton, 147  
 property, history of, 283, 304  
 Protestantism and economics, 454, 526, 528  
 prudery, social cost of, 529  
 psychoanalysis, 81, 96, 133, 146ff, 221ff  
 psychoanalytic historical biography, 221ff  
 psychological economics, 432  
 psychological interpretation of history, 35, 153ff, 196ff, 266  
 psychology and history, 76ff  
 psychology, development of, 76ff  
 psychology of peoples, 163ff, 176, 178ff  
 Pufendorf, Samuel, 473  
 Puritan, psychology of, 264  
 Puritanism, 374, 454, 526, 532, 553  
  
 Quetelet, Adolphe, 480  
  
 race and history, 53, 165ff, 280, 292ff, 343, 371, 491ff  
 race and politics, 489, 494  
 race mixture in history, 292ff  
 Radin, Paul, 298  
 Rambaud, Alfred Nicholas, 19, 202, 512  
 Randall, John Herman, Jr, 417  
 rationalism and ethical theory, 552, 558  
 Ratzel, Friedrich, 50  
 Ratzenhofer, Gustav, 487  
 Reclus, Elisée, 55  
 Reformation, ethical theories of, 551

- regional geography, 71  
 religion and history, 281, 298ff, 369  
 religion, psychology of, 248  
 Renard, Georges, 460  
 Rey, Abel, 407  
 Rhodes, James Ford, 304, 462  
 Ricardian Socialists, 431  
 Ricardo, David, 429  
 Ripley, William Zebina, 53, 292, 492  
 Ritter, Karl, 43  
 Robinson, James Harvey, 3, 6, 29, 39, 204ff, 298, 398, 415, 526, 568, 596  
*Rolls Series*, 6, 28  
 Romans, ethical theories of, 547  
 Romanticism and ethical theory, 553, 559  
 Rome, social history of, 359ff  
 Roscher, Wilhelm, 441  
 Ross, Edward Alsworth, 554  
  
 Saint-Simon, Henri de, 403  
 Sapir, Edward, 288  
 Sarton, George, 398, 401, 403  
 Scheyll, Ferdinand, 19  
 Schlesinger, Arthur Meier, 19, 340, 583  
 Schliemann, Heinrich, 22, 289  
 Schmoller, Gustav, 435, 441  
 science and history, 33, 412ff  
 science and Industrial Revolution, 393  
 science and morals, 534ff  
 science, history of, 387ff, 403ff  
 science, rise of modern, 576ff  
 scientist, narrowness of modern, 590  
 scope of history, 17ff  
 Scott, Walter Dill, 591  
 Seeley, John Robert, 4, 344  
 Seignobos, Charles, 202  
 Seligman, Edwin Robert Anderson, 462 note  
 Semple, Ellen Churchill, 50, 59  
 sex-complex, origin and nature of, 536  
 Shaftesbury, Earl of, 538  
 Shepard, Walter James, 471  
 Shepherd, William Robert, 24, 65, 72, 344, 372, 416, 574  
 Shotwell, James Thomson, 7, 29, 60, 375, 389, 397, 416  
 Simkhovitch, Vladimir Gregorievitch, 32, 572 note  
 Singer, Charles, 407  
 Slater, Gilbert, 19, 463  
 Small, Albion Woodbury, 7, 327, 487  
 Smith, Adam, 429  
 Smith, Donald E., 55 note  
 Smith, Grafton Elliot, 285  
 Smith, J. Russell, 59  
 Smith, Preserved, 19, 36, 217, 301, 574 note  
 social contract, 811  
 social control, 106, 119, 122ff., 196, 258  
 social history, 17ff, 316, 325, 339  
 social history of Europe, 342ff  
 social intelligence, history and, 566ff  
 social organization, evolution of forms of, 282, 484  
 social progress, state and, 500ff  
 social psychology, development of, 76ff., 196  
 social sciences, need of in contemporary civilization, 591  
 social selection, 295ff, 302ff.  
 social studies, modern problems and, 583  
 sociological approach to the study of society, 327ff.  
 sociology and ethics, 559ff.  
 sociology and history, 35, 307ff., 327ff, 342ff  
 sociology, development of, 309ff  
 Sombart, Werner, 32, 438, 442, 463  
 Spencer, Herbert, 3, 485  
 spiritual interpretation of history, 33  
 stage theory of history, 443ff  
 stages of civilization, 345, 438  
 state,  
   forms of, 495  
   functions of, 500  
   historical evolution of, 481  
   nature and importance of, 8, 107ff.  
 statistics and politics, 479  
 Stein, Ludwig, 219  
 Steinhausen, Georg, 201  
 Sumner, William Graham, 257, 523  
 synthetic history, 14ff, 71ff., 284ff, 336  
  
 Tannery, Paul, 33, 220, 404  
 Tarde, Gabriel, 170ff  
 Tawney, Richard Henry, 438, 454  
 Taylor, Henry Osborn, 33, 220  
 technology, history of, 392ff  
 Teggart, Frederick John, 62, 286, 291  
 theology and morals, 536  
 Thomas, Franklin, 40 note  
 Thomas, William Isaac, 80, 561  
 Thompson, James Westfall, 19, 364 note, 452 note  
 Thorndike, Edward Lee, 109ff  
 Thorndike, Lynn, 301, 411, 416  
 Tozzer, Alfred Marston, 275  
 Troeltsch, Ernst, 219  
 Trotter, Wilfred, 122ff.

- Tylor, Edward Burnett, 274, 281, 298  
 types of ethical theory, 556ff  
 Turner, Frederiek Jackson, 66, 71, 291, 340  
 unconscious, psychology of, 146ff, 221ff  
 unity of history, 26, 285  
 University of London, course in history of science, 408  
 Vacher de Lapouge, Georges, 296  
 Vaccaro, Michele Angelo, 487  
 Vallaux, Camille, 51  
 Veblen, Thorstein, 395, 398, 438, 554, 585  
 vice-crusader, psychology of, 251, 532  
 Vidal de la Blache, Paul, 50, 71  
 Vierkandt, Alfred, 298  
 Vinogradoff, Paul, 366, 460  
 vocational representation, 504ff  
 Voltaire, 313  
 war, social significance of, 89, 122, 156  
 Ward, Lester Frank, 9, 507, 591, 592  
 Ward, Robert De Courcy, 52  
 Watson, John Broadus, 136ff  
 Webb, Sidney, and Beatrice Potter, 438  
 Weber, Max, 36, 438, 454  
 welfare economics, 431ff  
 Wellhausen, Julius, 301  
 Wells, Herbert George, 302, 567, 586  
 Westermarek, Edward, 484  
 White, Andrew Dickson, 220, 407, 568  
 Willoughby, Westel Woodbury, 474  
 Wilson, Woodrow, 475, 495  
 wisdom of past, dubious nature of, 588  
 Wissler, Clark, 187ff, 275  
 world history, 24, 371, 375, 455, 481  
 Wundt, Wilhelm, 176ff  
 Young, Kimball, 82 note, 151 note  
 Zummern, Alfred E., 63









